Comments on Richard Jeffrey

In this commentary, after first summarizing the three major theses of Jeffrey's paper ‘Probability and Falsification: Critique of the Popper Program’, and sketching out what I take to be his central argument, I criticize Jeffrey on two grounds. The first is that he has failed to explain why his version of Bayesianism provides us with better theories upon which to make decisions; the second is that he has offered a theory about decision-making that by-passes the important question: How can we make more rational decisions?     

Double foot‐in‐the‐door,social representations,and environment: application for energy savings

This study aims to determine the most effective procedure to bring individuals to adopt pro‐environmental behaviors, specifically to make energy savings for several weeks. A link was established between two fields of research traditionally separated in social psychology literature: free will compliance and social representations theories. An experiment was carried out to test the effectiveness of several simple and double foot‐in‐the‐door procedures, activating central or peripheral cognitions of the social representation of energy savings. Basically, the results indicate that the most effective procedure is the double foot‐in‐the‐door, which activates central cognitions. Twice as many participants accepted the target request and three times as many actually performed the expected behavior with this procedure.     

Take The First: Option-generation and resulting choices

Experimental decision-making research often uses a task in which participants are presented with alternatives from which they must choose. Although tasks of this type may be useful in determining measures (e.g., preference) related to explicitly stated alternatives, they neglect an important aspect of many real-world decision-making environments—namely, the option-generation process. The goal of the present research is to extend previous literature that fills this void by presenting a model that attempts to describe the link between the use of different strategies and the subsequent option-generation process, as well as the resulting choice characteristics. Specifically, we examine the relationship between strategy use, number and order of generated options, choice quality, and dynamic inconsistency. “Take The First” is presented as a heuristic that operates in ill-defined tasks, based on our model assumptions. An experiment involving a realistic (sports) situation was conducted on suitable participants (athletes) to test the predictions of the model. Initial results support the model’s key predictions: strategies producing fewer generated options result in better and more consistent decisions.     

Self‐determination theory as a foundation for personality researchers

In this introductory article, we first describe the impetus for this special issue. What made us think that self‐determination theory (SDT) might provide a sort of foundation for the rest of personality psychology? For readers unfamiliar with SDT, we then provide a historical overview that covers the evolution of the six “mini‐theories” that currently compose SDT: cognitive evaluation theory, causality orientations theory, organismic integration theory, basic psychological needs theory, goal contents theory, and relational motivation theory. Following each section are preliminary suggestions about how each mini‐theory might be useful or informative in other branches of personality. This special issue contains nine articles, each of which makes its own attempt to newly link its area of personality research to SDT. Even if SDT is not the appropriate seed for greater consilience in personality psychology, we urge the field not to neglect the search for unifying principles (Sheldon, Cheng, & Hilpert, 2011); it may finally be time to renew the search for a “grand theory” in personality.     

Network Analysis in Community Psychology: Looking Back,Looking Forward

Network analysis holds promise for community psychology given the field's aim to understand the interplay between individuals and their social contexts. Indeed, because network analysis focuses explicitly on patterns of relationships between actors, its theories and methods are inherently extra‐individual in nature and particularly well suited to characterizing social contexts. But, to what extent has community psychology taken advantage of this network analysis as a tool for capturing context? To answer these questions, this study provides a review of the use network analysis in articles published in American Journal of Community Psychology . Looking back, we describe and summarize the ways that network analysis has been employed in community psychology research to understand the range of ways community psychologists have found the technique helpful. Looking forward and paying particular attention to analytic issues identified in past applications, we provide some recommendations drawn from the network analysis literature to facilitate future applications of network analysis in community psychology.     

Cognition in the Berlin Aging Study (BASE): The First 10 Years

This paper summarizes and expands research on cognitive aging from the Berlin Aging Study (BASE), a longitudinal, multidisciplinary, and population-based investigation of old and very old individuals. First, we describe previously reported research on five key themes: (a) experimental and mortality-associated components of longitudinal selectivity; (b) comparisons between cross-sectional and cross-sectional/longitudinal convergence age gradients; (c) old-age dedifferentiation of inter-individual differences; (d) possible reasons for the age-based increase in the link between intellectual and sensory domains; and (e) limits to cognitive plasticity in very old age. Second, we make use of multilevel modeling to determine the magnitude and direction of retest effects. Retest effects are classified as either flat (step function from the first to the second measurement occasion) or growing (linear increase after the first measurement occasion). Five of the eight longitudinally administered cognitive tests are found to display significant retest effects of either or both types. Retest adjustment increased the linear negative and decreased the quadratic negative component of cross-sectional/longitudinal convergence gradients in measures of intellectual abilities.     

On Using Ethical Theories to Teach Engineering Ethics

Many engineering ethics classes and textbooks introduce theories such as utilitarianism and Kantianism (and most others draw from these theories without mentioning them explicitly). Yet using ethical theories to teach engineering ethics is not devoid of difficulty. First, their status is unclear (should one pick a single theory or use them all? does it make a difference?) Also, textbooks generally assume or fallaciously ‘prove’ that egoism (or even simply accounting for one’s interests) is wrong. Further, the drawbacks of ethical theories are underestimated and the theories are also otherwise misrepresented to make them more suitable for engineering ethics as the authors construe it, viz. the ‘moral reasoning’ process. Stating in what various theories disagree would allow the students to frame the problem more productively in terms of motive–consequence or society–individual dichotomies rather than in terms of Kant–utilitarian.     

