Beyond sympathy: Smith’s rejection of Hume’s moral theory

Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) has long been recognized as importantly influenced by, and in part responding to, David Hume’s earlier ethical theory. With regard to Smith’s account of the foundations of morals in particular, recent scholarly attention has focused on Smith’s differences with Hume over the question of sympathy. Whilst this is certainly important, disagreement over sympathy in fact represents only the starting point of Smith’s engagement with – and eventual attempted rejection of – Hume’s core moral theory. We can see this by recognizing the TMS’s account of moral foundations as predicated upon a rejection of Hume’s distinction between the natural and artificial virtues. Smith is in turn revealed as generating a major break with Hume – a break which, if based on a superior theory of moral foundations (as Smith thought it to be) has important consequences for how we treat Smith and Hume in both the history of philosophy and contemporary moral theory.     

Our inalienable ability to sin: Peter Olivi’s rejection of asymmetrical freedom

From the time of Augustine to the late thirteenth century, leading Christian thinkers agreed that freedom requires the ability to make good choices, but not the ability to make bad ones. If freedom required the ability to sin, they reasoned, neither God nor the angels nor the blessed in heaven could be free. This essay examines the work of Peter Olivi, the first medieval philosopher known to reject the asymmetrical conception of freedom. Olivi argues that the ability to sin is essential to creaturely freedom and remains even in heaven. While Anselm is the nominal target of Olivi’s arguments on this topic, they form part of a wider critique directed even more at Aquinas and his followers. Olivi faults them for misunderstanding the nature of the created will and for failing to provide a foundation for a particular kind of moral responsibility: personal merit.     

Herscovitch and Meyer’s Three-Component model of commitment to change: Meta-analytic findings

Commitment to change has been subject to several qualitative reviews in recent years. As a response to an associated lack of consensus in construct definition, Herscovitch and Meyer introduced a three-component model demonstrating affective commitment to change (i.e., ACC), normative commitment to change (i.e., NCC) and continuance commitment to change (i.e., CCC). Given the growing literature on organizational change, the aim of this paper is to take stock of a decade of research that uses Herscovitch and Meyer’s instrument to measure these three components. To determine the tool’s discriminant validity we conducted meta-analyses evaluating the strength of relations among ACC, NCC and CCC; the relations among the three components and behavioural support for change; and the moderating role of North American context versus non-North American context in shaping these relationships. Findings based on data collected from 17 studies indicate notable differences in the strength of relationships among ACC–NCC, ACC–CCC and NCC–CCC. Also the pattern of the correlations among the three components and behavioural support reveals interesting extensions and insights for further research into the robustness of this model, and on hitherto under-acknowledged discrepancies in behavioural support for commitment to change research.     

The medical research council’s approach to allegations of scientific misconduct

The UK’s Medical Research Council (MRC) introduced a specific policy and procedure for inquiring into allegations of scientific misconduct in December 1997; previously cases had been considered under normal disciplinary procedures. The policy formally covers staff employed in MRC units, but those in receipt of MRC grants in universities and elsewhere are expected to operate under similar policies. The MRC’s approach is stepwise: preliminary action; assessment to establish prima facie evidence of misconduct; formal investigation; sanctions; and appeal. Strict time limits apply at all stages. The procedure will be evaluated after two years. The indications so far are that the procedure is robust, and its clarity and transparency have been an asset to all parties. The MRC is also convinced that it is equally important to achieve a working culture that fosters integrity. Thus education and training in good research practices are fundamental to the prevention of research misconduct. This paper was presented at a symposium, Scientific Misconduct: An International Perspective, organized by The Medical University of Warsaw, 16 November, 1998.     

Relative distance of lights: An extension of Bugelski’s findings

Three lights in various orientations were presented to two trained Ss. The Ss adjusted the three lights until they appeared equidistant. The results supported earlier work of a similar nature, in that the higher light was perceived as closer and horizontal separation between lights produced no significant differences in depth settings. The phenomenon was shown to occur with monocular vision, fixated vision, large angular separation of the stimuli, and with different directions of regard with respect to the fixation point. The relationship to other research is discussed.     

The origins of deference: when do people prefer lower status?

Although the desire for high status is considered universal, prior research suggests individuals often opt for lower status positions. Why would anyone favor a position of apparent disadvantage? In 5 studies, we found that the broad construct of status striving can be broken up into two conceptions: one based on rank, the other on respect. While individuals might universally desire high levels of respect, we find that they vary widely in the extent to which they strive for high-status rank, with many individuals opting for middle- or low-status rank. The status rank that individuals preferred depended on their self-perceived value to the group: when they believed they provided less value, they preferred lower status rank. Mediation and moderation analyses suggest that beliefs about others' expectations were the primary driver of these effects. Individuals who believed they provided little value to their group inferred that others expected them to occupy a lower status position. Individuals in turn conformed to these perceived expectations, accepting lower status rank in such settings.     

