The conceptualization of helplessness: II. Laboratory correlates of the phenomenological definition of helplessness

The present research was designed to investigate the correspondence between the phenomenological definition of helplessness and its laboratory analogue—the learned helplessness paradigm. In experiment 1, subjects were exposed to unsolvable, solvable, or no problems. It was found that exposure to unsolvable problems increased the report of helplessness feelings and impaired subsequent performance. In addition, experiment 1 demonstrated a negative and significant correlation between performance and the report of helplessness feelings. Experiment 2 isolated the cognitive component of helplessness by measuring the amount of expectancy changes following success and failure. The amount of expectancy changes was negatively correlated with the belief in an outcome's uncontrollability. Finally, experiment 3 showed that exposure to only one unsolvable problem was associated with the reports of coping and anger feelings, whereas exposure to four unsolvable problems was related to surrender feelings. These results demonstrated that laboratory-induced helpless situations elicit the same feelings as real-life helplessness situations.The study was conducted by the first author in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the M.A. degree at Bar Ilan University under the supervision of Prof. R. E. Lubow.     

Coping and learned helplessness: Effects of coping strategies on performance following unsolvable problems

The current study assesses the effects of individuals' coping strategies for dealing with stress on cognitive performance following unsolvable problems. In this study, subjects responded to a questionnaire tapping the use of problem-focused and emotion-focused coping strategies in dealing with failure in achievement settings. Then they were exposed to either no-feedback or failure in four unsolvable problems. Upon completing these problems, subjects performed a visual search task with a memory component. Results showed that failure, as compared with no-feedback, produced performance deficits among subjects who habitually relied on a single coping strategy, either problem- or emotion-focused, and among subjects who did not rely on any coping response. Only subjects who relied on both problem-focused and emotion-focused strategies did not show any performance deficit following unsolvable problems. The results are discussed in terms of Lazarus and Folkman's stress-coping model.     

Causal attribution, cognitive interference, and the generalization of learned helplessness

We assessed the role of off-task cognitions in mediating the performance effects of global and specific attributions for failure. In Experiment 1, subjects were divided into global and specific attributors and were exposed to either no feedback or failure feedback. In Experiment 2, subjects were exposed to no feedback or to unsolvable problems wherein they received attribution for failure to specific or global causes. Experiment 3 added a condition in which subjects were restrained from engaging in off-task cognitions. Results showed that exposure to unsolvable problems deteriorated performance and increased off-task cognitions mainly among subjects who attributed failure to global causes. In addition, the enhancement of off-task cognitions interfered with performance following unsolvable problems. The introduction of instructions that discouraged subjects from engaging in off-task cognitions eliminated the detrimental effects of global attribution. Results are discussed in terms of test anxiety and excuse-making conceptualizations of learned helplessness.     

A case study of three theories of learned helplessness: The role of test importance

The current study tests three alternative explanations (learned helplessness, cognitive interference, and egotism) for poor performance following unsolvable problems. In Experiment 1, subjects were exposed to no feedback or to failure in unsolvable problems and were further divided according to the importance of a test task (unstipulated, low, and high importance). In Experiment 2, during the training phase subjects were exposed to either no feedback, failure, or failure plus explicit hypothesis instructions. Then, subjects in each group received either low or high test-importance instructions. Results bring support to the cognitive interference explanation of performance deficits. Exposure to unsolvable problems was found to impair performance in a high importance task, but not in a low importance task. Such a deleterious effect of prior failure and high importance instructions was reversed by discouraging people from engaging in state-oriented actions. The theoretical implications of the findings were discussed.     

Attributional processes in the learned helplessness paradigm: behavioral effects of global attributions

Following the learned helplessness paradigm, I assessed in this study the effects of global and specific attributions for failure on the generalization of performance deficits in a dissimilar situation. Helplessness training consisted of experience with noncontingent failures on four cognitive discrimination problems attributed to either global or specific causes. Experiment 1 found that performance in a dissimilar situation was impaired following exposure to globally attributed failure. Experiment 2 examined the behavioral effects of the interaction between stable and global attributions of failure. Exposure to unsolvable problems resulted in reduced performance in a dissimilar situation only when failure was attributed to global and stable causes. Finally, Experiment 3 found that learned helplessness deficits were a product of the interaction of global and internal attribution. Performance deficits following unsolvable problems were recorded when failure was attributed to global and internal causes. Results were discussed in terms of the reformulated learned helplessness model.     

