Correlations, deviations and expectations: the Extended Principle of the Common Cause

The Principle of the Common Cause is usually understood to provide causal explanations for probabilistic correlations obtaining between causally unrelated events. In this study, an extended interpretation of the principle is proposed, according to which common causes should be invoked to explain positive correlations whose values depart from the ones that one would expect to obtain in accordance to her probabilistic expectations. In addition, a probabilistic model for common causes is tailored which satisfies the generalized version of the principle, at the same time including the standard conjunctive-fork model as a special case.     

Development and initial validation of the Brief Adolescent Life Event Scale (BALES)

We report initial validity analyses of the Brief Adolescent Life Event Scale (BALES). This instrument addresses negative and positive events pertinent to the well being of adolescent boys and girls, and is designed for use in studies utilizing an extended research protocol. Selection of items was guided by emerging perspectives on positive psychology , action theory , and personality vulnerability , as well as by new developments in statistical modeling theory. The 36 items of the scale tap negative and positive events, each of which addresses interpersonal and achievement life domains. Using a large sample of early-adolescents ( N = 895), we confirmed the hypothesized structure that includes four domain-level latent factors (i.e., negative interpersonal events, negative achievement events, positive interpersonal events, positive achievement events), and two overarching factors (negative events and positive events). Indices of positive and negative events predicted adolescent depressive symptoms in expected ways, and positive events buffered the effect of negative events on depressive symptoms. These findings encourage an informed use of the BALES and highlight considerations involved in the development of brief measures of stress and coping processes.     

Social anxiety and interpersonal stress generation: the moderating role of interpersonal distress

Background and Objectives: Existing models of social anxiety scarcely account for interpersonal stress generation. These models also seldom include interpersonal factors that compound the effects of social anxiety. Given recent findings that two forms of interpersonal distress, perceived burdensomeness and thwarted belongingness, intensify social anxiety and cause interpersonal stress generation, these two constructs may be especially relevant to examining social anxiety and interpersonal stress generation together.

Design: The current study extended prior research by examining the role of social anxiety in the occurrence of negative and positive interpersonal events and evaluated whether interpersonal distress moderated these associations.

Methods: Undergraduate students (N?=?243; M?=?20.46 years; 83% female) completed self-report measures of social anxiety, perceived burdensomeness, and thwarted belongingness, as well as a self-report measure and clinician-rated interview assessing negative and positive interpersonal events that occurred over the past six weeks.

Results: Higher levels of social anxiety were associated only with a higher occurrence of negative interpersonal dependent events, after controlling for depressive symptoms. This relationship was stronger among individuals who also reported higher levels of perceived burdensomeness, but not thwarted belongingness.

Conclusions: It may be important to more strongly consider interpersonal stress generation in models of social anxiety.     

Attributional Style Predicts Causes of Negative Life Events on the Attributional Style Questionnaire

Abstract

The causes cited by 218 participants for the hypothetical positive and negative life events on the Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ) and the dimensional ratings of the causes were examined to determine the match between the dimensional and categorical definitions of attributional style. Optimists (n = 105) and pessimists (n = 113) used different types of causes to explain the negative ASQ events, but not the positive events. However, optimists' and pessimists' causal explanations shared a number of features. The findings suggest that attributional styles depend, in part, on the event being explained and demonstrate that the ASQ events elicit specific types of causes.     

Promoting Mild Physical Exercise in a Person with Profound Multiple Disabilities

Prompt/orientation cues delivered through an automatic system were combined with one or two reinforcement events in order to promote mild physical exercise independent of staff in a man with profound multiple disabilities. The exercise sessions were gradually extended to 60 minutes. Data indicated that the man achieved high levels of exercise engagement. There were minimal differences in terms of engagement between sessions with one reinforcement event and those with two reinforcement events. Yet, in the latter sessions, the man had higher levels of positive mood. Implications of the findings are discussed.     

