Properties,laws, and worlds

Jonathan Schaffer argues against a necessary connection between properties and laws. He takes this to be a question of what possible worlds we ought to countenance in our best theories of modality, counterfactuals, etc. In doing so, he unfairly rigs the game in favor of contingentism. I argue that the necessitarian can resist Schaffer’s conclusion while accepting his key premise that our best theories of modality, counterfactuals, etc. require a very wide range of things called ‘possible worlds’. However, the necessitarian can and should insist that, in many cases, these worlds are not metaphysically possible. I will further argue that, having taken such a stance, the necessitarian has additional resources to respond to Schaffer’s other arguments against the view.     

Sensitivity,safety, and impossible worlds

Philosophical Studies - Modal knowledge accounts that are based on standards possible-worlds semantics face well-known problems when it comes to knowledge of necessities. Beliefs in necessities are...     

Phenomenology,possible worlds and negation

I would like to thank Charles W. Harvey from the University of Central Arkansas and Leon Gumaski from the University of Toru in Poland for a number of useful criticisms of an earlier version of this paper.     

Existentialism,Self Theory and the Existential Self

Self theory is reductionistic: it brackets off “real” reality and leaves it in metaphysical realms. Existentialism views both subjective and external reality as contained in existence. Rogers' theory is deterministic to the extent that it is built on causal constructs. The non-deterministic, holistic, and teleological assumptions of the existentialists may help strengthen self theories. For example the term existential self would combine self-as-doer and self-as-object, making such constructs as self-concept, self structure, individual, and organism unnecessary. The individual's experience or perception would not have to be caused by a self-definition, but would be for the purpose of something, i.e., his intentions or goals.     

Theism,possible worlds,and the multiverse

God is traditionally taken to be a perfect being, and the creator and sustainer of all that is. So, if theism is true, what sort of world should we expect? To answer this question, we need an account of the array of possible worlds from which God is said to choose. It seems that either there is (a) exactly one best possible world; or (b) more than one unsurpassable world; or (c) an infinite hierarchy of increasingly better worlds. Influential arguments for atheism have been advanced on each hierarchy, and these jointly comprise a daunting trilemma for theism. In this paper, I argue that if theism is true, we should expect the actual world to be a multiverse comprised of all and only those universes which are worthy of creation and sustenance. I further argue that this multiverse is the unique best of all possible worlds. Finally, I explain how his unconventional view bears on the trilemma for theism.     

Theism,natural evil,and superior possible worlds

I am greatful to an anonymous referee for suggestions which improved the content of this paper.     

Partial worlds and paradox

Since universal language systems are confronted with serious paradoxical consequences, a semantic approach is developed in whichpartial worlds form the ontological basis. This approach shares withsituation semantics the basic idea that statements always refer to certain partial worlds, and it agrees with the extensional and model-theoretic character ofpossible worlds semantics. Within the framework of the partial worlds conception a satisfactory solution to theLiar paradox can be formulated. In particular, one advantage of this approach over those theories that are based on the totality of possible worlds semantics can be found in the fact that the so-called Strengthened Liar problem is avoided.I would like to thank Dirk Koppelberg for helpful remarks on an earlier draft of this paper. Special thanks to an anonymous referee for detailed comments.     

Information,possible worlds and the cooptation of scepticism

The article investigates the sceptical challenge from an information-theoretic perspective. Its main goal is to articulate and defend the view that either informational scepticism is radical, but then it is epistemologically innocuous because redundant; or it is moderate, but then epistemologically beneficial because useful. In order to pursue this cooptation strategy, the article is divided into seven sections. Section 1 sets up the problem. Section 2 introduces Borel numbers as a convenient way to refer uniformly to (the data that individuate) different possible worlds. Section 3 adopts the Hamming distance between Borel numbers as a metric to calculate the distance between possible worlds. In Sects. 4 and 5, radical and moderate informational scepticism are analysed using Borel numbers and Hamming distances, and shown to be either harmless (extreme form) or actually fruitful (moderate form). Section 6 further clarifies the approach by replying to some potential objections. In the conclusion, the Peircean nature of the overall approach is briefly discussed.