When and why do people avoid unknown probabilities in decisions under uncertainty? Testing some predictions from optimal foraging theory.

When given a choice between two otherwise equivalent options - one in which the probability information is stated and another in which it is missing - most people avoid the option with missing probability information (Camerer & Weber, 1992). This robust, frequently replicated tendency is known as the ambiguity effect. It is unclear, however, why the ambiguity effect occurs. Experiments 1 and 2, which separated effects of the comparison process from those related to missing probability information, demonstrate that the ambiguity effect is elicited by missing probabilities rather than by comparison of options. Experiments 3 and 4 test predictions drawn from the literature on behavioral ecology. It is suggested that choices between two options should reflect three parameters: (1) the need of the organism, (2) the mean expected outcome of each option; and (3) the variance associated with each option's outcome. It is hypothesized that unknown probabilities are avoided because they co-occur with high outcome variability. In Experiment 3 it was found that subjects systematically avoid options with high outcome variability regardless of whether probabilities are explicitly stated or not. In Experiment 4, we reversed the ambiguity effect: when participants' need was greater than the known option's expected mean outcome, subjects preferred the ambiguous (high variance) option. From these experiments we conclude that people do not generally avoid ambiguous options. Instead, they take into account expected outcome, outcome variability, and their need in order to arrive at a decision that is most likely to satisfy this need.     

On a functional equation related to Thurstone models

If f and g are nonvanishing characteristic functions the functional equation g(s)g(t)g(?s ? t) = f(as)f(at)f(?as ? at) implies g(s) = e^ibsf(as), i.e., f and g corresponding to probability distributions of the same type. It is shown here that when f and g are allowed to vanish this equation also has solutions in which f and g correspond to distributions of different types. The practical implication is that there are nonequivalent. Thurstone models which cannot be discriminated by any choice experiment with three objects.     

Comparing the meanings of “if” and “all”

In this study, we compared the everyday meanings of conditionals (“if p then q”) and universally quantified statements (“all p are q”) when applied to sets of elements. The interpretation of conditionals was predicted to be directly related to the conditional probability, such that P(“if p then q”) = P(q|p). Quantified statements were assumed to have two interpretations. According to an instance-focused interpretation, quantified statements are equivalent to conditionals, such that P(“all p are q”) = P(q|p). According to a set-focused interpretation, “all p are q” is true if and only if every instance in set p is an instance of q, so that the statement would be accepted when P(q|p) = 1 and rejected when this probability was below 1. We predicted an instance-focused interpretation of “all” when the relation between p and q expressed a general law for an infinite set of elements. A set-focused interpretation of “all” was predicted when the relation between p and q expressed a coincidence among the elements of a finite set. Participants were given short context stories providing information about the frequency of co-occurrence of cases of p, q, not-p, and not-q in a population. They were then asked to estimate the probability that a statement (conditional or quantified) would be true for a random sample taken from that population. The probability estimates for conditionals were in accordance with an instance-focused interpretation, whereas the estimates for quantified statements showed features of a set-focused interpretation. The type of the relation between p and q had no effect on this outcome.     

Is guilt ‘likely’ or ‘not certain’?: Contrast with previous probabilities determines choice of verbal terms

This research focuses on what determines speakers' choice of positive and negative probability phrases (e.g., “a chance” vs. “not certain”) in a legal context. We argue that choice of phrase to describe an event's probability of occurrence can be determined by the contrast between its current p value and an earlier p value, and not by that current value alone. Three experiments were conducted describing scenarios where profilers communicated a suspect's probability of guilt to the police. In the first study, a probability estimate is revised upwards or downwards. In the second one, the probability estimate of a speaker is higher or lower than that given by a previous speaker. In both cases, participants expected upward trends to lead to positive phrases, whereas downward trends were associated with negative phrases. In a third study, participants had to select probability phrases to characterize two different suspects. No contrast effects were found. We conclude that verbal probability directionality has primarily an argumentative function, where positive phrases are selected when probabilities are contrasted with smaller p values, and negative when contrasted with higher p values.     

The center and range of the probability interval as factors affecting ambiguity preferences

Ambiguous decision situations are characterized as having probabilities that are uncertain. The uncertainty is due to the common, real-world deficiency of information about the process by which the outcomes are determined. Thirty lotteries having uncertain probabilities were constructed by varying the centers and the ranges of the intervals within which the imprecise probabilities of winning could lie. Pairs of the lotteries were presented as choice alternatives to subjects, with each pair having lotteries with the same interval center but differing interval ranges. Ambiguity avoidance, the selection of the less ambiguous option, was found to increase with the interval center C, with ambiguity indifference occurring for values of C ? 0.40. No evidence of ambiguity seeking as the prevalent behavior was obtained. Ambiguity avoidance did not significantly increase with the interval range R, but an interaction effect between C and the ranges R₁ and R₂ of the choice pair was obtained. This effect of the ranges could not be described simply by knowledge of the difference R₁ ? R₂; knowledge of both individual values was necessary. The theoretical implications of these results are discussed.     

