Belief bias and figural bias in syllogistic reasoning

Belief bias is the tendency to be influenced by the believability of the conclusion when attempting to solve a syllogistic reasoning problem. Figural bias is the tendency to be influenced by the order in which the information is presented in the premises when attempting to solve a syllogistic reasoning problem. When studied simultaneously they enable an investigation of whether participants' reasoning on the syllogistic reasoning task is guided by the conclusion (backward reasoning) or the premises (forward reasoning). Experiments 1 and 2 found evidence of belief bias but not figural bias on the syllogistic evaluation task paradigm. Experiments 3 and 4 found evidence of figural bias but not belief bias on the syllogistic production task paradigm. The findings highlight that different task characteristics influence performance dependent upon the nature of task presentation. These findings are discussed in the context of current theories of belief bias in syllogistic reasoning.     

Developmental grey matter changes in superior parietal cortex accompany improved transitive reasoning

The neural basis of developmental changes in transitive reasoning in parietal regions was examined, using voxel-based morphometry. Young adolescents and adults performed a transitive reasoning task, subsequent to undergoing anatomical magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) brain scans. Behaviorally, adults reasoned more accurately than did the young adolescents. Neural results showed (i) less grey matter density in superior parietal cortex in the adults than in the young adolescents, possibly due to a developmental period of synaptic pruning; (ii) improved performance in the reasoning task was negatively correlated with grey matter density in superior parietal cortex in the adolescents, but not in the adult group; and (iii) the latter results were driven by the more difficult trials, requiring greater spatial manipulation. Taken together, the results support the idea that during development, regions in superior parietal cortex are fine-tuned, to support more robust spatial manipulation, resulting in greater accuracy and efficiency in transitive reasoning.     

Who uses base rates andP(D/∼H)? An analysis of individual differences

In two experiments, involving over 900 subjects, we examined the cognitive correlates of the tendency to viewP(D/～H) and base rate information as relevant to probability assessment. We found that individuals who viewedP(D/～H) as relevant in a selection task and who used it to make the proper Bayesian adjustment in a probability assessment task scored higher on tests of cognitive ability and were better deductive and inductive reasoners. They were less biased by prior beliefs and more datadriven on a covariation assessment task. In contrast, individuals who thought that base rates were relevant did not display better reasoning skill or higher cognitive ability. Our results parallel disputes about the normative status of various components of the Bayesian formula in interesting ways. It is argued that patterns of covariance among reasoning tasks may have implications for inferences about what individuals are trying to optimize in a rational analysis (J. R. Anderson, 1990, 1991).     

Mental representation of logical connectives

Logical connectives, such as “AND”, “OR”, “IF . . . THEN”, and “IF AND ONLY IF” are ubiquitous in both language and cognition; however, reasoning with logical connectives is error-prone. We argue that some of these errors may stem from people's tendency to minimize the number of possibilities compatible with logical connectives and to construct a “minimalist” one-possibility representation. As a result, connectives denoting a single possibility (e.g., conjunctions) are likely to be represented correctly, whereas connectives denoting multiple possibilities (e.g., disjunctions or conditionals) are likely to be erroneously represented as conjunctions. These predictions were tested and confirmed in three experiments using different paradigms. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with a multiple-choice task and asked to select all and only those possibilities that would indicate that compound verbal propositions were true versus false. In Experiment 2, a somewhat similar task was used, except that participants were asked later to perform a cued recall of verbal propositions. Finally, Experiment 3 used an old/new recognition paradigm to examine participants' ability to accurately recognize different logical connectives. The results of the three experiments are discussed in relation to theories of representation of possibilities and theories of reasoning.     

Differential access to information and anticipated group interaction: impact on individual reasoning

Two studies examined the impact of relative differences in access to information and anticipated group interaction on individual reasoning. On 2 different reasoning tasks (P. C. Wason's [1966] selection task and D. Kahneman & A. Tversky's [1973] lawyer-engineer problem), participants sensing that they knew more in anticipation of group interaction or knew less when not anticipating interaction were less susceptible to typical cognitive biases demonstrated by these tasks. Study 2 also showed that the effect of these social contexts was contingent on the task presentation format. Thus, knowing more in anticipation of group interaction and knowing less when not anticipating group interaction seemingly compensated for task features that enhance suboptimal reasoning strategies. These results illustrate the importance of the social context in which reasoning is situated and are discussed in terms of cognitive tuning, social comparison, and social motivations.     

