A lag between understanding false belief and emotion attribution in young children: Relationships with linguistic ability and mothers' mental‐state language

This study examines the contribution of children's linguistic ability and mothers' use of mental‐state language to young children's understanding of false belief and their subsequent ability to make belief‐based emotion attributions. In Experiment 1, children (N = 51) were given three belief‐based emotion‐attribution tasks. A standard task in which the protagonist was a story character and the emotional outcomes were imagined, and two videos in which the story protagonist was a real infant and the emotional outcomes were observable (high and low expressed emotion conditions). Children's verbal ability (semantic competence) was also measured. In Experiment 2, children (N = 75) were given two belief‐based emotion tasks: the standard story task and the high expressed emotion video. In addition, children's verbal ability (syntactic competence) and mothers' use of mental‐state attributes when describing their children were also measured. The results showed that: (1) the lag between understanding false belief and emotion attribution was a stable feature of children's reasoning across the three tests; and (2) children who were more linguistically advanced and whose mothers' described them in more mentalistic terms were more likely to understand the association between false belief and emotion. The findings underline the continuing importance of verbal ability and linguistic input for children's developing theory‐of‐mind understanding, even after they display an understanding of false belief.     

Do social norms,false belief understanding,and metacognitive vocabulary influence irony comprehension? A study of five- and seven-year-old children

This study explores the effects of violating socially shared versus situationally defined norms on the understanding of ironic statements in 70 Italian-speaking five- and seven-year-old children. We also considered the possible relationships between irony understanding, receptive and metacognitive vocabulary, and false belief understanding. The results showed that violating socially shared norms does not benefit younger children's understanding of irony, although it does help older children's understanding. Ironic utterances that violate situationally defined norms were understood similarly across the two age groups. First- and second-order false belief understanding did not predict children's ability to interpret irony, although metacognitive vocabulary did predict interpretation for the seven-year-old group in instances of violating a situationally defined norm.     

Sibling conflict and theory of mind

This study examined conflicts between siblings in an attempt to identify variables that are related to false‐belief understanding. The variables investigated were children's use of mental state terms and specific types of arguments (Slomkowski & Dunn, 1992) that occurred during conflict episodes. Twenty‐two children between 3 and 5 years of age were administered eight false‐belief tasks and were also videotaped while playing with an older sibling. Use of other‐oriented arguments by the target child was significantly associated with success on false‐belief tasks after controlling for age and general language ability. No use of argument was negatively related to performance on the false‐belief tasks after controlling for age and general language ability. Neither the use of self‐oriented arguments nor use of mental state terms was found to be associated with false‐belief performance. The findings indicate that specific features of sibling conflicts are related to children's developing false‐belief understanding.     

Production of basic emotions by children with congenital blindness: Evidence for the embodiment of theory of mind

Children with congenital blindness are delayed in understanding other people's minds. The present study examined whether this delay was related to a more primitive form of inter‐subjectivity by which infants draw correspondence between parental mirroring of the infant's display and proprioceptive sensations. Twenty children with congenital blindness and 20 typically‐developing sighted children aged between 4 and 12 years were administered a series of tasks examining false belief and emotion understanding and production. The blind children scored lower on the false belief tasks and did not convey emotions facially to adult observers as accurately as sighted participants. The adults' ratings of the children's expressions were correlated with the children's scores on the false belief tasks. It is suggested that understanding people's minds might be anchored in primitive embodied forms of relatedness.     

Three‐year‐olds express suspense when an agent approaches a scene with a false belief

Research on early false belief understanding has entirely relied on affect‐neutral measures such as judgments (standard tasks), attentional allocation (looking duration, preferential looking, anticipatory looking), or active intervention. We used a novel, affective measure to test whether preschoolers affectively anticipate another's misguided acts. In two experiments, 3‐year‐olds showed more expressions of suspense (by, e.g. brow furrowing or lip biting) when they saw an agent approach a scene with a false as opposed to a true belief (Experiment 1) or ignorance (Experiment 2). This shows that the children anticipated the agent's surprise and disappointment when encountering reality. The findings suggest that early implicit knowledge of false beliefs includes anticipations of the affective implications of erring. This vital dimension of beliefs should no longer be ignored in research on early theory of mind.     

