Is Memory for Head Orientation Based on a Left-Looking Schema?

Research has shown that people misremember right-looking heads on coins as facing to the left, suggesting a general memory schema that favors left-lookers. This hypothesis was investigated in a study of 241 subjects in three experiments who were shown photographs of faces looking to the left, to the right, or at the observer and were later asked to identify whether each one had subsequently been left-right reversed. Also, in Experiments 2 and 3, respectively, initial judgments of liking and of orientation were obtained. Unexpectedly, orientation memory accuracy was lower after a 5-s exposure than after a 1-s exposure, and after initial judgments of lateral orientation than after judgments of liking. Although the difference between left- and right-lookers was significant in only 2 of 14 comparisons, aggregated data showed that identification accuracy was generally higher for left-lookers, with a mean effect size of 0.16. Although small, this difference is consistent with the hypothesis of a left-looking schema for heads.     

Further Tests of Schmidt’s Schema Theory

The present study investigated the generalizability of Schmidt’s (1975) schema theory to an open-skill (Poulton, 1957) situation. Subjects attempted to time a preferred-hand button press so that it was coincident with the lighting of the last of a series of runway lights whose apparent velocity was 4023 mm/sec. Prior to five trials of performance on the criterion task, subjects received 40 trials in which they either (a) watched (low response requirements) or (b) responded with the nonpreferred hand (high response requirements) to a stimulus moving at (a) a constant (2235, 3129, 4917, or 5812 mm/sec) velocity (low stimulus variability) or (b) different velocities (high stimulus variability) from trial to trial. Subjects receiving high stimulus variability and high response requirements during training had significantly lower absolute error on the criterion task than did those in the other conditions. The results were discussed in terms of the type of practice which facilitates development of a schema rule for coincident-timing situations.     

Schema anticipation in recall: memory process or report strategy?

Summary This article reports an experimental investigation testing the hypothesis that recall reports are systematically biased by the recaller's knowledge about who is to receive the recall report, while that bias is absent from a recognition test. Subjects listened to one of two versions of a story recounting John's visit to the doctor. After the story was read, subjects were asked to recall the story either with standard-recall instructions or with instructions to recall for peers, for Martians, or for a contest. In a fifth condition, subjects performed a filler activity, viz., the recall of a personal experience. After the recall test subjects were administered a recognition test. Between the groups no systematic differences in memory performance were observed in the recognition test. Recall for peers appeared to be poorer than recall in the other conditions. Subjects in the recall for a contest condition scored higher than the subjects in the other groups. Not only did groups differ with respect to bias, but there were also systematic differences in the memory or discrimination scores. The findings are discussed within the framework of schema theory.     

Superassertibility and the Equivalence Schema: A Dilemma for Wright’s Antirealist

Crispin Wright champions the notion of superassertibility as providing a truth predicate that is congenial to antirealists in many debates in that it satisfies relevant platitudes concerning truth and does so in a very minimal way. He motivates such a claim by arguing that superassertibility can satisfy the equivalence schema: it is superassertible that P if and only if P. I argue that Wright’s attempted proof that superassertibility can satisfy this schema is unsuccessful, because it requires a premise that has not been properly motivated and is prima facie implausible. I further argue that, even if the dubious premise is accepted, the resulting proof is intuitionistically invalid. This is problematic, because a proponent of superassertibility as a truth predicate has independent reasons to affect a logical revision in the direction of intuitionism. The resulting dilemma suggests that superassertibility may not be an adequate truth candidate for any significant ranges of discourse. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992     

A Quantitative Estimate of Schema Abnormality in Socially Anxious and Non‐Anxious Individuals

Although cognitive theories of anxiety suggest that anxious individuals are characterized by abnormal threat‐relevant schemas, few empirical studies have estimated the nature of these cognitive structures using quantitative methods that lend themselves to inferential statistical analysis. In the present study, socially anxious (n = 55) and non‐anxious (n = 62) participants completed 3 Q‐Sort tasks to assess their knowledge of events that commonly occur in social or evaluative scenarios. Participants either sorted events according to how commonly they personally believe the events occur (i.e. “self” condition), or to how commonly they estimate that most people believe they occur (i.e. “other” condition). Participants' individual Q‐Sorts were correlated with mean sorts obtained from a normative sample to obtain an estimate of schema abnormality, with lower correlations representing greater levels of abnormality. Relative to non‐anxious participants, socially anxious participants' sorts were less strongly associated with sorts of the normative sample, particularly in the “self” condition, although secondary analyses suggest that some significant results might be explained, in part, by depression and experience with the scenarios. These results provide empirical support for the theoretical notion that threat‐relevant self‐schemas of anxious individuals are characterized by some degree of abnormality.     

What is a family? a contemporary view

In the light of two cases that held the attention of the United States in mid-1993, family therapists as well as other professionals need to consider- or re-consider-what it is that constitutes a family. Is the family based on biological ties? On psychological bonds? On legal definitions? When a conflict arises as to the family with which a child should reside, what factors need to be considered? Contested adoption cases are rare but not unique; the legal “divorce” from biological parents in favor of psychological ties is a much newer phenomenon. These cases are central to the discussion of this contemporary view of what constitutes a family.     

