Battle of the sexes: gender stereotype confirmation and reactance in negotiations.

The authors examined how gender stereotypes affect negotiation performance. Men outperformed women when the negotiation was perceived as diagnostic of ability (Experiment 1) or the negotiation was linked to gender-specific traits (Experiment 2), suggesting the threat of negative stereotype confirmation hurt women's performance relative to men. The authors hypothesized that men and women confirm gender stereotypes when they are activated implicitly, but when stereotypes are explicitly activated, people exhibit stereotype reactance, or the tendency to behave in a manner inconsistent with a stereotype. Experiment 3 confirmed this hypothesis. In Experiment 4, the authors examined the cognitive processes involved in stereotype reactance and the conditions under which cooperative behaviors between men and women can be promoted at the bargaining table (by activating a shared identity that transcends gender).     

Shaping cooperation behavior: The role of accessibility experiences and uncertainty

The present research investigates the influence on cooperative behavior of accessibility experiences associated with the retrieval of fairness‐relevant information from memory. We argue that the decision whether to cooperate in negotiations depends not only on information about the appropriateness of the negotiation procedure, but also on the experience of how difficult or easy it is to come up with this information. Supporting this hypothesis, it is shown that in the context of a bargaining experiment, participants' experiences of ease or difficulty in retrieving unfair aspects of the respective negotiation procedure strongly influence their cooperation behavior. In addition, we hypothesize and empirically substantiate that the influence of accessibility experiences on cooperation behavior occurs particularly in situations of certainty salience. Implications for future research on cooperation and on accessibility experiences are discussed. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Conflict and Negotiation: Trends and Emerging Issues

Theory and research on dyadic conflict is traced from its historical roots in social exchange theory and interpersonal gaming to current concerns with the cognitive and tactical aspects of multiple issue bargaining and conflict in close personal relationships. This review examines the contributions of research with the Prisoner's Dilemma game, explicit two-person bargaining paradigms, and threat games, as well as work on representative negotiation and third-party intervention in conflict. The interplay of structural and motivational variables in the understanding of conflict and negotiation is emphasized. Criticisms of the typical theoretical and empirical approaches to the study of conflict are noted, especially the lack of general theory and the questionable representativeness of typical laboratory paradigms. Finally, recent research in integrative bargaining and entrapment is examined for insights concerning the active role the parties themselves play in the structuring of their conflict, and the implications of such a role for cognitive as well as motivational factors in conflict resolution.     

Bargaining strength and group polarization in intergroup negotiations

In the context of a labour-management simulation study, three-man union teams were made to believe that they had either a very strong or a very weak bargaining position vis-à-vis the other party. In half of each of these conditions, a cooperative and a competitive orientation toward the other group was induced. In preparation for the intergroup negotiations, the subjects were first asked to indicate their individual aspirations for three negotiation issues. After a group discussion, their collective aspirations were obtained. Regardless of the experimental conditions. groups set significantly higher aspiration levels than individuals on the most important issue but were more conservative and cautious on less important issues. In general, for all three topics, significant or near-significant interactions were found between bargaining strength and the direction of the group-induced shift. In the strong bargaining condition, groups set higher aspiration levels than the average of prior individual judgments; in the weak bargaining condition the opposite trend occurred. An effort was made to relate these findings to the various theories developed in the ‘risky-shift’ literature.     

Threats,Bluffs, and Disclaimers in Negotiations

In a buyer-seller simulation within two negotiation periods, we examined the attitudinal and behavioral consequences of variations in the communication of threats. Specifically, we examined the consequences of receiving no threat or a threat stated with, versus without, a disclaimer. In addition, we examined changes in subjects′ evaluations of their partner and negotiation outcomes after some were led to believe their partner had stated a false threat (a "bluff"). As expected, we found that while negotiators who used threats were perceived as more powerful, they were also perceived as less cooperative and achieved less integrative agreements than those who did not use threats. In addition, when information (allegedly from a constituent) identified the threat as a bluff, we found that the disclaimer lessened the negativity of re-evaluations of the negotiation partner. Taken together, our findings suggest that current theory regarding the effect of threats and bluffs in negotiation needs to be qualified by how these tactics are stated. Theoretical and practical implications of our findings are discussed.     