Knowing that I didn't know: preschoolers' understanding of their own false belief is a predictor of assents to fictitious events

The present study examines the relation between children's theory of mind abilities and their tendency to assent to fictitious events when questioned repeatedly across interviews. Children between the ages of 3 and 6 years were interviewed individually either four or seven times about a fictitious and a real staged event, and in addition given a false belief test as well as a fantasy‐reality distinction test. Children's performance on the false belief task addressing the understanding of their own false belief was a better predictor for assents to false events than was understanding the false belief of another person, age, number of interviews and performance on a fantasy‐reality distinction task. Children's memory for a staged event showed that repeated questions across interviews was related to a decrease in correct assents to having experienced a staged event, an increase in wrong yes‐responses about touch and erroneously mentioning names of children who had not been present during the staged event. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Relationship between Chinese children's imaginary companions and their understanding of second-order false beliefs and emotions

We investigated relationship between Chinese children's imaginary companions (ICs) and their understanding of second-order false beliefs and emotions in 180 children, aged 5–6 years old. We examined the potential differences in second-order false belief understanding and emotion understanding between children with and without ICs, children with egalitarian IC relationships and hierarchical IC relationships, as well as children with invisible friends and personified objects. The results revealed that children with ICs had better second-order false belief understanding and emotion understanding than children without ICs. Compared with children with hierarchical relationships, children with egalitarian relationships had better second-order false belief understanding. However, children with invisible friends and personified objects did not differ on their understanding of second-order false beliefs and emotions. The results suggest that compared with IC types, IC status and child-IC relationship qualities may be more relevant to children's theory of mind. It will be interesting for the future researchers to investigate the underlying mechanism of the differences between children with egalitarian IC relationships and hierarchical IC relationships.     

Guessing versus choosing – and seeing versus believing – in false belief tasks

Three‐ and 4‐year‐old children were tested using videos of puppets in various versions of a theory of mind change‐of‐location situation, in order to answer several questions about what children are doing when they pass false belief tests. To investigate whether children were guessing or confidently choosing their answer to the test question, a condition in which children were forced to guess was also included, and measures of uncertainty were compared across conditions. To investigate whether children were using simpler strategies than an understanding of false belief to pass the test, we teased apart the seeing‐knowing confound in the traditional change‐of‐location task. We also investigated relations between children's performance on true and false belief tests. Results indicated that children appeared to be deliberately choosing, not guessing, in the false belief tasks. Children performed just as well whether the protagonist gained information about the object visually or verbally, indicating that children were not using a simple rule based on seeing to predict the protagonist's behaviour. A true belief condition was significantly easier for children than a false belief condition as long as it was of low processing demands. Children's success rate on the different versions of the standard false belief task was influenced by factors such as processing demands of the stories and the child's verbal abilities.     

Older children's misunderstanding of uncertain belief after passing the false belief test

A four-location belief task was designed to examine children's understanding of another's uncertain belief after passing a false belief (FB) task. In Experiment 1, after passing the FB task, participants were asked what a puppet would do after he failed to find his toy at the falsely believed location. Most 4-year-olds and half of 6-year-olds children who passed the FB test showed difficulty in handling uncertain belief; answering that the puppet would then look for his toy at the current (moved-to) location. Eight-year-old children and adults all recognized that the puppet would look for the toy everywhere, or at random. In Experiment 2, 4- and 6-year-olds were presented two other search tasks; it was shown that preschoolers could use search strategies to solve a similar search problem when FB was not involved. This new aspect of post-FB understanding can be interpreted in terms of limited understanding of uncertainty in a less-knowledgeable individual and of limited ability to infer the consequences of belief-disconfirmation.     

Relations Among Preschool Children's Understanding of Visual Perspective Taking,False Belief,and Lying

This study investigated the relations among preschool children's ability to understand that other people see things differently than they do, that other people can believe things differently than the children know to be true, and that they can manipulate others' beliefs through intentional lying. Children between the ages of 3 and 5 were given tasks that tested their knowledge of Level 2 visual perspective taking, understanding of false belief, and the discriminative use of deceptive ploys. The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT-III) was administered as a measure of language proficiency. The children's scores on the three types of tasks were correlated with each other and with children's age, but not with scores on the PPVT-III. Most children either passed all the tasks or failed all the tasks. Regression analyses indicated that scores on visual perspective taking and false belief independently predicted each other, and scores on false belief and the discriminative use of deception independently predicted each other. The results provide evidence that advances in visual perspective taking, false belief understanding, and the discriminative use of deceptive ploys are developmentally related and occur in close synchrony.     

