Subsidized abortion: moral rights and moral compromise

The right of indigent women to have government-subsidized abortions is considered in light of the opposing societal opinions on the morality of abortion. Arguments for funding abortions as another facet of health care, and the welfare rights and freedom of indigents, are discussed. A compromise between pro- and anti-abortion factions in society is suggested--the elimination of government funding for elective abortions while continuing to allow them for those who can pay.     

Liberalism, legal moralism and moral disagreement

According to "legal moralism" it is part of law's proper role to "enforce morality as such". I explore the idea that legal moralism runs afoul of morality itself: there are good moral reasons not to require by law all that there is nevertheless good moral reason to do. I suggest that many such reasons have broad common-sense appeal and could be appreciated even in a society in which everyone completely agreed about what morality requires. But I also critique legal moralism from the special perspective of liberal political justice. Liberalism requires that citizens who disagree with one another on a number of morally significant matters nevertheless coexist and cooperate within a political framework of basic rights protections. When it comes to working out the most basic terms of their political association, citizens are expected to address one another within the limits of what Rawls has called "public reason". Critics of liberalism claim that this is an essentially a-moral (or expedient) attempt to evade substantive moral issues--such as the moral status of the fetus. I argue, on the contrary, that liberalism's emphasis on public reason is itself grounded in very deep--though (suitably) "non-comprehensive"--moral considerations.     

The force of rights: Parent on ‘moral specification’

Philosophical Studies -     

信念与结果对道德、法律责任判断的影响

在"执行者"和"旁观者"两个情境中,通过操纵当事人的信念和事件结果,考察了被试的道德与法律责任判断。结果显示:进行道德责任判断时,被试对当事人的信念信息更敏感;进行法律责任判断时,则对事件结果的信息更敏感。"执行者"情境中的道德和法律责任评分均高于"旁观者"情境中的责任评分。这说明道德、法律责任判断的内部机制有所不同,并且当事人的不同角色导致第三方对其的责任判断出现差异。     

Adolescent autonomy and minors' legal rights: contraception and abortion

During adolescence, dependent children grow into independent and autonomous adults, and it is necessary to make difficult policy judgements about children's rights. Questions that arise include: shoudl minors have the right to work, to marry, to make legal contracts, and to obtain medical care without parental consent; or should parental consent be required by the state in order to protect minors and to preserve parental authority. This discussion focuses upon the area of family planning, a topic of special interest to policymakers because they now face many questions about minor's contraceptive and abortion rights in Congress, in state legislatures, and in the courts. comprehensive response to policy questions about family planning rights for minors would require information about adolescent development, maturity, and autonomy; about teenagers' sexual and contraceptive attitudes and behavior; about the nature of parent-child communication regarding sexual and contraceptive questions; and about politics and values. Many from the legal system want help in answering questions about minors' rights. As little research has been conducted, policymakers can obtain only limited guidance from social scientists. As the policy issue is fundamentally tied to developmental issues, the better the knowledge about the development of cognitive competence, social competence, and autonomy, the easier it will be to make the difficult legal and policy judgements about minor's rights. Regarding minors' access to contraceptives, the situation is somewhat cloudy. There is only 1 state statute that requires parental consent for access to contraceptive medical services, passed in Utah in 1981, and pertaining to services provided with public funds. Yet, common law requires parental consent for any medical treatment (with exceptions for emancipated or mature minors) and "physicians often hesitate to serve young people without first obtaining parental consent because they fear civil liability." The situation is even more cloudy in the case of abortion. The Supreme Court's present position seems to grant emancipated and mature minors access to abortion without a requirement for parental consent or notification, but states may place some requirements for parental involvement upon other minors, as long as these minors have an alternative route to abortion. A thorough search of the literature on adolescent development reveals that the policy questions loom larger than the alternatives. 2 policy alternatives are: to single out a reasonable age below which minors require either parental consent or some form of adult involvement; or treat family planning and fertility control as basic rights which cannot be abridged because of age.     