Reasoning as we read: Establishing the probability of causal conditionals

Indicative conditionals of the form if p then q (e.g., if student tuition fees rise, then applications for university places will fall) invite consideration of a hypothetical event (e.g., tuition fees rising) and of one of its possible consequences (e.g., applications falling). Since a rise in tuition fees is an uncertain event with equally uncertain consequences, a reader may believe the statement to a greater or lesser extent. As a conditional is read, the earliest point at which this probabilistic evaluation can take place is as the consequent clause is wrapped up (e.g., as the critical word fall is read in the example above). Wrap-up processing occurs at the end of the clause, as it is evaluated and integrated into the evolving discourse representation. Five sources of probability may plausibly influence the evaluation of a conditional as it is wrapped up; these are P(p), P(q), P(pq), P(q|p), and P(not-p or q). A total of 128 conditionals were constructed, with these probabilities calculated for each item in a pretest. The conditionals were then embedded in vignettes and read by 36 participants on a word-by-word basis. Using linear mixed-effects modeling, we found that wrap-up reading times were predicted by pretest ratings of P(p) and P(q|p). There was no influence of P(q), P(pq), or P(not-p or q) on wrap-up reading times. Our findings are consistent with the suppositional theory of conditionals proposed by Evans and Over (2004) but do not support the mental-models theory advanced by Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002).     

Nondecomposable conjoint measurement for bisymmetric structures

This paper discusses two “nondecomposable” conjoint measurement representations for an asymmetric binary relation ? on a product set A × X, namely (a, x) ? (b, y) iff f₁(a) + g₁(a)g₂(x) > f₁(b) + g₁(b)g₂(y), and (a, x) ? (b, y) iff f₁(a) + f₂(x) + g₁(a)g₂(x) > f₁(b) + f₂(y) + g₁(b)g₂(y). Difficulties in developing axioms for ? on A × X which imply these representations in a general formulation have led to their examination from the standpoint of bisymmetric structures based on applications of a binary operation to A × X. Depending on context, the binary operation may refer to concatenation, extensive or intensive averaging, gambles based on an uncertain chance event, or to some other interpretable process. Independence axioms which are necessary and sufficient for the special representations within the context of bisymmetric structures are presented.     

Lexicographic additive differences

Several authors have identified sets of axioms for a preference relation ? on a two-factor set A × X which imply that ? can be represented by specific types of numerical structures. Perhaps the two best-known of these are the additive representation, for which there are real valued functions f_A on A and f_X on X such that (a, x) ? (b, y) if and only if f_A(a) + f_X(x) > f_A(b) + f_X(y), and the lexicographic representation which, with A as the dominant factor, has (a, x) ? (b, y) if and only if f_A(a) > f_A(b) or {f_A(a) = f_A(b) and f_X(x) > f_X(y)}. Recently, Duncan Luce has combined the additive and lexicographic notions in a model for which A is the dominant factor if the difference between a and b is sufficiently large but which adheres to the additive representation when the difference between a and b lies within what might be referred to as a lexicographic threshold. The present paper specifies axioms for ? which lead to a numerical model which also has a lexicographic component but whose local tradeoff structure is governed by the additive-difference model instead of the additive model. Although the additive-difference model includes the additive model as a special case, the new lexicographic additive-difference model is not more general than Luce's model since the former has a “constant” lexicographic threshold whereas Luce's model has a “variable” lexicographic threshold. Realizations of the new model range from the completely lexicographic representation to the regular additive-difference model with no genuine lexicographic component. Axioms for the latter model are obtained from the general axioms with one slight modification.     

Generalized procrustes analysis

SupposeP _i ⁽ⁱ⁾ (i = 1, 2, ...,m, j = 1, 2, ...,n) give the locations ofmn points inp-dimensional space. Collectively these may be regarded asm configurations, or scalings, each ofn points inp-dimensions. The problem is investigated of translating, rotating, reflecting and scaling them configurations to minimize the goodness-of-fit criterion Σ _i=1 ^m Σ _i=1 ⁿ Δ²(P _j ⁽ⁱ⁾ G _i ), whereG _i is the centroid of them pointsP _i ⁽ⁱ⁾ (i = 1, 2, ...,m). The rotated positions of each configuration may be regarded as individual analyses with the centroid configuration representing a consensus, and this relationship with individual scaling analysis is discussed. A computational technique is given, the results of which can be summarized in analysis of variance form. The special casem = 2 corresponds to Classical Procrustes analysis but the choice of criterion that fits each configuration to the common centroid configuration avoids difficulties that arise when one set is fitted to the other, regarded as fixed.     