Is Xunzi a utilitarian? Revisiting a disagreement

ABSTRACT

In Chinese scholarship, Xunzi is often regarded as an eclectic Confucian master who accepted some form of utilitarian thoughts (e.g. Fung Yu-lan, Mou Zongsan and Xu Fuguan). This characteristic was also observed by some western scholars such as Benjamin I. Schwartz. In a recent study, I argued that the basic character of Xunzi’s philosophy is utilitarianism in a broad sense based on an examination on his intellectual criticism and political criticism. Xunzi asserts that humans are innately driven by self-interested desires, and he evaluates all intellectual works and political behaviours by their utility. However, he does not limit utility to only basic animal desires such as food and sex. In Xunzi’s view, humans also have innate emotions; hence, these emotions should also be accounted for in their utility. This is similar to John Stuart Mill’s redefinition of Bentham’s concept of utility. Are Xunzi’s and Mill’s concepts of utility exactly the same? This question has yet to be examined. This article is a comparative study between utilitarianism and Xunzi’s philosophy which especially explores the compatibility of these two philosophies.     

Should a Naturalist Be a Supervenient Physicalist?

I clarify a widely accepted form of contemporary naturalism and argue that supervenient physicalism should not be considered an option for those who embrace this version of naturalism. Among other things, my thesis implies that if there are insuperable difficulties for strict physicalism, then the move toward supervenience views of the mind/body problem amounts to an abandonment of this version of naturalism and not a minor adjustment of it. More precisely, my argument is this: strict physicalism excludes both substance and property or event dualism. But the supervenience thesis entails some form of property or event dualism. So strict physicalism excludes the supervenience thesis. Moreover, given the nature of a widely accepted contemporary understanding of naturalism, it is best construed along strict physicalist lines and naturalists of this persuasion should not be supervenient physicalists. To make my case, I offer a characterization of a ubiquitous version of contemporary naturalism followed by an analysis of the most plausible version of supervenient physicalism consistent with this form of naturalism. I then try to show why this version of supervenient physicalism should not be an option for a naturalist of a certain persuasion.     

Self-analysis: a fool for a patient?

In this paper I first reviewed the scanty publications on the subject of self-analysis. Although it was recommended by Freud as early as 1910 for every analyst, self-analysis turns out to have many pitfalls and to be quite a complicated and controversial procedure. There is no agreement on the proper technique of self-analysis in the literature, nor is there any discussion of the determinants of the particular choice of technique of self-analysis that is employed, nor even of the reasons why some analysts do not engage in it at all. Using clinical data gathered from written material of many years of self-analysis following the termination of a successful training psychoanalysis, I have attempted to elucidate some of the problems posed by this procedure. These problems are in some ways similar to formal psychoanalysis, but are in some ways contingent on the fact that it is basically a different technique. It is a solitary occupation and therefore suffers from the dangers of disintegration into autism, narcissism, and obsessional rumination. There is no living presence of an analyst to serve either as a transference figure or to make interpretations and stimulate the production of material. The identification with the analyst's analyzing function is far from simple in self-analysis because of the complex nature of the various internalizations of the analyst that take place over years of a formal training analysis. Thus, Ticho (1967) is correct when she claimed that self-analysis is a skill that the analysand has to acquire by himself or herself. An important phase of the beginning of self-analysis involves the working through of the separation from the psychoanalyst and the re-evaluation of the analyst and the analytic process. This results in a heightened sense of independence and autonomy, increased cohesion of the self, and maturation--which is manifested by greater autonomous ego functioning, a more mature sense of identity, and continued transformations of narcissism which highly valuable goals, on the basis of the data I have presented, can be approached through the process of self-analysis. Above all this stands the most important goal of self-analysis, the understanding of one's countertransference reactions. This is especially important in the treatment of seriously disturbed patients who become disruptive, and thus get labeled borderline, often as a response to unconscious countertransference manifestations from the analyst which are then experienced in the self-object transference as failures in empathy.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

Can a Robot Be a Good Colleague?

Science and Engineering Ethics - This paper discusses the robotization of the workplace, and particularly the question of whether robots can be good colleagues. This might appear to be a strange...     

Why is a truth-predicate like a pronoun?

I begin with an exposition of the two main variants of the Prosentential Theory of Truth (PT), those of Dorothy Grover et al. and Robert Brandom. Three main types of criticisms are then put forward: (1) material criticisms to the effect that (PT) does not adequately explain the linguistic data, (2) an objection to the effect that no variant of (PT) gives a properly unified account of the various occurrences of “true” in English, and, most importantly, (3) a charge that the comparison with proforms is explanatorily idle. The last objection is that, given a complete semantic account of pronouns, proadjectives, antecedents, etc., together with a complete (PT), the essential semantic character of “true” could be deduced, but then, the idleness of the comparison with pronouns would be apparent. It turns out that objections (2) and (3) are related in the following way: the prosentential terminology is held to conceal the lack of unity in (PT), by describing the different data in the same terms (“proform”, “antecedent”, etc.). But this, I argue, is only a way of truly describing, rather than explaining, the data, these being certain relations of equivalence and consequence between sentences. I consider a language for which (PT) would be not only true, but also explanatory, but note that this language is very different from English. I end by showing that Robert Brandom’s case that “is true” is not a predicate fails, and that his motivation for saying so is based on fallacious reasoning (namely, Boghossian’s argument against deflationism).     

