Knowledge Under Threat

Many contemporary epistemologists hold that a subject S’s true belief that p counts as knowledge only if S’s belief that p is also, in some important sense, safe. I describe accounts of this safety condition from John Hawthorne, Duncan Pritchard, and Ernest Sosa. There have been three counterexamples to safety proposed in the recent literature, from Comesaña, Neta and Rohrbaugh, and Kelp. I explain why all three proposals fail: each moves fallaciously from the fact that S was at epistemic risk just before forming her belief to the conclusion that S’s belief was formed unsafely. In light of lessons from their failure, I provide a new and successful counterexample to the safety condition on knowledge. It follows, then, that knowledge need not be safe. Safety at a time depends counterfactually on what would likely happen at that time or soon after in a way that knowledge does not. I close by considering one objection concerning higher‐order safety.     

Unsafe Knowledge

Ernest Sosa has argued that if someone knows that p, then his belief that p is “safe”. and Timothy Williamson has agreed. In this paper I argue that safety, as defined by Sosa, is not a necessary condition on knowledge – that we can have unsafe knowledge. I present Sosa’s definition of safety and a counterexample to it as a necessary condition on knowledge. I also argue that Sosa’s most recent refinements to the notion of safety don’t help him to avoid the counterexample. I consider three replies on behalf of the defender of safety, and find them all wanting. Finally, I offer a tentative diagnosis of my counterexample.     

Against global method safety

The global method safety account of knowledge states that an agent’s true belief that p is safe and qualifies as knowledge if and only if it is formed by method M, such that her beliefs in p and her beliefs in relevantly similar propositions formed by M in all nearby worlds are true. This paper argues that global method safety is too restrictive. First, the agent may not know relevantly similar propositions via M because the belief that p is the only possible outcome of M. Second, there are cases where there is a fine-grained belief that is unsafe and a relevantly similar coarse-grained belief (with looser truth conditions) that is safe and where both beliefs are based on the same method M. Third, the reliability of conditional reasoning, a basic belief-forming method, seems to be sensitive to fine-grained contents, as suggested by the wide variation in success rates for thematic versions of the Wason selection task.

     

Foley's Threshold View of Belief and The Safety Condition on Knowledge

This paper introduces a new argument against Richard Foley's threshold view of belief. Foley's view is based on the Lockean Thesis (LT) and the Rational Threshold Thesis (RTT). The former thesis is the claim that it is epistemically rational to believe a proposition if and only if it is epistemically rational to have a degree of confidence in that proposition sufficient for belief. The latter thesis is the claim that it is epistemically rational to believe a proposition if and only if it is epistemically rational to have a degree of confidence in that proposition that meets or exceeds a specified threshold. The argument introduced here shows that the views derived from the joint endorsement of the LT and the RTT violate the safety condition on knowledge in way that threatens the LT and/or the RTT.     

Memory as a Generative Epistemic Source

It is widely assumed that memory has only the capacity to preserve epistemic features that have been generated by other sources. Specifically, if S knows (justifiedly believes/rationally believes) that p via memory at T2, then it is argued that (i) S must have known (justifiedly believed/rationally believed) that p when it was originally acquired at T1, and (ii) S must have acquired knowledge that p (justification with respect to p/rationality with respect to p) at T1 via a non-memorial source. Thus, according to this view, memory cannot make an unknown proposition known, an unjustified belief justified, or an irrational belief rational–it can only preserve what is already known, justified, or rational. In this paper, I argue that condition (i) is false and, a fortiori , that condition (ii) is false. Hence, I show that, contrary to received wisdom in contemporary epistemology, memory can function as a generative epistemic source.     

Luminosity Guaranteed

This article aims to show that Williamson's anti‐luminosity argument does not succeed if we presuppose a constitutive connection between the phenomenal and the doxastic. In contrast to other luminists, however, my strategy is not to critically focus on the refined safety condition in terms of degrees of confidence that anti‐luminists typically use in this context. Instead, I will argue that, given a certain conception of what Chalmers calls ‘direct phenomenal concepts,’ luminosity is guaranteed even if the refined safety condition in terms of degrees of confidence is taken for granted.     

A strategy for assessing closure

This paper looks at an argument strategy for assessing the epistemic closure principle. This is the principle that says knowledge is closed under known entailment; or (roughly) if S knows p and S knows that p entails q, then S knows that q. The strategy in question looks to the individual conditions on knowledge to see if they are closed. According to one conjecture, if all the individual conditions are closed, then so too is knowledge. I give a deductive argument for this conjecture. According to a second conjecture, if one (or more) condition is not closed, then neither is knowledge. I give an inductive argument for this conjecture. In sum, I defend the strategy by defending the claim that knowledge is closed if, and only if, all the conditions on knowledge are closed. After making my case, I look at what this means for the debate over whether knowledge is closed.     

