Inferring causal networks from observations and interventions

Information about the structure of a causal system can come in the form of observational data—random samples of the system's autonomous behavior—or interventional data—samples conditioned on the particular values of one or more variables that have been experimentally manipulated. Here we study people's ability to infer causal structure from both observation and intervention, and to choose informative interventions on the basis of observational data. In three causal inference tasks, participants were to some degree capable of distinguishing between competing causal hypotheses on the basis of purely observational data. Performance improved substantially when participants were allowed to observe the effects of interventions that they performed on the systems. We develop computational models of how people infer causal structure from data and how they plan intervention experiments, based on the representational framework of causal graphical models and the inferential principles of optimal Bayesian decision‐making and maximizing expected information gain. These analyses suggest that people can make rational causal inferences, subject to psychologically reasonable representational assumptions and computationally reasonable processing constraints.     

Equilibria of the Rescorla-Wagner model

The Rescorla-Wagner model has been a leading theory of animal causal induction for nearly 30 years, and human causal induction for the past 15 years. Recent theories (especially Psychol. Rev. 104 (1997) 367) have provided alternative explanations of how people draw causal conclusions from covariational data. However, theoretical attempts to compare the Rescorla-Wagner model with more recent models have been hampered by the fact that the Rescorla-Wagner model is an algorithmic theory, while the more recent theories are all computational. This paper provides a detailed derivation of the long-run behavior of the Rescorla-Wagner model under a wide range of parameters and experimental setups, so that the model can be compared with computational theories. It also shows that the model agrees with competing theories on a wider range of cases than had previously been thought. The paper concludes by showing how recently suggested modifications of the Rescorla-Wagner model impact the long-run behavior of the model.     

Modelling individual difference in visual categorization

Recent years has seen growing interest in understanding, characterizing, and explaining individual differences in visual cognition. We focus here on individual differences in visual categorization. Categorization is the fundamental visual ability to group different objects together as the same kind of thing. Research on visual categorization and category learning has been significantly informed by computational modelling, so our review will focus both on how formal models of visual categorization have captured individual differences and how individual difference have informed the development of formal models. We first examine the potential sources of individual differences in leading models of visual categorization, providing a brief review of a range of different models. We then describe several examples of how computational models have captured individual differences in visual categorization. This review also provides a bit of an historical perspective, starting with models that predicted no individual differences, to those that captured group differences, to those that predict true individual differences, and to more recent hierarchical approaches that can simultaneously capture both group and individual differences in visual categorization. Via this selective review, we see how considerations of individual differences can lead to important theoretical insights into how people visually categorize objects in the world around them. We also consider new directions for work examining individual differences in visual categorization.     

Reinforcement learning in the brain

A wealth of research focuses on the decision-making processes that animals and humans employ when selecting actions in the face of reward and punishment. Initially such work stemmed from psychological investigations of conditioned behavior, and explanations of these in terms of computational models. Increasingly, analysis at the computational level has drawn on ideas from reinforcement learning, which provide a normative framework within which decision-making can be analyzed. More recently, the fruits of these extensive lines of research have made contact with investigations into the neural basis of decision making. Converging evidence now links reinforcement learning to specific neural substrates, assigning them precise computational roles. Specifically, electrophysiological recordings in behaving animals and functional imaging of human decision-making have revealed in the brain the existence of a key reinforcement learning signal, the temporal difference reward prediction error. Here, we first introduce the formal reinforcement learning framework. We then review the multiple lines of evidence linking reinforcement learning to the function of dopaminergic neurons in the mammalian midbrain and to more recent data from human imaging experiments. We further extend the discussion to aspects of learning not associated with phasic dopamine signals, such as learning of goal-directed responding that may not be dopamine-dependent, and learning about the vigor (or rate) with which actions should be performed that has been linked to tonic aspects of dopaminergic signaling. We end with a brief discussion of some of the limitations of the reinforcement learning framework, highlighting questions for future research.     