Lay Theories of Personality: Cornerstones of Meaning in Social Cognition

Lay theories (or ‘implicit theories’) are cornerstones for social cognition: people use lay theories to help them make sense of complex and ambiguous behavior. In this study, we describe recent research on the entity and incremental theories (the belief that personality is fixed or malleable). In so doing, we demonstrate that each theory does not act alone. Instead, each is associated with a set of allied beliefs, the sum total of which cohere into two distinct meaning systems. We present evidence that these meaning systems produce systematic differences in a range of fundamental social cognition processes, with important implications for the field’s understanding of trait/situation attribution, moral judgment, person memory, and stereotyping. We further argue that because meaning systems serve a central meaning‐making function, people are motivated to believe that the meaning system they are using is effective and accurate. Accordingly, we present evidence that people exhibit processing distortions and compensatory mechanisms to minimize the impact of information that violates their meaning system. We discuss the implications of these findings for the field’s understanding of basic social cognition.     

The “r” that psychology forgot: Research on writing processes

Development of theory and methodology related to the psychology of reading and mathematical problem solving has far outpaced progress in the realm of the psychology of writing. However, recently published theories may serve to link written language production research with mainstream psychology, and new computer-based methodologies may help to make conducting research in writing more tractable. This paper describes several new initiatives for studying writing within a framework based on recent theories of working memory.     

Comparisons in research and reasoning: Toward an integrative theory of social induction

Strong scientific theories give coherence to a body of research findings, make precise predictions about key phenomena, and guide the search for new discoveries. In social psychology, some contemporary theories fall short of this ideal. Mini-theories are prevalent (cf. Van Lange, Higgins, & Kruglanski, 2011), many predictions are merely directional (like this one!) and theorizing post-hoc. Guided by experimental reasoning, many researchers emphasize—and reify—empirical differences. Taking the experimental method as an epistemological gold standard, they regard comparative thinking as a criterion of rational thinking. Using examples from social judgment and decision making, we show how comparative reasoning can constrain theoretical development and bias assessments of human rationality. To encourage movement toward stronger theory, we describe a model of inductive reasoning in social contexts.     

Forward inference using functional neuroimaging: dissociations versus associations

Many people are excited by functional neuroimaging as a new tool for cognitive science; many others are sceptical. In this opinion article, I describe a 'forward inference' that one can make from patterns of brain activity to distinguish between cognitive theories. I give an example of forward inferences in research on recognition memory, and outline some statistical criteria for a 'qualitative difference' in brain activity. Forward inferences resemble the dissociation logic long-used in behavioural studies of healthy and brain-damaged people, although I argue that dissociations in neuroimaging data can go beyond behavioural dissociations. Nonetheless, forward inferences are only as good as the cognitive theories to which they pertain, and are most valuable in conjunction with other types of inference.     

Examining arguments against quantitative research: “Case studies” illustrating the challenge of finding a sound philosophical basis for a human sciences approach to psychology

This article offers a close examination of critiques of quantitative research by Michell, 2011, Marecek, 2011, and Morawski (2011). One goal is to show that these three critics actually share with most mainstream quantitative researchers commitments to the Cartesian framework, even though this is not obvious because Cartesianism can appear in different guises. As a result of these commitments, the three theorists advance criticisms of mainstream quantitative research that fail to identify its key failings, put forward flawed views about how we should conduct research, and offer misguided criticisms of an approach I advocate called explicitly interpretive quantitative research. Another goal is to use the examination of the three critiques as a vehicle for clarifying the participatory perspective, a philosophical viewpoint that departs from the Cartesian framework. With regard to research methodology, the participatory perspective provides the basis for explicitly interpretive quantitative research, leads to ideas about changes we should make in how we conduct qualitative research, and treats quantitative and qualitative research as fundamentally similar because both should be pursued as interpretive modes of inquiry. I suggest that my analyses of the three critiques of quantitative research – or “case studies,” as I call these analyses – also may prove useful to researchers and theorists who want to develop a human sciences approach to other issues besides research methodology by helping them (1) recognize when lines of thinking that seem to depart from the mainstream actually represent variants of Cartesianism, and (2) consider what the participatory perspective might have to offer if they were to use it as the philosophical basis for their efforts.     

From moral theory to penal attitudes and back: a theoretically integrated modeling approach

From a moral standpoint, we would expect the practice of punishment to reflect a solid and commonly shared legitimizing framework. Several moral legal theories explicitly aim to provide such frameworks. Based on the theories of Retributivism, Utilitarianism, and Restorative Justice, this article first sets out to develop a theoretically integrated model of penal attitudes and then explores the extent to which Dutch judges' attitudes to punishment fit the model. Results indicate that penal attitudes can be measured in a meaningful way that is consistent with an integrated approach to moral theory. The general structure of penal attitudes among Dutch judges suggests a streamlined and pragmatic approach to legal punishment that is identifiably founded on the separate concepts central to moral theories of punishment. While Restorative Justice is frequently presented as an alternative paradigm, results show it to be smoothly incorporated within the streamlined approach.     

