The Undecidability of Propositional Adaptive Logic

We investigate and classify the notion of final derivability of two basic inconsistency-adaptive logics. Specifically, the maximal complexity of the set of final consequences of decidable sets of premises formulated in the language of propositional logic is described. Our results show that taking the consequences of a decidable propositional theory is a complicated operation. The set of final consequences according to either the Reliability Calculus or the Minimal Abnormality Calculus of a decidable propositional premise set is in general undecidable, and can be -complete. These classifications are exact. For first order theories even finite sets of premises can generate such consequence sets in either calculus.     

Non-standard Stochastics with a First Order Algebraization

Internal sets and the Boolean algebras of the collection of the internal sets are of central importance in non-standard analysis. Boolean algebras are the algebraization of propositional logic while the logic applied in non-standard analysis (in non-standard stochastics) is the first order or the higher order logic (type theory). We present here a first order logic algebraization for the collection of internal sets rather than the Boolean one. Further, we define an unusual probability on this algebraization.     

Completeness in Hybrid Type Theory

We show that basic hybridization (adding nominals and @ operators) makes it possible to give straightforward Henkin-style completeness proofs even when the modal logic being hybridized is higher-order. The key ideas are to add nominals as expressions of type t, and to extend to arbitrary types the way we interpret \(@_i\) in propositional and first-order hybrid logic. This means: interpret \(@_i\alpha _a\) , where \(\alpha _a\) is an expression of any type \(a\) , as an expression of type \(a\) that rigidly returns the value that \(\alpha_a\) receives at the i-world. The axiomatization and completeness proofs are generalizations of those found in propositional and first-order hybrid logic, and (as is usual inhybrid logic) we automatically obtain a wide range of completeness results for stronger logics and languages. Our approach is deliberately low-tech. We don’t, for example, make use of Montague’s intensional type s, or Fitting-style intensional models; we build, as simply as we can, hybrid logicover Henkin’s logic.     

A Predicate Logical Extension of a Subintuitionistic Propositional Logic

We develop a predicate logical extension of a subintuitionistic propositional logic. Therefore a Hilbert type calculus and a Kripke type model are given. The propositional logic is formulated to axiomatize the idea of strategic weakening of Kripke's semantic for intuitionistic logic: dropping the semantical condition of heredity or persistence leads to a nonmonotonic model. On the syntactic side this leads to a certain restriction imposed on the deduction theorem. By means of a Henkin argument strong completeness is proved making use of predicate logical principles, which are only classically acceptable.     

Proof-Theoretic Functional Completeness for the Hybrid Logics of Everywhere and Elsewhere

A hybrid logic is obtained by adding to an ordinary modal logic further expressive power in the form of a second sort of propositional symbols called nominals and by adding so-called satisfaction operators. In this paper we consider hybridized versions of S5 (“the logic of everywhere”) and the modal logic of inequality (“the logic of elsewhere”). We give natural deduction systems for the logics and we prove functional completeness results.     

A cirquent calculus system with clustering and ranking

Cirquent calculus is a new proof-theoretic and semantic approach introduced by G. Japaridze for the needs of his theory of computability logic (CoL). The earlier article “From formulas to cirquents in computability logic” by Japaridze generalized formulas in CoL to circuit-style structures termed cirquents. It showed that, through cirquents with what are termed clustering and ranking, one can capture, refine and generalize independence-friendly (IF) logic. Specifically, the approach allows us to account for independence from propositional connectives in the same spirit as IF logic accounts for independence from quantifiers. Japaridze's treatment of IF logic, however, was purely semantical, and no deductive system was proposed. The present paper syntactically constructs a cirquent calculus system with clustering and ranking, sound and complete w.r.t. the propositional fragment of cirquent-based semantics. Such a system captures the propositional version of what is called extended IF logic, thus being an axiomatization of a nontrivial fragment of that logic.     

Semantic games with chance moves revisited: from IF logic to partial logic

We associate the semantic game with chance moves conceived by Blinov with Blamey’s partial logic. We give some equivalent alternatives to the semantic game, some of which are with a third player, borrowing the idea of introducing the pseudo-player called Nature in game theory. We observe that IF propositional logic proposed by Sandu and Pietarinen can be equivalently translated to partial logic, which implies that imperfect information may not be necessary for IF propositional logic. We also indicate that some independent quantifiers can be regarded as dependent quantifiers of indeterminate sequence, using the interjunction connective in partial logic. We conclude our paper by indicating some further research in a more general setting.     

