Children as witnesses: A comparison of lineup versus showup identification methods

The goal of this study was to compare children's and adults eyewitness identification accuracy when presented with an array of possible suspects (‘lineup’) versus one suspect (‘showup’). Kindergarten children and adults were shown a slide show of a staged theft and subsequently asked whether, of the photo or photos shown them, the perpetrator was present or not. Children were more likely than adults to identify the perpetrator correctly when that suspect was present in the lineup or showup. Children were also more likely than adults to make an incorrect identification of another person when the perpetrator's photo was not present in the lineup or showup. Because false positive identification errors are more difficult to detect with the showup than the lineup, use of the showup may be less appropriate with child witnesses than with adults due to children's greater tendency to make positive identifications.     

An evaluation of lineup presentation,weapon presence,and a distinctive feature using ROC analysis

We conducted an experiment (N = 2675) including both laboratory and online participants to test hypotheses regarding important system and estimator variables for eyewitness identification. Simultaneous lineups were compared to sequential lineups with the suspect presented early versus late because there is evidence that suspect position could be an important factor determining a simultaneous versus sequential advantage in guilty-innocent suspect discriminability. We also manipulated whether or not the perpetrator held a weapon or had a distinctive feature on his face, to re-evaluate recent evidence that these factors interact. Overall, the simultaneous lineup yielded higher discriminability than the sequential lineup, and there was no effect of sequential position. Discriminability was higher when the perpetrator had no weapon, but only when no distinctive feature was present. We conclude with a discussion of the importance of exploring interactions between system and estimator variables using Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) analysis.     

The Automatic Activation of Retributive Motive When Determining Punishment

This study sought to test the hypothesis that an individual’s retributive motive is activated automatically when he or she is presented with an opportunity to determine appropriate punishment. Fifty-one undergraduate students were subjected to one of two conditions: one in which an video clip of a brutal crime was presented (crime video condition) and another in which a sports documentary video clip was presented (sports video condition). Participants were asked to complete the Implicit Association Test before and after being presented with the video. It was predicted that the activation of retributive motive would strengthen the association with a balanced combination of these factors as compared to the association with an unbalanced combination of factors and increase the IAT effect accordingly. The IAT effect increased in the crime video condition but did not change in the sports video condition. This result supported the hypothesis, indicating that decision making regarding punishment is carried out automatically and outside of conscious awareness, as the IAT reflects automatic cognitive processes such as implicit attitudes.     

Alibi Believability: The Effect of Prior Convictions and Judicial Instructions

Undergraduates (N = 339) listened to a simulated police interview with a defendant concerning his alibi. We studied the impact of (a) the strength of the alibi evidence; (b) defendant's prior convictions; (c) judge's instructions on prior conviction evidence; and (d) perceivers' need for cognition (NFC) on alibi believability and defendant guilt ratings. Defendants previously convicted of the same crime as the current charge were seen as more likely to be guilty than defendants previously convicted of a different crime. Judge's instructions did not affect guilt ratings. NFC was less influential than anticipated, but did affect participants' understanding and recall of judicial instructions. Strong alibis were seen as more believable and led to lower guilt ratings than weak alibis.     

The effect of viewing distance on empirical discriminability and the confidence–accuracy relationship for eyewitness identification

The distance from which an eyewitness views a perpetrator is a critical factor for eyewitness identification, but has received little research attention. We presented three mock-crime videos to participants, varying distance to three perpetrators (3, 10, or 20 m). Across two experiments, increased distance reduced empirical discriminability in the form of a mirror effect, such that correct identifications decreased while false identifications increased. Moreover, high confidence identifications were associated with high accuracy at 3 m (Experiment 1 and 2) and 10 m (Experiment 2), but not at 20 m. We conclude that eyewitnesses may be less likely to identify a perpetrator viewed at a distance, and also more likely to falsely identify an innocent suspect. Furthermore, there may be certain boundary conditions associated with distance and the impact it has on the confidence–accuracy relationship. More research is needed to elucidate the effect of estimator variable manipulations on the confidence–accuracy relationship.     

Vivisecting the religious mind: Religiosity and motivated social cognition

The relation between motivated social cognition and the religiosity dimensions, which Wulff (1991, 1997) described (Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence and Literal vs. Symbolic), was investigated in a Flemish speaking Belgian student sample (N=330). The Need for Closure Scale (NFC, Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) was used to measure motivated social cognition and the Post-Critical Belief Scale (Duriez et al., 2000) was used to measure Wulff's religiosity dimensions. Although NFC was expected to relate to the Literal vs. Symbolic dimension only, results also revealed a relation between NFC and the Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence dimension. However, whereas the former relationship is due to the NFC facets, Discomfort with Ambiguity and Closed-Mindedness, the latter relation can be attributed to the facets, Order and Structure and Predictability. Results obtained in a second Flemish speaking Belgian student sample (N=392) confirm these findings. Thus, apparently, whereas religious belief as such seems to be associated with a preference for order and structure as well as predictability, it is those who deal with religious content in a literal way who are incapable of dealing with alternative opinions.     

