建立儒家人文主义的学术传统:由文化“复建”到文化“复兴”

本文回顾了作者跟随杨国枢教授推动本土心理学的学术历程,并依据自己的切身体会,提出本土心理学运动必须以科学哲学作为基础。作者身体力行,在最近二三十年间,深入学习科学哲学的理论,逐步建立本土心理学的相关理论。其最终目标,是打算以儒家文化作为基底,吸纳西方近代文明的菁华,“中学为体,西学为用”,摆脱西方学术的宰制,建立“儒家人文主义”的自主学术传统。作者认为,唯有大力发展本土社会科学,建立华人“自主的社会科学传统”,华人学术社群才有可能走出“学术自我殖民”的心态。     

Mind,Consciousness, and Free Will

This commentary discusses how philosophy and science can collaborate to understand the human mind, considering dialogues involving three philosophers and three cognitive scientists. Their topics include the relation of philosophy and science, the nature of mind, the problem of consciousness, and the existence of free will. I argue that philosophy is more general and normative than science, but they are interdependent. Philosophy can build on the cognitive sciences to develop a theory of mind I call “multilevel materialism,” which integrates molecular, neural, mental, and social mechanisms. Consciousness is increasingly being understood as resulting from neural mechanisms. Scientific advances make the traditional concept of free will implausible, but “freeish” will is consistent with new theories of decision making and action resulting from brain processes. Philosophers should work closely with scientists to address profound problems about knowledge, reality, and values.     

Digging Deeper: Why Metaphysics is More Than a Toolbox

Steven French (J Gen Philos Sci,  https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-018-9401-8, 2018) proposes a vindication of “scientifically disinterested” metaphysics that leaves little room to its original ambitions. He claims that (1) as a discipline that looks to find out truths about the world, it is untenable; and that (2) rather, its vindication lies in its use as a “toolbox” of concepts for a philosophical discipline that does have a claim at getting us closer to truth—the philosophy of science, and more specifically of physics. I respond to both his main claims. The first claim, I argue, neglects what I call (with Ralf Busse) “archaeological” metaphysics, which tries to impose some order on phenomena by “digging deeper” from the less to the more fundamental, or from the less to the more abstract questions. The second claim imposes a hierarchical relation between metaphysics and philosophy of science which should, I argue, be replaced with a more egalitarian picture of philosophy.     

Paradigms and possibilities

This paper is a excursus into a philosophy of science for deployment in the study of sport. It argues for the virtues of Thomas Kuhn's account of the philosophy of science, an argument conducted strategically by contrasting that account with one derived from views of Karl Popper. In particular, it stresses, first, that Kuhn's views have been widely misunderstood; second, that a rectified Kuhnianism can give due weight to truth in science, while recognising that social sciences differ in crucial ways from natural sciences. For, as Kuhn recognised, social sciences do not function in the paradigm-relative way characteristic of natural sciences. Yet there Kuhn's jargon, and especially misguided talk of ‘paradigms’, is almost ubiquitous.

These thoughts have relevance for three groups. First, as both sports scientists and exercise scientists come to grips with the claims to scientificity of their work, they will need increasingly to locate it within an epistemological framework provided by philosophy of science. So they must begin to take Kuhn's view seriously. Second, social scientists of sport – faced with the predominant scientism of colleagues in sport and exercise science – must also recognise alternatives to a postmodernist rejection of the concept of truth, where Kuhn's picture of natural science clarifies one such. Finally, philosophers writing on sport must not let antipathy to scientism close off the options they present or the terms in which they (we!) present them. And that may require debate among ourselves on abstract issues not immediately connected with sport.     

科学知识社会学相对主义知识观批判

“The Strong Programme” is put forward as a metaphysical theory of sociology by the Edinburgh School (SSK) to study the social causes of knowledge. Barry Barnes and David Bloor are the proponents of the School. They call their programme “the Relativist View of Knowledge” and argue against rationalism in the philosophy of science. Does their relativist account of knowledge present a serious challenge to rationalism, which has dominated 20th century philosophy of science? I attempt to answer this question by criticizing the main ideas of SSK and defending rationalism theories in modern philosophy of science.     

Methodological naturalism and the truth seeking objection

Methodological naturalism, the exclusion of the supernatural from the natural sciences, has drawn critique from both proponents of Intelligent Design and some philosophical naturalists who argue that the methods of science can also be used to evaluate supernatural claims. One principal objection to methodological naturalism has been what I call the truth seeking objection. In this article I develop an understanding of methodological naturalism capable of answering the truth seeking objection. I further also argue that methodological naturalism as a convention of science can be best defended by abandoning scientism. In this way methodological naturalism can be reconnected to the original theistic context in which it was first developed.     