The Balance of Power: Effects of Role and Market Forces on Negotiated Outcomes1

Role and market forces provide two sources of power that affect negotiated outcomes. To test their effects, 48 subjects participated in one of two negotiation markets that favored either buyers or sellers. Profit was influenced by both power sources: Buyers outperformed sellers, and negotiators in a favorable market outperformed negotiators in an unfavorable market. This effect was shown to be additive, indicating that the effects of the two sources of power were independent of one another. Whereas negotiators advantaged by market forces showed increases in profit over time, profits for negotiators disadvantaged by the market remained stable. Joint profit rose throughout both markets. However, this did not reflect increasing integrativeness in the markets; rather, the increase could be attributed to increases in high power negotiator profits. Markets became more distributive over time, and both the effectiveness and efficiency of bargaining decreased, particularly in the market favoring buyers.     

Negotiators' bargaining histories and their effects on future negotiation performance

In 2 studies the authors show that the quality of deals negotiators reach are significantly influenced by their previous bargaining experiences. As predicted, negotiators who reached an impasse on a prior negotiation were more likely either to impasse in their next negotiation or to reach deals of low joint value compared to those who had reached an initial agreement. Notably, the impact of past performance on subsequent deals was just as strong for negotiators who changed partners on the 2nd occasion. Results highlight the role of bargaining histories as significant predictors of negotiation behavior. Moreover, they suggest that, at least in some cases, negotiations should be conceptualized as interrelated exchanges rather than separable incidents.     

Nonstrategic Delay in Bargaining: An Experimental Investigation

The practice of bargaining is strongly affected by procedural features. Procedures matter because they affect each party's bargaining power and, consequently, the negotiation outcome. The extent and nature of delay between offers and counteroffers are an example of procedural specification in bargaining. Bargaining models consider delay only as a strategic screening device to build a reputation for toughness, the logic being that the party with the smaller cost of delay obtains all the gain from trade. In reality, however, delay between offers is common because of imperfect player control over the duration of the offers for reasons other than strategic, namely, transactional, timing, and interruptions. This delay, in essence, limits the number of rounds of offers and counteroffers in a fixed-period negotiation compared to when there is no delay and, in turn, is expected to affect negotiation outcome. The objective of the current research is to experimentally explore the implications of nonstrategic delay between offers and counteroffers in a finite-horizon alternating-offer bargaining game with incomplete information but without discounting. Specifically, this study examines the effect of nonstrategic time delay during negotiation on (1) the effect of risk preference on negotiator effectiveness, (2) deadline effect, (3) first-mover advantage, and (4) conflict between the negotiating partners. As hypothesized, the results show that delay dilutes the effect of negotiators’ risk preference, eliminates the deadline effect, negates the first-mover advantage, and enhances dyadic conflict.     

同伴特点如何影响人们的合作与冲突行为?

人类的生存繁衍依赖于人们之间的相互合作,合作与冲突行为的研究近年来成为心理学的研究热点。本研究通过实验程序操纵Chicken Game中博弈同伴的特点,考察个体在社会困境中面对不同特点同伴时的合作行为。结果发现：(1)同伴道义论组和功利论组总和解率没有显著差异,同伴竞争组和合作组的总和解率也没有显著差异。(2)在与道义论以及合作型的同伴互动时,个体的行为没有明显受到上次博弈反馈的影响。(3)当同伴为功利论时,相比于上次博弈个体选择和解而同伴选择进攻,双方都选择和解时个体在当前博弈中更倾向于和解;(4)在同伴竞争组中,相比于上次博弈个体选择进攻而同伴选择和解,双方都选择和解时被试在当前博弈中会更倾向于和解。实验结果表明个体在博弈任务中会受到同伴特点的影响,并且同伴在博弈中的行为特点的影响更为显著。本研究从同伴特点来考察个体的合作行为,揭示了影响个体博弈行为的一种因素。     

