Computation,hypercomputation, and physical science

Copeland and others have argued that the Church–Turing thesis (CTT) has been widely misunderstood by philosophers and cognitive scientists. In particular, they have claimed that CTT is in principle compatible with the existence of machines that compute functions above the “Turing limit,” and that empirical investigation is needed to determine the “exact membership” of the set of functions that are physically computable. I argue for the following points: (a) It is highly doubtful that philosophers and cognitive scientists have widely misunderstood CTT as alleged.¹ In fact, by and large, computability theorists and mathematical logicians understand CTT in the exact same way. (b) That understanding most likely coincides with what Turing and Church had in mind. Even if it does not, an accurate exegesis of Turing and Church need not dictate how today's working scientists understand the thesis. (c) Even if we grant Copeland's reading of CTT, an orthodox stronger version of it which he rejects (Gandy's thesis) follows readily if we only accept a highly plausible necessary condition for what constitutes a deterministic digital computer. Finally, (d) regardless of whether we accept this condition, the prospects for a scientific theory of hypercomputation are exceedingly poor because physical science does not have the wherewithal to investigate computability or to discover its ultimate “limit.”     

McAllister's aesthetics in science: A critical notice

In Beauty and Revolution in Science, James McAllister argues that a sophisticated rationalist image of science can accommodate two prominent features of actual scientific practice, namely, appeals to “aesthetic” criteria in theory choice, and the occurrence of scientific “revolutions”. The aesthetic criteria to which scientists appeal are, he maintains, inductively grounded in the empirical record of competing theories, and scientific revolutions involve changes in aestheic criteria bu continuity in empirical criteria of theory choice. I raise difficulties for McAllister's account concerning: (a) the nature and scope of “aesthetic” criteria in science; (b) the rationality of appeals to aestheic criteria in science; (c) the rationality of scientific revolutions.     

A Kuhnian critique of Hume on miracles

In Part I of “Of Miracles,” Hume argues that belief in miracle-testimony is never justified. While Hume’s argument has been widely criticized and defended along a number of different veins, including its import on scientific inquiry, this paper takes a novel approach by comparing Hume’s argument with Thomas Kuhn’s account of scientific anomalies. This paper makes two arguments: first that certain types of scientific anomalies—those that conflict with the corresponding paradigm theory—are analogous to miracles in the relevant ways. Note, importantly, that the argument applies only to the first definition of ‘miracle’ that Hume offers (i.e. ‘miracle’ as a “violation of the laws of nature.”) Second, it argues that we are sometimes rationally justified in believing testimony for scientific anomalies (that conflict with the corresponding paradigm theory), because there have been several cases of scientists accepting such anomalies and—assuming certain criteria are met—we are rationally justified in believing these scientists. If both arguments are successful, then it is possible to be rationally justified in believing miracle-testimony, though the extent of justification depends on various criteria and comes in degrees. After examining a few objections, the paper concludes by contextualizing this argument in relation to Part II of Hume’s essay and in relation to broader apologetic concerns. In short, it is vital to recognize that this paper’s focus is Hume’s first account of ‘miracle,’ rather than his argument against miracle-testimony more broadly, but the argument could be coupled with other arguments against Hume’s broader attack on miracle-testimony.

     

Ernest Gellner's Words and Things: A Case Study of Empirical Philosophy

This article considers how Ernest Gellner used sociology and anthropology to attack ordinary language philosophy in Words and Things. It argues that this attack can be seen as a part of the movement to make philosophy more empirical or “naturalized,” something that has not been generally noted. It also discusses what general lessons to draw from Words and Things regarding how empirical knowledge should be used in philosophy. Among other things, the article argues that one important lesson is that empirical philosophers should make more use of “soft” social sciences, such as sociology and anthropology, and not focus exclusively on “harder” disciplines, such as physics and experimental psychology. Another upshot of the discussion is that philosophers should draw on empirical knowledge not only when they solve problems but also when they formulate them.     

