Performance prediction in young children: Effects of skill,metacognition and wishful thinking

Research on children's performance expectations has repeatedly shown that preschoolers and kindergarten children typically overestimate their own performance across a wide range of contexts. In this study, two experiments were carried out with 4- and 6-year-old children to assess the impact of familiarity with the task, memory monitoring, and wishful thinking on children's performance predictions. Results showed that overpredictions were rather due to wishful thinking than to poor metacognition, and that overpredictions were more frequent in unfamiliar as compared to familiar task settings.     

Belief-based and analytic processing in transitive inference depends on premise integration difficulty

Three experiments investigated belief-based versus analytic processing in transitive inference. Belief-based and analytic processing were inferred from conclusion acceptance rates for problems with conclusions that were either valid or invalid and believable or unbelievable. Premise integration difficulty was manipulated by varying premise integration time (Experiment 1), premise presentation order (Experiment 2), and the markedness of the relational terms in the premises (Experiment 3). In all the conditions, reasoning accuracy and rated confidence were lower on conflict problems, where belief-based and analytic processes yielded different responses. Participants relied more on analytic processing and less on belief-based processing in conditions in which premise integration was easier. Fluid intelligence and premise integration ability predicted analytical reasoning on conflict problems after reasoning on the no-conflict problems was controlled for. The findings were related to three dual-process models of belief bias. They provide the first evidence of belief bias in transitive inference.     

Belief inhibition in children's reasoning: memory-based evidence

Adult reasoning has been shown as mediated by the inhibition of intuitive beliefs that are in conflict with logic. The current study introduces a classic procedure from the memory field to investigate belief inhibition in 12- to 17-year-old reasoners. A lexical decision task was used to probe the memory accessibility of beliefs that were cued during thinking on syllogistic reasoning problems. Results indicated an impaired memory access for words associated with misleading beliefs that were cued during reasoning if syllogisms had been solved correctly. This finding supports the claim that even for younger reasoners, correct reasoning is mediated by inhibitory processing as soon as intuitive beliefs conflict with logical considerations.     

Do young and old preschoolers exhibit response bias due to different mechanisms? Investigating children's response time

Previous studies have suggested that younger preschoolers exhibit a yes bias due to underdeveloped cognitive abilities, whereas older preschoolers exhibit a response bias due to other factors. To test this hypothesis, we investigated the response latency to yes-no questions pertaining to familiar and unfamiliar objects in 3- to 6-year-olds. The 3-year-olds exhibited a strong yes bias for both objects, and their response latency was significantly shorter than that of the 6-year-olds. The 4- and 5-year-olds did not exhibit any response bias, whereas the 6-year-olds exhibited a nay-saying bias (a response bias to say “no”) for unfamiliar objects. Overall, children’s response bias scores were stronger for familiar objects than for unfamiliar objects. The results suggest that 3-year-olds exhibit a yes bias automatically, but 5- and 6-year-olds are sensitive to question context.     

Skin conductance and heart‐rate responses as indices of covert face recognition in preschool children

Covert face recognition was examined in 12 young preschoolers (age range 26–48 months) by comparing their autonomic functions to slides depicting former playmates from a family nursery school that the preschoolers had attended earlier with slides of their present playmates and unfamiliar children. While all preschoolers reported corroborated overt recognition of present playmates after the experiment, only three of them did so in relation to former playmates. The distribution of yes–no responses on the overt recognition task to former playmates was not significantly different from the responses to unfamiliar children. Nevertheless, the preschoolers evidenced increased skin conductance responses (SCRs) and more pronounced heart rate (HR) deceleration to the slides depicting former classmates compared to unfamiliar children. Thus, although the preschoolers' verbal responses did not differentiate between former playmates and unfamiliar children, their autonomic functions did. These findings suggest that young children can retain memories of past experiences in an implicit form without corroborated overt recognition. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The metacognitive disambiguation effect

From an early age, children show a tendency to map novel labels onto unfamiliar rather than familiar kinds of objects. Accounts of this tendency have not addressed whether children develop a metacognitive representation of what they are doing. In 3 experiments (each N = 48), preschoolers received a test of the metacognitive disambiguation effect, which involved deciding whether the referent of a novel label was located in a bucket of things “I know” or bucket of things “I don’t know.” Most 4-year-olds passed this test, whereas most 3-year-olds did not. Children’s performance was predicted by their ability to report whether various words and pseudowords were ones that they knew, even after age and vocabulary size were controlled. As children develop an awareness of their lexical knowledge/ignorance, they also develop a metacognitive representation of their tendency to map novel labels onto unfamiliar rather than familiar kinds.     