Area under the curve as a measure of discounting

We describe a novel approach to the measurement of discounting based on calculating the area under the empirical discounting function. This approach avoids some of the problems associated with measures based on estimates of the parameters of theoretical discounting functions. The area measure may be easily calculated for both individual and group data collected using any of a variety of current delay and probability discounting procedures. The present approach is not intended as a substitute for theoretical discounting models. It is useful, however, to have a simple, univariate measure of discounting that is not tied to any specific theoretical framework.     

How Should a Speech Recognizer Work?

Although researchers studying human speech recognition (HSR) and automatic speech recognition (ASR) share a common interest in how information processing systems (human or machine) recognize spoken language, there is little communication between the two disciplines. We suggest that this lack of communication follows largely from the fact that research in these related fields has focused on the mechanics of how speech can be recognized. In Marr's (1982) terms, emphasis has been on the algorithmic and implementational levels rather than on the computational level. In this article, we provide a computational-level analysis of the task of speech recognition, which reveals the close parallels between research concerned with HSR and ASR. We illustrate this relation by presenting a new computational model of human spoken-word recognition, built using techniques from the field of ASR that, in contrast to current existing models of HSR, recognizes words from real speech input.     

A tutorial on the use of excel 2010 and excel for mac 2011 for conducting delay-discounting analyses

In recent years, researchers and practitioners in the behavioral sciences have profited from a growing literature on delay discounting. The purpose of this article is to provide readers with a brief tutorial on how to use Microsoft Office Excel 2010 and Excel for Mac 2011 to analyze discounting data to yield parameters for both the hyperbolic discounting model and area under the curve. This tutorial is intended to encourage the quantitative analysis of behavior in both research and applied settings by readers with relatively little formal training in nonlinear regression.     

Pretense,Counterfactuals, and Bayesian Causal Models: Why What Is Not Real Really Matters

Young children spend a large portion of their time pretending about non‐real situations. Why? We answer this question by using the framework of Bayesian causal models to argue that pretending and counterfactual reasoning engage the same component cognitive abilities: disengaging with current reality, making inferences about an alternative representation of reality, and keeping this representation separate from reality. In turn, according to causal models accounts, counterfactual reasoning is a crucial tool that children need to plan for the future and learn about the world. Both planning with causal models and learning about them require the ability to create false premises and generate conclusions from these premises. We argue that pretending allows children to practice these important cognitive skills. We also consider the prevalence of unrealistic scenarios in children's play and explain how they can be useful in learning, despite appearances to the contrary.     

Integrating a cognitive computational model of planning and decision-making considering affective information

Planning and decision-making are two of the cognitive functions involved in the solution of problems. These functions, among others, have been studied from the point of view of a new field known as cognitive informatics focused on the development of cognitive architectures, autonomous agents, and human robots that are capable of showing human-like behavior. We present an exhaustive study of current biological and computational models proposed in the fields of neuroscience, psychology, and cognitive informatics. Also, we present a deep review of the brain areas involved in planning, decision-making, and affection. However, the majority of the proposed computational models are seeking to mimic human external behavior. This paper aims to contribute to the cognitive informatics field with an innovative cognitive computational model of planning and decision-making. The two main differences of our model with respect to the current models in the literature are: (i) our model considers affective and motivational information as a basic and essential trigger in planning and decision-making processes; (ii) our model attempts to mimic both the internal human brain as well as the external human behavior. We developed a computational model capable of offering a direct mapping from human brain areas to computational modules of our model. Thus, in this paper we present our model from a conceptual, formal, and computational approach in order to show how our proposal must be implemented. Finally, a set of tests were conducted in order to validate our proposal. These tests show an interesting comparison between the behavior of our prototype and the behavior exhibited by some people involved in a case study.     

Decision theory,reinforcement learning,and the brain

Decision making is a core competence for animals and humans acting and surviving in environments they only partially comprehend, gaining rewards and punishments for their troubles. Decision-theoretic concepts permeate experiments and computational models in ethology, psychology, and neuroscience. Here, we review a well-known, coherent Bayesian approach to decision making, showing how it unifies issues in Markovian decision problems, signal detection psychophysics, sequential sampling, and optimal exploration and discuss paradigmatic psychological and neural examples of each problem. We discuss computational issues concerning what subjects know about their task and how ambitious they are in seeking optimal solutions; we address algorithmic topics concerning model-based and model-free methods for making choices; and we highlight key aspects of the neural implementation of decision making.     

