Inhibition of Threshold Excitation in the Human Eye

Sixty–seven albino rats were tested in a maze situation under five different conditions in an attempt to investigate the presence of “social influences.” One condition was comprised of naive subjects, each run singly. A second condition was comprised of naive subjects run in pairs. A third condition consisted of naive subjects run in squads of three each. A fourth condition consisted of one naive subject run with one trained subject; and the remaining condition consisted of one naive subject run with two trained subjects. The results showed that performance was facilitated by increasing the number of naive subjects in the presence of other naive subjects (“numbers effect”), by the presence of a performing, trained S (“trained effect”), and by increasing the number of trained subjects (“interaction effect”). Inasmuch as these findings are in apparent contradiction to those reported by some previous researchers, an attempt was made to provide an explanation for the differences in experimental findings.     

Consciousness and Science: an Advaita-Vedantic Perspective on the Theology – Science Dialogue

In modern science, the synthesis of “nature/mind” in observation, experiment, and explanation, especially in physics and biology increasingly reveal a “non-linear” totality in which subject, object, and situation have become inseparable. This raises the interesting ontological question of the true nature of reality. Western science as seen in its evolution from Socratic Greece has tried to understand the world by “objectifying” it, resulting in dualistic dilemmas. Indian “Science,” as seen in its evolution from the Vedic times (1500—500 BCE) has tried to understand the world by “subjectifying” our consciousness of reality. Within the Hindu tradition, the Advaita-Vedanta school of philosophy offers possibilities for resolving not only the Cartesian dilemma but also a solution to the nature of difference in a non-dualistic totality. We also present the Advaita-Vedanta principle of superimposition as a useful approach to modern physical and social science, which have been increasingly forced to reject the absolute reductionism and dualism of classical differences between subject and object.     

Subjek en etiese verantwoordelikheidsbesef Die Idee van die Oneindige in Levinas se Totality and Infinity

Subject and the realisation of ethical responsibility - The Idea of the Infinite in Levinas’ Totality and Infinity. In Totality and Infinity Emmanuel Levinas writes about the categorical character of the ethical responsibility that the subject owes to the other. The confrontation with the suffering other puts the subject’s natural self-interest into question, and brings him/her to realise an ethical responsibility of which s/he cannot unburden himself/herself. The question arises as to what in the constitution of the subject makes him/her susceptible to the realisation of ethical responsibility. This article illustrates that in order to accentuate ethical responsibility as strongly as he does, Levinas needs to take a quasi-metaphysical step. The “trace of the infinite” that “creation” has left on the finite subject, predisposes the subject to the appeal of the other. Levinas’ use of words such as “God”, “the Good”, “creation” and “the Idea of Infinity” does not have a theological or a mystical underpinning. These metaphysical concepts are philosophical figures of speech that Levinas borrows from Plato and Descartes.     

Subverting utilitarian subject-object relations in video games: A philosophical analysis of Thatgamecompany’s Journey

In this article, I analyse the self-other relations that underpin the gameplay design of the majority of popular video games. Specifically, these self-other relations can be described as “utilitarian subject-object relations”, in which the player assumes the perspective of the player-character, or subject of the video game, while all the other elements of the video game, including the digital environment and the non-player characters and creatures, are treated as separate objects that merely exist to be used by the player-character. These subject-object relations are usually driven by the violent accumulation of power, which can, in turn, be channelled by the player-character into further violent actions against the so-called objects within the video game. In contrast to this typical model of gameplay, the gameplay of Thatgamecompany’s Journey does not include a subject that merely acts on and uses the other elements within the video game world for its own ends, but rather entails a relation of “becoming-other” in which the player-character and the other elements are involved in constant processes of reciprocal determination. In order to analyse the “becoming-other” relations that underpin Journey’s gameplay, I employ specific concepts from the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari, including the concepts of “becoming-other”, “percepts” and “affects”. Ultimately, I argue that Journey not only subverts the utilitarian, often violent, subject-object relations that have become an industry trope in the majority of video games, but also promotes self-other relations that are arguably far more positive and creative for video game design in general.     