How does a word become a message? An illustration on a developmental time-scale

Recent changes in views on cognition underscore its embodied, situated and distributed character. These changes are compatible with the conceptual framework of ecological psychology. However for ecological psychology to propose explanations for a broad range of cognitive phenomena, including language, it needs an account of how to link the dynamics of coupling between the organism and the environment with the apparent symbolicity of informational structures. In this paper it is proposed that a theory of information in biological systems, advocated by Howard Pattee, may help forge this link. By treating informational structures as constraints on dynamics this approach helps to identify which processes, in which systems and on what time-scales are needed for structures to ‘become messages’. I will illustrate how these processes might work on developmental time-scale in the domain of language, building on the work by Edward Reed (1995, 1996) and extending it using the view of linguistic structures as constraints.     

A failure of dialogue? a critical reflection on a discussion between a teacher trainer and a pre-service second-language teacher

Reflective practice in teacher education often involves dialogic communication between teacher educators and teachers. This essay asks what constitutes authentic dialogic engagement in discussions between a pre-service second-language (SL) teacher and her university supervisor. Written as a self-critical reflection, the paper first describes the author’s thoughts and feelings about a post-teaching session he conducted with one of his supervisees and identifies possible disconnections existing between them. Drawing on Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of dialogism and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s of genuine dialogue, this paper reflects on the dispositions that foster a dialogic relationship between teacher educators and pre-service and in-service teachers.     

Once a boring task always a boring task? Interest as a self-regulatory mechanism.

A process was proposed through which individuals regulate their motivation to perform necessary but uninteresting activities over time. If committed to continuing, individuals may engage in interest-enhancing strategies that can change the activity into something more positive to perform. In Study 1 Ss performed novel tasks and generated strategies to make regular performance interesting. In Study 2 Ss actually used these strategies primarily in conditions indicating a self-regulatory attempt: The task was currently boring, there was a perceived reason to continue (alleged health benefit), and a relevant strategy was available. Strategy use was associated with a change in activity definition and greater likelihood of subsequently performing the activity. In Study 3 Ss beliefs about how to maintain motivation to perform more everyday activities emphasized the importance of regulating interest relative to other self-regulatory strategies.     

Should a school honor a student's DNR order?

Physicians first present the case of a sixteen-year-old cardiac patient who has refused a heart transplant and cardiac resuscitation. Her family and physicians accept the decision. The family has asked the school system to honor her do not resuscitate order if she goes into cardiac arrest in school The school system has refused to do so. Following the case presentation, a lawyer, a physician/ethicist, and an educator consider the important issues raised by this ongoing case.     

Why Is a Valid Inference a Good Inference?

True beliefs and truth‐preserving inferences are, in some sense, good beliefs and good inferences. When an inference is valid though, it is not merely truth‐preserving, but truth‐preserving in all cases. This motivates my question: I consider a Modus Ponens inference, and I ask what its validity in particular contributes to the explanation of why the inference is, in any sense, a good inference. I consider the question under three different definitions of ‘case’, and hence of ‘validity’: (i) the orthodox definition given in terms of interpretations or models, (ii) a metaphysical definition given in terms of possible worlds, and (iii) a substitutional definition defended by Quine. I argue that the orthodox notion is poorly suited to explain what's good about a Modus Ponens inference. I argue that there is something good that is explained by a certain kind of truth across possible worlds, but the explanation is not provided by metaphysical validity in particular; nothing of value is explained by truth across all possible worlds. Finally, I argue that the substitutional notion of validity allows us to correctly explain what is good about a valid inference.     

Selecting a patient or initiating a psychoanalytic process?

The defences provoked in the analyst by the anxieties associated with the difficult tasks of ‘assessment’ and ‘selection’ for psychoanalysis can result in a tendency to think in terms of ‘hurdles to be cleared’ by potential psychoanalytic patients, rather than ‘opening the gates’. This can result in a diminution of the analyst's capacity to enlist and sustain a psychoanalytic stance. Only within a psychoanalytic frame can a meaningful psychoanalytic process unfold, at all stages of a potential patient's movement from their first contact through to, possibly, entering into an analysis. The author illustrates the value of this thinking by describing the work of the London Clinic of Psychoanalysis where there has been a shift of emphasis in psychoanalytic consultation towards working with individuals on their potential to initiate a psychoanalytic process, and away from the sole aim of ‘selection of a suitable patient’. In this paper, the author notes that when institutional culture and practice supports psychoanalytic identity, this makes it more possible to recognize and articulate the anxieties provoked by the ‘emotional storm’ inevitable in psychoanalytic consultation, and the draw towards unhelpful enactment that may otherwise obscure the initiation of a psychoanalytic process that may or may not result in analytic treatment. Illustrative case material from the Clinic is presented.