Some Problems with the Anti-Luminosity-Argument

I argue that no successful version of Williamson's anti-luminosity-argument has yet been presented, even if Srinivasan's further elaboration and defence is taken into account. There is a version invoking a coarse-grained safety condition and one invoking a fine-grained safety condition. A crucial step in the former version implicitly relies on the false premise that sufficient similarity is transitive. I show that some natural attempts to resolve this issue fail. Similar problems arise for the fine-grained version. Moreover, I argue that Srinivasan's defence of the more contentious fine-grained safety condition is also unsuccessful, again for similar reasons.     

Conditionals and directionality: On the meaning of if vs. only if

The aim of this study was to test the predictions of the current theories of reasoning about the comprehension of conditional statements. We used two types of conditional statement that are logically equivalent: if p then q and p only if q . The model theory of reasoning considers that these conditional forms differ in their initial meaning, because the negative contingency is considered only in the p only if q form. Mental-rule theories maintain that the interpretation of p only if q depends on a rephrasing of the statement as: if not q then not p . Alternatively, a directional bias may explain the differences between if p then q and p only if q . We report three experiments that demonstrate the existence of a directional bias in the comprehension of the conditionals. The results were not predicted by either the mental-rules theories or the model theory; they could, however, be easily assimilated by the model theory.     

How to stay safe while extending the mind

According to the extended mind thesis, cognitive processes are not confined to the nervous system but can extend beyond skin and skull to notebooks, iPhones, computers and such. The extended mind thesis is a metaphysical thesis about the material basis of our cognition. As such, whether the thesis is true can have implications for epistemological issues. Carter has recently argued that safety-based theories of knowledge are in tension with the extended mind hypothesis, since the safety condition implies that there is an epistemic difference between subjects who form their beliefs via their biological capacities and between subjects who have extended their cognition. Kelp, on the other hand, has argued that a safety-based theory of knowledge can be correct only if the extended mind thesis is true. While these claims are not logically inconsistent, they do leave the safety theorist in an uncomfortable position. I will argue that safety-based theories of knowledge are not hostage to the truth of the extended mind thesis, and that once the safety condition is properly understood it is not in tension with the extended mind thesis.

     

Sensitivity Theory and the Individuation of Belief-Formation Methods

In this paper it is argued that sensitivity theory suffers from a fatal defect. Sensitivity theory is often glossed as: (1) S knows that p only if S would not believe that p if p were false. As Nozick showed in his pioneering work on sensitivity theory, this formulation needs to be supplemented by a further counterfactual condition: (2) S knows that p only if S would believe p if p were true. Nozick further showed that the theory needs a qualification on the method used to form the belief. However, when these complications are spelled out in detail, it becomes clear that the two counterfactuals are in irresolvable tension. To jibe with the externalist intuitions that motivate sensitivity theory in the first place, (1) needs a fine-grained grouping of belief-formation methods, but (2) needs coarse-grained grouping. It is therefore suggested that sensitivity theory is in dire straits: either its proponents need to provide a workable principle of method individuation or they must retrench and give up their claims to providing sufficient conditions for knowledge.

---

Initial models in conditionals: evidence from priming

We examined the comprehension of different types of conditionals. We measured the reading time of sentences primed by different types of conditionals (Experiments 1 and 2). We found that the participants read not-p and not-q faster when it was primed by the conditional form p if q and they were slower to read p and q when it was primed by the conditional form p only if q. This effect disappeared in the second experiment, where the order of the elements was reversed (q and p and not-q and not-p). These results suggest that the conditional form p if q elicits an initial representation "from p to q" with two possibilities, while the conditional form p only if q elicits a reverse representation with only one possibility. The third experiment showed that there were effects of the order only for the conditional if p then q, which confirms the reverse representation hypothesis. We discuss the implications of these results for different theories of conditional comprehension.     

RELIABILISM AND SAFETY

Abstract: Duncan Pritchard has recently highlighted the problem of veritic epistemic luck and claimed that a safety‐based account of knowledge succeeds in eliminating veritic luck where virtue‐based accounts and process reliabilism fail. He then claims that if one accepts a safety‐based account, there is no longer a motivation for retaining a commitment to reliabilism. In this article, I delineate several distinct safety principles, and I argue that those that eliminate veritic luck do so only if at least implicitly committed to reliabilism.     

Three Arguments to Think that Faith Does Not Entail Belief

On doxastic theories of propositional faith, necessarily, S has faith that p only if S believes that p. On nondoxastic theories of propositional faith, it's false that, necessarily, S has faith that p only if S believes that p. In this article, I defend three arguments for nondoxastic theories of faith and I respond to published criticisms of them.     