Pure Extensions, Proof Rules, and Hybrid Axiomatics

In this paper we argue that hybrid logic is the deductive setting most natural for Kripke semantics. We do so by investigating hybrid axiomatics for a variety of systems, ranging from the basic hybrid language (a decidable system with the same complexity as orthodox propositional modal logic) to the strong Priorean language (which offers full first-order expressivity).We show that hybrid logic offers a genuinely first-order perspective on Kripke semantics: it is possible to define base logics which extend automatically to a wide variety of frame classes and to prove completeness using the Henkin method. In the weaker languages, this requires the use of non-orthodox rules. We discuss these rules in detail and prove non-eliminability and eliminability results. We also show how another type of rule, which reflects the structure of the strong Priorean language, can be employed to give an even wider coverage of frame classes. We show that this deductive apparatus gets progressively simpler as we work our way up the expressivity hierarchy, and conclude the paper by showing that the approach transfers to first-order hybrid logic.A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the fifth conference on Advances in Modal Logic (AiML 2004) in Manchester. We would like to thank Maarten Marx for his comments on an early draft and Agnieszka Kisielewska for help with the proof reading.Special Issue Ways of Worlds II. On Possible Worlds and Related Notions Edited by Vincent F. Hendricks and Stig Andur Pedersen     

Paraconsistency in classical logic

Classical propositional logic can be characterized, indirectly, by means of a complementary formal system whose theorems are exactly those formulas that are not classical tautologies, i.e., contradictions and truth-functional contingencies. Since a formula is contingent if and only if its negation is also contingent, the system in question is paraconsistent. Hence classical propositional logic itself admits of a paraconsistent characterization, albeit “in the negative”. More generally, any decidable logic with a syntactically incomplete proof theory allows for a paraconsistent characterization of its set of theorems. This, we note, has important bearing on the very nature of paraconsistency as standardly characterized.     

A Propositional Logic with Relative Identity Connective and a Partial Solution to the Paradox of Analysis

We construct a a system PLRI which is the classical propositional logic supplied with a ternary construction , interpreted as the intensional identity of statements and in the context . PLRI is a refinement of Roman Suszko’s sentential calculus with identity (SCI) whose identity connective is a binary one. We provide a Hilbert-style axiomatization of this logic and prove its soundness and completeness with respect to some algebraic models. We also show that PLRI can be used to give a partial solution to the paradox of analysis. Presented by Jacek Malinowski     

On The Computational Consequences of Independence in Propositional Logic

Sandu and Pietarinen [Partiality and Games: Propositional Logic. Logic J. IGPL 9 (2001) 101] study independence friendly propositional logics. That is, traditional propositional logic extended by means of syntax that allow connectives to be independent of each other, although the one may be subordinate to the other. Sandu and Pietarinen observe that the IF propositional logics have exotic properties, like functional completeness for three-valued functions. In this paper we focus on one of their IF propositional logics and study its properties, by means of notions from computational complexity. This approach enables us to compare propositional logic before and after the IF make-over. We observe that all but one of the best-known decision problems experience a complexity jump, provided that the complexity classes at hand are not equal. Our results concern every discipline that incorporates some notion of independence such as computer science, natural language semantics, and game theory. A corollary of one of our theorems illustrates this claim with respect to the latter discipline.     

Gentzen-Style Axiomatizations for Some Conservative Extensions of Basic Propositional Logic

We introduce two Gentzen-style sequent calculus axiomatizations for conservative extensions of basic propositional logic. Our first axiomatization is an ipmrovement of, in the sense that it has a kind of the subformula property and is a slight modification of. In this system the cut rule is eliminated. The second axiomatization is a classical conservative extension of basic propositional logic. Using these axiomatizations, we prove interpolation theorems for basic propositional logic.     

Liar-type Paradoxes and the Incompleteness Phenomena

We define a liar-type paradox as a consistent proposition in propositional modal logic which is obtained by attaching boxes to several subformulas of an inconsistent proposition in classical propositional logic, and show several famous paradoxes are liar-type. Then we show that we can generate a liar-type paradox from any inconsistent proposition in classical propositional logic and that undecidable sentences in arithmetic can be obtained from the existence of a liar-type paradox. We extend these results to predicate logic and discuss Yablo’s Paradox in this framework. Furthermore, we define explicit and implicit self-reference in paradoxes in the incompleteness phenomena.     