When do people cooperate? The neuroeconomics of prosocial decision making

Understanding the roots of prosocial behavior is an interdisciplinary research endeavor that has generated an abundance of empirical data across many disciplines. This review integrates research findings from different fields into a novel theoretical framework that can account for when prosocial behavior is likely to occur. Specifically, we propose that the motivation to cooperate (or not), generated by the reward system in the brain (extending from the striatum to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex), is modulated by two neural networks: a cognitive control system (centered on the lateral prefrontal cortex) that processes extrinsic cooperative incentives, and/or a social cognition system (including the temporo-parietal junction, the medial prefrontal cortex and the amygdala) that processes trust and/or threat signals. The independent modulatory influence of incentives and trust on the decision to cooperate is substantiated by a growing body of neuroimaging data and reconciles the apparent paradox between economic versus social rationality in the literature, suggesting that we are in fact wired for both. Furthermore, the theoretical framework can account for substantial behavioral heterogeneity in prosocial behavior. Based on the existing data, we postulate that self-regarding individuals (who are more likely to adopt an economically rational strategy) are more responsive to extrinsic cooperative incentives and therefore rely relatively more on cognitive control to make (un)cooperative decisions, whereas other-regarding individuals (who are more likely to adopt a socially rational strategy) are more sensitive to trust signals to avoid betrayal and recruit relatively more brain activity in the social cognition system. Several additional hypotheses with respect to the neural roots of social preferences are derived from the model and suggested for future research.     

"Inside Information" and Negotiator Decision Behavior

In negotiation, information about the other party may be a source of strength or weakness, depending on the context, the type of information, its availability and quality, and how a negotiator uses it. An empirical study examines the way negotiators use "inside" information specifically designed to increase bargaining strength. The scoop-privileged information about the other party′s deadline-does not inform negotiators about possible deals; rather, it suggests a process of negotiating agreement. Misuse of the scoop, therefore, poses potential costs that may diminish its possible advantages. In a two-party negotiation exercise, access to inside information affected negotiators′ thoughts and behaviors. It enhanced their feelings of success and shifted the criterion for success away from final price toward a relative, interpersonal standard. Furthermore, informed negotiators used the scoop appropriately to manage the negotiation process and enhance both joint and individual profits.     

Judgment Accuracy and Outcomes in Negotiation: A Causal Modeling Analysis of Decision-Aiding Effects

This study examines how interaction structure (no formal structure versus modified Nominal Group Technique) and communication channels (face-to-face versus computer-mediated) affect negotiation performance by changing negotiation judgment accuracy. Participants assumed the role of a selling division manager or one of two buying division managers and completed an intra-organizational transfer pricing negotiation task in groups of three members each. In half of all groups, members interacted freely without any formal structure; in the other half, members interacted using a two-step, modified Nominal Group Technique. Within each of these two conditions, half the groups met directly and communicated face-to-face; in the other half, members were physically isolated and communicated with the aid of a simultaneous electronic-messaging facility. Results showed that unstructured groups and computer-mediated groups had lower judgment accuracy, obtained lower outcomes, and distributed resources more unequally than structured groups and face-to-face groups, respectively. Further analyses using causal modeling revealed that judgment accuracy played a significant role in determining negotiation outcomes. Specifically, negotiation structure caused increases in both individual and group profits and decreases in inequality of resource distribution by reducing fixed-sum error. Computer-mediated communication increased both fixed-sum error and incompatibility error and these increases explained the effects of communication medium on resource distribution. However, changes in fixed-sum error only partially explained the effects of communication medium on individual and group profits. Changes in incompatibility error did not explain any of the effects of communication medium on profits. These results are discussed in terms of implications for the design and implementation of decision aids for small group negotiation.     

