Apologising for the past: German science and nazi medicine

Recently, religious organisations, governments and public institutions have begun to offer apologies for historical wrongs. Can they legitimately do so? Departing from the tendency, Professor Hubert Markl, President of the Max Planck Society, has offered strong reasons for not apologising for the crimes of medical scientists who experimented on human subjects during the Nazi era. He argues that only the perpetrators can meaningfully apologise. Markl’'s position is considered and rejected in favour of the view that apologies by proxy for historical wrongs are justifiable and should be made by institutions that have the authority to do so.     

Schizophrenia and modern culture: reasons for insanity

After pointing out the uncertainty and confusion to which neurobiological research has led schizophrenia, as shown and acknowledged in recent reviews, we offer seven reasons for reconsidering schizophrenia a disorder of the self, rather than of the brain. The first reason starts out conceiving schizophrenia as a disorder of the self, in the perspective of current phenomenology. The second relates the fact of its recent origin (as of 1750) with the particular configuration of the modern self and with the great transformation of the community into a society of individuals (industrialization, urbanization). The third reason emphasizes the affinity between schizophrenia and adolescence, a critical age in the formation of the self, which started to be problematic at the end of the 18th century. The fourth is the better prognosis of schizophrenia in developing countries, in comparison to developed countries, which probably has to do with the process of modernization (which still maintains community structures in less developed countries). The fifth is the high incidence of schizophrenia among immigrants, as a fact to be explained in terms of a socio-evolutionary model. The sixth reason reviews the genetic legend of schizophrenia, and how epigenetics gives protagonism back to the environment. The seventh and last reason refers to the reconsideration of psychological therapy as the possible treatment of choice and not merely an adjunct to medication, as it is known that, for patients, interpersonal chemistry is more important than neurochemistry.     

The soul of psychoanalysis in the modern world reflections on the work of Christopher Bollas

The paper begins with the claim that psychoanalysis faces a dilemma in locating itself in a contemporary world that devalues experiences of interiority, depth, and embeddedness in personal history. Psychoanalysis's coming to terms with this modern world—reflected in contemporary relational paradigms and emphases on interaction, authority, and epistemology—is essential yet tends to replace an outdated conformity with an updated one, in which what is offered to analysands may become limited and the soul of psychoanalysis lost.

Bollas's work attempts to reinspire psychoanalysis. This paper explores his contributions and the tensions within them and develops several points about how psychoanalysis can maintain a worthwhile self—for itself and for its analysands—in the modern world. Among the issues discussed are the sense in which an endogenous motivational core associated with an emphasis on interiority may be compatible with a relational paradigm and how the notion of personal idiom is a rich and fruitful one, but that the cultural field deserves a more fundamental place than it is given by Bollas. The problem of authority and exploitation, within and outside the consulting room, is also taken up, and it is argued that psychoanalysis should be conceived as a moral discourse in which the analyst's self‐subverting (but not diminished) authority is essential.     

The antinomy of science and democracy in modern China

Up to now Chinese academia has been addicted to inviting the twin goddesses of democracy and science, but has regrettably ignored the innate incongruity between them, which has led to the rise of scientism. May 4th pioneers first introduced this value system, but tension between these values subsequently led to a prevailing preference for science over freedom. The early Marxists defined freedom as obedience to social laws formulated in Marxist ‘science’, while Maoism finalized the Sinicization of Marxism with a belief in iron‐bound social laws and in human beings as mere political means, mercilessly suppressing any expression of free will.     

Reframing the question of forbidden knowledge for modern science

In this paper I use the concept of forbidden knowledge to explore questions about putting limits on science. Science has generally been understood to seek and produce objective truth, and this understanding of science has grounded its claim to freedom of inquiry. What happens to decision making about science when this claim to objective, disinterested truth is rejected? There are two changes that must be made to update the idea of forbidden knowledge for modern science. The first is to shift from presuming that decisions to constrain or even forbid knowledge can be made from a position of omniscience (perfect knowledge) to recognizing that such decisions made by human beings are made from a position of limited or partial knowledge. The second is to reject the idea that knowledge is objective and disinterested and accept that knowledge (even scientific knowledge) is interested. In particular, choices about what knowledge gets created are normative, value choices. When these two changes are made to the idea of forbidden knowledge, questions about limiting or forbidding lines of inquiry are shown to distract attention from the more important matters of who makes and how decisions are made about what knowledge is produced. Much more attention should be focused on choosing directions in science, and as this is done, the matter of whether constraints should be placed on science will fall into place.