The Reduction of Causal Processes

The principle that causes always render their effects more likely is fundamental to the enterprise of reducing facts of causation to facts about (objective) chances. This reductionist enterprise faces famous difficulties in accommodating common-sense intuitions about causal processes, if it insists on cashing out causal processes in terms of streams of events in which every event that belongs to the stream is a cause of the adjoining event downstream of it. I shall propose modifications to this way of cashing out causal processes, still well within the reductionist faith. These modifications will allow the reductionist to handle processes successfully, on the assumption that the reductionist proposal is itself otherwise satisfactory. I shall then argue that the reductionist enterprise lies squarely behind the Theory of Relativity, and so has all the confirmatory weight of Relativity behind it. However this is not all good news for reductionists. For throughout I shall simply assume that the reductionist proposal, to the effect that causes are just chance-raisers, is correct. AndI shall sidestep problems with that proposal as such. And so I shall show that, if in the end we find the reductionist proposal unsatisfactory, it cannot be on grounds of its treatment of causal processes as such. Thus, while I shall argue that causal processes pose no extra trouble for redutionists, I shall be making a case that all the action between reductionists and their opponents should be focused upon the proposal to reduce the two-term causal relation itself to relations amongst probabilities.     

The role of maltreatment experience in children's understanding of the antecedents of emotion

The ability to understand the causes and likely triggers of emotions has important consequences for children's adaptation to their social environment. Yet, little is currently known about the processes that contribute to the development of emotion understanding. To assess how well children understood the antecedents of emotional reactions in others, we presented children with a variety of emotional situations that varied in outcome and equivocality. Children were told the emotional outcome and asked to rate whether a situation was a likely cause of such an outcome. We tested the effects of maltreatment experience on children's ability to map emotions to their eliciting events and their understanding of emotion–situation pairings. The present data suggest that typically developing children are able to distinguish between common elicitors of negative and positive events. In contrast, children who develop within maltreating contexts, where emotions are extreme and inconsistent, interpret positive, equivocal, and negative events as being equally plausible causes of sadness and anger. This difference in maltreated children's reasoning about emotions suggests a critical role of experience in aiding children's mastery of the structure of interpersonal discourse.     

Physics and common causes

The common cause principle states that common causes produce correlations amongst their effects, but that common effects do not produce correlations amongst their causes. I claim that this principle, as explicated in terms of probabilistic relations, is false in classical statistical mechanics. Indeterminism in the form of stationary Markov processes rather than quantum mechanics is found to be a possible saviour of the principle. In addition I argue that if causation is to be explicated in terms of probabilities, then it should be done in terms of probabilistic relations which are invariant under changes of initial distributions. Such relations can also give rise to an asymmetric cause-effect relationship which always runs forwards in time.This paper was written while I was on an Andrew Mellon postdoctoral fellowship at the University of Pittsburgh, for which I am grateful. I am also grateful for comments from John Norton and an anonymous referee.     

Causation, coincidence, and commensuration

What does it take to solve the exclusion problem? An ingenious strategy is Stephen Yablo’s idea that causes must be commensurate with their effects. Commensuration is a relation between events. Roughly, events are commensurate with one another when one contains all that is required for the occurrence of the other, and as little as possible that is not required. According to Yablo, one event is a cause of another only if they are commensurate. I raise three reasons to doubt that this account solves the exclusion problem successfully. First, it leaves a mystery about what determines a particular’s causal capacities. Second, because there are two ways of construing coincidence between particulars, a dilemma arises: either the solution to the exclusion problem is threatened, or the account of coincidence loses an attractive feature concerning ontological economy. Third, even if we assume the commensuration constraint, a plausible principle about overdetermination seems to regenerate the exclusion problem.     

Search for meaning,finding meaning and adjustment in women following miscarriage: A longitudinal study

Objective: The purpose of this study was to explore the associations between meaning making and psychological adjustment in 127 women who experienced a miscarriage.

Design: A longitudinal and controlled study design was employed.

Main outcome measures: Meaning-making variables and distress outcomes were examined at four, seven and 16?weeks after miscarriage, in two groups of women, one who had medical investigations of the cause of their loss, and a control group receiving standard care.

Results: Search for meaning was very common and it declined with time after miscarriage. By seven weeks post-loss, more than half the women reported that they had found meaning/understood why the miscarriage happened. Providing information about the cause of the loss was associated with finding meaning. A decline in the search for meaning and finding meaning at seven weeks post-miscarriage, predicted levels of distress at 16?weeks, whilst controlling for the initial distress and for significant background factors.

