Perceived rationality,morality, and power of social choice as a function of interdependence structure and social value orientation

The present study examines how individuals with different social value orientations (i.e. prosocial, individualistic, and competitive) construe the rationality, morality, and power of choices in four distinct interdependence structures which systematically differ in the motives that could underlie the most prosocial or least aggressive choice: (a) altruism only, (b) altruism and cooperation, (c) altruism, cooperation, and individualism, and (d) altruism, cooperation, individualism, and competition. Results revealed that rationality ratings, and to a lesser degree morality and power ratings, increased most when the motives that could underlie a choice were part of the perceiver's social value orientation. Overall, the pattern of rationality ratings provided reasonable support for the Goal Prescribes Rationality Principle. Ratings of morality and power suggested a corresponding Goal Prescribes Morality/Power Principle (for prosocials and individualists), but revealed only mixed support for the Might Over Morality Hypothesis. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The double meaning of a single act: influences of the perceiver and the perceived on cooperative behaviour

The present research examines how a single behaviour that is informative of both the morality and intelligence of a person influences impressions, degree of cooperative behaviour expected from that person, and degree of cooperative behaviour displayed toward that person in a mixed‐motive interdependence situation (i.e., a social dilemma). Furthermore, it is investigated how individual differences in social value orientation influence these processes. Participants were provided with behavioural information that could be construed in terms of both morality (high/low) and intelligence (high/low). Consistent with the morality‐importance hypothesis, participants assigned greater weight to morality than to intelligence aspects of the information. Congruent with the social value orientation hypothesis (i) only proselfs and not prosocials expected more cooperation from unintelligent than from intelligent others, and (ii) prosocials attended more strongly to morality aspects than proselfs in deciding on own cooperation. Finally, consistent with the relative benefit hypothesis, people overall expected more cooperation than they were willing to display, and this tendency was especially pronounced with others described by moral/unintelligent behaviour, and for people with a proself value orientation. The authors discuss a model describing influences of the perceiver and the perceived on cooperative behaviour. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The scope of instrumental morality

In The Order of Public Reason (2011a), Gerald Gaus rejects the instrumental approach to morality as a viable account of social morality. Gaus’ rejection of the instrumental approach to morality, and his own moral theory, raise important foundational questions concerning the adequate scope of instrumental morality. In this article, I address some of these questions and I argue that Gaus’ rejection of the instrumental approach to morality stems primarily from a common but inadequate application of this approach. The scope of instrumental morality, and especially the scope of pure moral instrumentalism, is limited. The purely instrumental approach to morality can be applied fruitfully to moral philosophy only in situations of extreme pluralism in which moral reasoning is reduced to instrumental reasoning, because the members of a society do not share, as assumed by traditional moral theories, a consensus on moral ideals as a basis for the derivation of social moral rules, but only an end that they aim to reach. Based on this understanding, I develop a comprehensive two-level contractarian theory that integrates traditional morality with instrumental morality. I argue that this theory, if implemented, is most promising for securing mutually beneficial peaceful long-term cooperation in deeply pluralistic societies, as compared to cooperation in a non-moralized state of nature.     

Effects of social value orientation on expecting and learning others' orientations

The influence of an individual's own social value orientation on the orientation expected from others and on the learning of others' social orientations was examined. The subjects (N = 148) were classified according to theirown social value orientation. The orientations they generally expected from others were assessed as well. Each subject learned the choices of five other persons, representing the orientations altruism, cooperation, equality, individualism, and competition. With respect to subjects' expectations of others' orientations the triangle hypothesis was not fully supported: only individualists expected their orientation in high frequencies. The false consensus hypothesis received more support. Generally an orientation was expected more frequently by subjects who themselves had that particular orientation than by subjects with other orientations. With regard to the learning of others' orientations support was found for the predictions derived from the triangle and the false consensus hypothesis. Cooperators and individualists were the best overall learners, followed by egalitarian and maximum subjects, and at the lowest level competitors. In addition, nearly every orientation was learned better by subjects who had that orientation than by subjects with a different orientation.     

