Whose Life is it Anyway?

ABSTRACT This paper addresses a current confusion in debates on the morality of experimentation on human pre-embryos: the confusion that arises from ambiguity in the sense of 'human being'. We may quite legitimately decide to apply the term 'human being'to all entities with human DNA but in that case we should not then imply that all human beings are as much objects of moral concern as the fetus or a post-parturate human being. It is argued that whatever classifying terms we use, potential entities need to be distinguished from actual entities and that the very notion of potentiality rests on this distinction. The paper does not offer an argument in favour of experimentation, rather it appeals for clear thought. Moral attitudes to experimentation on pre-embryos are varied and attempts to analyse issues through implicit appeal to emotionally ambiguous terms do not help the moral debate.     

The anencephalic as organ donor: Whose baby is it anyway?

Should an anencephalic newborn, lacking cerebral hemispheres but possessing a functional brain stem, be eligible for organ donation? The dialectical method is used here to envision how a protagonist and an antagonist might debate the ethics of the issue.     

Whose idea is it anyway? The importance of reputation in acknowledgement

Six‐year‐old children negatively evaluate plagiarizers just as adults do (Olson & Shaw, 2011), but why do they dislike plagiarizers? Children may think plagiarism is wrong because plagiarizing negatively impacts other people's reputations. We investigated this possibility by having 6‐ to 9‐year‐old children evaluate people who shared their own or other people's ideas (stories). In Experiment 1, we found that children consider it acceptable to retell someone else's story if the source is given credit for their story (improving the source's reputation), but not if the reteller claims credit for the story (steals credit away from someone else). Experiments 2 and 3 showed that children do not consider it bad to lie by giving someone else credit for one's own good story (improving someone else's reputation), but do consider it bad to give someone else credit for one's own bad story (improving one's own reputation at the expense of someone else's). Experiment 4 demonstrated that children think it is equally bad to take credit for someone else's idea for oneself as it is to take someone else's idea and give credit to someone else, suggesting that children dislike when others take credit away from someone else, regardless of whether or not it improves the plagiarizer's reputation. Our results suggest that children dislike plagiarism because it negatively affects others' reputations by taking credit away from them.     

Whose Values? Whose Risk? Exploring Decision Making About Trial of Labor After Cesarean

In this article, we discuss decision making during labor and delivery, specifically focusing on decision making around offering women a trial of labor after cesarean section (TOLAC). Many have discussed how humans are notoriously bad at assessing risks and how we often distort the nature of various risks surrounding childbirth. We will build on this discussion by showing that physicians make decisions around TOLAC not only based on distortions of risk, but also based on personal values (i.e. what level of risk are you comfortable with or what types of risks are you willing to take) rather than medical data (or at least medical data alone). As a result of this, we will further suggest that the party who is best epistemically situated to make decisions about TOLAC is the woman herself.     

Whose life is it anyway? Adoption of each other's autobiographical memories by twins

Anecdotal evidence suggests that twins may dispute ownership of autobiographical experiences. We investigated the frequency and characteristics of such disputed memories in comparison to memories with undisputed ownership. In the present study, monozygotic twins (MZ), dizygotic twins (DZ), and siblings were asked to remember disputed and non‐disputed memories. They also dated each memory and provided a rating on the following variables: level of imagery, detail, rehearsal, and importance. Results showed that disputed memories were more common among MZ twins than in DZ twins and siblings. The frequencies of undisputed memories were not different among the three groups. When compared to non‐disputed memories, disputed memories were more likely to come from events experienced during preschool years. We consider disputed memories as instances of false memories, at least partly influenced by social interactional processes, and event characteristics. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Whose self is it anyway? Self-aspect control moderates the relation between self-complexity and well-being

Greater self-complexity refers to the extent that one’s self-concept is comprised of many and relatively differentiated self-aspects. Although some research has found that those greater in self-complexity fare better physically (e.g., fewer illnesses) and psychologically (e.g., less depression) when experiencing stress, other studies have reported another pattern of data (e.g., greater self-complexity predicts greater depression). In the current work, two studies found support for a moderating variable in this latter pattern, self-aspect control. Specifically, for those who perceived relatively little control over their self-aspects, being greater in self-complexity predicted worse physical and psychological outcomes. Study 2 tested alternative explanations and supported an interpretation that perceptions of control over one’s multiple selves, in particular, moderated the relation between self-complexity and well-being.     

Whose Consent is it Anyway? A Poststructuralist framing of the Person in Medical Decision-Making

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics - This paper explores the value of a Poststructuralist psychoanalytic model of persons, or “Subjects,” as an expanded frame for the question...     

Whose fault is it anyway: How do parents respond to their child’s setbacks?

We documented what parents report as the cause of their child’s academic and conduct setbacks and what they say they do in response. We recruited an opportunity sample of 479 parents and narrowed our sample to parents of children without disabilities between the ages of 5–18 (N = 312). Parents responded to open-ended questions, and we coded responses into categories of disciplinary tactics and types of attributions. Parents who reported experience with child setbacks significantly differed from parents who did not report such experience on several outcome variables. Parents did not exhibit hedonic biasing such that most reported causes of setbacks were controllable by the child; reported controllable causes correlated with the reported use of punishment. Our findings suggest that parental behavior change efforts must also address parents’ attributions, or verbal explanations, of causes of events. We discuss implications of our findings for child and parent researchers, educators, and practitioners.     