Thought Experiments in Philosophy: A Neo-Kantian and Experimentalist Point of View

The paper addresses the question of the nature and limits of philosophical thought experiments. On the one hand, experimental philosophers are right to claim that we need much more laboratory work in order to have more reliable thought experiments, but on the other hand a naturalism that is too radical is incapable of clarifying the peculiarity of thought experiments in philosophy. Starting from a historico-critical reconstruction of Kant’s concept of the “experiments of pure reason”, this paper outlines an account of thought experiments in philosophy that tries to reconcile the thesis of a principled difference between scientific and philosophical TEs with the position of a methodological naturalism that does not admit any difference in kind between the methods of science and of philosophy.

     

The harms of ignoring the social nature of science

In this paper I argue that philosophers of science have an obligation to recognize and engage with the social nature of the sciences they assess if those sciences are morally relevant. Morally-relevant science is science that has the potential to risk harm to humans, non-humans, or the environment. My argument and the approach I develop are informed by an analysis of the philosophy of biology literature on the criticism of evolutionary psychology (EP), the study of the evolution of human psychology and behaviour. From this literature, I tease out two different methods of scientific critique. The first I call the “truth-detectional” approach. Those who take this approach are first and foremost concerned about the truth of EP claims as that truth can be determined by evidence. The second I call the “social-dimensional” approach. Those who take this approach talk about the production and truth of EP claims but within a social framework. On this account, the legitimacy and perceived legitimacy of EP claims are not separate from the institutional and social processes and values that lend to their production. I show that the truth-detectional approach risks harms to society and to the philosophy of science, but that the social-dimensional approach avoids these harms. Philosophers of science, therefore, should take a social-dimensional approach to the assessment of morally-relevant science.

     

Should We All be Scientists? Re-thinking Laboratory Research as a Calling

In recent years there have been major shifts in how the role of science—and scientists—are understood. The critical examination of scientific expertise within the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS) are increasingly eroding notions of the “otherness” of scientists. It would seem to suggest that anyone can be a scientist—when provided with the appropriate training and access to data. In contrast, however, ethnographic evidence from the scientific community tells a different story. Scientists are quick to recognize that not everyone can—or should—be a scientist. Appealing to notions such as “good hands” or “gut feelings”, scientists narrate a distinction between good and bad scientists that cannot be reduced to education, access, or opportunity. The key to good science requires scientists to express an intuitive feeling for their discipline, but also that individuals derive considerable personal satisfaction from their work. Discussing this personal joy in—and “fittingness” of—scientific occupations using the fields of STS, ethics and science policy is highly problematic. In this paper we turn to theology discourse to analyze the notion of “callings” as a means of understanding this issue. Callings highlight the identification and examination of individual talents to determine fit occupations for specific persons. Framing science as a calling represents a novel view of research that places the talents and dispositions of individuals and their relationship to the community at the center of flourishing practices.     

Knowledge,Truth and Plausibility

From antiquity several philosophers have claimed that the goal of natural science is truth. In particular, this is a basic tenet of contemporary scientific realism. However, all concepts of truth that have been put forward are inadequate to modern science because they do not provide a criterion of truth. This means that we will generally be unable to recognize a scientific truth when we reach it. As an alternative, this paper argues that the goal of natural science is plausibility and considers some characters of plausibility.     

Epistemic Rationality

Many epistemologists and philosophers of science, especially those with “naturalist” inclinations, argue that if there is to be any such thing as normativity or rationality in these domains, it must be instrumental—roughly, a matter of goal satisfaction—rather than something involving normative “oughts” that are independent of the satisfaction of our epistemic, cognitive, or other ends. This paper argues that while such an instrumental conception of epistemic rationality is perfectly respectable, even insofar as it concerns specifically epistemic ends, it cannot be the whole story about such normativity. Rather, it must be accompanied by a “categorical,” goal‐independent sort of normativity that cannot be reduced to instrumental rationality, both because instrumental rationality itself depends on a noninstrumental relationship between a belief/claim/theory and the evidence that renders it rational, and because the epistemic rationality of many beliefs is independent of the goals of their believers.     