L’écriture limite: Kristeva's Postmodern Feminist Ethics

In this essay, I trace the development of Julia Kristeva's theory and practice of “the subject in procession trial” from her semiotic works of the 1960s to her psychoanalytic writings of the 1970s and 1980s. I read Kristeva's exploration of this “subject in procession trial” as contributing to a postmodern feminist ethics.     

Killing the father,Parmenides: On Lacan’s anti-philosophy

This paper examines the historical claims about philosophy, dating back to Parmenides, that we argue underlie Jacques Lacan’s polemical provocations in the mid-1970s that his position was an “anti-philosophie”. Following an introduction surveying the existing literature on the subject, in part ii, we systematically present the account of classical philosophy Lacan has in mind when he declares psychoanalysis to be an antiphilosophy after 1975, assembling his claims about the history of ideas in Seminars XVII and XX in ways earlier contributions of this subject have not systematically done. In part iii, focusing upon Lacan’s remarkable reading of Descartes’ break with premodern philosophy—but touching on Lacan’s readings of Hegel and (in a remarkable confirmation of Lacan’s “Parmenidean” conception of philosophy) the early Wittgenstein—we examine Lacan’s positioning of psychoanalysis as a legatee of the Cartesian moment in the history of western ideas, nearly-contemporary with Galileo’s mathematization of physics and carried forwards by Kant’s critical philosophy and account of the substanceless subject of apperception. In different terms than Slavoj ?i?ek, we propose that it is Lacan’s famous avowal that the subject of the psychoanalysis is the subject first essayed by Descartes in The Meditations on First Philosophy as confronting an other capable of deceit (as against mere illusion or falsity) that decisively measures the distance between Lacan’s unique “antiphilosophy” and the forms of later modern linguistic and cultural relativism whose hegemony Alain Badiou has decried, at the same time as it sets Lacan’s antiphilosophy apart from the Parmenidean legacy for which thinking and being could be the same.

     

Personal Identity and National Identity: An Analogy

Simone Weil writes in one of her notebooks: “When one arrives at the absolute one can only express oneself by identities … – For identity alone expresses the unconditioned” (Cahiers, in Œuvres complètes, t. VI, vol. 4 (Paris: Gallimard, 2006), 113). Thus, it is that “the good is the good”, one and the same, unconditionally. Certainly, an individual is unique, a nation is equally so. Nevertheless, personal identity – or “character” – and the identity of a nation are not absolutes. When we wish to treat them as absolutes, we ignore the fact that the “person,” as well as the “nation”, only exists within relationships that they are subject to exterior circumstances and that their identity is situated in time. Is one correct to suppose that the character of an individual or the identity of the nation are “invariables that one continues to find throughout various manifestations”, (“Notes sur le caractère”, Écrits de Marseille, in Œuvres complètes, Op. cit., t. IV, vol. 1 (2008), 87) observed or probable? We hypothesize here that one can apply to national identity what Simone Weil wrote about the notion of character, in notes composed in Marseille and in her commentary on the Our Father (“À propos du Pater”, ibid., 337-345).     

“I am NN”: A Reconstruction of Anscombe's “The First Person”

This paper develops a way of understanding G. E. M. Anscombe's essay “The First Person” at the heart of which are the following two ideas: first, that the point of her essay is to show that it is not possible for anyone to understand what they express with “I” as an Art des Gegebenseins—a way of thinking of an object that constitutes identifying knowledge of which object is being thought of; and second, that the argument through which her essay seeks to show this is itself first personal in character. Understanding Anscombe's essay in this light has the merit of showing much of what it says to be correct. But it sets us the task of saying what it is that we understand ourselves to express with “I” if not an Art des Gegebenseins, and in particular what it is that we understand ourselves to express with sentences with “I” as subject that might seem to express identity judgments, such as “I am NN”, and “I am this body”.     

