Progressive Dying: Meaningful Acts of Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide

In this paper I use William James's understanding of “significance” in life to show that for certain patients euthanasia and assisted suicide can be importantly meaningful acts that family, friends, and health care professionals must acknowledge and even, at times, aid in bringing to fruition. Dying with meaning is transformative. It reshapes the lives of others that are left behind, giving to their lives new groundings by engaging them in the meaning of dying for us. For the patient, dying with meaning takes the seemingly formless void in the abyss of death and gives it a significant purpose in the last stages of life itself; it turns potential nothingness into actual significance. To the extent that we outsiders do not help the dying, we condemn terminally ill patients to a meaningless existence until they die.     

Losing claims of rights

Conclusion I have contended that acting on some principle and complaining when others act in accordance with the same principle in similar circumstances is morally improper. By wrongdoing one forfeits the right to claim the right (s)he disregards in interacting with others. This is not equivalent to a view that one's acting in a certain way justifies others acting in that way, i.e. that by wrongdoing one forfeits rights (s)he disregards in interacting with others. It may still be morally improper to treat malfeasors in the same way they treat us but, I have argued, they cannot themselves claim a right not to be treated in that way.This analysis of the right to claim rights can help explain the change in moral status of wrongdoers in two important ways. First, if there are some non-forfeitable human rights, the loss of moral standing of one who disregards those rights in others can be explained. Second, and perhaps potentially more important, if having a right implies the right holder's being justified in claiming it, we have a basis for saying all human rights are forfeitable.This second position would require a tightening of the link between the right to X and the ancillary right to claim the right to X. I have not undertaken that burden here. Instead, I argued that the loss of the right to claim is, itself, a significant loss.     

Knowing When to Say Goodbye: Final Exit and Suicide in the Elderly

The publication of Derek Humphry's Final Exit in 1991 caused a large uproar. Although designed as a suicide manual for terminally ill persons, there has been considerable fear that the book's methods might be used by others, such as nonterminal elderly individuals who have made a “rational” decision to end their lives. This piece, a short story about an elderly couple that commits double suicide, explores rational suicide by using fiction, as opposed to a standard bioethical approach. Fiction does not provide answers, but rather highlights the ambiguities surrounding elder suicide, and reminds us to evaluate this issue in the context of individual life experiences.     

Assisted Suicide,Suffering and the Meaning of a Life

The ethical problems surrounding voluntary assisted suicide remain formidable, and are unlikely to be resolved in pluralist societies. An examination of historical attitudes to suicide suggests that modernity has inherited a formidable complex of religious and moral attitudes to suicide, whether assisted or not. Advocates usually invoke the ending of intolerable suffering as one justification for euthanasia of this kind. This does not provide an adequate justification by itself, because there are (at least theoretically) methods which would relieve suffering without causing the physical death of the suffering person. Carried to extremes, these methods would finish the life worth living, but leave a being which was technically alive. Such acts, however, would provide no moral escape, since they would create beings without meaning. Arguments seeking to justify ending the lives of others need some grounding in concepts of the meaning of a life. The euthanasia discourse therefore needs to take at least some account of the meaning we construct for our lives and the lives of others.     

Human Dignity and Assisted Dying

The United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in its preamble, affirms ‘the inherent dignity and … the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family’ as ‘the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’. However, advocates of assisted dying have proposed that human dignity is not inherent and that individuals should be able to determine their own dignity and quality of life. In response to this, it is suggested that persons who consider that their lives are no longer worth living, or believe that they have lost their ‘dignity’, are discriminating against themselves. Moreover, with assisted dying, as opposed to suicide, another person must also believe that it would be preferable for a person wishing to die not to continue living. In other words, assisted dying is a reflection of the unacceptable belief by a person that human dignity is not inherent and that another person can lose his or her dignity to such an extent that his or her life is no longer worth living and should be ended.     

Agency,Patiency, and The Good Life: the Passivities Objection to Eudaimonism

Many contemporary eudaimonists emphasize the role of agency in the good life. Mark LeBar, for example, characterizes his own eudaimonist view this way: “It is agentist, not patientist, because it emphasizes that our lives go well in virtue of what we do, rather than what happens, to us or otherwise”. Nicholas Wolterstorff, however, has argued that this prioritizing of agency over patiency is a fatal flaw in eudaimonist accounts of well-being. Eudaimonism must be rejected, Wolterstorff argues, because many life-goods are “passivities” that are out of a person’s hands, including how she is treated by others. In this paper, I defend eudaimonism against this passivities objection. I argue that eudaimonism can maintain its agentist character while also capturing the element of truth in the passivities objection—namely, that human well-being is vulnerable and social. I also argue that eudaimonists should avail themselves of the notion of receptivity to capture important aspects of the good life.     