论道德的本真形态与派生形态

道德的本真形态是“天理”和“良心”,即普遍的、至高无上的实践法则及其在人心中的体现。道德要通过人的理论和实践体现出来,就需要实现道德的学理化和规范化,从而形成道德理论与社会规范两种道德的派生形态。     

Causal attribution and self-justification as explanations for the consensus expectation of one's social value orientation

This study focuses on explanations for the perceived consensus of one's own social value orientation. The prediction of the triangle hypothesis that the consensus expectation of individualistic and competitive people is higher than that of cooperative people was partially supported. Only individualists expected their own orientation more frequently of other people. According to a causal attribution explanation, it was expected that subjects' causal attributions for their own orientation to internal and external causes influenced their consensus expectations. Only attributions to internal causes differed significantly between subjects with different orientations and corresponded with their consensus estimates. Individualism was attributed least internally, cooperation most internally, and competition in between. Additionally, direct support for the effect of internal attributions on consensus expectations was found. Compared with subjects who attributed their own orientation more internally, subjects who attributed it less internally were more likely to expect their own orientation among other people. According to a self-justification explanation, it was hypothesized that the consensus expectations of individualists and competitors would be higher when first their own social orientation was assessed and then the orientation they expected to predominate among others than in the reversed order. This hypothesis was not supported.     

道德信仰的两重规定及其限度

道德必须以信仰为基础 ,道德信仰既是对道德的信仰 ,又是对善的终极追求。两者合为一体 ,统一于道德信仰这一主体的道德意识之中的 ,它们从不同的角度与层面反映了人对道德的态度与意愿。这是研究道德信仰应有的理论视点。     

同伴特点如何影响人们的合作与冲突行为?

人类的生存繁衍依赖于人们之间的相互合作,合作与冲突行为的研究近年来成为心理学的研究热点。本研究通过实验程序操纵Chicken Game中博弈同伴的特点,考察个体在社会困境中面对不同特点同伴时的合作行为。结果发现：(1)同伴道义论组和功利论组总和解率没有显著差异,同伴竞争组和合作组的总和解率也没有显著差异。(2)在与道义论以及合作型的同伴互动时,个体的行为没有明显受到上次博弈反馈的影响。(3)当同伴为功利论时,相比于上次博弈个体选择和解而同伴选择进攻,双方都选择和解时个体在当前博弈中更倾向于和解;(4)在同伴竞争组中,相比于上次博弈个体选择进攻而同伴选择和解,双方都选择和解时被试在当前博弈中会更倾向于和解。实验结果表明个体在博弈任务中会受到同伴特点的影响,并且同伴在博弈中的行为特点的影响更为显著。本研究从同伴特点来考察个体的合作行为,揭示了影响个体博弈行为的一种因素。     

On perceiving morality and potency: Social values and the effects of person perception in a give-some dilemma

The present study examines a two-person give-some dilemma characterized by the conflict between the pursuit of own benefits (not giving) and collective benefits (giving). The major purpose was two-fold: (a) to examine the effects of person perceptions manipulated along the dimensions of morality (goodness) and potency (strength) on co-operation, and (b) to examine whether pre-existing differences between individuals in their preference for specific self-other outcome distributions (social values) would modify the effects of person perception. First, we predicted and found that across social values the degree of co-operative behaviour increased as a linear function of the extent to which the other was seen as moral. Concerning the perceptions in terms of potency, we found a significant quadratic trend; another seen as moderate on potency elicited more co-operative behaviour than another seen as either high or low on potency. These effects of person perception were not moderated by social value. More interesting was the finding that even though persons classified as pro-social (co-operators and altruists) and pro-self (individualists and competitors) held about the same expectation about the magnitude of another's co-operation, pro-socials behaved more co-operatively than pro-selfs. This suggests that under certain conditions behavioural differences between pro-socials and pro-selfs are not conditional upon expectational differences between those two social values.     

Introduction: Meaning,measurement, and correlates of moral development

Morality has again become an important focus of research in different scientific disciplines: from biology (ethology), neuropsychology and evolutionary psychology to social psychology, business ethics, and political philosophy. One of the reasons for this renewed interest, no doubt, stems from the tragedies that human beings, individually or in groups, inflict upon the lives of one another and the world at large, e.g., (civil) war, the extinction of species and ecological destruction, climate change, and last but not least – the financial crisis. Moral destitution and collapse, a lack of respect for human dignity and worth, deficits in proper moral functioning at all levels of the world community often discounted or masked by transparent excuses and vacuous rationalizations, are viewed as a principal cause of the social, societal and ecological crises with which we are confronted today. The key to solving these crises must lie, at least partly, in a better understanding and active deployment of morality. However, morality is not only an important topic of study for its potential relationship with antisocial behaviour, but also for its relationship with prosocial behaviour (helping, sharing, etc.). Relationships of morality with both types of negative and positive conduct shed important insight on moral (dis)functioning. Developmental psychology is charged with the specific task of illuminating the growth and evolution of moral functioning in human beings.     