Learned helplessness, depression, and the attribution of failure.

Depressed and nondepressed college students received experience with solvable, unsolvable, or no discrimination problems. When later tested on a series of patterned anagrams, depressed groups performed worse than nondepressed groups, and unsolvable groups performed worse than solvable and control groups. As predicted by the learned helplessness model of depression, nondepressed subjects given unsolvable problems showed anagram deficits parallel to those found in naturally occurring depression. When depressed subjects attributed their failure to the difficulty of the problems rather than to their own incompetence, performance improved strikingly. So, failure in itself is apparently not sufficient to produce helplessness deficits in man, but failure that leads to a decreased belief in personal competence is sufficient.     

Self-Deceptive Coping: Adaptive Only in Ambiguous Contexts

ABSTRACT Two experiments investigated claims for the efficacy of self-deceptive coping (e.g., Sackeim, 1983, 1988). In Study I the performance of self-deceivers on solvable anagrams was found to he remarkably poor relative to that of non-self-deceivers after both groups were exposed to unsolvable problems. The starkly unambiguous failure experience may have precluded self-deception. Therefore, in Study 2 participants were exposed to unsolvable problems either with or without an excuse. Self-deceivers who encountered failure with an excuse subsequently performed much better on the solvable tasks than those without an excuse. These findings suggest that the use of self-deception following threat is constrained by the availability of contextual ambiguity (e.g., excuses). The effect of the excuse was not related to participants' mood or attributions for performance.     

The Price of a Piece of Cheese: Value from Fit Between Epistemic Needs and a Learning Versus an Outcome Focus

In decision making, people can focus on decisional outcomes (outcome focus), but they can also focus on gaining knowledge about the decisional domain (learning focus). Furthermore, people differ in the strength of their epistemic needs—their preference for developing a rich and accurate understanding of the world. We invoke the regulatory fit theory to predict that higher epistemic needs better fit a learning focus than lower epistemic needs, resulting in a greater increase in valuation of the chosen option when a learning rather than an outcome focus is induced. This general hypothesis was tested and supported in three studies, each focusing on a different proxy to epistemic needs. Thus, individuals experienced greater value when they had lower expertise (Study 1), higher need for assessment (Study 2), and higher need for cognition (Study 3) when a learning rather than an outcome focus was induced. Implications for work on epistemic needs, regulatory fit theory, and decision‐making practice are discussed. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reactance and helplessness following exposure to unsolvable problems: the effects of attributional style

I assessed the effects of internal-external attributional style and amount of unsolvable problems on subsequent task performance. Undergraduate subjects were divided according to their attributional style for bad events into internal, nondefined, and external attributors and were exposed to either one, four, or no unsolvable problems. Following exposure to a single unsolvable problem, internal attributors exhibited greater frustration and hostility and better performance in a subsequent cognitive task than did external attributors. Following exposure to four unsolvable problems, internal attributors exhibited stronger feelings of incompetence and a decrease in performance compared with external attributors. The results are discussed in terms of Wortman and Brehm's (1975) approach to reactance and helplessness.     

Investigating whether group status modulates the relationship between individual differences in epistemic motivation and political conservatism

Previous research has found that individual differences in epistemic motivation predict political conservatism. However, meta-analyses indicate substantial heterogeneity in this association and such variation remains underexamined. Using a large, pre-existing dataset, we investigated whether group status—a group’s social value—modulates this relationship. We used several assessments of epistemic motivation (need for structure, need for cognition) and group status (race, gender, social class). We found that the epistemic motivation-ideology relationship was stronger for women (versus men) and for members of lower (versus higher) social class groups, although the relationship strength differences were relatively small. The relationship did not consistently vary across racial group status. Group status appears to be a small, but not consistent, moderator of the epistemic motivation-ideology relationship.     

