Against epistemic partiality in friendship: value-reflecting reasons

Philosophical Studies - It has been alleged that the demands of friendship conflict with the norms of epistemology—in particular, that there are cases in which the moral demands of friendship...     

Predicting having a best friend in young children: individual characteristics and friendship features

In this study, the authors investigated the characteristics that predict best friend status in young children. One hundred and twenty-four preschool, kindergarten, and first-grade children identified their "best friend" and up to four "other friends" in their class. Teachers completed a questionnaire about each friendship to determine positive and negative features of the relationships. First, the authors used individual characteristics to predict if a child had a best friend. The variables age, gender, and peer acceptance predicted that a child would have a best friend. Second, positive friendship features positively predicted best friendships in analyses of all friendship pairs. Best friendships are meaningful relationships to children even at this young age and offer children more positive experiences than do other friendships.     

Trust and the doxastic family

This article examines Keith Lehrer??s distinction between belief and acceptance and how it differs from other accounts of belief and of the family of doxastic attitudes. I sketch a different taxonomy of doxastic attitudes. Lehrer??s notion of acceptance is mostly epistemic and at the service of his account of the ??loop of reason??, whereas for other writers acceptance is mostly a pragmatic attitude. I argue, however, that his account of acceptance underdetermines the role that the attitude of trust plays in his analysis of reason.     

Cross-sex best friendship influences on early adolescent cigarette and alcohol expectancies and use

In this study, the author investigates the influences of cross-sex best friends in early adolescence in regard to cigarettes and alcohol. Specific goals include determining the prevalence of cross-sex best friendships, investigating expectancies and perceived approval of the use of cigarettes and alcohol, and examining substance use levels. A group of urban sixth, seventh, and eighth graders completed a survey that addressed these issues. Results indicate the presence of cross-sex best friendships in the sample. Significant findings on cross-sex best friends' influence include positive expectancies for alcohol in sixth (p = .006) grade, the perception of seventh graders that the best friend's attitudes about smoking (p = .003) and drinking (p = .001) are less negative, and higher levels of cigarette use in sixth (p = .001) and eighth (p = .024) grade and alcohol use in sixth (p = .008), seventh (p = .002), and eighth grades (p = .039).     

Relational peer victimization and psychosocial adjustment: The mediating role of best friendship qualities

With a sample of 414 tenth‐grade students (53% girls) from the Northeastern United States, the unique mediating roles that different dimensions of best friendship quality play in linking relational victimization and psychosocial maladjustment were examined. For both boys and girls, relational victimization was found to predict higher levels of internalizing behaviors directly and through partial mediation by greater conflict and weaker feelings of help within adolescents' best friendships. Increased conflict also partially mediated the association between relational victimization and higher levels of externalizing behaviors. Together, the results provide support for the significance of broader peer group functioning on both dyadic relationships and individual functioning.     

Believing on trust

The aim of the paper is to propose a way in which believing on trust can ground doxastic justification and knowledge. My focus will be the notion of trust that plays the role depicted by such cases as concerned Hardwig (J Philos 82:335–49, 1985; J Philos 88:693–708, 1991) in his early papers, papers that are often referenced in recent debates in social epistemology. My primary aim is not exegetical, but since it sometimes not so clear what Hardwig’s claims are, I offer some remarks of interpretation that might be of interest. The main purpose of the paper, however, is this: following various cues in Hardwig’s writing, I specify certain epistemic properties of agents in social systems, such that, roughly speaking, for agents to know (or be justified in believing) what the ‘system knows’, social relations of epistemic trust between agents in the system are necessary. I will suggest that we can view this social form of epistemic trust as non-inferential dispositions to believe what some individual or other source of information asserts or transmits. When this disposition is discriminating and defeater-sensitive, it can ground knowledge and justification. Or, more cautiously, we should be sympathetic to this view if we are inclined to accept the core insight of process reliabilism. Finally, I will offer some remarks about how epistemic trust and epistemic reasons may relate on this picture.     