Rate of processing and judgment of response speed: comparing the effects of alcohol and practice

Both alcohol and practice affect choice reaction time. The present study was conducted to investigate the possibility that impairment from alcohol and improvement with practice could be attributed to changes in the efficiency of control mechanisms (Rabbitt, 1979a), some of which depend upon the ability to judge response speed accurately. Twenty subjects participated in a four-choice reaction time experiment in which they received no alcohol (NA) in Session 1 and either no alcohol (10 subjects) or 0.8 ml alcohol (A) per kilogram of body weight (10 subjects) in Session 2. The task was to respond as fast and as accurately as possible to each stimulus. In addition, subjects were required to press a fifth key after any response that they considered to be both fast and accurate. Subjects had no difficulty in performing this task: (1) there was a significant difference of 122 msec between the mean response time for correct responses indicated as fast and that for correct responses not indicated as fast, and (2) subjects indicated 1 in 4 correct responses but only 1 in 64 errors. Alcohol increased all response times by approximately 40 msec. In contrast, practice decreased response times less for correct responses not indicated as fast than for correct responses indicated as fast. The ability to distinguish between fast and slow responses was thus unaffected by alcohol, but was improved by practice. Responses indicated as "fast" were significantly faster than errors, and appeared to occur without warning (unlike errors, which tended to end a sequence of increasingly fast correct responses). The results suggest that alcohol and practice influence choice reaction time in qualitatively different ways: Alcohol impairs overall response speed but has no effect on the ability to judge response speed, whereas practice improves both.     

3～5岁幼儿在主题-规则冲突条件下的类比推理

本研究采用经典类比任务,考察了3～5岁幼儿在主题-规则冲突条件下类比推理发展的水平与特点.结果表明:(1)在无主题联想条件下,幼儿的单维类比推理在3～4岁迅速发展,4～5岁发展较为平缓,而双维类比推理在3～5岁仍处于较低水平.(2)在主题—规则冲突条件下,幼儿在单维类比推理中表现出一定的主题联想优势反应;幼儿在双维类比推理中表现出较强的主题联想优势反应,年龄特点为:3岁幼儿有较强的主题联想优势反应,4岁幼儿的主题联想优势反应明显下降,而5岁幼儿又表现出较强的主题联想优势反应.     

The impact of semantic distance and induced stress on analogical reasoning: A neurocomputational account

In a study of reasoning with four-term verbal analogy problems, we explored the relationship between the effects of an acute, mild stressor and the complexity of the reasoning process. Participants judged whether analogy problems in the form A:B :: C:D were valid or invalid, on the basis of whether the relation in the A:B term matched that in the C:D term. Half of the problems contained a C:D pair semantically near the A:B pair (e.g., NOSE:SCENT :: TONGUE:TASTE), and the other half contained ones semantically far from A:B (e.g., NOSE:SCENT :: ANTENNA:SIGNAL). After an initial block without stress, participants were randomly assigned to count backward by 13?s from 1,000 while being told to go faster, or to count forward by 1?s from 0. The stress-induced participants reported a significant increase in state anxiety as compared to controls immediately after the mental arithmetic task. Stressed participants performed less accurately (as measured by d') on both near and far analogy problems, mainly due to an increase in false alarms. We were able to model the influence of semantic distance using the ??learning and inference with schemas and analogies?? (LISA) model. Our findings indicated that even mild increases in stress impair analogical reasoning. However, the decrement does not seem to directly involve the integration of relations, but rather is due to a shift in decision strategy: Under stress, people show an increased tendency to endorse analogies as valid when the terms in the individual pairs are semantically related to each other, even if the overall analogical relationship is not valid.     

Reasoning on social dilemmas varying in emotional saliency: an adult developmental perspective

The purpose of this study was to provide age-comparative evidence of social cognitive reasoning in adulthood, as mediated by the emotional saliency of tasks tapping postformal reasoning. Specifically, the tasks focused on the ability to resolve discrepant accounts of the same event sequence. It was assumed that less mature thinking may be more evident in reasoning contexts in which emotional factors play a major role. A postformal coding scheme was used to assess levels of reasoning in an interpersonal context. Tasks were administered to 60 subjects--adolescents and young and middle-aged adults. Measures of formal operations, ego level, and verbal ability were also administered. An interaction was found between age and degree of emotional saliency of the task for reasoning level. Specifically, adolescents performed less well on tasks higher in degree of emotional saliency. In addition, developmental differences in postformal reasoning as a function of age and ego level were found.     