Children and Adults Use Gender and Age Stereotypes in Ownership Judgments

In everyday life, we are often faced with the problem of judging who owns an object. The current experiments show that children and adults base ownership judgments on group stereotypes, which relate kinds of people to kinds of objects. Moreover, the experiments show that reliance on stereotypes can override another means by which people make ownership judgments—inferring ownership from first possession. Experiment 1 replicates previous findings in showing that children and adults are strongly biased to assume that the first person to possess an object is its owner, while also demonstrating that the first-possession bias shows specificity to ownership. Experiment 2 shows that preschoolers and adults used gender stereotypes to make ownership judgments, and they do this even when stereotypes conflict with first possession. Experiment 3 reports similar findings but with age stereotypes. These findings reveal that stereotypes are a powerful means for making ownership judgments.     

干扰材料的熟悉性和认知方式对语篇阅读的影响

采用熟悉词和不熟悉词为干扰材料,考察了干扰材料的熟悉性对语篇阅读的影响.实验第一阶段要求不同认知方式被试朗读插入熟悉度不同干扰材料的短文,考查被试的阅读效率;第二阶段采用学习—自由回忆任务考查不同提示条件下在短文中使用过的干扰词和新词的学习效果.结果发现:(1)对场独立者而言,熟悉词的干扰作用明显大于不熟悉词,而对场依存者而言,熟悉词和不熟悉词的干扰作用无差异;(2)在提示条件下,被试对干扰词的回忆量大于对新词的回忆量.研究结果表明,在语篇阅读过程中,与场依存者相比,熟悉的干扰材料对场独立者的影响更大;熟悉词比不熟悉词产生更大干扰的原因可能是由于其激活了读者更多的经验,而非具有加工的优势.     

Smarter than we think: when our brains detect that we are biased

Human reasoning is often biased by stereotypical intuitions. The nature of such bias is not clear. Some authors claim that people are mere heuristic thinkers and are not aware that cued stereotypes might be inappropriate. Other authors claim that people always detect the conflict between their stereotypical thinking and normative reasoning, but simply fail to inhibit stereotypical thinking. Hence, it is unclear whether heuristic bias should be attributed to a lack of conflict detection or a failure of inhibition. We introduce a neuroscientific approach that bears on this issue. Participants answered a classic decision-making problem (the "lawyer-engineer" problem) while the activation of brain regions believed to be involved in conflict detection (anterior cingulate) and response inhibition (lateral prefrontal cortex) was monitored. Results showed that although the inhibition area was specifically activated when stereotypical responses were avoided, the conflict-detection area was activated even when people reasoned stereotypically. The findings suggest that people detect their bias when they give intuitive responses.     

Age-related qualitative differences in post-error cognitive control adjustments

Detecting an error signals the need for increased cognitive control and behavioural adjustments. Considerable development in performance monitoring and cognitive control is evidenced by lower error rates and faster response times in multi-trial executive function tasks with age. Besides these quantitative changes, we were interested in whether qualitative changes in balancing accuracy and speed contribute to developmental progression during elementary school years. We conducted two studies investigating the temporal and developmental trajectories of post-error slowing in three prominent cognitive conflict tasks (Stroop, Simon, and flanker). We instructed children (8-, 10-, and 12-year-old) and adults to respond as fast and as accurately as possible and measured their response times on four trials after correct and incorrect responses to a cognitive conflict. Results revealed that all age groups had longer response times on post-error versus post-correct trials, reflecting post-error slowing. Critically, slowing on the first post-error trial declined with age, suggesting an age-related reduction in the orienting response towards errors. This age effect diminished on subsequent trials, suggesting more fine-tuned cognitive control adjustments with age. Overall, the consistent pattern across tasks suggests an age-related change from a relatively strong orienting response to more balanced cognitive control adaptations.     