Balance,positivity, and agreement in the Jordan Paradigm: A defense of balance theory

It was argued that Heider's p?o?x triad can best be conceptualized according to a three- factor analysis of variance model in which the p?o, p?x, and o?x bands are all factors. From this perspective the balance effect is the triple interaction, the positivity effect a main effect for the p?o factor, and the agreement effect a p?x by o?x interaction. Although the existence of the latter two effects has previously been regarded as damaging to balance theory, it was shown that these effects could be interpreted from a balance perspective and that balance theory could be used to generate supportable propositions regarding these effects. Thus in agreement with a unit-relation interpretation it was shown, in accordance with balance theory, that positivity effects are obtained when the subject, or p, assumes future contact with o, that reverse positivity effects are obtained when the subject anticipates breaking off contact with o, and that no positivity effect is obtained when there is absolutely no contact, past or future. It was also demonstrated in an experiment involving the p?o?q triad that, in accordance with balance theory, positivity effects may be produced by the assumption or inference of same-sign reciprocation in sentiment. Evidence for two balance processes underlying agreement effects was also found. One of these processes was based on the assumption that the subject would have or reveal psycho-logical reasons for the disagreement and thus produce imbalance. Consistent with this interpretation it was found that the agreement effect was significantly larger when future contact with discussion of x was assumed than when future contact without discussion of x was assumed. The other, or unit-relation interpretation was supported by evidence indicating that the breaking off of contact resulted in a reversed agreement effect. In general, it was argued that balance theory did quite well in such phenomenological investigations when attention was not narrowly restricted to the three-sign pattern but considered other potential cognitive bands.     

Order from chaos? 1/f noise predicts performance on reaction time measures

In repetitive tasks, latencies typically display non-random variation called 1/f noise, but the magnitude of 1/f noise can depend on effort. Between-participant variation in 1/f noise might therefore predict differences in performance for tasks that are sensitive to effort. Feedback was manipulated to suggest that participants had (or had not) shown bias on a preliminary task. Participants then completed a computer-based measure of prejudice. Consistent with an ironic process account, participants who were falsely informed that they had shown bias ultimately did show increased prejudice. But ironic processes should depend on control-related effort. Taking 1/f noise as a proxy for effort, results show that the effect of the feedback was moderated by 1/f noise. Participants demonstrating a low-effort 1/f pattern were unaffected by the manipulation (η_p² < .01), whereas those demonstrating a high-effort 1/f pattern showed larger effects (η_p² = .19). Results thus suggest that 1/f noise can provide novel explanatory power regarding behavior.     

Effect of psychostimulant medications on static balance performance in adults with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder: Within-subjects repeated-measure study

ObjectiveThis study examined the effect of psychostimulant medications nPS) on balance and functional motor performance in adults with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).MethodsParticipants completed two sessions (off-medication and on-medication) in a within-subjects repeated-measure study design. There was a minimum of seven days between the two sessions. During both sessions, participants stood for 30 s per condition on a force platform. The conditions were: feet-apart with 1) eyes-open and 2) eyes-closed; feet-together with 3) eyes-open and 4) eyes-closed. Participants performed three trials of timed up and go (TUG) and lateral step-up test (LSUT) during both sessions. Outcome measures were sway area (SA [cm²]), average sway velocity (SV [cm/s]), TUG average time (s), and average number of LSUT repetitions. Data were analyzed using multivariate repeated measures analysis of variance and paired t-tests for examining PS effects on balance (SA and SV) and functional motor performance (TUG and LSUT), respectively.ResultsThe sample included 45 adults (35 females; mean age = 28.4 ± 6.3 years). The repeated-measures MANOVA indicated that PS was associated with better SA [F(1,44) = 9.6; p = 0.003;η_p² = 0.18] but not with SV [F(1,44) = 1.0; p = 0.319;η_p² = 0.02]. PS was associated with significantly better SA with decreasing base-of-support [F(1,44) = 9.9; p = 0.003;η_p² = 0.18]. Additionally, PS use was associated with better TUG [t(1,44) = 2.65; p = 0.014;Cohen's d = 0.39] but not LSUT performances [t(1,44) = −0.68; p = 0.499;Cohen's d = −0.10].ConclusionsPS was associated with better SA and TUG in adults with ADHD. Further studies are needed to investigate the effects of PS on balance performance using rigorous designs in this population.ImpactHealthcare providers should screen for PS status and balance when treating adults with ADHD to enhance safe motor performance.     