The semantics of Hoare's Iteration Rule

Hoare's Iteration Rule is a principle of reasoning that is used to derive correctness assertions about the effects of implementing a while-command. We show that the propositional modal logic of this type of command is axiomatised by Hoare's rule in conjunction with two additional axioms. The proof also establishes decidability of the logic. The paper concludes with a discussion of the relationship between the logic of while and Segerberg's axiomatisation of propositional dynamic logic.     

Non-classical Metatheory for Non-classical Logics

A number of authors have objected to the application of non-classical logic to problems in philosophy on the basis that these non-classical logics are usually characterised by a classical metatheory. In many cases the problem amounts to more than just a discrepancy; the very phenomena responsible for non-classicality occur in the field of semantics as much as they do elsewhere. The phenomena of higher order vagueness and the revenge liar are just two such examples. The aim of this paper is to show that a large class of non-classical logics are strong enough to formulate their own model theory in a corresponding non-classical set theory. Specifically I show that adequate definitions of validity can be given for the propositional calculus in such a way that the metatheory proves, in the specified logic, that every theorem of the propositional fragment of that logic is validated. It is shown that in some cases it may fail to be a classical matter whether a given sentence is valid or not. One surprising conclusion for non-classical accounts of vagueness is drawn: there can be no axiomatic, and therefore precise, system which is determinately sound and complete.     

On Modal Logics of Partial Recursive Functions

The classical propositional logic is known to be sound and complete with respect to the set semantics that interprets connectives as set operations. The paper extends propositional language by a new binary modality that corresponds to partial recursive function type constructor under the above interpretation. The cases of deterministic and non-deterministic functions are considered and for both of them semantically complete modal logics are described and decidability of these logics is established. Presented by Melvin Fitting     

Stoic Sequent Logic and Proof Theory

This paper contends that Stoic logic (i.e. Stoic analysis) deserves more attention from contemporary logicians. It sets out how, compared with contemporary propositional calculi, Stoic analysis is closest to methods of backward proof search for Gentzen-inspired substructural sequent logics, as they have been developed in logic programming and structural proof theory, and produces its proof search calculus in tree form. It shows how multiple similarities to Gentzen sequent systems combine with intriguing dissimilarities that may enrich contemporary discussion. Much of Stoic logic appears surprisingly modern: a recursively formulated syntax with some truth-functional propositional operators; analogues to cut rules, axiom schemata and Gentzen’s negation-introduction rules; an implicit variable-sharing principle and deliberate rejection of Thinning and avoidance of paradoxes of implication. These latter features mark the system out as a relevance logic, where the absence of duals for its left and right introduction rules puts it in the vicinity of McCall’s connexive logic. Methodologically, the choice of meticulously formulated meta-logical rules in lieu of axiom and inference schemata absorbs some structural rules and results in an economical, precise and elegant system that values decidability over completeness.     

Relational Semantics of the Lambek Calculus Extended with Classical Propositional Logic

We show that the relational semantics of the Lambek calculus, both nonassociative and associative, is also sound and complete for its extension with classical propositional logic. Then, using filtrations, we obtain the finite model property for the nonassociative Lambek calculus extended with classical propositional logic.     

A logic for epistemic two-dimensional semantics

Epistemic two-dimensional semantics is a theory in the philosophy of language that provides an account of meaning which is sensitive to the distinction between necessity and apriority. While this theory is usually presented in an informal manner, I take some steps in formalizing it in this paper. To do so, I define a semantics for a propositional modal logic with operators for the modalities of necessity, actuality, and apriority that captures the relevant ideas of epistemic two-dimensional semantics. I also describe some properties of the logic that are interesting from a philosophical perspective, and apply it to the so-called nesting problem.     

Incompleteness and the Barcan formula

A (normal) system of prepositional modal logic is said to be complete iff it is characterized by a class of (Kripke) frames. When we move to modal predicate logic the question of completeness can again be raised. It is not hard to prove that if a predicate modal logic is complete then it is characterized by the class of all frames for the propositional logic on which it is based. Nor is it hard to prove that if a propositional modal logic is incomplete then so is the predicate logic based on it. But the interesting question is whether a complete propositional modal logic can have an incomplete extension. In 1967 Kripke announced the incompleteness of a predicate extension of S4. The purpose of the present article is to present several such systems. In the first group it is the systemswith the Barcan Formula which are incomplete, while those without are complete. In the second group it is thosewithout the Barcan formula which are incomplete, while those with the Barcan Formula are complete. But all these are based on propositional systems which are characterized by frames satisfying in each case a single first-order sentence.