Supersubstantivalism and vague location

One well-known objection to supersubstantivalism is that it is inconsistent with the contingency of location. This paper presents a new objection to supersubstantivalism: it is inconsistent with the vagueness of location. Though contingency and vagueness are formally similar, there are important philosophical differences between the two. As a result, the objection from vague location will be structurally different than the objection from contingent location. The paper explores these differences and then defends the argument that supersubstantivalism is inconsistent with the plausible thesis that it is vague where I am located.

     

Restricted Diachronic Composition,Immanent Causality,and Objecthood: A Reply to Hudson

Abstract

In ‘On Making an Effort’ E. J. Coffman develops what he takes to be a fairly serious problem for Robert Kane's positive theory of free choice, where the concept of efforts of will is pivotal.¹ Coffman argues that the plausibility of Kane's libertarian account of free choice ‘is inversely proportional to the plausibility of a certain principle of agency’ (p. 12). And since the latter is quite plausible, the former is therefore ‘at best fairly implausible’ (p. 12). In what follows I will show that Coffman's objection is in fact misplaced. Kanean libertarianism not only is in accordance with the essence of the principles of personal responsibility that Coffman advocates, it also affords a more plausible and intelligible account of the sources of personal responsibility superior to the proposed principles.     

How can we come to know metaphysical modal truths?

Those who aim to give an account of modal knowledge face two challenges: the integration challenge of reconciling an account of what is involved in knowing modal truths with a plausible story about how we can come to know them, and the reliability challenge of giving a plausible account of how we could have evolved a reliable capacity to acquire modal knowledge. I argue that recent counterfactual and dispositional accounts of modal knowledge cannot solve these problems regarding specifically metaphysical modal truths—leaving us with the threat of skepticism about large portions of metaphysics, and certain other areas of philosophy. I argue, however, that both of these problems look insuperable only if we assume that metaphysical modal discourse serves a describing or tracking function. If we adopt instead a normativist approach to metaphysical modal discourse, which sees the basic function of modal discourse as giving us perspicuous ways of conveying, reasoning with, and renegotiating semantic rules, the problems show up very differently. The modal normativist can give a plausible response to both of the classic problems of how we can come to know metaphysical modal truths.

     

Episodic and semantic memory in accounts of food intolerance

It was hypothesized that accounts of occasions of eating followed by adverse symptoms (i.e. perceived food intolerance) would contain greater detail when based on recall of actual events, using episodic memory. Where accounts lacked detail it was hypothesized that recalled events were based on knowledge about food intolerance, without personal experience of a plausible incident. These hypotheses were tested by categorizing the contents of interviews of respondents to a randomized survey of the electorate in the Birmingham area, who attributed one or more adverse symptoms to one or more foods. The majority of interview records provided evidence for semantic memory rather than recall of actual episodes of food ingestion followed by symptoms(s). Vagueness of recollection correlated negatively with patho‐physiological plausibility of the perceived food intolerance. Greater detail and specificity in accounts of food‐symptom episodes was positively correlated with plausibility. Rareness of food‐symptom(s) contingencies also correlated with detail and specificity in accounts of episodes and with plausibility of food intolerance. Detail and specificity of accounts of the eating of foods followed by symptoms, when coupled with rareness of the contingency of that food being followed by those symptoms, may prove to be a better predictor of physically diagnosed food intolerance than plausibility by patho‐physiological criteria alone. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On the Importance of History for Responsible Agency

In this article I propose a resolution to the history issue for responsible agency, given a moderate revisionist approach to responsibility. Roughly, moderate revisionism is the view that a plausible and normatively adequate theory of responsibility will require principled departures from commonsense thinking. The history issue is whether morally responsible agency – that is, whether an agent is an apt target of our responsibility-characteristic practices and attitudes – is an essentially historical notion. Some have maintained that responsible agents must have particular sorts of histories, others have argued that no such history is required. Resolution of this contentious issue is connected to a wide range of concerns, including the significance and culpability of different forms of manipulation, the plausibility of important incompatibilist criticisms of compatibilism, and of course, a satisfactory account of moral responsibility. As it turns out, history matters sometimes, but less frequently than we might think.     

A model of plausibility

Plausibility has been implicated as playing a critical role in many cognitive phenomena from comprehension to problem solving. Yet, across cognitive science, plausibility is usually treated as an operationalized variable or metric rather than being explained or studied in itself. This article describes a new cognitive model of plausibility, the Plausibility Analysis Model (PAM), which is aimed at modeling human plausibility judgment. This model uses commonsense knowledge of concept-coherence to determine the degree of plausibility of a target scenario. In essence, a highly plausible scenario is one that fits prior knowledge well: with many different sources of corroboration, without complexity of explanation, and with minimal conjecture. A detailed simulation of empirical plausibility findings is reported, which shows a close correspondence between the model and human judgments. In addition, a sensitivity analysis demonstrates that PAM is robust in its operations.     

