析托马斯·阿奎那的自然法概念

作为法律之一类的自然法是托马斯·阿奎那自然法理论体系最重要的概念之一。本文在分析阿奎那的法律定义的基础上,重点阐述了其自然法概念的性质和含义,最后还考察了值得进一步思考与探讨的理论问题。     

The concept of free will: philosophy, neuroscience and the law

Various philosophical definitions of free will are first considered. The compatibilist definition, which says simply that acts are freely willed if they are not subject to constraints, is identified as much used in the legal system and essentially impervious to scientific investigation. A middle-ground "incompatibilist" definition, which requires that freely willed acts be consciously initiated, is shown to be relevant to the idea of mens rea and in the author's view not actually incompatible in principle with a fully scientific worldview. Only the strong libertarian definition, which requires that freely willed acts have no physical antecedents whatsoever, makes the existence of free will very hard to swallow scientifically. However, with regard to the middle-ground "incompatibilist" definition, three different lines of scientific experimental evidence are then described, which suggest that, in fact, consciousness is not the real cause of much of what is generally considered as voluntary behavior. Many voluntary actions are initiated preconsciously, with consciousness kept informed only after the neural events leading to the act have begun. It is suggested that a reasonable way of integrating these experimental findings with the idea that persons do have a somewhat more than compatibilist version of free will is to acknowledge explicitly that a person is a mixture of conscious and unconscious components. In this scenario, the mind in mens rea would have to be judged guilty if it contained either conscious or unconscious intentions to perform the guilty act.     

Bioethics and law: from the abundance of sources to the confusion of genders

The law of bioethics reveals frequent confusion in the definition and role devolved to the law and ethics. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate some of these confusions.     

Semantic Normativity and Semantic Causality

Semantic normativism, which is the view that semantic properties/concepts are some kind of normative properties/concepts, has become increasingly influential in contemporary meta‐semantics. In this paper, I aim to argue that semantic normativism has difficulty accommodating the causal efficacy of semantic properties. In specific, I raise an exclusion problem for semantic normativism, inspired by the exclusion problem in the philosophy of mind. Moreover, I attempt to show that the exclusion problem for semantic normativism is peculiarly troublesome: while we can solve (or dissolve) mental‐physical exclusion by adopting the so‐called ‘autonomy approach’, a similar autonomy solution to semantic exclusion is implausible if semantic properties are understood as normative properties.     

Reconciling Semantic Dispositionalism with Semantic Holism

Dispositionalist theories of mental content have been attacked on the grounds that they are incompatible with semantic holism. In this paper, I resist important worries of this variety, raised by Paul Boghossian. I argue that his objections can be avoided by a conceptual role version of dispositionalism, where the multifarious relationships between mental contents are grounded on the relationships between their corresponding, grounding dispositions.     

Mapping the Structure of Semantic Memory

Aggregating snippets from the semantic memories of many individuals may not yield a good map of an individual’s semantic memory. The authors analyze the structure of semantic networks that they sampled from individuals through a new snowball sampling paradigm during approximately 6 weeks of 1‐hr daily sessions. The semantic networks of individuals have a small‐world structure with short distances between words and high clustering. The distribution of links follows a power law truncated by an exponential cutoff, meaning that most words are poorly connected and a minority of words has a high, although bounded, number of connections. Existing aggregate networks mirror the individual link distributions, and so they are not scale‐free, as has been previously assumed; still, there are properties of individual structure that the aggregate networks do not reflect. A simulation of the new sampling process suggests that it can uncover the true structure of an individual’s semantic memory.     

Pinocchio against the Semantic Hierarchies

The Liar paradox is an obstacle to a theory of truth, but a Liar sentence need not contain a semantic predicate. The Pinocchio paradox, devised by Veronique Eldridge-Smith, was the first published paradox to show this. Pinocchio’s nose grows if, and only if, what Pinocchio is saying is untrue (the Pinocchio principle). What happens if Pinocchio says that his nose is growing? Eldridge-Smith and Eldridge-Smith (Analysis, 70(2): 212-5, 2010) posed the Pinocchio paradox against the Tarskian-Kripkean solutions to the Liar paradox that use language hierarchies. Eldridge-Smith (Analysis, 71(2): 306-8, 2011) also set the Pinocchio paradox against semantic dialetheic solutions to the Liar. Beall (2011) argued the Pinocchio story was just an impossible story. Eldridge-Smith (Analysis, 72(3): 749-752, 2012b) responded that unless the T-schema is a necessary truth of some sort (logical, metaphysical or analytic), the Pinocchio principle is possible. Luna (Mind & Matter 14(1): 77–86, 2016) argues that the Pinocchio contradiction proves the principle is false. D’Agostini & Ficara (2016) discuss a more plausible physical truth-tracking trait, the Blushing Liar, and argue that the Pinocchio contradiction is not a metaphysical dialetheia. I respond to Luna, and D’Agostini & Ficara, and prove that the Pinocchio paradox is a counterexample to hierarchical solutions to the Liar.     