SECOND NATURE AND SPIRIT: HEGEL ON THE ROLE OF HABIT IN THE APPEARANCE OF PERCEPTUAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Hegel's discussion of the concept of “habit” appears at a crucial point in his Encyclopedia system, namely, in the transition from the topic of “nature” to the topic of “spirit” (Geist): it is through habit that the subject both distinguishes itself from its various sensory states as an absolute unity (the I) and, at the same time, preserves those sensory states as the content of sensory consciousness. By calling habit a “second nature,” Hegel highlights the fact that incipient spirit retains a “moment” of the natural that marks a limitation compared to “pure thought” but that also makes perceptual consciousness possible. This makes Hegel's account analogous in important respects to John McDowell's “naturalism of second nature.” But Hegel's account of habit can be seen as a version of a Kantian synthesis of the productive imagination—and hence presupposes a given material that can become one's own by means of habit. This does not mean that Hegel falls into the Myth of the Given, but it does suggest that an appropriate account of second nature might be committed to something McDowell wants to deny: that nonconceptual states of consciousness play a role (even if not a justificatory role) in perception.     

Processing ambiguous Spanish se in a minimal chain

The recovery of pieces of information that are not linguistically expressed is a constant feature of the process of language comprehension. In the processing literature, such missing information is generally referred to as “gaps”. Usually, one resolves gaps by finding “fillers” in either the sentence or the context. For instance, in Peter seemed to be upset, Peter is really the subject of being upset but appears as surface subject of seems. Sometimes constituents move, leaving gaps behind. Various Romance languages such as Spanish or Italian have a grammatical particle se/si, which, as it is extremely ambiguous, licenses different sorts of gaps. In Spanish, se can encode at least reflexive, impersonal, and passive meanings. In an eye-tracking experiment we contrast reflexive structures containing postverbal subjects with impersonal structures with no subjects (GAP se vendó apresuradamente el corredor/“the runner bandaged himself hurriedly” vs. GAP se vendó apresuradamente al corridor/“(someone) bandaged the runner hurriedly”). In a second manipulation we contrast the presence of an extra argument with se-passives (GAP se vendó el tobillo el corredor/“the runner bandaged his ankle” vs. GAP se vendó el tobillo al corridor/“the runner's ankle was bandaged”). Our comparisons involve contrasting standard transitive structures with nonstandard word order (postverbal subject and a preverbal subject gap) against inherently complex and less habitual structures such as impersonals (with no subject) or se-passives (with subjects in canonical object position). We evaluate the minimal chain principle (de Vincenzi, 1991 De Vincenzi, M. 1991. Syntactic parsing strategies in Italian, Dordrecht, , The Netherlands: Kluwer. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]), according to which displacement is costly because it entails complex (derivational) “chains” that must be undone before phrasal packaging can commence. We show the minimal chain principle to be essentially correct when contrasting more complex but more frequent structures with less complex but less frequent structures. A noteworthy feature of this research is that the gaps appear before the fillers in the structures that we analyse.     

Aristotle's Cognitive Science: Belief,Affect and Rationality

I offer a novel interpretation of Aristotle's psychology and notion of rationality, which draws the line between animal and specifically human cognition. Aristotle distinguishes belief (doxa), a form of rational cognition, from imagining (phantasia), which is shared with non‐rational animals. We are, he says, “immediately affected” by beliefs, but respond to imagining “as if we were looking at a picture.” Aristotle's argument has been misunderstood; my interpretation explains and motivates it. Rationality includes a filter that interrupts the pathways between cognition and behavior. This prevents the subject from responding to certain representations. Stress and damage compromise the filter, making the subject respond indiscriminately, as non‐rational animals do. Beliefs are representations that have made it past the filter, which is why they can “affect [us] immediately.” Aristotle's claims express ceteris paribus generalizations, subject to exceptions. No list of provisos could turn them into non‐vacuous universal claims, but this does not rob them of their explanatory power. Aristotle's cognitive science resolves a tension we grapple with today: it accounts for the specialness of human action and thinking within a strictly naturalistic framework. The theory is striking in its insight and explanatory power, instructive in its methodological shortcomings.     