Blinding me with (queer) science: religion, sexuality, and (post?) modernity

This essay brings to bear insights from continental philosophers Michel Foucault and Judith Butler on the science of (homo)sexuality and, more importantly, the desire to use such science to resolve contemporary conflicts over homosexuality’s acceptability. So-called “queer science” remains deeply beholden to modern notions of sex, gender, and sexuality, the author argues, a schematic that its premodern (Christian) roots further denaturalize. The philosophical insights drawn from this analysis are then applied to the controversy over homosexuality within global Christianity that often pits the “backward” former colonies against the “modern” west.     

Normative Philosophy of Science: Responding to Special-Interest Science

This article shows why it is important to do normative or practical philosophy of science, especially philosophy of science that criticizes and evaluates contemporary use of scientific methods to analyze welfare-affecting societal problems. The article (1) introduces the scientific, ethical, and social problem of environmental injustice—disproportionate environmental and pollution threats that are responsible for roughly 40% of all preventable disease and death. Next it (2) explains that many deadly threats (like pollution) continue in part because of “special-interest science”, methodologically flawed science that is done to promote corporate profits, rather than truth, then (3) argues that philosophers of science should use normative or practical philosophy of science to critique and expose special-interest science. To illustrate special-interest science, the article (4) provides two case studies, on diesel-particulate-matter pollution and on organophophate-pesticide pollution, and (5) shows how diesel and pesticide polluters use special-interest science. For instance, they often ignore observational data, illegitimately demand statistically significant evidence of harm from observational data, use small sample sizes, do the wrong tests, or demand certainty—rather than a preponderance of evidence—to justify a conclusion about pollution harm. They also use flawed normative arguments to defend both diesel and pesticide pollution. The article (6) concludes that, given the epistemic, scientific, human-welfare toll of special-interest science, philosophers of science need to do normative or practical philosophy of science that exposes these scientific flaws.     

A Defense of Partisan-Science: An Assessment of Stenmark's Non-Partisan Science3

Abstract

In his influential book “How to Relate Science and Religion,” Mikael Stenmark argues for the legitimateness of what he calls “partisan science”: “science that is aligned with or supports a particular ideology, religion, or worldview over another.” However, he maintains that we should make an exception: the justification phase of science (phase 3) requires neutral science. Thus, he argues for “non-partisan science₃.” In this article, I assess his arguments for non-partisan science₃. I find them wanting and I will argue for partisan science₃ and maintain that we should adhere to “Augustinian” or “theistic science.”     

Mind,Consciousness, and Free Will

This commentary discusses how philosophy and science can collaborate to understand the human mind, considering dialogues involving three philosophers and three cognitive scientists. Their topics include the relation of philosophy and science, the nature of mind, the problem of consciousness, and the existence of free will. I argue that philosophy is more general and normative than science, but they are interdependent. Philosophy can build on the cognitive sciences to develop a theory of mind I call “multilevel materialism,” which integrates molecular, neural, mental, and social mechanisms. Consciousness is increasingly being understood as resulting from neural mechanisms. Scientific advances make the traditional concept of free will implausible, but “freeish” will is consistent with new theories of decision making and action resulting from brain processes. Philosophers should work closely with scientists to address profound problems about knowledge, reality, and values.     

Two approaches to natural kinds

Philosophical treatments of natural kinds are embedded in two distinct projects. I call these the philosophy of science approach and the philosophy of language approach. Each is characterized by its own set of philosophical questions, concerns, and assumptions. The kinds studied in the philosophy of science approach are projectible categories that can ground inductive inferences and scientific explanation. The kinds studied in the philosophy of language approach are the referential objects of a special linguistic category—natural kind terms—thought to refer directly. Philosophers may hope for a unified account addresses both sets of concerns. This paper argues that this cannot be done successfully. No single account can satisfy both the semantic objectives of the philosophy of language approach and the explanatory projects of the philosophy of science approach. After analyzing where the tensions arise, I make recommendations about assumptions and projects that are best abandoned, those that should be retained, and those that should go their separate ways. I also recommend adopting the disambiguating terminology of “scientific kinds” and “natural kinds” for the different notions of kinds developed in these different approaches.