Two approaches to natural kinds

Philosophical treatments of natural kinds are embedded in two distinct projects. I call these the philosophy of science approach and the philosophy of language approach. Each is characterized by its own set of philosophical questions, concerns, and assumptions. The kinds studied in the philosophy of science approach are projectible categories that can ground inductive inferences and scientific explanation. The kinds studied in the philosophy of language approach are the referential objects of a special linguistic category—natural kind terms—thought to refer directly. Philosophers may hope for a unified account addresses both sets of concerns. This paper argues that this cannot be done successfully. No single account can satisfy both the semantic objectives of the philosophy of language approach and the explanatory projects of the philosophy of science approach. After analyzing where the tensions arise, I make recommendations about assumptions and projects that are best abandoned, those that should be retained, and those that should go their separate ways. I also recommend adopting the disambiguating terminology of “scientific kinds” and “natural kinds” for the different notions of kinds developed in these different approaches.

     

心理学的历史编纂学：后现代主义的挑战

后现代主义思潮深刻影响了心理学史的研究与写作。传统的心理学历史编纂学接受真理的符合论,认为心理学的发展史是一维的和历时的。它习惯于在心理学的发展史中寻找某些“中心”或“标志”,并假定了不同的国家和民族、不同历史时期的心理学所面对的是同一主题。但是后现代主义的心理学历史编纂学强调了历史的社会建构特性,认为心理学史叙述的并非一种“客观实在”,而是史学家的一种话语建构。后现代主义的心理学历史编纂学使得心理学史家更明确的意识到历史知识的主观性,有助于心理学史家认识历史研究中的价值和意识形态问题,正视文化视角造成的认识差异,因而是有着积极意义的     

Competing for Reality

In this article, we will apply aspects of Rychlak's philosophy of science to some of the most important issues in psychology today (issues of brain versus behavior, genetic destiny, the nature of scientific investigation, ecopsychology, and artificial intelligence). In our discussion of these issues, we attempt to show the ways that an appreciation of Rychlak's views can help conceptualize the bases of the disagreements in the field as well as explain why so many psychologists tend to “talk past” as opposed to “talk to” one another. We believe that a greater appreciation of Rychlak's major theses could allow psychologists to respect the work of others instead of trying to assert politically their favorite truth claims.     

Sartre’s Dialectical Methodology

Sartre’s intention in the Critique of Dialectical Reason is to establish the heuristic value of the dialectical method when applied to the social sciences. Toward this end, he furnishes an account of how, on the basis of natural needs, rational choices, burgeoning social ensembles, natural and social contingencies and unintended consequences, human beings make their history. I shall argue that his dialectical method, especially when modified, opens up interesting possibilities for clarifying the two most important and enduring meta-issues in the philosophy of social science: (1) whether social phenomena should be explained in terms of the beliefs, desires and actions of individuals or the rules and practices of social institutions (“Methodological Individualism” or “Methodological Holism”) and (2) whether social phenomena should be explained in terms of causes, as in the natural sciences, or in terms of what they mean in their social contexts, as in hermeneutics and other interpretive approaches (“Explanation” or “Understanding”).     

Science as a Vocation in the Era of Big Data: the Philosophy of Science behind Big Data and humanity’s Continued Part in Science

We now live in the era of big data, and according to its proponents, big data is poised to change science as we know it. Claims of having no theory and no ideology are made, and there is an assumption that the results of big data are trustworthy because it is considered free from human judgement, which is often considered inextricably linked with human error. These two claims lead to the idea that big data is the source of better scientific knowledge, through more objectivity, more data, and better analysis. In this paper I analyse the philosophy of science behind big data and make the claim that the death of many traditional sciences, and the human scientist, is much exaggerated. The philosophy of science of big data means that there are certain things big data does very well, and some things that it cannot do. I argue that humans will still be needed for mediating and creating theory, and for providing the legitimacy and values science needs as a normative social enterprise.     

Enactivism,pragmatism…behaviorism?