Children in Asian cultures say yes to yes-no questions: Common and cultural differences between Vietnamese and Japanese children

We investigated whether children's response tendency toward yes-no questions concerning objects is a common phenomenon regardless of languages and cultures. Vietnamese and Japanese 2- to 5-year-old (N = 108) were investigated. We also examined whether familiarity with the questioning issue has any effect on Asian children's yes bias. As the result, Asian children showed a yes bias to yes-no questions. The children's response tendency changes dramatically with their age: Vietnamese and Japanese 2- and 3-year-olds showed a yes bias, but 5-year-olds did not. However, Asian 4-year-olds also showed a yes bias only in the familiar condition. Also, Asian children showed a stronger yes bias in the familiar condition than the unfamiliar condition. These two findings in Asian children were different from the previous finding investigated North American children (Fritzley & Lee, 2003). Moreover, there was a within-Asian cross-cultural difference. Japanese children showed different response tendencies, which were rarely observed in Vietnamese children. Japanese 2-year-olds and some 3-year-olds showed a "no answer" response: they tended not to respond to an interviewer's questions. Japanese 4- and 5-year-olds also showed an "I don't know" response when they were asked about unfamiliar objects. Japanese children tended to avoid a binary decision. We discussed the cross-cultural differences.     

Conflict detection during moral decision-making: evidence for deontic reasoners’ utilitarian sensitivity

Moral dilemmas often force us to decide between deontological (harming others is wrong) and utilitarian (harming others can be acceptable depending on the consequences) considerations. Cognitive scientists have shown that utilitarian responders typically engage demanding deliberate thinking to override a conflicting intuitive deontological response. A key question is whether deontic responders also take utilitarian considerations into account and detect that there are conflicting responses at play. The present study addressed this issue by contrasting people's processing of moral dilemmas in which utilitarian and deontological considerations cued conflicting or non-conflicting decisions. Results showed that deontic responders were slower and less confident about their decision when solving the conflict (vs. no-conflict) dilemmas. This suggests that they are considering both deontic and utilitarian aspects of their decision and indicates that a deontic decision is more informed and less oblivious than it might appear.     

The ability for dimensional analysis in preschool and retarded children: evidence from comparison, conservation, and prediction tasks

Previous findings of a developmental trend from holistic to analytic modes of processing yield to two possible interpretations—the ability to analyze into dimensions increases with age, or a production deficiency for the strategy of analyzing decreases with age. In the three studies reported here an attempt is made to elucidate which of these interpretations is the more correct by investigating the performance of preschoolers and retarded children in three tasks, all of which require dimensional analysis. The three tasks involve (a) same-different comparisons of selected dimensions of stimuli, (b) judgments of whether dimensions are conserved through transformations of objects, and (c) predictions of the outcomes of transformations that selectively modify dimensions of objects. Normal 3-year-old children and mildly retarded preadolescents make many errors on all three tasks and the patterns of these errors are predictable from holistic processing. Older groups of normal preschoolers, 4.5 to 5 years old, perform very well on the tasks, although they show some hints of remaining analytic deficits. It seems likely that the ability to analyze does undergo development in the preschool years, but that the production-deficiency interpretation also has merit, particularly for explaining developmental trends within the elementary school range.     

认知抑制——问题解决研究的新视角

抑制是一种领域一般(domain-general)的认知过程,它使儿童和成人能够抗拒习惯、自动化、诱惑、分心物或干扰从而适应存在冲突的情境(Diamond,2013)。抑制控制模型认为儿童或成人在问题解决中的失败并非是缺少相关知识与概念,而是抑制控制失败造成的。研究者采用负启动研究范式和脑成像技术在类皮杰任务、数学和科学问题解决中证实了认知抑制的作用。未来研究应把认知抑制与元认知的研究结合起来,探究认知抑制的发展轨迹及二者在问题解决中的相对重要性。同时,针对认知抑制训练的干预研究也值得重视。     

冲突水平的变化诱发冲突适应

冲突适应是重要的认知控制现象, 反映了认知控制的动态过程。然而, 目前为止对于冲突水平上的差异能否诱发冲突适应尚不清楚。本研究采用字母Flanker的变式, 通过改变目标-分心物的一致性操纵冲突水平, 探究冲突水平的变化对认知控制调整的影响。结果发现被试的反应时间随冲突水平的提高而增加; 而且先前试次的一致性影响当前试次的干扰效应, 无冲突和低冲突、无冲突和高冲突、低冲突和高冲突条件之间均出现了典型的冲突适应。本研究结果表明, 除了冲突的有无, 冲突水平的变化也能诱发冲突适应, 支持更大的冲突驱动更强的认知控制, 而且冲突诱发的认知控制的功能可能通过注意聚焦实现。这一发现为冲突监测理论的注意调节机制提供了直接的支持证据, 对于促进冲突适应的相关研究具有重要意义。     