幼儿对所有权权利的理解

对物品的所有权意味着所有者对所有物具有多重权利, 如触碰、使用、更改、追踪和转移等。研究发现, 3岁幼儿就能理解, 所有者对自己的物品具有触碰权和使用权, 而他人不具有。但是, 他们理解所有物的更改权、追踪权和转移权, 却相对滞后。这提示对不同所有权权利表征的发展可能是分化的。此外, 3岁幼儿还理解所有者具有赋予他人使用所有物的权利, 还会积极维护这种权利, 并对阻止权利实施的行为表示抗议, 说明他们也能理解二级所有权权利。为什么幼儿对不同所有权权利的表征会出现分化, 其背后的机制需要未来研究的探索。此外, 某些公共物品(如公共汽车)本身存在着所有权权利相分离的情况, 幼儿是如何表征的, 也值得我们进行研究。不同文化对所有权权利的侧重不同, 提示我们有必要对所有权权利认知的发展进行跨文化检验。     

Suicide: bad act or good intervention

This article develops a different perspective on the ethics of suicide, based on theoretical and clinical grounds. In terms of value theory, applying "good" or "bad" to the suicide act makes no sense. We need to shift our focus from a search for an ethical statement about suicide (e.g., "rational suicide") to the ethical justification for intervention based on the needs and interests of an affirming therapeutic profession. We choose to intervene because of values we hold about well-functioning, existence, potential for human life; and because as emphatic, social beings, we feel for others and are motivated by that feeling. This justification leads us to suggest a situational case-centered ethics for suicide intervention.     

Nocturne

A king must be willing to first lower himself and live the life of a common man, before rising once more to his full stature. Boromir fails this test (he who should have realized that he was a steward, not a king), but finally redeems himself in death. Strider/Aragorn fully passes his test and, unlike Boromir, does not die but instead triumphs over death, actually raising the Army of the Dead to help him in a great battle. After the Quest is completed—the ring is destroyed—Strider fully becomes Aragorn, reunites Gondor and Arnor, and is crowned king. His is the classic path of the hero, one that can teach all of us many lessons about our own individuation.     

Life and Death Matters: Losing a Sense of the Value of Human Beings

The essay combines a specific and a more general theme. In attacking ‘the doctrine of the sanctity of human life’ Singer takes himself thereby to be opposing the conviction that human life has special value. I argue that this conviction goes deep in our lives in many ways that do not depend on what Singer identifies as central to that ‘doctrine’, and that his attack therefore misses its main target. I argue more generally that Singer’s own moral philosophy affords only an impoverished and distorted sense of the value of human life and human beings. In purporting to dig below the supposedly illusion–ridden surface of our thinking about value, Singer in fact often leads us away from the robust terrain of our lived experience into rhetorical, and sometimes brutal, fantasy.     

Using Stars for Moral Navigation: An Ethical Exploration into Celebrity

What role do celebrities play in our moral lives? Philosophers have explored the potential for celebrities to function as moral exemplars and role models. We argue that there are more ways in which celebrities play a role in helping us navigate our moral lives. First, gossiping about celebrities helps us negotiate our moral norms and identify competing styles of life. Second, fandom for celebrities serves as the basis for the development of distinct moral communities and identities. Third, celebrities possess high levels of epistemic power which can be used to help change and adapt our moral norms. We will then investigate two kinds of problems that arise from using celebrities in this way. Firstly, harm is done to celebrities because they are used in the ways explained in the first part of the article; secondly, celebrity life has a distinctive nature that can affect the moral agency of celebrities. Fame, we suggest, might lead to a morally unhealthy asymmetry in human relationships. We end by discussing the ethical implications of our analysis and conclude that when using stars for moral navigation, we should take into account the harm this does to them and the distinctive nature of their lives.     

Evolutionary ethics and moral theory

Conclusion This example, like the others, demands further discussion. My conclusion must therefore remain modest: an agent-neutral theory of our moral competence is not biologically implausible. Agent-centered rules like tit-for-tat, prerogatives, special obligations, and duties not to harm others might be best regarded as belonging to the theory of moral performance rather than the theory of moral competence. For biologists who may think otherwise, the general argument of this essay is that any claims to the contrary must be based on more empirically well-developed theories of our moral competence and moral performance.More adequate theories of both kinds are worth developing, even if by themselves they determine nothing about how we ought to live our lives. Biology may help us understand the broad taxonomical categories of moral performance. It may also explain why, at the deepest levels of our moral thinking, we so easily slide into agent-neutral ways of reasoning. But how we ought to live our lives is something that must be determined by social experiment and moral argumentation. Discoveries regarding the empirical nature of morality cannot be made independently of the actual workings of our moral competence, which is itself only one factor in broader social and psychological processes that are capable of leading human beings down any number of more or less morally laudable paths.