The Glasgow Face Matching Test

We describe a new test for unfamiliar face matching, the Glasgow Face Matching Test (GFMT). Viewers are shown pairs of faces, photographed in full-face view but with different cameras, and are asked to make same/different judgments. The full version of the test comprises 168 face pairs, and we also describe a shortened version with 40 pairs. We provide normative data for these tests derived from large subject samples. We also describe associations between the GFMT and other tests of matching and memory. The new test correlates moderately with face memory but more strongly with object matching, a result that is consistent with previous research highlighting a link between object and face matching, specific to unfamiliar faces. The test is available free for scientific use.     

A Gender Analysis of Theories of Coping with Stress

In this article, various feminist theories are used to critique selected psychological theories of coping with stress, a reformulated coping theory is outlined, and recommendations for future research are made. To date, theories of coping often portray women as less able copers than the samples of men with whom they are compared. A reformulated theory, based on different women's experiences, explicitly examines the role of social forces (sexism, racism) and access to power as variables in the coping process rather than solely focusing on the individual. Selected examples of research that contribute to such a revision are given. Revised theories and methodologies will encourage the more accurate appraisal of women's coping abilities and generate information vital to the creation of more inclusive and representative theories of coping.     

Quasi-truth,paraconsistency, and the foundations of science

In order to develop an account of scientific rationality, two problems need to be addressed: (i) how to make sense of episodes of theory change in science where the lack of a cumulative development is found, and (ii) how to accommodate cases of scientific change where lack of consistency is involved. In this paper, we sketch a model of scientific rationality that accommodates both problems. We first provide a framework within which it is possible to make sense of scientific revolutions, but which still preserves some (partial) relations between old and new theories. The existence of these relations help to explain why the break between different theories is never too radical as to make it impossible for one to interpret the process in perfectly rational terms. We then defend the view that if scientific theories are taken to be quasi-true, and if the underlying logic is paraconsistent, it’s perfectly rational for scientists and mathematicians to entertain inconsistent theories without triviality. As a result, as opposed to what is demanded by traditional approaches to rationality, it’s not irrational to entertain inconsistent theories. Finally, we conclude the paper by arguing that the view advanced here provides a new way of thinking about the foundations of science. In particular, it extends in important respects both coherentist and foundationalist approaches to knowledge, without the troubles that plague traditional views of scientific rationality.     

Evolution and Personality: What Should a Comprehensive Theory Address and How?

Personality is arguably the most integrative area of psychology; yet, it is an area about which evolutionary psychologists have had comparatively little to say. This is unfortunate because evolutionary theory holds great potential as a framework that can link together the disparate aspects that make up a person. We suggest that progress in evolutionary personality psychology will be helped by clarification of precisely what an evolutionary theory of personality would need to address. To this end, we first describe and assess some extant contributions by theorists attempting to understand personality from an evolutionary perspective. Next, we endorse a working definition of what personality entails and outline three types of personality differences – character traits, goals/motives, and selves/identities – that any comprehensive evolutionary theory of personality should address. Finally, we suggest an approach forward, one where evolved species‐typical motives orient people toward adaptive ends and result in the differentiation of individuals’ unique selves.     

Are Causal Structure and Intervention Judgments Inextricably Linked? A Developmental Study

The application of the formal framework of causal Bayesian Networks to children’s causal learning provides the motivation to examine the link between judgments about the causal structure of a system, and the ability to make inferences about interventions on components of the system. Three experiments examined whether children are able to make correct inferences about interventions on different causal structures. The first two experiments examined whether children’s causal structure and intervention judgments were consistent with one another. In Experiment 1, children aged between 4 and 8 years made causal structure judgments on a three‐component causal system followed by counterfactual intervention judgments. In Experiment 2, children’s causal structure judgments were followed by intervention judgments phrased as future hypotheticals. In Experiment 3, we explicitly told children what the correct causal structure was and asked them to make intervention judgments. The results of the three experiments suggest that the representations that support causal structure judgments do not easily support simple judgments about interventions in children. We discuss our findings in light of strong interventionist claims that the two types of judgments should be closely linked.     

The implicit theories of potential rapists: What our questionnaires tell us

Theories of rape give some prominence to the role of offense-supportive cognitive processes and attitudes. Yet, research on the relationship between cognition and rape has produced a confusing picture. Numerous methodological issues are no doubt contributing to this confusion. However, in this article, we argue that another major contributor is the lack of attention given to the underlying mechanisms responsible for generating rape-supportive beliefs. Firstly, we review the relevant cognitive research on rapists and rape-prone men. Then, we present psychological research on implicit theories, and on the nature of conceptual representation, development, and change. We apply this implicit theory perspective to existing scales that measure rape-related distorted cognitions, and derive some core theories from the scale items. We describe these theories, giving examples of items that support them. Finally, we discuss the clinical and research implications of the implicit theories we have identified.