Fairness and bargaining power in threshold public goods experiments

Experiments on three two‐person threshold public good provision games, namely, the simultaneous, sequential, and dictator games, are conducted to explore the motives behind giving. Players who move simultaneously are endowed with equal bargaining power, and players who move first are endowed with more bargaining power than players who move subsequently. Dictators are indubitably endowed with complete bargaining power. Since the differences between the bargaining powers of two players increase from the simultaneous to the sequential to the dictator game, comparisons among games allow us to trace whether the contribution behavior is motivated by fairness or is simply due to the strategic concern. The experimental evidence shows that the strategic concern explains the overall contribution behavior better than the motive of fairness. However, in the final round 26% of the dictators share the threshold evenly with their opponents, suggesting that some subjects do play fairly. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of commitment to threats and promises upon bargaining behaviour and outcomes

The course of bargaining is determined in part by interdependent individuals exchanging messages so as to influence other's behaviour, and thereby to increase the likelihood of achieving outcomes consistent with their own goals. The communication of threats and promises are two major message strategies that are employed to influence the behaviour of others in a bargaining relationship. The present study examines the effects of players' level of commitment to these forms of message strategies upon behaviour in a duopoly bargaining task. Past research has oprationalized commitment in terms of the consistency with which an individual has followed through on threats or promises in the past. In the present research, Becker's (1960) concept of a side-bet is employed to provide an alternative means for defining and manipulating commitment. A side-bet obtains when either a threatener or a promiser posts a valued resource, say a bond, which they forfeit if they do not follow through on their stated threat or promise. The main expectations of the present study were that increased commitment to threat meassages would lead to more competitive behaviour and outcomes within a duopoly bargaining task, whereas increased commitment to promise messages would produce more cooperative behaviour and outcomes. Partial support for these major expectations, as well as confirmation of a number of secondary expectations, was obtained.     

Threats,Promises, and Coalitions: A Study of Compliance and Retaliation in a Simulated Organizational Setting1

This research sought to examine the effects of threats and promises on compliance and the formation of subordinate coalitions in a simulated employeremployee conflict situation. It also sought to determine some of the motives underlying coalition decisions-tangible and intangible-and the conditions under which each of these possible motive types would be salient. Coalition motives were examined by manipulating the consequences for coalition members following their use of coalition power (presence vs. absence of monetary gain). A control condition was present in which no such power was available. Ninety male undergraduate business students were randomly assigned to one of six experimental conditions in a 3 × 2 factorial design. Three Ss engaged in a modified bilateral monopoly bargaining task in which two of them (the “employees”) believed they were exchanging a series of offers and counteroffers with the third (the “employer”) over a hypothetical wage increase for a maximum of eight rounds. Ss were told they would earn a sum of money proportional to the effectiveness of their bargaining. In actuality, all Ss were assigned the employee role and all employer “offers” were pre-programmed. On round six, the Ss were “sent” either a threat or promise message by the employer demanding that they accept his round five offer. Compliance-noncompliance was defined as employee acceptance-rejection of this demand, respectively. In addition to compliance behavior, S s in coalition conditions had the power to form an alliance with the other employee against the employer after the latter used his threat or promise power. Coalitions could confiscate up to 25% of the employer's earnings and, depending on experimental condition, could either keep or not keep any money their coalition acquired. It was hypothesized that threateners would elicit less compliance, and be responded to with more, and more severe subordinate coalitions than would promisers. It was further assumed that there would be less compliance when subordinates had coalition power, and that the effect of monetary reward on the likelihood of coalition formation would be contingent on the type of power (threats vs. promises) the employer used. Specifically, it was assumed that a majority of S s in the Threat condition who had this power would form coalitions against the employer regardless of whether or not they realized any tangible gain for doing so. In the promise condition, however, it was expected that coalition decisions would be based primarily on whether Ss stood to gain monetarily. The hypotheses were supported. These results were discussed in terms of the impact of power acquisition as a variable mediating perception and compliance behavior, and in terms of the role of economic vs. retaliatory motives as factors underlying subordinate coalition decisions. Some of the conditions which influence the relative salience of these two coalition motives were proposed, and the organizational implications of these findings were suggested.     