A counterexample to Fishburn's conjecture on finite linear qualitative probability

Kraft, Pratt and Seidenberg (Ann. Math. Statist. 30 (1959) 408) provided an infinite set of axioms which, when taken together with de Finetti's axiom, gives a necessary and sufficient set of “cancellation” conditions for representability of an ordering relation on subsets of a set by an order-preserving probability measure. Fishburn (1996) defined f(n) to be the smallest positive integer k such that every comparative probability ordering on an n-element set which satisfies the cancellation conditions C₄,…,C_k is representable. By the work of Kraft, Pratt, and Seidenberg (1959) and Fishburn (J. Math. Psychol. 40 (1996) 64; J. Combin. Design 5 (1997) 353), it is known that n-1?f(n)?n+1 for all n?5. Also Fishburn proved that f(5)=4, and conjectured that f(n)=n-1 for all n?5. In this paper we confirm that f(6)=5, but give counter-examples to Fishburn's conjecture for n=7, showing that f(7)?7. We summarise, correct and extend many of the known results on this topic, including the notion of “almost representability”, and offer an amended version of Fishburn's conjecture.     

Some representation problems for semiorders

Suppose we have a number representation of a semiorder 〈A, P〉 such that aPb iff f(a)+δ(a) < f(b), for all a, b ∈ A, where δ is a nonnegative function describing the variable jnd. Such an f (here called a closed representation) may not preserve the simple order relation $\text{R}{}^1$ generated by 〈A, P〉, i.e., $\text{aR}{}^1\text{b}$ but f(a) > f(b) for some f, δ and a, b ∈ A. We show that this “paradox” can be eliminated for closed and closed interval representations. For interval representations it appears to be impossible. That is why we introduce a new type of representation (an R-representation) which is of the most general form for number representations that preserve the linear structure of the represented semiorders. The necessary and sufficient condition for an R-representation is given. We also give some independent results on the semiorder structure. Theorems are proved for semiorders of arbitrary cardinality. The Axiom of Choice is used in the proofs.     

Assigning and combining probabilities in single-case studies: A second study

The present study builds on a previous proposal for assigning probabilities to the outcomes computed using different primary indicators in single-case studies. These probabilities are obtained by comparing the outcome to previously tabulated reference values, and they reflect the likelihood of the results in the case that no intervention effect is present. In the present study, we explored how well different metrics are translated into p values in the context of simulation data. Furthermore, two published multiple-baseline data sets were used to illustrate how well the probabilities might reflect the intervention effectiveness, as assessed by the original authors. Finally, the importance of which primary indicator would be used in each data set to be integrated was explored; two ways of combining probabilities were used: a weighted average and a binomial test. The results indicated that the translation into p values worked well for the two nonoverlap procedures, with the results for the regression-based procedure diverging due to some undesirable features of its performance. These p values, when either taken individually or combined, were well aligned with effectiveness for the real-life data. These results suggest that assigning probabilities can be useful for translating the primary measure into the same metric, using these probabilities as additional evidence of the importance of behavioral change, complementing visual analysis and professionals’ judgments.     

Pseudocontingencies derived from categorically organized memory representations

Pseudocontingencies (PCs) allow for inferences about the contingency between two variables X and Y when the conditions for genuine contingency assessment are not met. Even when joint observations X _i and Y _i about the same reference objects i are not available or are detached in time or space, the correlation r(X _i ,Y _i ) is readily inferred from base rates. Inferred correlations are positive (negative) if X and Y base rates are skewed in the same (different) directions. Such PC inferences afford useful proxies for actually existing contingencies. While previous studies have focused on PCs due to environmental base rates, the present research highlights memory organization as a natural source of PC effects. When information about two attributes X and Y is represented in a hierarchically organized categorical memory code, as category-wise base rates p(X) and p(Y), the reconstruction of item-level information from category base rates will naturally produce PC effects. Three experiments support this contention. When the yes base rates of two respondents in four questionnaire subscales (categories) were correlated, recalled and predicted item-level responses were correlated in the same direction, even when the original responses to specific items within categories were correlated in the opposite direction.     

Analyzing proximity matrices: The assessment of internal variation in combinatorial structure

A data analysis strategy is discussed for evaluating the degree to which a subset D of a larger object set S satisfies a particular algebraic property. Based on a set measure f(D) and a proximity function on S × S, two separate evaluation tasks, referred to as confirmatory and exploratory, are considered. In a confirmatory task the subset D is identified a priori and f(D) is compared against the distribution of f(·) over all subsets containing the same number of objects. The exploratory task, on the other hand, treats f(·) as an objective function to be optimized over all subsets of a given size. Examples of these two notions include the assessment of symmetry, cluster compactness, and the extent to which D satisfies the error-free conditions for a hierarchical model or a unidimensional scale.