Exploratory study of best friendship dissolution characteristics and psychological difficulties during early adolescence

Few studies have evaluated best friendship dissolutions and especially the circumstances surrounding the dissolutions. In this exploratory study of young adolescents (N = 273, M_age = 11.83 years; 51% boys), we investigate young adolescents' experiences with two types of best friendship dissolution (complete dissolutions, downgrade dissolutions) and two characteristics of such experiences: initiation status (self- versus friend-initiation) and emotional reactions (degree of happiness, anger, sadness, and embarrassment). We also consider whether these characteristics of best friendship dissolutions are related to psychological difficulties (loneliness, depressive symptoms). Results indicated that most young adolescents perceive their friends initiated their recent complete and downgrade dissolutions. When young adolescents did initiate their complete dissolutions, however, they reported less negative (anger) and more positive (happiness) emotional responses. Initiation status was not related to psychological difficulties, but variability in several types of emotional responses (e.g., embarrassment) was related to variability in loneliness and depressive symptoms. Findings underscore the importance of considering not only the type of dissolution, but also the circumstances surrounding dissolutions, during early adolescence.     

Believing the impossible

A version of this paper was read at the Western Division meetings of the APA in April 1990. I am indebted for the comments of my commentator on that occasion, Stephen Hetherington. I am also indebted to Ruth Marcus for helpful correspondence, and to Steven Luper-Foy for comments. Work on the paper was supported by an academic leave from Trinity University.     

Believing the improbable

I would like to thank Brad Armendt, Patrick Maher, Bas Van Fraassen and Joan Weiner for comments on this (and/or earlier versions of this) paper. I have also benefited from conversation and correspondence with Stewart Cohen. Some of the research of which this paper was a product was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation.     

Believing in Miracles

Classical Christian definitions of miracle speak of events transcending the natural powers of objects. A personal creator, I argue, might well cause such events in order to achieve a supernatural purpose—bringing creatures to eternal life. Miracles—events transcending natural powers, disclosing and realizing the divine purpose—would then be integral to the rational order of nature. David Hume' arguments against believing reports of miracles are shown to be very weak. Laws of nature, I suggest, are best seen not as exceptionless rules but as context–dependent realizations of natural powers. In that context miracles transcend the natural order not as "violations" but as intelligible realizations of a divine supernatural purpose. Miracles are not parts of scientific theory but can be parts of a web of rational belief fully consistent with science.     

Choosing and refusing: doxastic voluntarism and folk psychology

A standard view in contemporary philosophy is that belief is involuntary, either as a matter of conceptual necessity or as a contingent fact of human psychology. We present seven experiments on patterns in ordinary folk-psychological judgments about belief. The results provide strong evidence that voluntary belief is conceptually possible and, granted minimal charitable assumptions about folk-psychological competence, provide some evidence that voluntary belief is psychologically possible. We also consider two hypotheses in an attempt to understand why many philosophers have been tempted to view belief as involuntary: that belief is a prototype concept and that belief is a dual character concept. Altogether, our findings contribute to longstanding philosophical debates about the relationship between the will and the intellect, while also advancing scientific understanding of important social judgments.     

How intergroup friendship works: A longitudinal study of friendship effects on outgroup attitudes

Cross‐sectional research has shown that frequency of self‐disclosure to outgroup members mediates the positive relationship between intergroup friendship and outgroup attitudes. The current research investigated the relationship between self‐disclosure and attitudes in more depth. New undergraduate students were asked to nominate an ingroup or outgroup friend and then report the intimacy of their disclosures to them, their anxiety and attitudes towards a series of social groups, in the first week of the semester and 6 weeks later. Intimacy of disclosure predicted more positive attitudes towards outgroups over time, but this association was only found among participants who nominated an outgroup friend. In the ingroup friend condition, a negative association was found. These associations were mediated by general intergroup anxiety. These relationships highlight the importance of integrating theories of interpersonal and intergroup relations when investigating intergroup contact. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The ethics of belief: doxastic self-control and intellectual virtue

Most of the literature on doxastic voluntarism has concentrated on the question of the voluntariness of belief and the issue of how our actual or possible control of our beliefs bears on our justification for holding them and on how, in the light of this control, our intellectual character should be assessed. This paper largely concerns a related question on which less philosophical work has been done: the voluntariness of the grounding of belief and the bearing of various views about this matter on justification, knowledge, and intellectual virtue. In part, my concern is the nature and extent of our voluntary control over our responses to reasons for believing—or over what we take to be such reasons. This paper provides a partial account of such control and, on the basis of the account, will clarify the criteria for appraising intellectual virtue.