逻辑－信念冲突与推理难度对逻辑和信念判断的影响

双加工理论框架下的平行竞争模型和默认干涉模型对推理过程中启发式和分析式加工的启动次序和相互作用的性质提出了不同假设。本研究通过考察被试在信念判断和逻辑判断两种指导语下解决不同难度和不同类型推理问题的正确率和反应时,对两个模型的预测进行了检验。实验结果表明,解决简单问题时,问题类型对信念判断有显著影响,对逻辑判断无显著影响;解决复杂问题时,问题类型对逻辑判断的影响显著大于对信念判断的影响。实验结果支持平行竞争模型的假设,即两类加工在推理过程中同时启动,共同竞争最终的推理反应。     

Phonological sensitivity and the acquisition of new words in children

Two studies are reported which aimed to examine the relationship between phonological sensitivity and the acquisition of new words that systematically differed in the familiarity of their sound structures. In the first study measures of phonological sensitivity, phonological short-term memory, vocabulary, and nonverbal ability were administered to forty-one 5-year-old children. Phonological sensitivity was related to the paired-associate learning of phonologically unfamiliar words, but not to the learning of familiar words. In the second study a group of 14 nonreading 5-year-old children received phonological sensitivity training. A control group was trained in semantic categorization. After the training, the phonological sensitivity group did perform better on measures of letter knowledge and phonological sensitivity (rhyme and first-sound categorization) and appeared to learn phonologically unfamiliar words more easily. The findings of both studies suggest that phonological sensitivity can support the acquisition of novel words.     

Exploring levels of face familiarity by using an indirect face-matching measure

An experiment is reported in which participants matched complete images of unfamiliar, moderately familiar, and highly familiar faces with simultaneously presented images of internal and external features. Participants had to decide if the two images depicted same or different individuals. Matches to internal features were made faster to highly familiar faces than both to moderately familiar and to unfamiliar faces, and matches to moderately familiar faces were made faster than to unfamiliar faces. For external feature matches, this advantage was only found for "different" decision matches to highly familiar faces compared to unfamiliar faces. The results indicate that the differences in familiar and unfamiliar face processing are not the result of all-or-none effects, but seem to have a graded impact on matching performance. These findings extend the earlier work of Young et al (1985 Perception 14 737-746), and we discuss the possibility of using the matching task as an indirect measure of face familiarity.     

线索冲突情境下幼儿对不同领域知识的选择性信任特点

探讨幼儿在准确性线索和共识线索冲突情境下对自然与社会领域知识的选择性信任特点。实验1探究幼儿在线索冲突情境下对自然领域知识的选择性信任,选取88名4~6岁幼儿,采用对物品命名的方法,结果发现4岁幼儿依据共识线索进行信任判断,而5~6岁幼儿依据准确性线索进行信任判断;实验2探究幼儿在线索冲突情境下对社会领域知识的选择性信任,选取94名4-6岁幼儿,采用对人格特质命名的方法,结果发现4岁幼儿依据共识线索进行信任判断,5岁幼儿对两类线索没有做出偏向性选择,6岁幼儿依据准确性线索进行信任判断。实验3采用被试内设计,探讨5岁幼儿对两个领域知识的选择性信任,验证了实验1和实验2的相关结果。结论:在线索冲突情境下幼儿对不同领域知识的选择性信任具有不同的年龄发展特点。     

Feeling we’re biased: Autonomic arousal and reasoning conflict

Human reasoning is often biased by intuitive beliefs. A key question is whether the bias results from a failure to detect that the intuitions conflict with logical considerations or from a failure to discard these tempting intuitions. The present study addressed this unresolved debate by focusing on conflict-related autonomic nervous system modulation during biased reasoning. Participants’ skin conductance responses (SCRs) were monitored while they solved classic syllogisms in which a cued intuitive response could be inconsistent or consistent with the logical correct response. Results indicated that all reasoners showed increased SCRs when solving the inconsistent conflict problems. Experiment 2 validated that this autonomic arousal boost was absent when people were not engaged in an active reasoning task. The presence of a clear autonomic conflict response during reasoning lends credence to the idea that reasoners have a “gut” feeling that signals that their intuitive response is not logically warranted. Supplemental materials for this article may be downloaded from http://cabn.psychonomic-journals.org/content/supplemental.