Saying what you mean, meaning what you say: language, interaction and interpretation

As analysts, we strive to say what we mean, which involves understanding the other person's communication, finding the appropriate form of words to articulate what we have understood, and expressing them in the tone of voice which can be heard. Meaning what we say refers to the authenticity of our response, that what we say is sincere. My theme touches on different ways of saying what we mean and how this can affect the meaning of what we say. Some of the issues are aesthetic, some grammatical. How some sentence structures lead to closing off communication while others open it.     

Extensionality, underdetermination and indeterminacy

I am grateful to Burton Dreben, Warren Goldfarb, Don Gustafson, Jim Higginbotham, Jerrold Katz, Joe Levine, Ted Morris, Nick Pappas, Hilary Putnam, Georges Rey and Bob Richardson for helpful discussions and comments on the issues discussed in this paper. Also I thank an anonymous reviewer for Erkenntnis for helpful comments.     

Empirical equivalence and underdetermination

Jarrett Leplin in A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism (1997) argues that if the thesis of empirical equivalence is cogent, then the thesis of underdetermination cannot even get off the ground. Part of Leplin's argument rests on the claim that auxiliary hypotheses can be independently confirmed, thus enabling us to determine the epistemic worth of a theory. This, in turn, helps in determining about what we should be realists. Leplin's claims are demonstrated to be problematic. Leplin wants, inconsistently, to use only those auxiliary hypotheses which dovetail with confirmed theories. Finally, a detail of Leplin's argument is found wanting.     

The content, consequence and likeness approaches to verisimilitude: compatibility, trivialization, and underdetermination

Theories of verisimilitude have routinely been classified into two rival camps—the content approach and the likeness approach—and these appear to be motivated by very different sets of data and principles. The question thus naturally arises as to whether these approaches can be fruitfully combined. Recently Zwart and Franssen (Synthese 158(1):75–92, 2007) have offered precise analyses of the content and likeness approaches, and shown that given these analyses any attempt to meld content and likeness orderings violates some basic desiderata. Unfortunately their characterizations of the approaches do not embrace the paradigm examples of those approaches. I offer somewhat different characterizations of these two approaches, as well as of the consequence approach (Schurz and Weingartner (Synthese 172(3):415–436, 2010) which happily embrace their respective paradigms. Finally I prove that the three approaches are indeed compatible, but only just, and that the cost of combining them is too high. Any account which combines the strictures of what I call the strong likeness approach with the demands of either the content or the consequence approach suffers from precisely the same defect as Popper’s—namely, it entails the trivialization of truthlikeness. The downside of eschewing the strong likeness constraints and embracing the content constraints alone is the underdetermination of the concept of truthlikeness.     

Naming,Saying, and Structure

It is commonplace for philosophers to distinguish mere truths from truths that perspicuously represent the world's structure. According to a popular view, the perspicuous truths are supposed to be metaphysically revelatory and to play an important role in the accounts of law‐hood, confirmation, and linguistic interpretation. Yet, there is no consensus about how to characterize this distinction. I examine strategies developed by Lewis and by Sider in his Writing the Book of the World which purport to explain this distinction in terms of vocabulary: the truths that represent the world perspicuously have better, joint‐carving vocabulary. I argue that the distinction between a perspicuous and mere truth concerns both the vocabulary of the sentence and its grammar. I then show that the collective motivations for distinguishing perspicuous from mere truths do not allow Lewis and Sider to properly impose constraints on grammar.     

Realism and the underdetermination of theory

The main theme is that theorizing serves empirical prediction. This is used as the core of a counter to contemporary anti-realist arguments. Different versions of the thesis that data underdetermines theory are identified and it is shown that none which are acceptable differentiates between theory selection and prediction. Criteria sufficient for the former are included amongst those necessary for the latter; and obviously go beyond mere compatibility with data.Special attention is given to causal process theories. It is argued that the only empirically equivalent alternatives which can be constructed to any theory of this kind must be parasitic on that theory; so a choice for the original theory can not be avoided. Once this is established, a positive case for taking a realist position can be developed.     

海德格尔与道家：思想与事实——“道”：道路与道说

1 现在我们就海德格尔的另一个关键术语--即道说(Sage)①--来追问道家思想对于海德格尔的影响的问题.     

Perspectives,Pluralism, Showing and Saying

This paper reflects on a number of metaphysical and epistemological aspects of theatrical performance and the theatrical aspects of some philosophical writing. It tries to demonstrate that both philosophy and theater say and show philosophical truths while also giving some evidence for the truth of a pluralist view.     

Saying and Showing: Art, Literature and Religious Understanding

I argue that works of art and literature can be primary expressions of religious ideas, i.e., ones not dependent on other modes of communication like preaching or theology. This does not mean, however, that such works are independent of criticism, for an artist or writer can show something that is untrue, immoral, crude, and so on. I maintain that art and literature may criticize theology, or vice versa; or, thirdly, the relationship between them may be reciprocal, and I illustrate these three possibilities via Ibsen's Brand, Goethe's Faust, and the film Dead Man Walking.     

Saying and Showing: Art,Literature and Religious Understanding

I argue that works of art and literature can be primary expressions of religious ideas, i.e., ones not dependent on other modes of communication like preaching or theology. This does not mean, however, that such works are independent of criticism, for an artist or writer can show something that is untrue, immoral, crude, and so on. I maintain that art and literature may criticize theology, or vice versa; or, thirdly, the relationship between them may be reciprocal, and I illustrate these three possibilities via Ibsen’s Brand, Goethe’s Faust, and the film Dead Man Walking.     

Conditionals: a theory of meaning,pragmatics, and inference

The authors outline a theory of conditionals of the form If A then C and If A then possibly C. The 2 sorts of conditional have separate core meanings that refer to sets of possibilities. Knowledge, pragmatics, and semantics can modulate these meanings. Modulation can add information about temporal and other relations between antecedent and consequent. It can also prevent the construction of possibilities to yield 10 distinct sets of possibilities to which conditionals can refer. The mental representation of a conditional normally makes explicit only the possibilities in which its antecedent is true, yielding other possibilities implicitly. Reasoners tend to focus on the explicit possibilities. The theory predicts the major phenomena of understanding and reasoning with conditionals.     

Recurrent transient underdetermination and the glass half full

Kyle Stanford’s arguments against scientific realism are assessed, with a focus on the underdetermination of theory by evidence. I argue that discussions of underdetermination have neglected a possible symmetry which may ameliorate the situation.