Descartes as critic of Galileo's scientific methodology

Some philosophers of science suggest that philosophical assumptions must influence historical scholarship, because history (like science) has no neutral data and because the treatment of any particular historical episode is going to be influenced to some degree by one's prior philosophical conceptions of what is important in science. However, if the history of science must be laden with philosophical assumptions, then how can the history of science be evidence for the philosophy of science? Would not an inductivist history of science confirm an inductivist philosophy of science and a conventionalist history of science confirm a conventionalist philosophy of science? I attempt to resolve this problem; essentially, I deny the claim that the history of science must be influenced by one's conception of what is important in science — one's general philosophy of science. To accomplish the task I look at a specific historical episode, together with its history, and draw some metamethodological conclusions from it. The specific historical episode I examine is Descartes' critique of Galileo's scientific methodology.     

The big picture: Writing psychology into the history of the human sciences

The grand narratives which once gave order and readability to histories, of science and of the human sciences are widely rejected in current historiography, and historians focus on detailed studies of scientific knowledge and activity in particular contexts. How, then, are synthetic general histories, accessible to the non-specialist, to be written? This paper, designed as an open-ended discussion, reflects on the business of writing about psychology in a general history of the human sciences. It considers three large topics: reflexivity, and the situation in the human sciences where “man” is both subject and object; the boundary-less identity of the human sciences and hence the need to express values in delimiting the content of the field; and the long-standing debate about what sort of “science” is appropriate for knowledge of human beings. The conclusion turns to “the quest” as a narrative form. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

A MINOR MATTER? THE FRANCISCAN THESIS AND PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY1

The Franciscan thesis maintains that the primary motive of the Incarnation is to glorify the triune God in the person of Jesus Christ: though Christ atones for human sins, his coming isn't relative to our need for redemption but rather has an absolute primacy. The Franciscan thesis is sometimes associated with the counterfactual claim that Christ would have come even if humans hadn't sinned. In recent work on the Franciscan thesis, an attempt is made to prove the counterfactual claim on the basis of a purely logical argument drawn from the writings of Bl. John Duns Scotus. After showing that this proof fails, I construct an axiological argument for the Franciscan thesis that disentangles it from unsubstantiated counterfactual claims while respecting the subtle interplay between natural and revealed theology. I then provide a metaphysical interpretation of the axiological argument that builds upon Scotist notions. Seen through this interpretive lens, Scotus's logical argument can be understood not as attempting to prove a counterfactual claim but as articulating Scotus's vision of what is required of any created order that is radically contingent on God's will yet perfectly glorifies its Creator. Thus understood, the Franciscan thesis challenges a powerful and influential picture in philosophical theology.     

On nonassociative fear emergence

Poulton and Menzies have articulated a nonassociative alternative to traditional conditioning theories of phobia emergence. Prompted by their essay, I address several issues including controversies about what counts as a conditioning event, difficulties establishing whether a fear functioned as an adaptation throughout evolutionary history, hazards of attempting to recover conditioning events in the histories of patients, and problems with the contingency view of associative learning.     

An epistemic solution to Goodman's new riddle of induction

Goodman'snew riddle of induction can be characterized by the following questions: What is the difference between ‘grue’ and ‘green’?; Why is the hypothesis that all emeralds are grue not lawlike?; Why is this hypothesis not confirmed by its positive instances?; and, Why is the predicate ‘grue’ not projectible? I argue in favor of epistemological answers to Goodman's questions. The notions of ‘lawlikeness’, ‘confirmation’, and ‘projectibility’ have to be relativized to (actual and counterfactual) epistemic situations that are determined by the available background information. In order to defend this thesis, I discuss an example that is less strange than the grue example. From the general conclusions of this discussion, it follows that ‘grue’ is not projectible in the actual epistemic situation, but it is projectible in certain counterfactual epistemic situations.     

Is reasoning from counterfactual antecedents evidence for counterfactual reasoning?

In most developmental studies the only error children could make on counterfactual tasks was to answer with the current state of affairs. It was concluded that children who did not show this error are able to reason counterfactually. However, children might have avoided this error by using basic conditional reasoning (Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas, & Perner, 2010). Basic conditional reasoning takes an antecedent, which like in counterfactual reasoning can be counter to fact, and combines it with a conditional (or set of conditionals reflecting knowledge of how the world works) to draw a likely conclusion. A critical feature of counterfactual reasoning then is that these additional assumptions be modelled after the actual events to which the counterfactual is taken to be counterfactual. In contrast in basic conditional reasoning one enriches the given antecedent with any plausible assumptions. In our tasks basic conditional reasoning leads to different answers than counterfactual reasoning. For instance, a doctor, sitting in the park with the intention to read a paper, is called to an emergency at the swimming pool. The question, "if there had been no emergency, where would the doctor be?" should counterfactually be answered "in the park". But ignoring the doctor's intentions and just reasoning on plausible grounds one might answer: "in the hospital". Only by 6 years, did children give mostly correct answers.     