Shaun Gallagher applies enactivist thinking to a staggeringly wide range of topics in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, even venturing into the realms of biological anthropology. One prominent point Gallagher makes that the holistic approach of enactivism makes it less amenable to scientific investigation than the cognitivist framework it seeks to replace, and should be seen as a “philosophy of nature” rather than a scientific research program. Gallagher also gives truth to the saying that “if you want new ideas, read old books”, showing how the insights of the American pragmatists, particularly Dewey and Mead, offer a variety of resources and tools that can be brought to bear on modern day enactivism. Here, I suggest that the adoption of enactivist thinking would undermine the assumptions of certain scientific positions, requiring their abandonment, rather than simply making it more difficult to conduct research within an enactivist framework. I then discuss how Mead’s work has been used previously as a “pragmatist intervention” to help resolve problems in a related 4E endeavour, Gibson’s ecological psychology, and make a case for the inclusion of radical behaviorism as another pragmatist resource for 4E cognition. I conclude with a plea for further enactivist intervention in studies of comparative cognition.

     

Psychology's search for unity

Arguments for unifying psychology's disparate elements are examined in relation to the actualities of scientific practice. These arguments are often based on such implicit unexamined assumptions as: (1) psychology resembles physics conceptually and historically; (2) there is an underlying rational order to knowledge which will define and justify the direction unification will take; (3) there is a knowable reality independent of our perceptions; (4) the outcome of unification will resemble a harmonious family working for the common good of “knowledge” and “truth.” While these assumptions have plausibility, it is argued that alternative views have equally legitimate claims and if we accept them, the possibility of unifying psychology becomes more problematic. Psychology's desire for unification appears parallel to a similar yearning within society that seeks to counteract the fragmentation of social life and consciousness that characterizes modernity.     

Reading the Lives of Others: Biography as Political Thought in Hannah Arendt and Simone de Beauvoir

In this essay, I focus on two biographical works by Hannah Arendt and Simone de Beauvoir that I read as political texts: Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess (Arendt 1957 ) and “Must We Burn Sade?” (Beauvoir 2012 ). Reading Arendt's Varnhagen and Beauvoir's “Sade” side by side illuminates their shared preoccupation with lived experience and their common political premises: the antagonism between freedom and sovereignty, and the centrality of action and constructive relations with others. My argument is that these texts constitute an original style of political thinking, which I call politico‐biographical hermeneutics, or reading the life of others as exercises in political theory. Politico‐biographical hermeneutics, as I take it, is not a systematic methodology, but an approach to interpreting sociopolitical forces as they come to bear and are embodied and inscribed in the lived experiences, struggles, and works of representative or exemplary individuals. This approach identifies the political lessons of lived experience and supports one of the central claims of feminist philosophy, namely, that the personal and the political are not antithetical, but relational.     

The Baby and the Bathwater: Hans Jonas's Recovery of Aristotelian Biological Concepts

The idiom referred to in the title, “don't throw out the baby with the bath water,” instructs us to keep what is essential and to only throw away what is inessential. Bathing babies has the well-being of the child in mind, the end result of which is cleanliness. Efficiency in the task of cleaning is secondary. No one would throw away a baby when draining the baby's bathwater. Somewhat analogously, science and philosophy each have the goal of the attainment of truth in mind. Part and parcel of this search for truth has been the attachment of being parsimonious, especially since William of Ockham. If the goal is truth, then one cannot get lost in the pursuit of parsimony, therefore losing the truth. The goal of finding the truth must remain intact; the method of parsimony at best remains subservient to the attainment of truth. Hans Jonas believed this regarding truth and pursued the criticism of reductive materialism as part and parcel of his research program in philosophy of biology and philosophical anthropology beginning in 1950. In his mind, reductive materialism, as it was practiced, involved the pursuit of parsimony at the cost of the truth through neglect of the purpose-driven conscious life of the subject. In this article, I expose and defend the recovery of certain elements of Aristotelian biology by Professor Hans Jonas. In the process, I show how Jonas was among the early authors writing on the philosophy of biology and defending ontological essentialism and purposefulness in organisms against reductive materialism and the relentless pursuit of the unity of the sciences. Along this line, I position Jonas among the arguments made regarding teleological explanations current in the philosophy of biology. First, I explain and defend Jonas's thesis that a full understanding of organisms requires recognizing an ontological essentialism regarding organisms. Secondly, I explain and defend Jonas's forward looking and backward looking teleological conceptions of activity insofar as it concurs directly with the conscious experience of life for humans, while situating it within the mainstream of philosophy of biology. Last, the importance of this recovery of Aristotelian concepts highlights Jonas's position as an early proponent of non-reductive materialism. More importantly, his thought forces us to recognize that in the pursuit of truth we must use parsimony well. We should take extreme care to preserve the truth; we should not throw out the baby with the bath water.