关于伦理道德与智慧

伦理道德与智慧的关系是一个有着重要的理论和现实意义的课题。伦理、道德与智慧都有联系,但本身都不是智慧。伦理智慧与道德智慧相通,但两者不是同一种意义上的智慧。伦理智慧与道德智慧具有多方面的社会价值,提倡伦理智慧和道德智慧有助于当代中国的社会改革和全面进步,为此需要对中国传统伦理思想和道德价值进行批判性的反思。     

Social value orientation and intelligence: A test of the goal prescribes rationality principle

The present study examines the influence of pre-existing individual differences in social value orentations, or preferences for certain patterns of outcomes to oneself and others (McClintock, 1978), on perceptions of rationality in a social dilemma. In Experiment 1 conducted in Groningen (the Netherlands), it was found that people with pro-social orientations expected more cooperation from another described as intelligent than from another described as unintelligent, whereas individualists and competitors expected relatively more cooperation from another described as unintelligent. The cross-cultural generalizability of this finding was examined and supported in Experiment 2 which was conducted in Santa Barbara (U.S.A.). Results from both studies are consistent with the Goal Prescribes Rationality Principle (Van Lange, Liebrand and Kuhlman, 1990) which assumes that people with pro-social (cooperative) orientations would perceive rationality in social dilemmas primarily from the collective perspective, whereas individualists and competitors would take a strong egocentric perspective on rationality. In addition, we found a strong relationship between expectations of other's cooperation and own cooperative behaviour when the other was described as intelligent. The strength of this relationship was reduced, particularly for individualists and competitors, when the other person was described as unintelligent.     

The boundaries of reciprocal cooperation

The current research examines the role of social value orientation in determining the extent to which individuals are inclined to reciprocate cooperation exhibited by others perceived as either honest, intelligent, or unintelligent. Results revealed that individuals with prosocial orientation reciprocated high levels of cooperation regardless of other's characteristics. Individuals with proself orientation (i.e. individualists and competitors) exhibited some reciprocal cooperation toward others perceived as honest, yet took advantage of others perceived as intelligent or unintelligent. These results suggest that proselfs can be motivated to reciprocate cooperation by others if they have faith in others' benign intentions and trustworthiness. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Sex and racial differences in preference for a caring morality in a corporate environment that promotes diversity and equal opportunity

This study investigated the caring moral perspective of managers in a corporation recognized as being a champion of promoting diversity and equal opportunity. Caring is described as a morality of responsibility and relationship, a sensitivity to the needs of persons. The study was based on the prediction that the attachment and caring shown elsewhere to be characteristic of the morality of females would be characteristic of all managers, regardless of sex or race in this kind of corporate environment. 121 male and female, African-American and Euro-American managers responded to a survey using three subscales of a Caring Morality Inventory: caring orientation, use of intuition and feeling to make a judgment, and concern with others in decision-making. Analysis showed female managers, regardless of race, scored significantly higher on the Caring Morality scale than the male managers, supporting other findings of sex differences in caring moral perspective and suggesting that working for a company actively promoting diversity and equal opportunity does not cancel out these differences. In addition, for this study it was assumed that, although African Americans, in general, may have been sensitized to lean more toward a caring morality, any racial differences in caring morality would be cancelled out by the fact that all of the managers work for the same prodiversity and, by assumption, more sensitive company. The Euro-American managers, regardless of sex, actually scored higher on the Caring Morality scale than did the African-American managers, with the difference being attributable solely to the greater tendency of the Euro-American managers to use intuition and feeling to make a judgment.     

Carol Gilligan's theory of sex differences in the development of moral reasoning during adolescence

Gilligan's work, which focuses on sex differences in moral reasoning, the perception of violence, the resolution of sexual dilemmas and abortion decisions, poses a major challenge to Kohlberg's theory by introducing a feminist perspective of moral development. Kohlberg had shown that the average female attained a moral judgment rating of stage three (good boy-nice girl), while adolescent males score at level four (law and order) and are more likely to move on to postconventional levels. Gilligan suggests that these findings reveal a gender bias, not that females are less mature than boys. Men and women follow different voices. Men tend to organize social relationships in a hierarchical order and subscribe to a morality of rights. Females value interpersonal connectedness, care, sensitivity, and responsibility to people. Kohlberg's scoring criteria give the interpersonal care orientations of females lower ratings than the principled justice orientation. Hence, Gilligan identifies different developmental stages for females. However, she does not claim that one system is better; both are equally valid. Only by integrating these complementary male (justice) and female (care) orientations will we be able to realize our full human potential in moral development.     