Conclusions: This study provides support for the notion that search for meaning is very common following negative life events, such as miscarriage, and that finding meaning is important in many peoples’ process of adjustment. Providing information about the cause of the loss facilitates finding meaning.     

Libertarian Free Will and the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection

Libertarian free will is, roughly, the view that agents (or, agent-involving events) cause actions to occur or not occur: Maddy’s decision to get a beer causes her to get up off her comfortable couch to get a beer, though she almost chose not to get up. Libertarian free will notoriously faces the luck objection, according to which agential states do not determine whether an action occurs or not, so it is beyond the control of the agent, hence lucky, whether an action occurs or not: Maddy’s reasons for getting beer in equipoise with her reasons to remain in her comfortable seat do not determine that she will get up or stay seated, so it seems beyond her control, hence lucky, that she gets up. In this paper I consider a sub-set of the luck objection called the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection, according to which indeterministic physical processes cause actions to occur or not, and agent’s lack control over these indeterministic physical processes, so agent’s lack control over, hence it is lucky, whether action occurs or not. After motivating the physical indeterminism luck objection, I consider responses from three recent event-causal libertarian models, and conclude that they fail to overcome the problem, though one promising avenue is opened up.

This paper is divided into six parts. In Section One, I minimally define libertarian free will as accepting agential indeterminism, which is the conjunction of indeterminism and agential causation, where agential indeterminism occurs when an agent’s reasons, efforts or character indeterministically cause actions. In Sections Two and Three I outline the physical indeterminism luck objection to libertarian free will, which states that sub-agential physical processes in the brain indeterministically cause actions to occur, and agents lack control over these indeterministic physical causes, so agent’s lack control over whether their actions occur. If agent’s lack control over whether actions occur, the occurrence of these actions is lucky, where this luck jeopardizes free will and moral responsibility. In Sections Four through Six I consider three recent libertarian responses to this objection—Mark Balaguer in Section Four, Chris Franklin in Section Five, and Robert Kane in Section Six. I conclude that none of these models satisfactorily overcomes the physical indeterminism luck objection, though one interpretation of Kane yields a promising avenue of reply.

     

Infants' Perception of Causal Chains

Three experiments examined infants' and adults' perception of causal sequences of events. In a causal-chain sequence, the first action causes a second action that then causes a final outcome; in a temporal-chain sequence, the first two actions are independent and the second action causes a final outcome. Infants and adults were shown the same event sequences; infants were tested using a visual habituation paradigm, whereas adults were given a questionnaire. Experiment 1 indicated that 15-month-old infants perceive the primary cause of the final outcome to be the first action in a causal chain but the second action in a temporal chain. Experiment 2 showed that adults interpret the causal sequences in a manner similar to that of 15-month-olds. Finally, Experiment 3 showed that 10-month-old infants do not yet perceive causal sequences in the same manner as 15-month-olds and adults. These results are interpreted in terms of both infants' developing knowledge of causal events and adults' attributions of causality in complex events.     

Causal imprinting in causal structure learning

Suppose one observes a correlation between two events, B and C, and infers that B causes C. Later one discovers that event A explains away the correlation between B and C. Normatively, one should now dismiss or weaken the belief that B causes C. Nonetheless, participants in the current study who observed a positive contingency between B and C followed by evidence that B and C were independent given A, persisted in believing that B causes C. The authors term this difficulty in revising initially learned causal structures "causal imprinting." Throughout four experiments, causal imprinting was obtained using multiple dependent measures and control conditions. A Bayesian analysis showed that causal imprinting may be normative under some conditions, but causal imprinting also occurred in the current study when it was clearly non-normative. It is suggested that causal imprinting occurs due to the influence of prior knowledge on how reasoners interpret later evidence. Consistent with this view, when participants first viewed the evidence showing that B and C are independent given A, later evidence with only B and C did not lead to the belief that B causes C.     

When good evidence goes bad: the weak evidence effect in judgment and decision-making

An indispensable principle of rational thought is that positive evidence should increase belief. In this paper, we demonstrate that people routinely violate this principle when predicting an outcome from a weak cause. In Experiment 1 participants given weak positive evidence judged outcomes of public policy initiatives to be less likely than participants given no evidence, even though the evidence was separately judged to be supportive. Experiment 2 ruled out a pragmatic explanation of the result, that the weak evidence implies the absence of stronger evidence. In Experiment 3, weak positive evidence made people less likely to gamble on the outcome of the 2010 United States mid-term Congressional election. Experiments 4 and 5 replicated these findings with everyday causal scenarios. We argue that this “weak evidence effect” arises because people focus disproportionately on the mentioned weak cause and fail to think about alternative causes.     