道德法律化正当性的法哲学分析

正如约翰.罗尔斯所言:法律与道德的主题提出了许多不同的问题,而道德的法律强制、法律制度的道德基础则是其中的重要问题。[1]在我国,表面上看道德法律化正当性的确证在学界的主流观点中已通论达识,好像无须多论,实则道德法律化的语义含义及其正当性理据,仍有细论之必要。一道德法律化疏正“道德法律化”的术语,尽管在学界及日常生活中是一个被普遍使用的概念,但其内涵仍需廓清。从目前学界流行的主要观点来看,基本是在立法的意义上,将道德法律化理解为把最基本的道德规则通过立法程序上升为法律制度。“道德法律化是国家的立法机关借助于一…     

The moral compass and life skills in navigating radicalization processes: Examining the interplay among life skills,moral disengagement,and extremism

The present study investigated the interplay among deficient life skills, moral disengagement, and extremist attitude across two national contexts. Using a sample of young students in high school or college (N = 686), the present study found significant indirect effects between deficient life skills (agency and structure) and various aspects of an extremist mindset through moral disengagement. These findings suggest that these two psychological concepts of life skills and moral disengagement are relevant for understanding and countering violent radicalization processes; that is to say that morality can direct the life skills toward either violent extremism or nonviolent, legal civil participation. Furthermore, the development and empowerment of life skills could enhance individual resilience to morally disengaging narratives and radicalized ideologies.     

The role of legal and moral norms to regulate the behavior of texting while driving

Despite a nationwide lawful effort to regulate texting-while-driving behavior, little change has been reported. This study assessed the effect of current legal enforcement on attitudinal and behavioral responses toward texting while driving in conjunction with potential influences of two types of perceived norms—legal and moral. An online survey was conducted with 313 college students recruited from three states where the history of a banning law of texting while driving varied (more than 3 years, less than 1 year, and none). The students self-reported perceived legal norm, perceived moral norm, perceived risk of texting while driving, frequency of texting while driving, attitude toward texting while driving, and intention of texting while driving. General linear model analyses revealed that the mere presence of legal enforcement showed a negative relationship with frequency of behavior only for the state with the banning law in effect more than 3 years. While the perceived legal norm showed inconsistent relationships with outcome variables, the perceived moral norm appeared most promising to discourage texting while driving among young drivers. A banning law for texting-while-driving behavior not only backfired on the actual behavior in a short-term effect, but also required a long-term exposure of the law to change the actual behavior among college students. On the other hand, cultivation of a moral norm to regulate the behavior of texting while driving is particularly encouraged in that the stable nature of this psychological variable can play a role to suppress possible reactance evoked by an external force. Policy makers are encouraged to harness their approach to regulate young drivers’ texting while driving with the strategy that appeals to the drivers’ moral beliefs rather than simply forcing them to comply with the law.     

The critique of natural rights and the search for a non-anthropocentric basis for moral behavior