On Distinguishing Epistemic from Pragmatic Action

We present data and argument to show that in Tetris—a real-time, interactive video game—certain cognitive and perceptual problems are more quickly, easily, and reliably solved by performing actions in the world than by performing computational actions in the head alone. We have found that some of the translations and rotations made by players of this video game are best understood as actions that use the world to improve cognition. These actions are not used to implement a plan, or to implement a reaction; they are used to change the world in order to simplify the problem-solving task. Thus, we distinguish pragmatic actions—actions performed to bring one physically closer to a goal—from epistemic actions—actions performed to uncover informatioan that is hidden or hard to compute mentally. To illustrate the need for epistemic actions, we first develop a standard information-processing model of Tetris cognition and show that it cannot explain performance data from human players of the game—even when we relax the assumption of fully sequential processing. Standard models disregard many actions taken by players because they appear unmotivated or superfluous. However, we show that such actions are actually far from superfluous; they play a valuable role in improving human performance. We argue that traditional accounts are limited because they regard action as having a single function: to change the world. By recognizing a second function of action—an epistemic function—we can explain many of the actions that a traditional model cannot. Although our argument is supported by numerous examples specifically from Tetris, we outline how the new category of epistemic action can be incorporated into theories of action more generally.     

The effect of superstitious belief on performance following an unsolvable problem

Two experiments investigated the hypothesis that performance is not impaired following instances of uncontrollability when superstitious beliefs are invoked. In Experiment 1, undergraduates worked on an anagrams task following exposure to either a solvable or unsolvable word puzzle. Level of superstitious belief was assessed using Tobacyk, 1988 revised Paranormal Belief Scale. Following the unsolvable problem, students with a high level of superstitious belief solved more anagrams than students with a low level of superstitious belief. In Experiment 2, level of superstitious belief was assessed both before and after working on a solvable or unsolvable puzzle. Reported level of superstitious belief increased following exposure to unsolvable, but not solvable problems. These studies support the hypothesis that participants invoke superstitious beliefs during instances of uncontrollability, which may prevent or interrupt subsequent performance impairment.     

The Ineliminability of Epistemic Rationality*

Many writers have recently urged that the epistemic rationality of beliefs can depend on broadly pragmatic (as opposed to truth-directed) factors. Taken to an extreme, this line of thought leads to a view on which there is no such thing as a distinctive epistemic form of rationality. A series of papers by Susanna Rinard develops the view that something like our traditional notion of pragmatic rationality is all that is needed to account for the rationality of beliefs. This approach has undeniable attractions. But examining different versions of the approach uncovers problems. The problems help reveal why epistemic rationality is an indispensable part of understanding rationality—not only of beliefs, but of actions. We may or may not end up wanting to make a place, in our theories of epistemic rationality, for factors such as the practical or moral consequences of having beliefs. But a purely pragmatic notion of rationality—one that’s stripped of any component of distinctively epistemic evaluation—cannot do all the work that we need done.     

Influence of personal and universal failure on the subsequent performance of persons with type A and type B behavior patterns

We conducted this experiment to compare the task performance of Type A and Type B persons following failure on a task in which no one succeeded (universal failure) versus failure on a task in which others had succeeded (personal failure). Postfailure performance was measured in terms of speed of completion of anagrams. Initial analyses indicated that the failure manipulation was effective in influencing the subjects' perceived cause of their failures, and that subjects were more anxious and depressed following personal failure than universal failure. More important, we found that Type A subjects performed better following personal rather than universal failure, whereas type of failure had no effect on the performance of Type B subjects. The results suggest that contrary to what is usually thought, Type A persons do not struggle for success indiscriminately. The results are discussed in terms of need for control and self-esteem.     

The Epistemic Regress Problem,the Problem of the Criterion,and the Value of Reasons

There are important similarities between the epistemic regress problem and the problem of the criterion. Each turns on plausible principles stating that epistemic reasons must be supported by epistemic reasons but that having reasons is impossible if that requires having endless regresses of reasons. These principles are incompatible with the possibility of reasons, so each problem is a paradox. Whether there can be an antiskeptical solution to these paradoxes depends upon the kinds of reasons that we need in order to attain our epistemic goals. This article explains the problems and considers the ways in which two different conceptions of human flourishing support the value of different kinds of reasons. One conception requires reasons that allow an easy solution to these paradoxes. The other—rational autonomy—requires reasons that depend upon endless regresses. So we cannot have the kinds of fully transparent reasons required for rational autonomy.     

