Neither ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’ nor ‘Better’ in Terms of ‘Good’

In this paper, I argue against defining either of ‘good’ and ‘better’ in terms of the other. According to definitions of ‘good’ in terms of ‘better’, something is good if and only if it is better than some indifference point. Against this approach, I argue that the indifference point cannot be defined in terms of ‘better’ without ruling out some reasonable axiologies. Against defining ‘better’ in terms of ‘good’, I argue that this approach either cannot allow for the incorruptibility of intrinsic goodness or it breaks down in cases where both of the relata of ‘better’ are bad.     

A Lesson in ‘Psycholese,’ or How to ‘Get a Feel For’ Where Your ‘Helper’ Is ‘Coming From’

Oftentimes/frequently the consumers/clients/patients of community/private mental health agencies/facilities experience/encounter difficulty communicating with the mental health professionals/paraprofessionals. Presented is a glossary that should aid novice clients to better communicate with their helpers/therapists/counselors/ caregivers. On the other hand (at the same time), it might just confuse the clients further. This is clearly a risk with counseling.     

Still Not ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’

Erik Carlson puts forward a new way of defining monadic value predicates, such as ‘good’, in terms of dyadic value relations, such as ‘better’. Earlier definitions of this kind have the unwanted feature that they rule out some reasonable axiologies by conceptual fiat. Carlson claims that his definitions do not have this drawback. In this paper, I argue that they do.     

‘Tell me what I want to hear’: Motivated recall and attributions in media regarding asylum seekers

Within Australia, divisive debates regarding the processing of asylum seekers have delivered increasing polarisation rather than convergence on an evidence‐based, humane approach. In order to investigate the role of motivated reasoning (the idea that our judgment is based on our motivations) with respect to attributions of warmth and competence, 186 participants indicated the extent to which they accepted false beliefs regarding asylum seekers. They read an article rebutting such false beliefs and then reported their attitudes towards the author and the extent to which the author possessed warmth and competence traits. They then reported whether they agreed with the information in the article before completing a test of recall. Participants who disagreed with the article recalled less accurate information and rated authors significantly lower on warmth and competence. These findings suggest that motivated reasoning plays an important role in the way stereotypes are applied and in the way information is processed.     

Counseling the ‘disadvantaged’

In this article, Henrietta Tolson looks at the obstacles to a sharing relationship with clients which counselors set up by stereotyping people and seeking to enhance their own status. With the vision of someone who has worked for many years with people in Seattle's central area, she discusses the subtleties of racial and economic prejudice among well meaning, middle class counselors and case workers.     

Direct and indirect influence in the Asch paradigm: Effects of ‘valid’ or ‘denied’ information

In an experiment using the Asch paradigm, a source whose response was ‘denied’ (source younger than subjects, in an experiment context implying the development of visual acuity) was found to have less direct influence than a ‘validated’ source (older or same age as subjects), tending to specialize in a pattern of influence similar to the so-called conversion phenomenon (i.e. direct influence only).     

‘Taking time’ and ‘making sense’: Rowan Williams on the Habits of Theological Imagination

This article argues that Rowan Williams' methodology cannot be fruitfully employed by others without grasping his intellectual habits and the depth of his engagement with Christian tradition. The argument is centred on the themes of ‘taking time’ and ‘making sense’, which run throughout Williams' work, and proceeds in three sections. First, ‘taking time’ implies an attitude of patient humility that frames engagement with all Williams' interlocutors. Second, ‘making sense’, as the primary work of the theologian, depends upon ‘taking time’. Third, Williams' theological style cannot be imitated without the conversion of desire that characterizes Christian discipleship as he describes it.     

On the Motivational Primacy of the Individual Self: ‘I’ Is Stronger than ‘We’

The self‐concept is dynamic, with momentary definition shifting from a representation of self as a unique and independent social agent to an undifferentiated and interchangeable group member. Indeed, the individual self and collective self are fundamental components of the self‐concept, with each being important and meaningful to human experience. However, are those selves equally important and meaningful? We review a program of research empirically testing three competing hypotheses that suggests that the motivational core of human experience is (a) the individual self, (b) the collective self, or (c) determined by contextual factors that make a given self momentarily accessible. The research furnished unanimous and consistent evidence that the individual self is the motivationally primary form of self‐definition.