Delay discounting: Interactions between personality and cognitive ability

Delay discounting describes the extent to which the value of a reward decreases as the delay to obtaining that reward increases. Lower discounting rates predict better outcomes in social, academic, and health domains. The current study investigates how personality and cognitive ability interact to predict individual differences in delay discounting. Extraversion was found to predict higher discounting rates at the low end of the cognitive distribution, while emotional stability was found to predict lower discounting rates at the high end of the cognitive distribution. These findings support recent models of discounting behavior and suggest that personality and cognitive ability interact in shaping decision making.     

Feature localization and identification

Theories on visual search differ substantially with respect to the relationship they assume between localization and identification processes. The aim of the present study was to rigorously compare the alternative theoretical notions on how localization and identification processes are related. In two experiments, participants searched for a target with a unique line orientation among distractors containing another orientation. Localization and identification performance were measured in combination, as function of display size and target eccentricity. To compare the alternative theories, formal binomial models were developed and compared with respect to their goodness of fit to the individual data. The formal analyses showed that the model assuming identification processes to be conditioned on localization processes provided the best fit to the individual data. Furthermore, maximum likelihood estimates of the parameter corresponding to identification processes were differently affected by display size than identification performance was. The results were discussed in terms of their implication for current theories on visual search.     

A Process Model of Causal Reasoning

How do we make causal judgments? Many studies have demonstrated that people are capable causal reasoners, achieving success on tasks from reasoning to categorization to interventions. However, less is known about the mental processes used to achieve such sophisticated judgments. We propose a new process model—the mutation sampler—that models causal judgments as based on a sample of possible states of the causal system generated using the Metropolis–Hastings sampling algorithm. Across a diverse array of tasks and conditions encompassing over 1,700 participants, we found that our model provided a consistently closer fit to participant judgments than standard causal graphical models. In particular, we found that the biases introduced by mutation sampling accounted for people's consistent, predictable errors that the normative model by definition could not. Moreover, using a novel experimental methodology, we found that those biases appeared in the samples that participants explicitly judged to be representative of a causal system. We conclude by advocating sampling methods as plausible process-level accounts of the computations specified by the causal graphical model framework and highlight opportunities for future research to identify not just what reasoners compute when drawing causal inferences, but also how they compute it.     

Computational approaches to motor control

This review will focus on four areas of motor control which have recently been enriched both by neural network and control system models: motor planning, motor prediction, state estimation and motor learning. We will review the computational foundations of each of these concepts and present specific models which have been tested by psychophysical experiments. We will cover the topics of optimal control for motor planning, forward models for motor prediction, observer models of state estimation arid modular decomposition in motor learning. The aim of this review is to demonstrate how computational approaches, as well as proposing specific models, provide a theoretical framework to formalize the issues in motor control.     

Construing Consumer Decision Making

Understanding how consumers represent outcomes and weigh different decision criteria is critical to consumer behavior research. Construal‐level theory articulates how psychological distance alters the mental representation of inputs and the effective weight given to “high‐level” and “low‐level” criteria. Trope, Liberman, and Wakslak (2007) provide a review of this literature. In this commentary, we illustrate the relevance of construal‐level theory to issues in consumer psychology, particularly consumer decision making. We highlight specific questions that researchers could address by considering consumer behavior within the framework of changes in construal. We focus our discussion on how construal levels affect consideration sets and how shifts in weight from high‐level to low‐level features might lead to consumer regret and dissatisfaction. Construal level can help us understand follow‐through on stated intentions for “really new” products and illuminate public‐policy issues such as consumer saving for retirement and nonredemption of rebates. We identify open issues related to how construal levels for the same object evolve over time and whether resources differ in terms of how susceptible they are to psychological distance effects.