     

Rationality and the psychology of inference

Recent advances in the cognitive psychology of inference have been of great interest to philosophers of science. The present paper reviews one such area, namely studies based upon Wason's “4-card” selection task. It is argued that interpretation of the results of the experiments is complex, because a variety of inference strategies may be used by subjects to select evidence needed to confirm or disconfirm a hypothesis. Empirical evidence suggests that which strategy is used depends in part on the semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic context of the inference problem at hand. Since the factors of importance are also present in real-world science, and similarly complicate its interpretation, the selection task, though it does not present a “quick fix”, represents a kind of microcosm of great utility for the understanding of science. Several studies which have examined selection strategies in more complex problem-solving environments are also reviewed, in an attempt to determine the limits of generalizability of the simpler selection tasks. Certain interpretational misuses of laboratory research are described, and a claim made that the issue of whether or not scientists are rational should be approached by philosophers and psychologists with appropriate respect for the complexities of the issue.     

A Defense and Critical Appraisal of Sosaesque Virtue Epistemology

This paper attempts three things. The first is a defense and the rest is a critical appraisal of a crucial notion involved in the defense. First, it argues that John Turri’s criticisms of Ernest Sosa’s virtue epistemological account of knowledge that it fails to rule out Gettier cases rest on a misconstrual of the “because of clause” which Sosa employs. Turri overlooks the notion of “success manifests competence” which is central to understand the “because of” clause. Thus, the position of Sosa is defended from the criticisms of Turri. Secondly, it critically examines the notion of “success manifests competence” which is a crucial notion in Sosa’s account. It argues, unlike what Sosa seems to hold, some of the conditions which Sosa provides for “success manifests competence” are not necessary. It also clarifies, by agreeing with Sosa, that the conditions he provides are not sufficient for “success manifests competence.” Thirdly, it briefly argues that Sosa’s occasional insistence that complete competence should be present in the case of success manifests competence brings in certain internal tension in the account of Sosa. Thus, the paper defends Sosa’s position from the criticisms of Turri; but it also clarifies Sosa’s account as well as raises some criticisms to it.

     

Getting ontologically natural

It is argued that Arthur Fine's “natural ontological attitude” (NOA), i.e., the view that science should not be philosophically (either realistically or anti‐realistically) interpreted at all but should rather be allowed to “speak for itself”, is seriously problematic, even though it contains deep insights which philosophers of science should take into account. In particular, Fine succeeds in showing that no non‐question‐begging, conclusive demonstration of scientific realism (e.g., on “explanationist” grounds) is possible. But this is not a threat to scientific realism, if realism is subordinated to pragmatism. From the pragmatic point of view, the demand for a non‐circular proof of scientific realism is mistaken. Rather, realism can be seen as our natural attitude, based on our practices, scientific and otherwise. Fine's NOA turns out to be, on a charitable reading, quite close to a version of pragmatic realism. The paper concludes by briefly examining the idea of regarding realism as a “narrative explanation” of science.     

Against Mathematical Explanation

Lately, philosophers of mathematics have been exploring the notion of mathematical explanation within mathematics. This project is supposed to be analogous to the search for the correct analysis of scientific explanation. I argue here that given the way philosophers have been using “explanation,” the term is not applicable to mathematics as it is in science.     

Is psychoanalysis alive and well at 85? A rejoinder

Psychoanalysis has declined in public interest and scientific validity. It has become a “dead science” and an anachronistic system of beliefs. Its goal of total personality reconstruction is frustrating and futile. Psychoanalytic practice became a form of “exclusive salvationism,” and unconscionable, when it excluded the spouse from participation in the total treatment plan. More frequent interviews over a longer period of time do not produce a therapeutic effect that is “deeper,” and there is no reason to believe that fewer interviews are superficial, or temporary, and that prolongation of an analysis is more likely to produce better therapeutic results. Research studies do not produce any clear-cut winners when psychotherapies are compared. Psychoanalytic theories rest more on argument than on scientific evidence. The patient’s needs seldom, if ever, correspond to the therapist’s theoretical preoccupations, system of beliefs, and indoctrination. Research psychologists, philosophers of science, and eclectic psychiatrists have expressed their dissatisfaction with unproven psychoanalytic doctrines and the concept of “mental energy.” Psychoanalysis is not a pseudoscience, but a “half-science,” whose poetic mythology requires translation into the prose of science.