Gender and Negotiator Competitiveness: A Meta-analysis

Although there have been numerous investigations into the relationship between gender and bargaining competitiveness over the past several decades, few conclusions have been reached. The results of 62 research reports on the relationship between gender and competitive behavior in dyadic bargaining interactions were examined by meta-analytic review. The average weighted effect size indicated that women appear to behave more cooperatively in negotiations than men, but this difference is slight. Results suggest that constraints on negotiators (imposed by abstract bargaining paradigms and restrictions on communication) lessen gender differences in negotiation behavior. Women were significantly more competitive than men when competing against an opponent who pursued a “tit-for-tat” bargaining strategy.     

Reversing the Gender Gap in Negotiations: An Exploration of Stereotype Regeneration

We examine how gender stereotypes affect performance in mixed-gender negotiations. We extend recent work demonstrating that stereotype activation leads to a male advantage and a complementary female disadvantage at the bargaining table (Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001). In the present investigation, we regenerate the stereotype of effective negotiators by associating stereotypically feminine skills with negotiation success. In Experiment 1, women performed better in mixed-gender negotiations when stereotypically feminine traits were linked to successful negotiating, but not when gender-neutral traits were linked to negotiation success. Gender differences were mediated by the performance expectations and goals set by negotiators. In Experiment 2, we regenerated the stereotype of effective negotiators by linking stereotypically masculine or feminine traits with negotiation ineffectiveness. Women outperformed men in mixed-gender negotiations when stereotypically masculine traits were linked to poor negotiation performance, but men outperformed women when stereotypically feminine traits were linked to poor negotiation performance. Implications for stereotype threat theory and negotiations are discussed.     

On feeling good and getting your way: mood effects on negotiator cognition and bargaining strategies.

Are happy people more likely to be cooperative and successful negotiators? On the basis of the Affect Infusion Model (AIM; Forgas, 1995a). Experiment 1 predicted and found that both good and bad moods had a significant mood-congruent effect on people's thoughts and plans, and on their negotiation strategies and outcomes in both interpersonal and intergroup bargaining. Experiment 2 replicated these results and also showed that mood effects were reduced for persons more likely to adopt motivated processing strategies (scoring high on machiavellianism and need for approval). Experiment 3 confirmed these effects and demonstrated that the mood of the opposition also produced more mood-congruent bargaining strategies and outcomes. The results are discussed in terms of affect priming influences on interpersonal behaviors, and the implications of these findings for real-life cognitive tasks and bargaining encounters are considered.     

Verbal Responses to Different Bargaining Strategies: A Content Analysis of Real-Life Buyer-Seller Interaction

A field exerpiment was conducted in order to demonstrate a way in which social psychological research can avoid some of the shortcomings of past research on bargaining communication. Two preprogrammed male buyers negotiated a discount on the price of new cars with 48 professional salesmen. The salespersons' verbal responses to various bargaining strategies were recorded and analyzed by a content analytic scheme with the following categories: attempted antagonistic influence; attempted cooperative influence; strategic question; justification; self-disclosure; concession refusal; "other". Results indicated that (a) soft bargaining is reciprocated with attempted cooperative influence, whereas tough bargaining does not provoke attempted antagonistic influence; (b) stragetic questions are used as a response to both soft and tough bargaining behavior; (c) justifications are most frequent in the last phase of a sales interaction, especially when accompanying a concession refusal; (d) self-disclosure was only present in the last phase of bargaining; (e) concessions are most frequently found in the early phase of bargaining and a concession refusal becomes increasingly frequent as bargaining proceeds; (f) most concessions are made in response to a soft-soft bargaining strategy.