A Comparison of Updating and Explanation as Causes of the Incongruity Effect on Person Memory

Abstract

Information that is incongruent with a prior expectancy is remembered better than congruent information. Two explanations were investigated: (a) people attempt to explain incongruent information to understand it, and (b) people use incongruent information to update their expectancies. The common assumption in these two accounts is that the additional cognitive processing stimulated by incongruent information is responsible for the incongruity effect. In this study, U.S. students were explicitly requested to engage in one or the other of these processes. Although both processes resulted in an incongruity effect, there was a positive correlation between recall of expectancy-congruent and expectancy-incongruent items in the impression-updating condition but not in the other condition; those in the impression-updating condition showed greater expectancy change.     

The Motivational Roots of Norms for Environmentally Responsible Behavior

We assessed whether people use a magnitude-matching principle in determining causes for complex social events. We hypothesized that individuals tend to favor causal explanations that match the event in terms of size and scope. In Experiment 1, the magnitude of the consequences of events was manipulated, and participants were presented with two potential causes of modest magnitude and two potential causes of high magnitude. Analyses revealed a relative magnitude-matching effect such that participants were more likely to select high magnitude causes for large magnitude events than modest magnitude events and more likely to select modest magnitude causes for modest magnitude events than large magnitude events. Experiment 2 replicated the magnitude-matching effect with a different event and set of causes, and demonstrated that this effect could be reversed by undermining participants' beliefs in the magnitude-matching principle.     

Wholes and Parts: The Limits of Composition

Abstract

The paper argues that very different part-whole relations hold between different kinds of entities. While these relations share most of their formal properties, they need not share all of them. Nor need other mereological principles be true of all kinds of part-whole pairs. In particular, it is argued that the principle of unrestricted composition, that any two or more entities have a mereological sum, while true of sets and propositions, is false of things and events.     

“You knit me together in my mother’s womb”: a theology of creation and divine action in light of intersex

ABSTRACT

Some Christian theologians and intersex Christians maintain that intersex is part of God’s good and intended creation, in contrast to those who view intersex as a pathological result of fallen nature. The former claim that intersex bodies “are how God made them” and that “God does not make mistakes;” however, these statements risk implying a belief in special creation or divine intervention, two theological positions which have been challenged by evolutionary theory and contemporary natural sciences. This paper provides a more nuanced theology of creation and divine action as a foundation for a positive theology of intersex. Drawing from the work of Thomas Aquinas on primary and secondary causality, the author argues that God, as primary cause, creates the intersex person through the free interplay of secondary causes, in the same way and to the same extent that God acts in the creation of every other person.     

The correlation-based law of effect

It is commonly understood that the interactions between an organism and its environment constitute a feedback system. This implies that instrumental behavior should be viewed as a continuous exchange between the organism and the environment. It follows that orderly relations between behavior and environment should emerge at the level of aggregate flow in time, rather than momentary events. These notions require a simple, but fundamental, change in the law of effect: from a law based on contiguity of events to a law based on correlation between events. Much recent research and argument favors such a change. If the correlation-based law of effect is accepted, it favors measures and units of analysis that transcend momentary events, extending through time. One can measure all consequences on a common scale, called value. One can define a unit of analysis called the behavioral situation, which circumscribes a set of values. These concepts allow redefinition of reinforcement and punishment, and clarification of their relation to discriminative stimuli.     

The Space of Motivations

Abstract

The distinction between the space of reasons and the realm of law captures two familiar ways of making events intelligible, by reference to reasons or to natural laws, respectively. I describe a third way of making events intelligible, by explaining them in terms of an agent’s being motivated to do certain things. Explanations of this sort do not involve appealing to reasons for which the agent acts, nor to natural laws under which the event falls. To explain an event in this way is to place it in the space of motivations. I outline the relation between the space of motivations and the space of reasons, and suggest that the space of motivations may serve as a common ground between the positions defended by McDowell and Dreyfus in their recent debate.