Effect of locus of control,expectancy confirmation-disconfirmation,and type of goal on causal attributions of failure

Two experiments demonstrated interactive effects between locus of control and expectancy confirmation-disconfirmation in determining attribution of failure. Experiencing an expected versus an unexpected failure significantly influenced the performance attributions of internals but not externals. The first experiment also demonstrated an interaction between locus of control and type of performance goal (self-determined versus other-determined) in determining failure attribution. When the performance goal was other-determined, there were significant differences between internals and externals in their attributions of failure, but these differences did not materialize when the performance goals were selfdetermined, in the absence of any externally defined standard. Interpretation of results focused on the differences between internals and externals in regard to information processing and certain cognitive characteristics as they are related to the attribution of outcomes.     

Ideological Asymmetries and the Essence of Political Psychology

Individuals are not merely passive vessels of whatever beliefs and opinions they have been exposed to; rather, they are attracted to belief systems that resonate with their own psychological needs and interests, including epistemic, existential, and relational needs to attain certainty, security, and social belongingness. Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway ( 2003 ) demonstrated that needs to manage uncertainty and threat were associated with core values of political conservatism, namely respect for tradition and acceptance of inequality. Since 2003 there have been far more studies on the psychology of left‐right ideology than in the preceding half century, and their empirical yield helps to address lingering questions and criticisms. We have identified 181 studies of epistemic motivation (involving 130,000 individual participants) and nearly 100 studies of existential motivation (involving 360,000 participants). These databases, which are much larger and more heterogeneous than those used in previous meta‐analyses, confirm that significant ideological asymmetries exist with respect to dogmatism, cognitive/perceptual rigidity, personal needs for order/structure/closure, integrative complexity, tolerance of ambiguity/uncertainty, need for cognition, cognitive reflection, self‐deception, and subjective perceptions of threat. Exposure to objectively threatening circumstances—such as terrorist attacks, governmental warnings, and shifts in racial demography—contribute to modest “conservative shifts” in public opinion. There are also ideological asymmetries in relational motivation, including the desire to share reality, perceptions of within‐group consensus, collective self‐efficacy, homogeneity of social networks, and the tendency to trust the government more when one's own political party is in power. Although some object to the very notion that there are meaningful psychological differences between leftists and rightists, the identification of “elective affinities” between cognitive‐motivational processes and contents of specific belief systems is essential to the study of political psychology. Political psychologists may contribute to the development of a good society not by downplaying ideological differences or advocating “Swiss‐style neutrality” when it comes to human values, but by investigating such phenomena critically, even—or perhaps especially—when there is pressure in society to view them uncritically.     

Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth

A popular form of virtue epistemology—defended by such figures as Ernest Sosa, Linda Zagzebski and John Greco—holds that knowledge can be exclusively understood in virtue‐theoretic terms. In particular, it holds that there isn't any need for an additional epistemic condition to deal with the problem posed by knowledge‐undermining epistemic luck. It is argued that the sustainability of such a proposal is called into question by the possibility of epistemic twin earth cases. In particular, it is argued that such cases demonstrate the need for virtue‐theoretic accounts of knowledge to appeal to an independent epistemic condition which excludes knowledge‐undermining epistemic luck.     

Motivation effects of attributions, expectancy, and achievement motivation during the learning of a novel motor task

Several cognitive motivational theories including achievement motivation, attribution theory, and a test of expectancy for future success were linked to explain and predict psychomotor performance. Sixty high- and 60 low-need-achieving male high school students were randomly placed into success and failure feedback conditions, and performance scores on a lever-positioning apparatus were assessed. Following each block of performance trials, fictitious feedback in the form of success and failure information was given, and then each subject rated attribution and expectancy questionnaires. Expectancies for future performance improved more following success than after failure and were generally predicted by attributions to stable elements. Although trends were present, performance scores were unaffected by these cognitive beliefs. However, a significant prediction of performance was obtained when stepwise multiple regression procedures were used with constant error as the criterion variable. The factors of expectancy and luck significantly predicted performance.     

Attributions for Success and Failure in Children of Different Social Class

Abstract

Seventh-grade male and female students (N = 60), divided on the basis of socioeconomic status, were asked to attribute causes to their success or failure on a block-design measure after having experienced solvable, unsolvable, or no pretreatment problems. Differences in use of attributions to ability, effort, task ease, and luck factors were analyzed. The results failed to support the hypothesis that social class groups would differ in their use of attributions in response to success. Subjects were more clearly differentiated, however, in their choice of attributions for failure, with lower class failing students less prone to ascribe their outcome to unstable causes than middle-class failing students.