幼儿对基于信念的惊奇情绪的认知发展

采用简化的错误信念任务,考察了90名3~5岁幼儿对自己或他人信念证伪引发的惊奇情绪认知及其错误信念理解。结果显示,3~5岁幼儿对自身或是故事主人公信念证伪之后的惊奇情绪理解表现出显著的发展趋势,其归因均以情境定向为主,只有极少数幼儿提到了相应的信念状态。3、4、5幼儿对他人、以及自身错误信念的认知基本是一致的,通过率分别为一半左右、76.7%、93.3%。幼儿对惊奇情绪产生原因的逆向推理能力在3~5岁之间获得了显著的发展,这一能力显著差于其错误信念认知,且略低于其顺向预测能力。这些结果揭示出幼儿很早就发展的心理理论以及心理表征技能在惊奇情绪理解中的作用     

Charting the development of representational skills: When do children know that maps can lead and mislead?

This study was conducted to test Perner's (1991) hypothesis that 3-year-olds fail the false belief task because they cannot metarepresent (represent a representation's sense and reference). Preschoolers made and interpreted symbolic maps, and were tested on their understanding of the implications of following an incorrect map (false belief test). Young 3-year-olds showed some ability to make and use maps but performed poorly on the false belief tests. Children were more likely to use an incorrect map to predict behavior if the represented object was missing instead of in a wrong location. Many children were also able to predict that someone who used an incorrect map would not “find” the object. These results contradict Perner's hypothesis and suggest that representational skills develop gradually rather than appearing in a radical conceptual shift at age 4.     

Being proven wrong elicits learning in children – but only in those with higher executive function skills

This study investigated whether prompting children to generate predictions about an outcome facilitates activation of prior knowledge and improves belief revision. 51 children aged 9–12 were tested on two experimental tasks in which generating a prediction was compared to closely matched control conditions, as well as on a test of executive functions (EF). In Experiment 1, we showed that children exhibited a pupillary surprise response to events that they had predicted incorrectly, hypothesized to reflect the transient release of noradrenaline in response to cognitive conflict. However, children's surprise response was not associated with better belief revision, in contrast to a previous study involving adults. Experiment 2 revealed that, while generating predictions helped children activate their prior knowledge, only those with better inhibitory control skills learned from incorrectly predicted outcomes. Together, these results suggest that good inhibitory control skills are needed for learning through cognitive conflict. Thus, generating predictions benefits learning – but only among children with sufficient EF capacities to harness surprise for revising their beliefs.     

Spatial Mapping in Preschoolers: Close Comparisons Facilitate Far Mappings

To test the hypothesis that comparison processes facilitate schema extraction, we studied the effect of making comparisons on 3-year-olds' ability to perform mapping tasks. In 3 studies, children were tested on their ability to find a hidden toy in a model room after being shown its location in a perceptually different room. In Experiment 1 we found that seeing 2 similar hiding events-permitting a sequential comparison-improved 3-year-olds' performance on the mapping task. Experiment 2 showed a more striking effect: Simply comparing the initial hiding model with another nearly identical model helped children to succeed on the subsequent mapping task. Experiment 3 showed that the comparison effect was not simply due to an opportunity to interact with 2 examples, but was specific to comparing them. We conclude that comparing examples can facilitate children's noticing common relational schemas-in this case, a spatial relational schema-and their ability to use this system of relations in subsequent tasks.Our central hypothesis is that the process of comparison is a major force in children's learning and development. In this work, we test the specific claim that drawing comparisons among similar spatial arrays fosters insight into the common spatial relations, as assessed in a subsequent spatial mapping task.     