Framing Posthumous Organ Donation in Terms of Reciprocity: What Are the Emotional Consequences?

Posthumous organ donation was framed in terms of reciprocity by asking young participants to respond to another person who was or was not registered as an organ donor, while simultaneously manipulating participants' own registration status. Participants were additionally required to adopt the perspective of a potential donor or recipient of organs. The influence of these variables on self-reported anger, fear, pity, guilt, gratitude, and positive self-feelings is systematically described. The results illustrate the relative independence of self-preservational and altruistic motives in organ donation. Practical implications are discussed.     

Marriage Matters But How Much? Marital Centrality Among Young Adults

Marriage, once a gateway to adulthood, is no longer as widely considered a requirement for achieving adult status. With declining marriage rates and delayed marital transitions, some have wondered whether current young adults have rejected the traditional notion of marriage. Utilizing a sample of 571 young adults, the present study explored how marital centrality (the expected importance to be placed on the marital role relative to other adult roles) functioned as a unique and previously unexplored marital belief among young adults. Results suggested that marriage remains an important role for many young adults. On average, young adults expected that marriage would be more important to their life than parenting, careers, or leisure activities. Marital centrality profiles were found to significantly differ based on both gender and religiosity. Marital centrality was also associated with various outcomes including binge-drinking and sexual activity. Specifically, the more central marriage was expected to be, the less young adults engaged in risk-taking or sexual behaviors.     

But is it evolution…?

We applaud Müller & Schumann (M&S) for bringing needed attention to the problem of motivation for common non-addictive drug use, as opposed to the usual focus on exotic drugs and addiction. Unfortunately, their target article has many underdeveloped and sometimes contradictory ideas. Here, we will focus on three key issues.     

More Royalist Than the King? Immigration Policy Attitudes Among Naturalized Citizens

Social psychological research has analyzed immigration attitudes mostly from the perspective of natives without an immigrant background. Nevertheless, an increasing number of migrants obtain national citizenship and take a stance towards immigration policies. By studying immigration policy attitudes reported by naturalized citizens, this article develops a dual-pathway model of immigrant political incorporation featuring pathways of either absorption or transformation. Based on a unique sample of immigrants who just accomplished the naturalization procedure (N = 566), we investigate participants' preferences for permissive or restrictive immigration policies as a function of their naturalization motives and expectations about how immigrants should acculturate in the receiving society (i.e., acculturation orientations). Our findings provide evidence for both processes of political absorption and transformation. On the one hand, belongingness motives underlying naturalization were connected to orientations towards host culture adoption, which in turn predicted support for restrictive immigration policies. On the other hand, instrumental motives were connected to orientations towards heritage culture maintenance, which in turn predicted support for permissive immigration policies. To conclude, we discuss the social psychological dynamics involved in the transition from national outsiders to national insiders and highlight the effects of naturalization on power relations between national majority and immigrant minority groups.     

Experience‐What is it?

The author takes a renewed look at the constitutive aspects of experience, looking at it as process rather than contents. Recently more psychoanalytic voices are discernible that argue for the complexity and multi-leveled nature of inner experience. Yet the predominant and preeminent psychoanalytic voice has traditionally emphasized the linearity and single-factored nature of experience and all that is based on it: development, object relations, psychopathology, and treatment. The author offers an understanding of experience as stemming from the operation of two contiguous, ongoing modalities of processing internal and external input, and reflecting two polarities of the subject-object experience: of separateness and instrumentality, and of oneness and ongoing being. Such a conceptual reframing of experience harbors multiple implications for understanding subjectivity and inter-subjectivity, inter-relatedness as well as single-person psychology, and the all-important role of an experiential 'goodness-of-fit' in the analytic situation and elsewhere.     

What is it to Depsychologize Psychology?

In this essay, I distinguish two ways of depsychologizing psychology: ‘anti‐psychologism’ and ‘non‐psychologism’. Both positions are responses to the Fregean sharp distinction between the logical and the psychological. But where anti‐psychologism, which I find in John McDowell, attempts to overcome the sharp distinction by arguing that psychological states and their expressions are apt to be articulated into judgments, Stanley Cavell's non‐psychologism, a powerful and neglected alternative, wants to overcome the sharp distinction by abandoning judgment as the paradigm expression of thought and communication.     

What is it to be healthy?

According to Christopher Boorse's Bio-Statistical Theory (BST), 'health' is statistically normal function in a reference class, and 'health' and 'disease' are empirical, objective and value-free concepts. I demonstrate that the success of the BST depends on its choice of reference classes; different reference classes result in different accounts of health. I argue that nothing in nature empirically or objectively dictates the use of reference classes Boorse proposes. Reference classes in the BST, and the concept of health, are therefore not value-free. Nor is there a reason to favour the BST over accounts of health that use different reference classes.