Perceptual interactions in a minimalist virtual environment

How in real-life or through the use of technical devices can we recognize the presence of other persons and under what conditions can we differentiate them from objects? In order to approach this question, in the study reported here we explored the most basic conditions necessary for participants to recognize the presence of another person during a perceptual interaction. We created a mini-network of two minimalist devices and investigated whether participants were able to differentiate the perception of another person from the perception of a fixed and a mobile object even when the pattern of sensory stimulation was reduced to a bare minimum. We show that participants can recognize when the all-or-none tactile stimulation they experienced was attributable to an encounter with the other participant's avatar or the mobile object rather than with a fixed object. Participants were also able to establish different strategies in order to favor the situations of mutual perception. Thus, in the minimalist conditions of our experiment, the perception of another intentional subject was not based purely on any particular shape or objective trajectories of displacement; it was also based on properties that are intrinsic to the joint perceptual activity itself.     

How to be a minimalist about sets

According to the iterative conception of set, sets can be arranged in a cumulative hierarchy divided into levels. But why should we think this to be the case? The standard answer in the philosophical literature is that sets are somehow constituted by their members. In the first part of the paper, I present a number of problems for this answer, paying special attention to the view that sets are metaphysically dependent upon their members. In the second part of the paper, I outline a different approach, which circumvents these problems by dispensing with the priority or dependence relation altogether. Along the way, I show how this approach enables the mathematical structuralist to defuse an objection recently raised against her view.     

Experimental evidence for a minimalist account of English resumptive pronouns.

In this article we provide evidence for a Minimalist account of English-type resumptive pronouns. Our findings provide empirical support for syntactic theories that, like Minimalist accounts, allow for competition among derivations. According to our account, resumptive pronouns are spell-outs of traces. For reasons of economy, the resumptive pronoun surfaces only when the derivation with the trace is precluded by syntactic principles. This account predicts that resumptive pronouns should only improve violations of constraints on representation, and not violations of constraints on movement. We tested this prediction by conducting an acceptability judgment task with 36 native speakers of English. The results bore out our prediction; subjects preferred the resumptive pronoun over the trace in cases where the trace itself was illicit, but not in cases where only the movement operation was illicit.     

A process-based model for an interactive ontology

The paper proposes a process-based model for an ontology that encompasses the emergence of process systems generated by increasingly complex levels of organization. Starting with a division of processes into those that are persistent and those that are fleeting, the model builds through a series of exclusive and exhaustive disjunctions. The crucial distinction is between those persistent and cohesive systems that are energy wells, and those that are far-from-equilibrium. The latter are necessarily open; they can persist only by interaction with their environments. Further distinctions, developed by means of the notions of self-maintenance and error detection, lead to the identification of complex biological organisms that are flexible learners, some of which are self-conscious and form themselves into social institutions. This model provides a non-reductive model for understanding human beings as both embodied and yet emergent. In particular, it provides a way of characterizing action as ‘metaphysically deep’, not an ontological embarrassment within an otherwise physicalist world.     

Self-awareness: A proposal for supervision

Summary Herein has been presented a questionnaire intended to encourage students in the helping professions to explore their feelings and attitudes and thereby to build self-awareness. I have suggested that such a questionnaire be utilized as a catalyst for small group discussion and interaction. In this way the student's self-awareness and personal and professional growth could be enhanced.     

A proposal for handling missing data

A method for dealing with the problem of missing observations in multivariate data is developed and evaluated. The method uses a transformation of the principal components of the data to estimate missing entries. The properties of this method and four alternative methods are investigated by means of a Monte Carlo study of 42 computer-generated data matrices. The methods are compared with respect to their ability to predict correlation matrices as well as missing entries. The results indicate that whenever there exists modest intercorrelations among the variables (i.e., average off diagonal correlation above .2) the proposed method is at least as good as the best alternative (a regression method) while being considerably faster and simpler computationally. Models for determining the best alternative based upon easily calculated characteristics of the matrix are given. The generality of these models is demonstrated using the previously published results of Timm.     