Need for cognition can magnify or attenuate priming effects in social judgment

This article hypothesizes that the individual-difference variable, need for cognition (NFC), can have opposite implications for priming effects, depending on prime blatancy. Subtle primes are argued to be more effective for high- versus low-NFC individuals. This is because for high-NFC individuals, (a) constructs are generally easier to activate, (b) their higher amount of thought offers more opportunity for an activated construct to bias judgment, and (c) their thoughtfully formed judgments are more likely to affect behavior. However, because high-NFC individuals are adept at identifying and correcting for bias, with blatant primes the activated construct should be less likely to exert its default influence. Furthermore, with blatant primes, low-NFC individuals may achieve sufficient activation for primes to affect judgment. Across three studies, it is shown that as NFC increases, the magnitude of priming effects increases with a subtle prime but decreases with a blatant prime.     

“He Couldn't Have Done It,He Was With Me!”: The Impact of Alibi Witness Age and Relationship

Undergraduate participants who conducted a simulated police investigation were presented with either a child (6 years old) or adult (25 years old) alibi witness, who was either the son or neighbor of the participant's suspect. Replicating previous research, participants were more likely to believe the adult neighbor alibi witness than the adult son. In fact, an alibi provided by the adult son actually proved detrimental to that suspect, as participants thought the suspect was more likely to be guilty after viewing an alibi provided by the adult son. However, child‐provided alibis reduced perceptions of suspect guilt, regardless of that child's relationship to the suspect. The child alibi witnesses were also viewed by the participants as more credible than the adult witnesses. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Need for Cognition Moderates Responses to Framed Smoking‐Cessation Messages1

Smoking‐cessation messages usually emphasize the costs of continuing to smoke (loss‐framed). However, prospect theory suggests that messages that instead emphasize the benefits of quitting smoking (gain‐framed) could be more effective than loss‐framed messages because smoking cessation is likely viewed as a cancer‐prevention behavior with a certain rather than a risky outcome. In this study, smokers at public events read brochures containing brief gain‐ or loss‐framed smoking‐cessation messages. The influence of framing was moderated by participants' need for cognition (NFC). Individuals lower in NFC had greater intention to quit after reading a gain‐framed message than after reading a loss‐framed message a finding consistent with our predictions whereas framing did not affect the persuasiveness of messages among people higher in NFC.     

Background beliefs and evidence interpretation

In this paper we argue that it is often adaptive to use one's background beliefs when interpreting information that, from a normative point of view, is incomplete. In both of the experiments reported here participants were presented with an item possessing two features and were asked to judge, in the light of some evidence concerning the features, to which of two categories it was more likely that the item belonged. It was found that when participants received evidence relevant to just one of these hypothesised categories (i.e. evidence that did not form a Bayesian likelihood ratio) they used their background beliefs to interpret this information. In Experiment 2, on the other hand, participants behaved in a broadly Bayesian manner when the evidence they received constituted a completed likelihood ratio. We discuss the circumstances under which participants, when making their judgements, consider the alternative hypothesis. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our results for an understanding of hypothesis testing, belief revision, and categorisation.     

Absolute and Relative Decision Processes in Eyewitness Identification

A prominent and long-standing theory of eyewitness identification decision making distinguishes between absolute judgments, based on the lineup members' match to the witness's memory of the perpetrator, versus relative judgments, based on match values relative to other lineup members. This distinction was implemented in a computational model and simulations showed that the model predicts an accuracy advantage for absolute judgments over relative judgments under some conditions. The present experiment tested this prediction by evaluating the accuracy of witnesses instructed to use relative or absolute rules. Contrary to predictions, the overall analysis did not show an absolute advantage. Additional exploratory analyses showed a relative advantage when the suspect was surrounded by high-similarity foils. These results are consistent with a model that assumes that side-by-side comparisons of lineup members increase diagnostic accuracy by allowing witnesses to give greater weight to more diagnostic features and less weight to less diagnostic features.     

Blindness to alternative scenarios in evidence evaluation

In order to prevent miscarriages of justice, police, prosecution, and judges must remain open to alternative scenarios in which the suspect is in fact innocent. In recent years, however, several studies have delivered results suggesting that open‐mindedness is not always standard in criminal procedures. For example, Ask and Granhag (2005) found that police officers' estimation of the incriminating power of investigation findings was not affected by knowledge of an alternative suspect. The current first study replicated these findings in a mixed sample of police officers, district attorneys, and judges. In Study 2, this blindness to alternative scenarios did not emerge in a sample of university students. However, the estimation of the incriminating power of the evidence and the willingness to convict the primary suspect were predicted with the participants' confirmation proneness. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Sins of Their Fathers: When Current Generations Are Held to Account for the Transgressions of Previous Generations

When are current generations held accountable for transgressions committed by previous generations? In two studies, we test the prediction that current generations will only be assigned guilt for past atrocities when victim group members perceive high levels of cultural continuity between historical perpetrators and the current generation within the perpetrator group. Japanese participants were presented with information describing the current generation of Americans as either similar or dissimilar in personality to the Americans who were implicated in dropping the atomic bomb on Japan during World War II. The results of both studies revealed that victim group members assigned more guilt to current Americans when they perceived high (compared to low) outgroup continuity, and they did so relatively independently of the transgressor group's guilt expressions.     