Automatic attentional orienting to other people’s gaze in schizophrenia

Explicit tests of social cognition have revealed pervasive deficits in schizophrenia. Less is known of automatic social cognition in schizophrenia. We used a spatial orienting task to investigate automatic shifts of attention cued by another person’s eye gaze in 29 patients and 28 controls. Central photographic images of a face with eyes shifted left or right, or looking straight ahead, preceded targets that appeared left or right of the cue. To examine automatic effects, cue direction was non-predictive of target location. Cue–target intervals were 100, 300, and 800?ms. In non-social control trials, arrows replaced eye-gaze cues. Both groups showed automatic attentional orienting indexed by faster reaction times (RTs) when arrows were congruent with target location across all cue–target intervals. Similar congruency effects were seen for eye-shift cues at 300 and 800?ms intervals, but patients showed significantly larger congruency effects at 800?ms, which were driven by delayed responses to incongruent target locations. At short 100-ms cue–target intervals, neither group showed faster RTs for congruent than for incongruent eye-shift cues, but patients were significantly slower to detect targets after direct-gaze cues. These findings conflict with previous studies using schematic line drawings of eye-shifts that have found automatic attentional orienting to be reduced in schizophrenia. Instead, our data indicate that patients display abnormalities in responding to gaze direction at various stages of gaze processing—reflected by a stronger preferential capture of attention by another person’s direct eye contact at initial stages of gaze processing and difficulties disengaging from a gazed-at location once shared attention is established.     

‘Drinking is our modern way of bonding’: Young people’s beliefs about interventions to encourage moderate drinking

Efforts to discourage excessive alcohol use among young people can only be effective if the target audience is exposed to, attends to, and comprehends key messages. The aim of this study was to examine age and sex differences in drinking motives to better inform development of targeted interventions to reduce alcohol-related harm. Thirty individual interviews and 12 group interviews were conducted with English 13–25?year olds. Interviewees gave multiple motivations for drinking – especially those related to image and reputation, and played down the health implications of heavy drinking. Negative aspects of drinking – caring for drunk friends, being cared for when drunk and suffering through hangovers with friends – were considered to offer opportunities for closer interpersonal bonding than other social activities. Respondents distanced themselves from ‘problem’ drinkers, but disapproved of others’ problematic drinking or antisocial behaviour. Narrative messages demonstrating the social consequences of excessive consumption were preferred to single, static messages emphasising risk or harm. Interviewees noted that interventions must use an engaging tone or pitch: they considered many campaigns to be patronising or preaching. A lack of consensus between age and sex groups highlighted a need for multifaceted, multi-modal approaches that utilise mobile technologies and new media.     

Knowing One’s Own Self: An Analysis of Vivekananda’s Approach to One’s Identity

A successful declaration of one’s identity in saying “ahaṃ Brahmāsmi” is a result of knowing one’s own self as indistinguishable from Brahman. The non-difference between oneself and the Brahman is one’s true identity, and it goes without saying, knowledge of one’s true identity constitutes the correct knowing of one’s own self. That the said non-difference is upheld by vedānta, and we need to put this ideal non-difference into practice is the crux of Vivekananda’s practical vedānta. Vivekananda gives certain reasons for the practicability of vedānta. This paper’s part I is an exposition of Vivekananda’s practical vedānta, focussing on those reasons for practical vedānta and orienting each towards an analytical understanding. In part II, a linguistic analysis of Vivekananda’s approach to one’s identity has been carried out after introducing J. Hintikka’s interpretation of Descartes’ “I think, therefore, I am” and G. Misra’s interpretation of sat (existence, reality or being) cit (consciousness, knowledge or cognition) ānanda (bliss, intense happiness or felicity). The latter’s interpretation displays a positivist’s linguistic analysis of vedānta, whereas the former’s does a speech act theorist’s analysis of Descartes’ cogito principle. The present analysis indicates that practical vedānta can be read in the light of analytic philosophy and Vivekananda’s approach to one’s identity can be understood in terms of speech acts.

     

On people’s understanding of the diagnostic implications of probabilistic data

Two lines of prior research into the conditions under which people seek information are examined in light of two statistical definitions of diagnosticity. Five experiments are reported. In two, subjects selected information in order to test a hypothesis. In the remaining three, they selected information in order to convince someone else of the truth of a known hypothesis. A total of 567 university students served as subjects. The two primary conclusions were as follows: (1) When the task is highly structured by the environment, subjects select information diagnostically, and (2) when the task is less structured, so that subjects must seek relevant information not manifest, they select information pseudodiagnostically. Possible relations to other laboratory inference tasks and to clinical judgment are discussed.     

The push of social pain: Does rejection’s sting motivate subsequent social reconnection?

Physical pain motivates the healing of somatic injuries, yet it remains unknown whether social pain serves a similarly reparative function toward social injuries. Given the substantial overlap between physical and social pain, we predicted that social pain would mediate the effect of rejection on greater motivation for social reconnection and affiliative behavior toward rejecters. In Study 1, the effect of rejection on an increased need to belong was mediated by reports of more intense social pain. In Study 2, three neural signatures of social pain (i.e., activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, left and right anterior insula during social rejection), each predicted greater behavioral proximity to rejecters. Our findings reify the overlap between social and physical pain. Furthermore, these results are some of the first to demonstrate the reparative nature of social pain and lend insight into how this process may be harnessed to promote postrejection reconnection.     

