Epistemology shmepistemology: moral error theory and epistemic expressivism

Some philosophers object to moral error theory by arguing that there a parity between moral and epistemic normativity. They maintain that moral and epistemic error theory stand or fall together, that epistemic error theory falls, and that moral error theory thus falls too. This paper offers a response to this objection on behalf of moral error theorists. I defend the view that moral and epistemic error theory do not stand or fall together by arguing that moral error theory can be sustained alongside epistemic expressivism. This unusual combination of theories can be underpinned by differences in the foundational norms that guide moral and epistemic inquiry. I conclude that the problem of epistemic normativity fails to show that it is compulsory for us to reject moral error theory.     

Cue redundancy and extra logical inferences in a deductive reasoning task

This study investigated the influence of extraexperimental knowledge on deductive reasoning. Two groups of subjects solved modified abstract or concrete versions of Wason’s (1966) four-card selection problem in which the “if-then” implication rule provided the sole cue to underlying logical structure. Six other groups solved abstract or concrete comparison problems in which additional information was supplied by varying the relationship between antecedents and consequents in a manner consistent with logical structure. Selection responses and subjects’ explanations were analyzed using log-linear models of data arrayed in multiway contingency tables. Results showed improved performance for concrete over abstract problems and for both abstract and concrete problems that included relational information. Subjects capitalized upon the redundancy between the implication rule and the relational cues to reason effectively with either abstract or concrete stimuli.     

Intuitions,theory choice and the ameliorative character of logical theories

Synthese - Anti-exceptionalists about logic claim that logical methodology is not different from scientific methodology when it comes to theory choice. Two anti-exceptionalist accounts of theory...     

Epistemic expressivism and the argument from motivation

This paper explores in detail an argument for epistemic expressivism, what we call the Argument from Motivation. While the Argument from Motivation has sometimes been anticipated, it has never been set out in detail. The argument has three premises, roughly, that certain judgments expressed in attributions of knowledge are intrinsically motivating in a distinct way (P1); that motivation for action requires desire-like states or conative attitudes (HTM); and that the semantic content of knowledge attributions cannot be specified without reference to the intrinsically motivating judgments that such attributions express (P2). We argue that these premises entail a version of ecumenical expressivism. Since the argument from motivation has not been explicitly stated before, there is no current discussion of the argument. In this paper we therefore consider and reject various objections that one might propose to the argument, including some that stem from the idea that knowledge is factive, or that knowledge involves evidence that rules out relevant alternatives. Other objections to (P1) specifically might be derived from cases of apparent lack of epistemic motivation considered in in Kvanvig (The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding, 2003) and Brown (Nous 42(2):167–189, 2008), as well as from general forms of externalism about epistemic motivation. We consider these and find them wanting. Finally, the paper offers some critical remarks about the prospect of denying (P2).     

The role of logical and nonlogical factors in making inferences about category membership

Three postulates are proposed concerning the manner in which persons infer the validity of propositions that do not necessarily follow logically from the information available. These postulates assume that subjects first attempt to identify the propositions that are most and least likely to follow from the information given. They then use their beliefs in these propositions as anchors, relative to which the validity of other propositions is evaluated on the basis of both logical and nonlogical criteria. Two experiments are reported in which these postulates are used successfully to diagnose the logical and nonlogical factors that underlie inferences based upon both single statements and sets of syllogistically related propositions. The implications of the proposed postulates for existing formulations of social inference and cognitive organization are discussed.     

Symmetry, gestalt and information theory: A critique

A criticism of a recent analysis of matrix pattern perception is advanced. It is pointed out that a fair test of the equivalence for performance of different forms of redundancy must be framed in terms of the measure of transmitted information.     

Logical examination of physical theory

Part II of Duhem 1917, pp. 151–57, translated by Peter Barker and Roger Ariew; published also by Duhem in Duhem 1913a, pp. 737–40.     

Origins of the logical theory of probability: Von Kries,Wittgenstein, Waismann

The physiologist and neo-Kantian philosopher Johannes von Kries (1853-1928) wrote one of the most philosophically important works on the foundation of probability after P.S. Laplace and before the First World War, his Principien der Wohrscheinlich-keitsrechnung (1886, repr. 1927). In this book, von Kries developed a highly original interpretation of probability, which maintains it to be both logical and objectively physical. After presenting his approach I shall pursue the influence it had on Ludwig Wittgenstein and Friedrich Waismann. It seems that von Kries's approach had more potential than recognized in his time and that putting Waismann's and Wittgenstein's early work in a von Kries perspective is able to shed light on the notion of an elementary proposition.     

A logical formalization of the OCC theory of emotions

In this paper, we provide a logical formalization of the emotion triggering process and of its relationship with mental attitudes, as described in Ortony, Clore, and Collins’s theory. We argue that modal logics are particularly adapted to represent agents’ mental attitudes and to reason about them, and use a specific modal logic that we call Logic of Emotions in order to provide logical definitions of all but two of their 22 emotions. While these definitions may be subject to debate, we show that they allow to reason about emotions and to draw interesting conclusions from the theory.     

A possible extension of logical theory?

Philosophical Studies -     

Sense data and logical relations: Karin Costelloe-Stephen and Russell’s critique of Bergson

ABSTRACT

Though scholarship has explored Karin Costelloe-Stephen’s contributions to the history of psychoanalysis, as well as her relations to the Bloomsbury Group, her philosophical work has been almost completely ignored. This paper will examine her debate with Bertrand Russell over his criticism of Bergson. Costelloe-Stephen had employed the terminology of early analytic philosophy in presenting a number of arguments in defence of Bergson’s views. Costelloe-Stephen would object, among other things, to Russell’s use of an experiment which, as she points out, was first conducted by Carl Stumpf. Russell appeals to Stumpf's experiment in his attempt to prove that sense data are terms in logical relations, a thesis presupposed by the project of logical analysis outlined in Our Knowledge of the External World. A reformulated version of Costelloe-Stephen's argument put forth by this paper shows that Russell's argument fails to provide adequate proof for his thesis. Further modifications of the argument can also address a reconstruction (based on contemporary reports) of Russell's reply to Costelloe-Stephen. In his reply, Russell would use, already in 1914, the term ‘analytic philosophy’ in contrasting his and Moore’s approach to a continental one, exemplified by Bergson and Costelloe-Stephen.     

Review, critique, and synthesis of personality theory in motivation to sexually assault

A widely-cited meta-analysis of recidivism amongst adult male perpetrators or sexual assult [Hanson and Bussiere, J. Consult. Clin. Psychol. 66 (1998) 348–362] found that the presence of any personality disorder (APA, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-III-R. (1987); [APA, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-IV (1994)] was the only variable to significantly predict sexual recidivism in a category measuring “Psychological Maladjustment” (r₊=.16, n=315). The relationship between personality disturbance and new sexual offenses is undoubtedly a dynamic relationship that deserves exploration. This review and critique of theory covers two theories of personality: (1) a psychoanalytic theory of rapist personality offered by Groth [Men Who Rape: The Psychology of the Offender. (1979), New York: Plenum] and (2) a general biosocial theory or personality disturbance offered by Millon [Disorders of Personality: DSM-IV and Beyond. (1996). New York: Wiley]. Theory offered by Groth is critiqued and limitations considered. Theory offered by Millon is offered and the two approaches are synthesized to suggest possible causes of characteristic psychological disturbance associated with perpetration of sexual assault. Applications for research and practice are considered, and implications of this line of research for risk assessment and sexual assault prevention are reviewed.