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Parental Rights

ABSTRACT This paper is concerned with the philosophical foundations of parental rights. Some commonly held accounts are rejected. The question of whether parental rights are property rights is examined. It is argued that there are useful analogies with property rights which help us to see that the ultimate justification of parental rights lies in the special value of parenthood in human life. It is further argued that the idea of generation is essential to our understanding of parenthood as having special value and that parental rights properly belong, in the first instance, to natural parents.     

‘IP’ Moral Rights Breaches are Deception Offences,Not Property Offences: Correcting a Category Error

In March of 2014 Nature Publishing Group, responsible for the publication of journals such as Nature and Scientific American, was subject to criticism for its requirement that contributing authors waive their moral rights (a component of their copyright) in relation to their published articles. Some of the rights included under the umbrella term ‘moral rights’ are the right to have any copies of one’s work reproduced accurately and without alteration; the right to the accurate attribution of one’s work under one’s own name; and the right not to have the work of others falsely attributed to oneself. The Nature Publishing case, from the criticism it sparked to the group’s own response, highlights a category error that occurs when moral rights are conceived of as property rights. Rather, moral rights are natural, non-proprietary rights. In correcting this category error it becomes evident that moral rights offences are not property offences, such as theft, but fraud offences—like plagiarism and forgery. Subsequently, whereas property rights, by definition, are able to be transferred or waived, it can be shown that no justification can be made for treating moral rights as transferrable or able to be waived.     

Remembering and Remembering to Forget

To navigate our lives we all need to find ways both to remember and sometimes to forget aspects of our experiences that threaten us or cause us anxiety. Often patients need help in developing a capacity to hold in some dialectical tension, both remembering and forgetting. Some people are so frightened by the harsher realities of their lives that they turn to us to take on the remembering side of this dialectic, and, sometimes, to take on the forgetting side. Part of the work of their therapy is to help them develop the capacity to do more of both for themselves. Other patients come better prepared to take on this challenge and use us to witness and support their own efforts. This paper considers how patients use their hours with us to remember and to forget and ways in which psychoanalysts might participate in this undertaking.     

The psychotherapist's duty to act reasonably to prevent suicide: A proposal to allow rational suicide

It is proposed that society should re-examine its assumptions about suicide. Rational suicide is viewed as an extension of the right to die. After a review of the legal liability of the psychotherapist and psychiatric facility for both inpatient and outpatient suicide, the author presents an analysis of philosophical, ethical, and psychoanalytic arguments for allowing rational suicide. It is argued that emotional pain should be given more legitimacy as a reason for suicide. The decision to live or to die is argued to best rest with the individual.     

Personal Value,Biographical Identity,and Retrospective Attitudes

We all could have had better lives, yet often do not wish that our lives had gone differently, especially when we contemplate alternatives that vastly diverge from our actual life course. What, if anything, accounts for such conservative retrospective attitudes? I argue that the right answer involves the significance of our personal attachments and our biographical identity. I also examine other options, such as the absence of self-to-self connections across possible worlds and a general conservatism about value.     

Solidarity and Social Moral Rules

The value of solidarity, which is exemplified in noble groups like the Civil Rights Movement along with more mundane teams, families and marriages, is distinctive in part because people are in solidarity over, for or with regard to something, such as common sympathies, interests, values, etc. I use this special feature of solidarity to resolve a longstanding puzzle about enacted social moral rules, which is, aren’t these things just heuristics, rules of thumb or means of coordination that we ‘fetishize’ or ‘worship’ if we stubbornly insist on sticking to them when we can do more good by breaking them? I argue that when we are in a certain kind of solidarity with others, united by social moral rules that we have established among ourselves, the rules we have developed and maintain are a constitutive part of our solidary relationships with one another; and it is part of being in this sort of solidarity with our comrades that we are presumptively required to follow the social moral rules that join us together. Those in the Polish Revolution, for example, were bound by informally enforced rules about publicity, free speech and the use of violence, so following their own rules became a way of standing in a valuable sort of solidarity with one another. I explain why we can have non-instrumental reasons to follow the social moral rules that exist in our own society, improve our rules and even sometimes to break the otherwise good rules that help to unite us.     

Beloved of the Beloved: When the Male Muse Appears

Serious illness puts us in touch with an acute sense of our own vulnerability and mortality. Loss of ego identity creates an urgent longing to find meaning within the experience of illness or impending death. Inspired by his own near-death experiences in later life, Jung wrote about the goal of the second half of life: “to be ready to die with life.” This article reflects upon three individuals’ stories illustrating how palliative care embraces the needs of the whole person and prepares individuals to participate consciously in their final journey in life. This interprofessional model of care can help individuals and their loved ones experience the highest quality of life possible and bring completion to life's relationships. These stories demonstrate a synergy between Jung's beliefs regarding the goal of the second half of life and the soul work necessary for healing, wholeness, and individuation.