Psychological Realism, Morality, and Chimpanzees

The parsimonious consideration of research into food sharing among chimpanzees suggests that the type of social regulation found among our closest genetic relatives can best be understood as a form of morality. Morality is here defined from a naturalistic perspective as a system in which self-aware individuals interact through socially prescribed, psychologically realistic rules of conduct which provide these individuals with an awareness of how one ought to behave. The empirical markers of morality within chimpanzee communities and the traditional moral traits to which they correspond are (1) self-awareness/agency; (2) calculated reciprocity/obligation; (3) moralistic aggression/blame; and (4) consolation/empathy.     

趋避道德动机调节方式的作用

道德动机是推动人们产生和完成具有道德意义和行为的内在动因。在解释道德动机的各种理论中, 道德动机模型(Model of Moral Motive, MMM)是一种比较综合的理论。该模型透过一个新颖的视角, 强调趋避两种动机调节方式在自我、他人和群体背景下产生的道德动机。通过对MMM模型综合性的分析, 并且横向比较了道德基础理论(MFT)和行为/结果双系统模型这两个具有代表性的道德理论, 挖掘出了MMM模型的比较优势, 如强调利他、聚焦于自我的道德动机、群体道德与意识形态之间的联系等。由于MMM模型是基于西方道德观提出的, 未来的研究重点应着重于西方道德动机的心理与脑机制与国人的异同以及文化差异对道德动机的影响。     

Evolutionary Ethics and the Status of Non-Human Animals

ABSTRACT If we accept that the behaviour of humans and other animals is very substantially channelled by evolutionary constraints, it might appear that there can be no place for animals within the protection of a human system of morality.
However, the nature of plausible evolutionary constraints on the cognition of social animals, including humans, suggests that this is not so. It is likely that the most important element in our morality is the capacity to imagine the feelings of other individuals, and this capacity is so important for our ability to understand and predict their behaviour that it would be likely to be preserved by evolution even if moral behaviour had no survival value in its own right. We also use this kind of imaginative sympathy to understand and predict the behaviour of other animals, and it is this which provides the main reason for the inclusion of such animals within a human moral system. The primitive elements of morality have a survival value that is probably common to many other social species of animals. Since one of our reasons for putting a special value on human life is the human capacity for moral behaviour, we ought also to view members of these species as being of special significance.     

In search of an everyday morality: the development of a measure

Current interest in moral theorizing has been dominated by Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental view. Haan (1982) has challenged psychology's reliance on this rationalistic focus and has argued for a rethinking of morality's meaning in accord with everyday human experience. In light of this challenge, the present study gives both theoretical and empirical support to the advancement of a morality for everyday life. Specifically, a new measure called the Visions of Morality Scale (VMS) is reported. The VMS is sensitive to three dimensions which are necessary for an everyday morality: (1) a human constitutive component which is universally experienced by all human beings (empathy); (2) the inclusion of a behavioral component which reflects actual behavior (pro-social inclinations); and (3) a view of morality that is multilevel (private, interpersonal, and social). A brief sketch of the VMS is provided. Results are presented from a study of 181 high school students which relate the VMS to empathy and political orientation. Highly significant relationships were found among morality, political orientation, and empathy. In addition, results revealed numerous sex differences. Finally, the implications of an everyday morality are discussed.     

Mapping the Connections between Politics and Morality: The Multiple Sociopolitical Orientations Involved in Moral Intuition

According to moral foundations theory (Haidt & Joseph, 2004), five foundations are central to moral intuition. The two individualizing foundations—harm/care and fairness/reciprocity—hinge on the rights of the individual, whereas the three binding foundations—in‐group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity—focus on communal bonds. Recent work suggests that reliance on the various foundations varies as a function of sociopolitical orientation: liberals consistently rely on the individualizing foundations, whereas conservatives rely on both the individualizing and binding foundations. In an effort to further explore the relationship between sociopolitical orientation and morality, we argue that only certain types of sociopolitical attitudes and beliefs should relate to each cluster of foundations. Drawing on dual‐process models of social and political attitudes, we demonstrate that the individualizing foundations are aligned with attitudes and beliefs relevant to preferences for equality versus inequality (i.e., SDO and competitive‐jungle beliefs), whereas the binding foundations are aligned with attitudes and beliefs relevant to preferences for openness versus social conformity (i.e., RWA and dangerous‐world beliefs). We conclude by discussing the consequences of these findings for our understanding of the relationship between sociopolitical and moral orientations.