Undermining the Zeigarnik effect: Another hidden cost of reward

Forty college students participated in a study ostensibly designed to obtain measures of the hemispheric activity while they worked on a spatial reasoning task. In fact, our true interest was in determining whether subjects would return to the spatial reasoning task once the hemispheric recordings were completed. Subjects would normally be expected to return to the task by virtue of the Zeigarnik effect because no subject completed the task during the “hemispheric recording” phase. The manipulation involved telling one group of subjects that they would be paid $1.50 for participating in the study (expected reward group). The remainder of the subjects were not led to expect the reward (unexpected reward group). The result was that 86% of the unexpected reward subjects but only 58% of the expected reward subjects (p < .05) manifested the Zeigarnik effect. This differential tendency to return to the task was further reflected in time differences. The average unexpected reward subject spent 3 min 48 sec of a five-minute free-choice period at the task, whereas the average expected reward subject spent only 2 min 20 sec (p < .05). Reward expectancy, therefore, led to an undermining of the Zeigarnik effect. This observation supports Condry's prediction that rewarding performance at a task can lead to premature task disengagement.     

A dual-process account of the development of scientific reasoning: The nature and development of metacognitive intercession skills

Metacognitive knowledge of the dual-processing basis of judgment is critical to resolving conflict between analytic and experiential processing responses [Klaczynski, P. A. (2004). A dual-process model of adolescent development: Implications for decision making, reasoning, and identity. In R. V. Kail (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior, Vol. 31 (pp. 73–123). San Diego, CA: Academic Press]. Such conflict is ubiquitous when reasoning scientifically. Three studies explored the nature, development, and stability of this metacognitive knowledge. In each study, participants completed the ratio-bias judgment task, which assessed their tendency to make analytically based responses, and the ratio-bias evaluation task, which assessed their metacognitive knowledge of the processing basis of judgments on the task (Metacognitive Status). In Study 1, college students’ judgment performance was related to metacognitive status but not to general cognitive ability. In Study 2, metacognitive status was related to age and mathematics-related changes. Metacognitive status again predicted participants’ tendency to make analytically based judgments. In Study 3, college students’ judgments, but not metacognitive status, were affected by task conditions. The evidence suggests that assessing metacognitive knowledge is important for understanding how conflict between analytically and experientially based judgments is resolved.     

图形型归纳推理的神经机制:一项fMRI研究

利用fMRI脑成像技术探讨图形型归纳推理的神经机制。设计了一种由图形形状和条纹方向描述的简单几何图形组成的归纳推理任务,这种图形型任务与以往研究中常用的语句型归纳推理任务是同质的。根据两个图形共享特征数量的不同设计了两种实验任务:共享两个特征(2T)和共享一个特征(1T),以休息基线(Rest)作为控制任务。2T和1T任务均为归纳推理任务,但2T任务包含知觉特征整合成分,而1T任务不包括。结果发现:与控制任务相比,归纳推理任务在前额区(BA6、9、11、46、47)、尾状核、壳核和丘脑等脑区有显著激活,反映了"前额皮层-纹状体-丘脑"通路在图形型归纳推理中的重要作用;图形型归纳推理中的知觉信息整合与右侧额下回(BA47)、双侧尾状核头部、壳核等脑区有关。     

The Influence of Linguistic Form on Reasoning: The Case of Matching Bias

A well-established phenomenon in reasoning research is matching bias : a tendency to select information that matches the lexical content of propositional statements, regardless of the logically critical presence of negations. Previous research suggested, however, that the effect might be restricted to reasoning with conditional statements. This paper reports two experiments in which participants were required to construct or identify true and false cases of propositional rules of several kinds, including universal statements, disjunctions, and negated conjunctions. Matching bias was observed across all rule types but largely restricted to problems where participants were required to falsify rather than to verify the rules. A third experiment showed a similar generalization across linguistic forms in the Wason selection task with only if conditionals substituted for universals. The results are discussed with reference to contemporary theories of propositional reasoning.     

Secondary task difficulty modulates forward blocking in human contingency learning

The influence of a secondary task on forward blocking of human contingency ratings was examined. A smaller blocking effect was found when participants performed a highly demanding secondary task than when they performed a less demanding secondary task. The modulatory effect of secondary task difficulty was significant only when the secondary task was administered during both the learning and the test phase of the contingency judgement task. The results suggest that forward blocking in human contingency learning cannot be fully accounted for by associative processes. Instead, forward blocking seems to depend at least partially on deliberate deductive reasoning processes.     

Involvement of shared resources in time judgment and sequence reasoning tasks

Previous research suggests that time perception is supported by the same attentional resources involved in sequence processing. The present experiment was designed to clarify this connection by examining the relation between timing and reasoning tasks that involved either sequencing or non-sequencing judgments. For the timing task, subjects produced a series of 5-s intervals. For the reasoning tasks, subjects judged whether pairs of statements describing common actions either (a) were presented in the correct temporal order (sequencing), or (b) described similar actions or objects (similarity). Subjects performed the timing and reasoning tasks both separately and concurrently in a series of 3-minute trials. Comparisons of single-task and dual-task performance assessed interference patterns between concurrent tasks. Both reasoning tasks interfered with timing by making temporal productions longer and more variable. Timing had differential effects on the two reasoning tasks. Concurrent timing caused sequencing judgments to become slower, less accurate, and less sensitive relative to sequencing-only conditions. In contrast, similarity judgments were either unaffected or affected to a lesser degree by the concurrent timing task. These results support the notion that timing and sequencing are closely related processes that rely on the same set of cognitive resources or mechanisms.     