Beard's concept of neurasthenia and Freud's concept of the actual neuroses

Beard's concept of neurasthenia and Freud's concept of the actual neuroses are described and evaluated critically. Despite differences in the content of their theories, especially in the role of sexual factors and sexual mechanisms, there are important formal and logical similarities. Both Beard and Freud incorrectly identified the causes of the neuroses being studied; both used inadequate methods of assessing the strengths of the causal factors; and the central theoretical concepts of both were equally vacuous. Freud adopted the same method of study as did Beard, but does not seem to have been influenced directly by him.     

Semantic defectiveness and the liar

In this paper, we do two things. First, we provide some support for adopting a version of the meaningless strategy with respect to the liar paradox, and, second, we extend that strategy, by providing, albeit tentatively, a solution to that paradox—one that is semantic, rather than logical.     

序列语义的类别一致性关系能否进行无意识整合？

阈下语义之间能否进行整合,最近的研究给出了不同的结果。当多个阈下语义词语同时呈现时显示出无意识语义整合效应,但是当序列呈现时没有观察到无意识整合效应。本研究在保留同时呈现方法优点（不同空间呈现位置）的情况下研究了序列呈现的不同汉字词语之间能否产生无意识语义类别关系整合。在实验1中,两个相同或不同类别的词语作为阈下启动刺激先后在两侧呈现,且第一个词语消失后第二词语马上出现,结果显示出无意识语义类别整合效应。实验2延长了两个阈下启动词语之间的时间间隔,结果未发现无意识语义类别整合效应。另外,实验3进一步排除了实验1中第一个启动词语的视觉残留,结果也未观察到显著的无意识语义类别整合效应,说明实验1中观察到的无意识整合效应是视觉残留所致。综合三个实验结果表明,两个阈下词语之间的语义类别一致性关系只有在同时呈现这种特殊条件下才能进行无意识整合加工,说明了短时间维度对于无意识语义关系整合的重要性。     

Semantic holism

A bivalent valuation is snt iff sound (standard PC inference rules take truths only into truths) and non-trivial (not all wffs are assigned the same truth value). Such a valuation is normal iff classically correct for each connective. Carnap knew that there were non-normal snt valuations of PC, and that the gap they revealed between syntax and semantics could be jumped as follows. Let VAL _snt be the set of snt valuations, and VAL _nrm be the set of normal ones. The bottom row in the table for the wedge is not semantically determined by VAL _snt, but if one deletes from VAL _snt all those valuations that are not classically correct at the aforementioned row, one jumps straights to VAL _nrm and thus to classical semantics. The conjecture we call semantic holism claims that the same thing happens for any semantic indeterminacy in any row in the table of any connective of PC, i.e., to remove it is to jump straight to classical semantics. We show (i) why semantic holism is plausible and (ii) why it is nevertheless false. And (iii) we pose a series of questions concerning the number of possible steps or jumps between the indeterminate semantics given by VAL _snt and classical semantics given by VAL _nrm.     

Semantic closure

This paper argues for tlie claims that a) a natural language such as English is semanticaly closed b) semantic closure implies inconsistency. A corollary of these is that the semantics of English must be paraconsistent. The first part of the paper formulates a definition of semantic closure which applies to natural languages and shows that this implies inconsistency. The second section argues that English is semeantically closed. The preceding discussion is predicated on the assumption that there are no truth value gaps. The next section of the paper considers whether the possibility of these makes any difference to the substantive conclusions of the previous sections, and argues that it does not. The crux of the preceding arguments is that none of the consistent semantical accounts that have been offered for solving the semantical paradoxes is a semantic ofEnglish. The final section of the paper produces a general argument as to why this must always be the case.     

Semantic Normativity

Philosophical Studies -