Cross‐national examination of the perpetrator–victim account estimation bias as a function of different types of accounts

In two cross‐national studies, we investigated the existence of a perpetrator–victim account estimation bias and how this bias can be reduced or eliminated when estimating the perpetrator's use of a mixed account; that is, an account in which the perpetrator not only apologizes but also explains mitigating and justifiable circumstances. Japanese and American participants took either the perspective of the perpetrator or the victim and estimated the likelihood of the perpetrator's use of each account. The results supported our hypothesis in both national samples. The implications of the bias and the role of the mixed account in reducing it are discussed.     

The vengeance puzzle—retributive justice or hostile aggression?

Vengeance is understood as a blend of instrumental and hostile aggression. Taking the Berkowitz neoassociationistic aggression model as a basis, 84 students received a priming manipulation (anger, fear, or control condition). Afterwards, they judged one of four vengeance scenarios that differed in victim‐perpetrator relationship (coworker vs. stranger) and in the attributed motive of the perpetrator. Priming had an influence on judgments of injustice and on anticipated fury, but no effect whatsoever on aggression (measured as the decrease in well‐being wished for the perpetrator). The type of relationship had an effect only on anticipated disappointment. The main effects of motive were found on aggression and on the anticipated feeling of the perpetrator after the act. Aggression could be predicted from the motive of the perpetrator and well‐being of the victim after the transgression. Neither anticipated fury, importance of deterrence, nor judgment of injustice predicted aggression. Aggr. Behav. 00:1–12, 2005. © 2005 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.     

Non‐blind lineup administration biases administrators' interpretations of ambiguous witness statements and their perceptions of the witness

Administering lineups “blind”—whereby the administrator does not know the identity of the suspect—is considered part of best practices for lineups. The current study tests whether non‐blind lineup administrators would evaluate ambiguous eyewitness statements, and the witness himself or herself, in a manner consistent with their beliefs. College students (n = 219) were told the identity of the suspect or not before administering a lineup to a confederate‐witness who made an ambiguous response (e.g., “it could be #3 but I'm not sure”). When ambiguous witness statements matched administrators' beliefs regarding the suspect (compared with when they mismatched administrators' beliefs, or administrators had no belief), administrators (a) were significantly more likely to record the statement as an identification (as opposed to a “not sure” response); (b) were significantly less likely to make statements that might lead the witness away from the suspect; and (c) evaluated the witness's viewing conditions significantly more positively.     

The police officer's terrorist dilemma: trust resilience following fatal errors

Suicide attacks have raised the stakes for officers deciding whether or not to shoot a suspect (‘Police Officer's Terrorist Dilemma’). Despite high‐profile errors we know little about how trust in the police is affected by their response to the terrorist threat. Building on a conceptualisation of lay observers as intuitive signal detection theorists, a general population sample (N = 1153) were presented with scenarios manipulated in terms of suspect status (Armed/Unarmed), officer decision (Shoot/Not Shoot) and outcome severity (e.g. suspect armed with Bomb/Knife; police shoot suspect/suspect plus child bystander). Supporting predictions, people showed higher trust in officers who made correct decisions, reflecting good discrimination ability and who decided to shoot, reflecting an ‘appropriate’ response bias given the relative costs and benefits. This latter effect was moderated by (a) outcome severity, suggesting it did not simply reflect a preference for a particular type of action, and (b) preferences for a tough stance towards terrorism indexed by Right‐Wing Authoritarianism (RWA). Despite loss of civilian life, failure to prevent minor terror attacks resulted in no loss of trust amongst people low in RWA, whereas among people high in RWA trust was positive when police erroneously shot an unarmed suspect. Relations to alternative definitions of trust and procedural justice research are discussed. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Permitting immoral behaviour: A generalized compensation belief hypothesis

When are we more likely to permit immoral behaviours? The current research examined a generalized compensation belief hypothesis that individuals, as observers, would morally tolerate and accept someone paying forward unfair treatment to an innocent person as a means to compensate for the perpetrator's previously experienced mistreatment. Across five experiments (N = 1107) based on economic games (Studies 1–4) and diverse real-life scenarios (Study 5), we showed that participants, as observing third parties, were more likely to morally permit and engage in the same negative act once they knew about previous maltreatment of the perpetrator. This belief occurred even when the content of received and paid-forward maltreatment was non-identical (Study 2), when the negative treatment was received from a non-human target (Study 3) and when the maltreatment was intangible (e.g. material loss) or relational (e.g. social exclusion; Study 5). Perceived required compensation mediated the effect of previous maltreatment on moral permission (Studies 4 and 5). The results consistently suggest that people's moral permission of immoral behaviours is influenced by perpetrator's previous mistreatment, contributing to a better understanding of the nature and nuances of our sense of fairness and contextualized moral judgement.