Independence and dependence in human causal reasoning

Causal graphical models (CGMs) are a popular formalism used to model human causal reasoning and learning. The key property of CGMs is the causal Markov condition, which stipulates patterns of independence and dependence among causally related variables. Five experiments found that while adult’s causal inferences exhibited aspects of veridical causal reasoning, they also exhibited a small but tenacious tendency to violate the Markov condition. They also failed to exhibit robust discounting in which the presence of one cause as an explanation of an effect makes the presence of another less likely. Instead, subjects often reasoned “associatively,” that is, assumed that the presence of one variable implied the presence of other, causally related variables, even those that were (according to the Markov condition) conditionally independent. This tendency was unaffected by manipulations (e.g., response deadlines) known to influence fast and intuitive reasoning processes, suggesting that an associative response to a causal reasoning question is sometimes the product of careful and deliberate thinking. That about 60% of the erroneous associative inferences were made by about a quarter of the subjects suggests the presence of substantial individual differences in this tendency. There was also evidence that inferences were influenced by subjects’ assumptions about factors that disable causal relations and their use of a conjunctive reasoning strategy. Theories that strive to provide high fidelity accounts of human causal reasoning will need to relax the independence constraints imposed by CGMs.     

逻辑训练对不同理性思维方式大学生三段论推理的影响

采用理性—经验思维方式量表对105名大学生进行测量,选出高、低理性思维方式各35名大学生进行实验,探讨了逻辑训练对不同理性思维方式大学生三段论推理的影响。结果表明：(1)高理性思维方式个体三段论推理的平均反应时快于低理性思维方式个体;非冲突类型题目推理的平均正确率高于冲突类型题目;逻辑训练可以提高个体三段论推理的平均反应时和正确率;(2)逻辑训练后非冲突任务类型题目的平均正确率高于冲突任务类型题目;(3)逻辑训练对低理性思维方式个体冲突任务类型题目平均正确率的提高效果更明显。这意味着逻辑训练可以显著提升个体的推理成绩,但不能完全消除信念偏差对推理的影响,而且逻辑训练对低理性思维方式个体推理成绩的提升效果更加明显。     

Neuroscientific insights into the development of analogical reasoning

Analogical reasoning, or the ability to find correspondences between entities based on shared relationships, supports knowledge acquisition. As such, the development of this ability during childhood is thought to promote learning. Here, we sought to better understand the mechanisms by which analogical reasoning about semantic relations improves over childhood and adolescence (e.g. chalk is to chalkboard as pen is to…?). We hypothesized that age‐related differences would manifest as differences in the brain regions associated with one or more of the following cognitive functions: (1) controlled semantic retrieval, or the ability to retrieve task‐relevant semantic associations; (2) response control, or the ability to override the tendency to respond to a salient distractor; and/or (3) relational integration, or the ability to consider jointly two mental relations. In order to test these hypotheses, we analyzed patterns of fMRI activation during performance of a pictorial propositional analogy task across 95 typically developing children between the ages of 6 and 18 years old. Despite large age‐related differences in task performance, particularly over ages 6–10 but through to around age 14, participants across the whole age range recruited a common network of frontal, parietal and temporal regions. However, activation in a brain region that has been implicated in controlled semantic retrieval – left anterior prefrontal cortex (BA 47/45) – was positively correlated with age, and also with performance after controlling for age. This finding indicates that improved performance over middle childhood and early adolescence on this analogical reasoning task is driven largely by improvements in the ability to selectively retrieve task‐relevant semantic relationships.     

Incidental emotions have a greater impact on the logicality of less proficient reasoners

Previous research shows differences in reasoning about emotional and neutral stimuli. A common explanation hypothesised for this effect is that emotion incurs an additional cognitive load. If this is the case, incidental emotion should have a greater impact on the reasoning of less proficient reasoners, and when items are more difficult, because a greater proportion of available cognitive resources must be allocated to the task. We manipulated the emotional value of reasoning stimuli using conditioning and with the simultaneous presentation of images. The deleterious effect of emotion on logicality was greater for less proficient reasoners. There was also some indication that the effect of emotion may be more pronounced for more difficult items. Physiological responses and affective evaluations of the stimuli were similar across groups, irrespective of reasoning proficiency. Results provide some support for the hypothesis that the impact of emotion occurs through increased cognitive load.