A modal ontology of properties for quantum mechanics

Our purpose in this paper is to delineate an ontology for quantum mechanics that results adequate to the formalism of the theory. We will restrict our aim to the search of an ontology that expresses the conceptual content of the recently proposed modal-Hamiltonian interpretation, according to which the domain referred to by non-relativistic quantum mechanics is an ontology of properties. The usual strategy in the literature has been to focus on only one of the interpretive problems of the theory and to design an interpretation to solve it, leaving aside the remaining difficulties. On the contrary, our aim in the present work is to formulate a “global” solution, according to which different problems can be adequately tackled in terms of a single ontology populated of properties, in which systems are bundles of properties. In particular, we will conceive indistinguishability between bundles as a relation derived from indistinguishability between properties, and we will show that states, when operating on combinations of indistinguishable bundles, act as if they were symmetric with no need of a symmetrization postulate.     

A process ontology for persons and their development

Persons are socio-cultural emergents—emerging progressively in the bio-psychological development of the individual. Persons are special kinds of agents, crucially characterized by their abilities to participate in the constitution of emergent social ontologies. I will present a model of these special bio-cultural relationships, and argue that modeling these relationships requires revisions in conceptions about the ontology of social realities, the relationships between agency and cognition, and naturalism and normativity.     

A proposal for a new system of credit allocation in science

This essay discusses some of the problems with current authorship practices and puts forward a proposal for a new system of credit allocation: in published works, scientists should more clearly define the responsibilities and contributions of members of research teams and should distinguish between different roles, such as author, statistican, technician, grant writer, data collector, and so forth. Dr. Resnik is an Associate Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Center for the Advancement of Ethics, University of Wyoming. Information is available on website: http://www.uwyo.edu/bu/acct/cae.htm     

Temporalizing ontology: a case for pragmatic emergence

Synthese - Despite an attempt to break with the hierarchical picture in traditional emergentist thought, non-standard accounts of emergence are often still committed to a premise that ontology is...     

Hindsight bias and causal reasoning: a minimalist approach

What factors contribute to hindsight bias, the phenomenon whereby the known outcome of an event appears obvious only after the fact? The Causal Model Theory (CMT) of hindsight bias (Nestler et al. in Soc Psychol 39:182–188, 2008a; in J Expl Psychol: Learn Mem Cog 34:1043–1054, 2008b; Pezzo in Mem 11:421–441, 2003; Wasserman et al. in Pers Soc Psychol Bull 17:30–35, 1991) posits that hindsight bias can occur when people have the opportunity to identify potential causal antecedents and evaluate whether they could have led to the outcome. Two experiments incorporating highly controlled minimalist scenarios supported the CMT. As predicted by the CMT, hindsight bias occurred when the causal factor explained the actual outcome better than the alternative outcome, and reverse hindsight bias occurred when the causal factor explained the alternative outcome better than the actual outcome. Moreover, we found new evidence that outcome knowledge alone was insufficient to elicit hindsight bias in the absence of a potential causal antecedent. Implications for future directions in hindsight bias research are discussed.     

A model-theoretic criterion of ontology

Conclusion My aim has been to adapt Quine's criterion of the ontological commitment of theories couched in standard quantificational idiom to a much broader class of theories by focusing on the set-theoretic structure of the models of those theories. For standard first-order theories, the two criteria coincide on simple entities. Divergences appear as they are applied to higher-order theories and as composite entities are taken into account. In support of the extended criterion, I appeal to its fruits in treating the various examples considered above and to the healthy intuitions of the non-noneists among us. Don't O(m) and E(m) comprise just the things we should have though existed according to a particular interpretation m of a language or a theory? Whatever the answer (and it will hardly be unanimous), I hope to have pointed the way towards a recognition of ontology as a worthwhile branch of modern theory.Earlier versions of parts of this paper were read at New York University, at the Australasian Association of Philosophy, and at the University of Sydney. I am very grateful to William Barrett, Keith Campbell, Gregory Currie, Kenneth Gemes, Toomas Karmo, and Stephen Read for comments and criticisms.     

Framework for formal ontology

The discussions which follow rest on a distinction, first expounded by Husserl, between formal logic and formal ontology. The former concerns itself with (formal) meaning-structures; the latter with formal structures amongst objects and their parts. The paper attempts to show how, when formal ontological considerations are brought into play, contemporary extensionalist theories of part and whole, and above all the mereology of Leniewski, can be generalised to embrace not only relations between concrete objects and object-pieces, but also relations between what we shall call dependent parts or moments. A two-dimensional formal language is canvassed for the resultant ontological theory, a language which owes more to the tradition of Euler, Boole and Venn than to the quantifier-centred languages which have predominated amongst analytic philosophers since the time of Frege and Russell. Analytic philosophical arguments against moments, and against the entire project of a formal ontology, are considered and rejected. The paper concludes with a brief account of some applications of the theory presented.