Self-Formation and the speculative: Gadamer and Lacan

Abstract

Gadamer’s project in Truth and Method is as much about truth in the human sciences as it is about human subjectivity, for, following Heidegger, he claims that truth is reducible to method (technical rationality) only if one is misled by old Enlightenment subject/object dualisms. Posing the question of the possibility and nature of truth in scientific thinking, where a strict division between subjective and objective has fallen away, Gadamer belongs, as one of its inaugural figures, to an alternative tradition of philosophical complexity, which implicates environmental systems (culture, ideology, institutions), embedded in language, in the constitution of human subjectivity.

With these theoretical shifts in mind, what caught my attention in a press report concerning the trial of (subsequently convicted) serial killer, Stewart Wilken (“Boetie Boer”), was the strangely anachronistic question that dominated the front page of a Port Elizabeth newspaper: “Boetie: Is he Sick or Evil?” This question, in my view, harks back to a questionable framework of Enlightenment autonomy, which depends upon the easy technical rationality of clear-cut dichotomies. In what follows I hope to show that in acknowledging the role of complex interrelations between cultural and other systems, a tradition of philosophical complexity justifiably claims a more adequate framework for understanding self-formation than that underpinning the discourses at work in Wilken’s trial. I shall draw on Gadamer’s hermeneutic model of an “embedded” subject, which is based on his speculative model of “play” outlined in Truth and Method, and supplement this with Lacan’s psychoanalytic account of subject formation.     

The Nudity of the Ego. An Eckhartian Perspective on the Levinas/Derrida Debate on Alterity

The present paper examines the Eckhartian motives in Derrida's critique of Levinas’ concept of the “Other”. The focus is put on the Husserlian concept of alter ego that is at the core of the debate between Levinas and Derrida. Against Levinas, Derrida argues that alter is not an epithet that expresses a mere accidental modification of the ego, but an indicator of radical exteriority. Interestingly enough, this position is virtually identical with Meister Eckhart's interpretation of the famous proposition from Exodus 3:14 “I am who I am”. Eckhart claims that the pronoun ego denotes the absolutely simple substance of the uncreated intellect, which can, by definition, never receive any accidental determination whatsoever. The reduplication of the “I am” is by no means tautological, but expresses the intra-divine dynamic of the Father who engenders the Son as his perfect equal and alter ego. This transcendental conception of egoity also governs the relationships between human beings: the ethical encounter with the “Other” requires that we consider them not primarily in their empirical, contingent existence but in the transcendental purity of their indeclinable ego, which is identical with the incessant act in which God knows himself in the Son as his absolutely Other. Thus, Meister Eckhart's approach proves, against Levinas, that it is possible to develop an “egological” philosophy that avoids the pitfalls of a naturalistic and potentially violent ontology of the subject.     

Attitude toward the Ten Commandments

Summary

This study investigated helping behavior on Election Day, 1972, at 20 polling places in southeastern Michigan. One experimenter, posing as a “campaign worker,” dropped his political literature as he attempted to give some to a subject approaching or exiting from the polls, while a second experimenter recorded the subject's behavior and then ascertained the subject's presidential preference and/or party affiliation. It was found that (a) subjects were more likely to help the “campaign worker” if he had the same political preference; (b) McGovern supporters were more likely to help than were Nixon supporters; and (c) neither sex of subject or campaign worker, nor whether the interaction took place before or after voting, was significantly related to the likelihood of helping behavior occurring.     

“Girls Are as Good as Boys at Math” Implies That Boys Are Probably Better: A Study of Expressions of Gender Equality

Although “Girls are as good as boys at math” explicitly expresses equality, we predict it could nevertheless suggest that boys have more raw talent. In statements with this subject‐complement structure, the item in the complement position serves as the reference point and is thus considered more typical and prominent. This explains why “Tents are like houses,” for instance, sounds better than “Houses are like tents”—people generally think of houses as more typical. For domains about ability, the reference point should be the item that is typically more skilled. We further propose that the reference point should be naturally more skilled. In two experiments, we presented adults with summaries of actual scientific evidence for gender equality in math (Experiment 1) or verbal ability (Experiment 2), but we manipulated whether the reference point in the statements of equality in the summaries (e.g., “Boys’ verbal ability is as good as girls’”) was girls or boys. As predicted, adults attributed more natural ability to each gender when it was in the complement rather than subject position. Yet, in Experiment 3, we found that when explicitly asked, participants judged that such sentences were not biased in favor of either gender, indicating that subject‐complement statements must be transmitting this bias in a subtle way. Thus, statements such as “Girls are as good as boys at math” can actually backfire and perpetuate gender stereotypes about natural ability.     