Parent–child talk and children's understanding of beliefs and emotions

We examined the development of children's understanding of beliefs and emotions in relation to parental talk about the psychological world. We considered the relations between parent–child talk about the emotions of characters depicted in a picture book, false belief understanding and emotion understanding. Seventy-eight primarily Caucasian and middle-class parents and their 3- to 5-year-old children participated (half boys and half girls). The emotions talked about were relatively simple, but the complexity of the situation varied in terms of whether or not an understanding of beliefs was required to understand the emotion. Talk about the belief-dependent aspects of the emotions of picture book characters predicted children's false belief understanding, whereas talk about non-belief-dependent aspects of these emotions predicted children's emotion understanding. We argue that these data suggest that the development of children's understanding of beliefs and emotions is intertwined with learning to talk about the psychological world.     

Implicit understanding of belief

Implicit understanding of false belief was investigated by monitoring where children look in anticipation of a protagonist reappearing, when the protagonist mistakenly thinks that his desired object is in a different place from the place where it really is. This implicit measure of understanding was contrasted with children's explicit answers to the experimenter's question about where the protagonist would look for the object. Children from 2 years 5 months to 2 years 10 months erroneously looked at the object's real location, which they gave for their answer. From 2 years 11 months to 4 years 5 months, about 90% of the children looked at the empty location where the protagonist thought the object was.In sharp contrast, only about 45% of the children in this age span gave that location as their explicit answer to the experimenter's question. These results are explained in terms of a distinction between representing a fact and making a judgment about that fact.     

Young children's practical deceptions and their understanding of false belief

This paper deals with young children's understanding of false belief and their behaviour in situations of deception. It is argued that it is unsurprising that children under the age of 4 fail traditional false belief tests; and yet that children aged 2–3 do implement deceptive behaviours. To achieve compatibility, a particular category of deceptive acts (deceptive acts where awareness of the dupe's erroneous belief plays no role) is detailed. Deceptive behaviours are treated as belonging to the category of pretend behaviours. Some developmental considerations, concerning the links between deception and false belief are put forward.     

Preschoolers’ Theory-of-Mind Knowledge Influences Whom They Trust About Others’ Theories of Mind

Two experiments examined whether particular aspects of social-cognitive knowledge predicted how preschoolers would treat informants who displayed a more or less developed understanding of that knowledge. In Experiment 1, children's own success on false-belief measures correlated with the extent to which they endorsed information generated by a confederate with a more developed sense of false belief over a confederate with a less developed sense of false belief. In Experiment 2, preschoolers were assessed for whether they possessed a more action-based or mental state-based understanding of pretense. They were then presented with informants who displayed each kind of knowledge. Children's own knowledge again correlated with which informant they believed was a reliable source of knowledge about novel pretend actions. These results not only extend findings in the “trust in testimony” literature beyond word learning, but also potentially reveal another mechanism by which children learn from others—they might trust others’ information about a specific piece of knowledge based on examination of their own knowledge of that domain.     

The ontogeny of intent‐based normative judgments

When evaluating norm transgressions, children begin to show some sensitivity to the agent's intentionality around preschool age. However, the specific developmental trajectories of different forms of such intent‐based judgments and their cognitive underpinnings are still largely unclear. The current studies, therefore, systematically investigated the development of intent‐based normative judgments as a function of two crucial factors: (a) the type of the agent's mental state underlying a normative transgression, and (b) the type of norm transgressed (moral versus conventional). In Study 1, 5‐ and 7‐year‐old children as well as adults were presented with vignettes in which an agent transgressed either a moral or a conventional norm. Crucially, she did so either intentionally, accidentally (not intentionally at all) or unknowingly (intentionally, yet based on a false belief regarding the outcome). The results revealed two asymmetries in children's intent‐based judgments. First, all age groups showed greater sensitivity to mental state information for moral compared to conventional transgressions. Second, children's (but not adults') normative judgments were more sensitive to the agent's intention than to her belief. Two subsequent studies investigated this asymmetry in children more closely and found evidence that it is based on performance factors: children are able in principle to take into account an agent's false belief in much the same way as her intentions, yet do not make belief‐based judgments in many existing tasks (like that of Study 1) due to their inferential complexity. Taken together, these findings contribute to a more systematic understanding of the development of intent‐based normative judgment.