Conclusion MacIntyre, Clark, and Heidegger would all agree that the current problem with moral theory is its lack of a satisfactory conception of human telos. This lack leads us to resort to such fictions as rights, interests, and utility, which are disguises for the will to power. These thinkers would also agree that modern nation-states are cut off from the roots of the Western tradition. Modern political economy, with its individualism, its acquisitiveness and its elevation of the values of the market to a central social place is leading us into the coming age of barbarism and darkness. MacIntyre's grim depiction of the future, which Heidegger calls the time of the darkening of the earth and the flight of the gods, can only be met by re-appropriating our own tradition. Although Aristotle has much to tell us, I believe Heidegger is right to turn to Heraclitus for a non-anthropocentric conception of humanity's place in Nature. Other writers, however, such as Arne Naess, George Sessions, and Stuart Hampshire, argue that the writings of Spinoza may offer the most helpful vision of humanity needed to guide our efforts to find a more appropriate basis for our behavior toward each other and toward the non-human world as well. Yet Aristotle, Qark, Heidegger, Heraclitus, Maclntyre, and Spinoza all agree that in order to behave fittingly, we must understand what it means to be human.At this time, I would like to acknowledge the importance of the following objection to what I have been arguing here: While it may be true that the concept of human rights is a fiction, it is nevertheless a very useful fiction for changing how human beings relate to each other. The doctrine of the rights of man justified the American and French revolutions, which brought forth new and important human freedoms. Today, most of humanity still lacks the protection afforded by constitutionally guaranteed human rights. Moreover, even in constitutional democracies there are frequent abuses of and attempts to curtail human rights. Until far more people become committed to protecting human rights, it is unlikely that there will be a big movement to extend rights to non-human beings, much less to overcome the anthropocentrism inherent in the concept of rights. What the Buddhist tradition calls skillful means is appropriate in our current situation. We must approach people in a way sensitive to their current self-understanding. Before we can pass on to the stage of planetary unity made possible by non-anthropocentric thinking, we need to find ways that promote mutual respect among human beings. Out of such respect there can also arise respect for the non-human as well.While largely in agreement with this point of view, I would like to note that our means must be very skillful, indeed, if we are to transform our relationships to each other and to the natural world before irreparable damage is done to the earth, through nuclear war or environmental destruction. The time grows short for the transformation needed to bring us from the stage of anthropocentrism to a deeper awareness of our internal relationship to the whole world. Some people, such as Peter Russell, argue that we are witnessing the evolution of a non-anthropocentric mode of planetary consciousness that will be supported by the revolution in communications and computers. Other people, such as Jeremy Rifkin, maintain that the coming computer age promises ever greater intrusions into natural processes, such as the drive for control of genetic structures. In my view, while it is important to extend the idea of human rights wherever possible, it is also crucial that we consider seriously the possibility that the idea of human rights is merely a transitional way of conceiving of morality. As we learn more about the interrelationship of human life with all other aspects of the earth's life, our self-understanding will no longer be in harmony with the human-centered morality we know today. We will either learn to respect all beings and act toward them in appropriate ways, or else we will continue down the road we are now headed - a road which seems to have a very disturbing destination. Learning to dwell appropriately on earth is the most pressing moral issue of the day.

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The interplay of modern myths about sexual aggression and moral foundations in the blaming of rape victims

Moral Foundations Theory proposes five intuition-based moral concerns: Care and Fairness (“individualizing foundations”) as well as Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity (“binding foundations”). In studies carried out in Italy, Spain, and Germany, the authors examined how these concerns are associated with the acceptance of modern myths about sexual aggression (AMMSA), and how both jointly predict rape victim blaming. Overall, victim blaming was positively predicted by Authority and Sanctity, and negatively predicted by Care and Fairness. Although victim blaming was best predicted by AMMSA, moral concerns also contributed to its prediction, partly independently, partly mediated through AMMSA, and in the case of Sanctity in interaction with AMMSA. Discussion highlights how integrating moral foundations in the investigation of victim blaming and AMMSA across different cultural contexts may deepen our understanding of why, in each cultural context, victim blaming and related beliefs are resistant to change.     

Asserting scientific authority. Cognitive development and adolescent legal rights

The APA uses amicus briefs to communicate scientific knowledge to the legal system. There can be tension, however, between promoting the social good through law and the disinterested reporting of scientific data. This article examines this conflict by discussing two APA amicus briefs filed in the United States Supreme Court in cases involving adolescents' abortion rights. The Court has restricted adolescents' rights to make important life decisions in part because adolescents have been presumed to lack competence and maturity. The briefs argued that developmental theory and data confirm that adolescents and adults have equivalent decision-making capacities. The scientific arguments in the briefs, however, do not justify this assertion. Analysis of the briefs illuminates some dimensions describing the role of a scientific statement in a legal brief. These dimensions identify ways to limit scientific claims about the evidence at hand to avoid overstatement. The primary danger of overstatement is that it undermines psychology's claim to expert authority in assisting in the formation of law and the shaping of social institutions.