Saint Thomas Aquinas's Pagan Virtues?

Today's conversations in virtue ethics are enflamed with questions of “pagan virtues,” which often designate non‐Christian virtue from a Christian perspective. “Pagan virtues,” “pagan vices,” and their historied interpretations are the subject of Jennifer Herdt's book Putting On Virtue: The Legacy of the Splendid Vices (2008). I argue that the questions and language animating Herdt's book are problematic. I offer an alternative strategy to Herdt's for reading Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae. My results are twofold: (1) a different set of conclusions and questions regarding the moral life that lend a fresh perspective to “pagan virtues” and (2) corresponding methodological suggestions for improving Herdt's project that would, to my mind, reaffirm her normative conclusions regarding the most viable ways forward for contemporary discussions of virtue.     

The paradox of evolution

In the second (and expanded) version of Origin of the Species, Darwin introduces the term “advanced progressive development” in an attempt to describe the development of the more complex species from the simpler ones. More than 100 years have passed since Darwin tried to qualify and conceptualize the directional question of evolution, and very little progress has been made regarding the subject. The appearance of the species, from the simple to the more complex, is today an empirical fact, one which is no longer dependent upon any theory, including that of Darwin. This work examines the subject of advanced development in evolution by attempting to answer a few basic questions: What parameters may be used to evaluate complexity? Can any rules or order be identified as to the development of the species? Is the mechanism of “natural selection” sufficient to explain the direction or ‘purpose’ of evolution? Can the human race be included within the “rules” of Darwin's evolutionary theory?

The purpose of this essay is to develop and represent a new conceptual framework. Through this, it will be possible to offer a principle answer to all four questions.     

Decisions of Identity: Feminist Subjects and Grammars of Sexuality

While Sarah Hoagland's conception of a lesbian ethic offers a promising route toward articulating an ethics of resistance, her notion of self in community does not provide a conception of “subject” capable of both embracing political action as fundamental to personal life and explicitly recognizing cultural, ethnic, and sexual multiplicity as central to ethical decision-making. Such a notion can be found, however, in the remarks of later Wittgenstein concerning the “language games” of describing.     

The Effects of Subject-and Experimenter-Induced Defensive Response Sets on Picture-Frustration Test Reactions

Thirty male college students, half scoring high and half low on the MMPI K-scale, were administered a multiple-choice (M-C) modification of the Rosenzweig P-F Study under three instructional sets. Two of these sets were induced by E and compared with the third which represented S's normal test-taking set. The two induced sets included (1) a “should” set in which concern for the social consequences of behavior was accentuated, and (2) a “wish” set in which concern for social consequences was minimized, and freedom of self-expression was accentuated.

It was hypothesized that Ss making extremely high or low scores on the K-scale would likewise score differently on the M-C, P-F test. High K, defined by its authors as a measure of test defensiveness, and low K, as test-taking candidness, would be associated with P-F score patterns reflecting these test-taking attitudes: High K Ss showing Impunitive (M) dominant reaction patterns and low K showing Extrapunitive (E) or Intropunitive (I) dominant patterns. These hypothèses were confirmed except that intropunitive responses were extremely rare in the entire subject sample.

It was further hypothesized that the typical high K pattern would be induced in low K Ss under the “should” instructional set and the low K pattern would be elicited from high K Ss under “wish” instructions. This expectation was confirmed. It was suggested that the technique of manipulating responses via test taking instructions can generate correction factors useful in projective as well as structured personality tests.