条件推理的语义关系表达形式效应

作者用以大学生为被试的实验考察, 基本条件句语义关系表达形式(充分关系、必要关系和析取关系表达形式)和作为心理模型外显建构的可能性判断任务对条件推理的可能影响。实验结果发现, 条件推理的语义关系表达形式效应显著, 条件句语义关系表达形式对被试条件推理有显著的影响, 条件推理成绩随条件句语义关系表达的外显程度增加而增加; 被试在可能性判断任务中对条件句所含心理模型的外显建构并没有明显改善条件推理的成绩; 在有可能性判断任务条件下, 被试外显心理模型建构的成绩变化模式并不能一致地预测条件推理成绩的变化模式。这些结果说明, 人们的条件推理可能并不是完全基于心理模型建构, 而是还受对条件句前后件之间语义关系理解的影响; 条件句表达形式中语义关系的外显内隐模式影响对条件句语义关系的知觉理解难易, 从而影响相应条件推理的成绩。     

Fumerton's Puzzle for Theories of Rationality

Richard Foley has presented a puzzle purporting to show that all attempts in trying to find a sufficient condition of rationality are doomed. The puzzle rests on two plausible assumptions. The first is a level-connecting principle: if one rationally believes that one's belief that p is irrational, then one's belief that p is irrational. The second is a claim about a structural feature shared by all promising sufficient conditions of rationality: for any such condition, it is possible that one's belief satisfies it and yet one rationally believes that it doesn’t. With the two assumptions, Foley argues that a sufficient condition of rationality is impossible. I explain how exactly the puzzle goes and I try to offer a solution. If my solution works, all theorists of rationality who accept certain level-connecting principles need to add an extra condition to their favourite rationality-making condition.     

The Decision-Theoretic Lockean Thesis

Abstract

Certain philosophers maintain that there is a ‘constitutive threshold for belief’: to believe that p just is to have a degree of confidence that p above a certain threshold. On the basis of this view, these philosophers defend what is known as ‘the Lockean Thesis’, according to which it is rational to believe that p just in case it is rational to have a degree of confidence that p above the constitutive threshold for belief. While not directly speaking to the controversy over the Lockean Thesis, this paper defends the general idea behind it—namely, the thesis that there is some threshold such that it is rational to believe that p if and only if it is rational to have a degree of confidence greater than that threshold. This paper identifies the threshold in question—not with the alleged constitutive threshold for belief—but with what I call ‘the practical threshold for rational belief’. Roughly, the thesis defended here is that it is rational to believe that p if and only if it is rational to have a degree of confidence that p that rationalizes engaging in certain types of practical reasoning.     

对塔斯基“真”理论的批评与重建

塔斯基首先提出关于真之定义的T模式即:"p"是真的,当且仅当,p。随后他又用X取代T模式中的"p",并且用"满足"来定义"真"。本文一方面根据"内容恰当性"要求,提出另一种模式T′即:"p"是真的,当且仅当,p是存在的;用以补充T模式,并完善塔斯基的语言层次论。另一方面根据"形式正确性"要求,指出塔斯基对T模式的这两项修改都是多余的。     

Discrimination and differentiation of response number in stimulus directed pecking of pigeons.

In Experiment 1, autoshaping trials terminated with food only if pigeons emitted more than a target number of responses during a trial in one condition and fewer than a target number in another. The median number of responses per trial shifted in accordance wtih the requirements. The responding of yoked-control birds that received response-independent reinforcers did not vary with the response requirements. In Experiment 2, the number of responses in autoshaping trial became the discriminative stimulus for reinforcement in the second component of a chained schedule. In one condition, responding was reinforced only if the number of responses in the first component was above a target value; in the other condition, responding was reinforced only if the number was below the target value. The distribution of the first-component response numbers did not shift systematically between discrimination conditions, but response rates in the second component indicated that the number of responses in the autoshaping trial was a discriminable property behavior.     

Increasing Safety Belt Use: Effects of Modeling and Trip Length1

Effects of modeling on car safety belt use were investigated in a field experiment. Modeling, anticipated trip length, and gender of the model were manipulated in a 2 × 2 × 2 factorial design. Sixty-four female college students were told that they were to participate in an experiment that would take place in another location, requiring a drive either of less than one mile or of several miles. The driver either used or did not use a safety belt. Subjects' belt use was significantly related to the model's behavior. When the driver used a safety belt, 77.4% of the subjects used one; when the driver did not use a safety belt, only 313% of the subjects used one. A significant effect for trip length was also found. In the long trip condition, 71.9% of the subjects used a belt; in the short trip condition, 35.5% used one. Results are interpreted as support for a social learning theory approach to increasing voluntary safety belt use.