Putnam’s account of apriority and scientific change: its historical and contemporary interest

In the 1960s and 1970s, Hilary Putnam articulated a notion of relativized apriority that was motivated to address the problem of scientific change. This paper examines Putnam’s account in its historical context and in relation to contemporary views. I begin by locating Putnam’s analysis in the historical context of Quine’s rejection of apriority, presenting Putnam as a sympathetic commentator on Quine. Subsequently, I explicate Putnam’s positive account of apriority, focusing on his analysis of the history of physics and geometry. In the remainder of the paper, I explore connections between Putnam’s account of relativized a priori principles and contemporary views. In particular, I situate Putnam’s account in relation to analyses advanced by Michael Friedman, David Stump, and William Wimsatt. From this comparison, I address issues concerning whether a priori scientific principles are appropriately characterized as “constitutive” or “entrenched”. I argue that these two features need to be clearly distinguished, and that only the constitutive function is essential to apriority. By way of conclusion, I explore the relationship between the constitutive function a priori principles and entrenchment.     

Receiving other people’s advice: Influence and benefit

Seeking advice is a basic practice in making real life decisions. Until recently, however, little attention has been given to it in either empirical studies or theories of decision making. The studies reported here investigate the influence of advice on judgment and the consequences of advice use for judgment accuracy. Respondents were asked to provide final judgments on the basis of their initial opinions and advice presented to them. The respondents’ weighting policies were inferred. Analysis of the these policies show that (a) the respondents tended to place a higher weight on their own opinion than on the advisor’s opinion (the self/other effect); (b) more knowledgeable individuals discounted the advice more; (c) the weight of advice decreased as its distance from the initial opinion increased; and (d) the use of advice improved accuracy significantly, though not optimally. A theoretical framework is introduced which draws in part on insights from the study of attitude change to explain the influence of advice. Finally the usefulness of advice for improving judgment accuracy is considered.     

Coping with threatened identities: Unemployed people’s self-categorizations

This article presents a theoretical argument to explain the way in which unemployed people react to and cope with threats to their identities that derive from perceptions ofstigma and low self-worth. It is argued here that strategies used by unemployed people to cope with such threats are influenced by whether the individuals categorize themselves as “unemployed” or adopt some other categorization (e.g., housewife, retired coal-miner). It is also proposed that the concept of self-categorization can be framed within Folkman and Lazarus’s (1980, 1985) coping model of distress in order to provide a more general framework for understanding these issues. The study reviews literature about stigma and coping with threatened identities with reference to these integrated frameworks, and concludes with a general model for predicting the way in which unemployed people self-categorize and cope with stigma and low self-esteem. This takes into account the role played by situational and individual factors, and suggests that individuals recategorize themselves in order to cope better during different phases of their unemployment.     

Troublesome Sentiments: The Origins of Dewey’s Antipathy to Children’s Imaginative Activities

One of the interesting aspects of Dewey’s early educational thought is his apparent hostility toward children’s imaginative pursuits, yet the question of why this antipathy exists remains unanswered. As will become clear, Dewey’s hostility towards imaginative activities stemmed from a broad variety of concerns. In some of his earliest work, Dewey adopted a set of anti-Romantic criticisms and used these concerns to attack what one might call “runaway” imaginative and emotional tendencies. Then, in his early educational writings, these earlier concerns were augmented by several other factors, including problematic trends in progressive education, new developments in psychology, and Dewey’s own educational aims. This analysis explores the roots of these criticisms, and explains how they culminate in the stance on the imagination that Dewey eventually outlined in the early educational writings. Notably, these findings have some important implications for certain prominent contemporary critics of progressivism.     

From philosophy to criticism of myth: Cassirer’s concept of myth

This article discusses the question whether or not Cassirer’s philosophical critique of technological use of myth in The Myth of the State implies a revision of his earlier conception and theory of myth as provided by The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. In the first part, Cassirer’s early theory of myth is compared with other approaches of his time. It is claimed that Cassirer’s early approach to myth has to be understood in terms of a transcendental philosophical approach. In consequence, myth is conceived as a form of cultural consciousness which is constituted by specific symbolic processes. In the second part, the theoretical assumptions underlying Cassirer’s criticism of myth are discussed and compared with his earlier theory. It is argued that there is a strong conceptual and theoretical continuity between Cassirer’s early views on myth as a symbolic form and his later critique of technological use of myth.     

Forcing you to experience wonder: Unconsciously biasing people’s choice through strategic physical positioning

Magicians have developed powerful tools to covertly force a spectator to choose a specific card. We investigate the physical location force, in which four cards (from left to right: 1-2-3-4) are placed face-down on the table in a line, after which participants are asked to push out one card. The force is thought to rely on a behavioural bias in that people are more likely to choose the third card from their left. Participants felt that their choice was extremely free, yet 60% selected the 3rd card. There was no significant difference in estimates and feelings of freedom between those who chose the target card (i.e. 3rd card) and those who selected a different card, and they underestimated the actual proportion of people who selected the target card. These results illustrate that participants’ behaviour was heavily biased towards choosing the third card, but were oblivious to this bias.