Can readers ignore implausibility? Evidence for nonstrategic monitoring of event-based plausibility in language comprehension

We present evidence for a nonstrategic monitoring of event-based plausibility during language comprehension by showing that readers cannot ignore the implausibility of information even if it is detrimental to the task at hand. In two experiments using a Stroop-like paradigm, participants were required to provide positive and negative responses independent of plausibility in an orthographical task (Experiment 1) or a nonlinguistic color judgment task (Experiment 2) to target words that were either plausible or implausible in their context. We expected a nonstrategic assessment of plausibility to interfere with positive responses to implausible words. ANOVAs and linear mixed models analyses of the response latencies revealed a significant interaction of plausibility and required response that supported this prediction in both experiments, despite the use of two very different tasks. Moreover, it could be shown that the effect was not driven by the differential predictability of plausible and implausible words. These results suggest that plausibility monitoring is an inherent component of information processing.     

How persuasive is a good fit? A comment on theory testing

Quantitative theories with free parameters often gain credence when they closely fit data. This is a mistake. A good fit reveals nothing about the flexibility of the theory (how much it cannot fit), the variability of the data (how firmly the data rule out what the theory cannot fit), or the likelihood of other outcomes (perhaps the theory could have fit any plausible result), and a reader needs all 3 pieces of information to decide how much the fit should increase belief in the theory. The use of good fits as evidence is not supported by philosophers of science nor by the history of psychology; there seem to be no examples of a theory supported mainly by good fits that has led to demonstrable progress. A better way to test a theory with free parameters is to determine how the theory constrains possible outcomes (i.e., what it predicts), assess how firmly actual outcomes agree with those constraints, and determine if plausible alternative outcomes would have been inconsistent with the theory, allowing for the variability of the data.     

动机冲突下2~4岁幼儿反事实思维理解的发展

采用故事法, 考察在3种动机冲突下幼儿反事实思维理解的发展。结果表明：(1) 2岁幼儿的加法、减法反事实思维得分显著高于替代反事实思维。(2)在加法反事实任务中, 2岁幼儿显著低于4岁幼儿;在减法反事实任务中, 3个年龄组得分有显著性差异。(3)在趋避冲突下, 加法与减法反事实得分都显著高于替代反事实。(4)在结果反事实理解任务中, 随着年龄增长, 幼儿结果反事实思维理解能力有显著提高。     

The Structure of Idealization in Biological Theories: The Case of the Wright-Fisher Model

In this paper we present a new framework of idealization in biology. We characterize idealizations as a network of counterfactual and hypothetical conditionals that can exhibit different ??degrees of contingency??. We use this idea to say that, in departing more or less from the actual world, idealizations can serve numerous epistemic, methodological or heuristic purposes within scientific research. We defend that, in part, this structure explains why idealizations, despite being deformations of reality, are so successful in scientific practice. For illustrative purposes, we provide an example from population genetics, the Wright-Fisher Model.     

IV. Logic and truth‐finding in society and sociology

The question of sociological truth‐finding is posed in the light of the view that logical formalizations, along with other arguments, only acquire relevance in illocutionary contexts, where it is not so much the abstract correctness of a sentence as the stating of it that counts. In order to become a counterfactual an argument requires its antecedent to be recognized as being contrary to the ‘facts’. To this extent there is a clear link with ‘reality’ or with a view of the world that is taken as factually given. Social science develops on the basis not only of generalizations but also of historical facts and political requirements. The question arises: in terms of what world‐view or purpose can we unambiguously declare a conditional to be a counterfactual ‐ and a significant or non‐trivial one at that? Further, can Elster's clarifications help identify political agents and the proper entities within and through which political action is performed? Finally, the problem‐solving capacity of the concept of closeness of one possible world to another or to the actual world, especially with regard to counterfactuals and causality, is questioned.     

Perception is not all-purpose

I aim to show that perception depends counterfactually on the action we want to perform. Perception is not all-purpose: what we want to do does influence what we see. After clarifying how this claim is different from the one at stake in the cognitive penetrability debate and what counterfactual dependence means in my claim, I will give a two-step argument: (a) one’s perceptual attention depends counterfactually on one’s intention to perform an action (everything else being equal) and (b) one’s perceptual processing depends counterfactually on one’s perceptual attention (everything else being equal). If we put these claims together, what we get is that one’s perceptual processing depends counterfactually on one’s intention to perform an action (everything else being equal).

     

Hazards mean luck: Counterfactual thinking in reports of dangerous situations and careless behavior

It has been shown (Teigen, 1995) that experiences of "luck" in daily life are dependent upon the existence a worse and close hypothetical (counterfactual) outcome, rather than upon a positive evaluation of what actually happened. The present investigation focuses on the inverse relationship, namely whether a situation with a negative outcome close at hand will be perceived as lucky. To test this hypothesis, students were asked to describe dangerous situations (Experiment 1) and examples of careless behavior (Experiment 3) from their own lives, which subsequently were rated by the actors and by peer groups for good and bad luck, attractiveness, and for closeness and attractiveness of the counterfactual outcome. Dangerous situations and episodes involving careless behavior were generally regarded as more lucky than unlucky. Furthermore, degree of good luck was positively correlated with degree of dangerousness and with degree of carelessness. Luck was related to closeness, aversiveness, and (in Experiment 2) to estimated probability of the counterfactual outcome. It is concluded that luck is primarily determined by negative outcomes that did not happen, and thus a frequent by-product of risk taking and risk exposure.