Perception in action: multiple roles of sensory information in action control

Perceptual processes play a central role in the planning and control of human voluntary action. Indeed, planning an action is a sensorimotor process operating on sensorimotor units, a process that is based on anticipations of perceptual action effects. I discuss how the underlying sensorimotor units emerge, and how they can be employed to tailor action plans to the goals at hand. I also discuss how even a single action can induce sensorimotor binding, how intentionally implemented short-term associations between stimuli and responses become autonomous, how feature overlap between stimulus events and actions makes them compatible, and why action plans are necessarily incomplete.

Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action

Are there distinct roles for intention and motor representation in explaining the purposiveness of action? Standard accounts of action assign a role to intention but are silent on motor representation. The temptation is to suppose that nothing need be said here because motor representation is either only an enabling condition for purposive action or else merely a variety of intention. This paper provides reasons for resisting that temptation. Some motor representations, like intentions, coordinate actions in virtue of representing outcomes; but, unlike intentions, motor representations cannot feature as premises or conclusions in practical reasoning. This implies that motor representation has a distinctive role in explaining the purposiveness of action. It also gives rise to a problem: were the roles of intention and motor representation entirely independent, this would impair effective action. It is therefore necessary to explain how intentions interlock with motor representations. The solution, we argue, is to recognise that the contents of intentions can be partially determined by the contents of motor representations. Understanding this content‐determining relation enables better understanding how intentions relate to actions.     

Comprehending Complex Concepts

Recent theories of concepts have raised the issue of how people combine simple concepts (like engine and repair) to form complex concepts (like engine repair). This article approaches this issue by asking how people comprehend modified noun phrases of this sort. One explanation of how complex concepts are understood (the feature weighting model) provides a simple mechanism in which the primary feature of the modifying concept is made more salient in the modified concept. Another explanation focuses on how world knowledge directs the combination process. The two explanations are compared in their ability to account for the interpretation of various kinds of noun phrases. Two experiments are reported which evaluate the feature weighting model's predictions for adjective-noun phrases. These contrasts suggest that the combination process does require reference to world knowledge. The consequences of accepting such an account are discussed.     

Quality of Reasons and Degrees of Responsibility

Traditionally, theories of moral responsibility feature only the minimally sufficient conditions for moral responsibility. While these theories are well-suited to account for the threshold of responsibility, it’s less clear how they can address questions about the degree to which agents are responsible. One feature that intuitively affects the degree to which agents are morally responsible is how difficult performing a given action is for them. Recently, philosophers have begun to develop accounts of scalar moral responsibility that make use of this notion of difficulty [Coates and Swenson 2013; Nelkin 2016]. In this paper, I argue that these accounts, although innovative, are incomplete. The degree to which agents are morally responsible is determined not only by the difficulties that agents face but also by the quality of the reasons for which they act.     

Using Dynamic Field Theory to extend the embodiment stance toward higher cognition

The embodiment stance emphasizes that cognitive processes unfold continuously in time, are constantly linked to the sensory and motor surfaces, and adapt through learning and development. Dynamic Field Theory (DFT) is a neurally based set of concepts that has turned out to be useful for understanding how cognition emerges in an embodied and situated system. We explore how the embodiment stance may be extended beyond those forms of cognition that are closest to sensorimotor processes. The core elements of DFT are dynamic neural fields (DNFs), patterns of activation defined over different kinds of spaces. These may include retinal space and visual feature spaces, spaces spanned by movement parameters such as movement direction and amplitude, or abstract spaces like the ordinal axis along which sequences unfold. Instances of representation that stand for perceptual objects, motor plans, or action intentions are peaks of activation in the DNFs. We show how such peaks may arise from input and are stabilized by intra-field interaction. Given a neural mechanism for instantiation, the neuronal couplings between DNFs implement cognitive operations. We illustrate how these mechanisms can be used to enable architectures of dynamic neural fields to perform cognitive functions such as acquiring and updating scene representations, using grounded spatial language, and generating sequences of actions. Implementing these DFT models in autonomous robots demonstrates how these cognitive functions can be enacted in embodied, situated systems.     

中央执行注意资源在消极和积极特征捆绑中的作用

鉴于以往研究未明确视觉工作记忆中特征捆绑是否需要注意资源,以及未考察积极加工条件下的特征捆绑等问题,本研究运用双任务干扰范式,通过两个实验分别在消极加工和积极加工条件下考察了联结客体的特征加工和特征捆绑,以及中央执行注意资源在特征捆绑中的作用。结果表明：联结客体的特征加工不但存在双重存储机制,还存在双重操作机制,这一结果拓展了Wheeler和Treisman（2002）的特征捆绑理论;联结客体的特征捆绑可分为消极特征捆绑和积极特征捆绑两种类型,消极特征捆绑不需要中央执行注意资源的参与,而积极特征捆绑则需要中央执行注意资源的参与。     

Frequency of the first feature in action sequences influences feature binding

We investigated whether binding among perception and action feature codes is a preliminary step toward creating a more durable memory trace of an action event. If so, increasing the frequency of a particular event (e.g., a stimulus requiring a movement with the left or right hand in an up or down direction) should increase the strength and speed of feature binding for this event. The results from two experiments, using a partial-repetition paradigm, confirmed that feature binding increased in strength and/or occurred earlier for a high-frequency (e.g., left hand moving up) than for a low-frequency (e.g., right hand moving down) event. Moreover, increasing the frequency of the first-specified feature in the action sequence alone (e.g., ??left?? hand) increased the strength and/or speed of action feature binding (e.g., between the ??left?? hand and movement in an ??up?? or ??down?? direction). The latter finding suggests an update to the theory of event coding, as not all features in the action sequence equally determine binding strength. We conclude that action planning involves serial binding of features in the order of action feature execution (i.e., associations among features are not bidirectional but are directional), which can lead to a more durable memory trace. This is consistent with physiological evidence suggesting that serial order is preserved in an action plan executed from memory and that the first feature in the action sequence may be critical in preserving this serial order.     

Action unit classification using active appearance models and conditional random fields

In this paper, we investigate to what extent modern computer vision and machine learning techniques can assist social psychology research by automatically recognizing facial expressions. To this end, we develop a system that automatically recognizes the action units defined in the facial action coding system (FACS). The system uses a sophisticated deformable template, which is known as the active appearance model, to model the appearance of faces. The model is used to identify the location of facial feature points, as well as to extract features from the face that are indicative of the action unit states. The detection of the presence of action units is performed by a time series classification model, the linear-chain conditional random field. We evaluate the performance of our system in experiments on a large data set of videos with posed and natural facial expressions. In the experiments, we compare the action units detected by our approach with annotations made by human FACS annotators. Our results show that the agreement between the system and human FACS annotators is higher than 90% and underlines the potential of modern computer vision and machine learning techniques to social psychology research. We conclude with some suggestions on how systems like ours can play an important role in research on social signals.     

Action unit classification using active appearance models and conditional random fields

In this paper, we investigate to what extent modern computer vision and machine learning techniques can assist social psychology research by automatically recognizing facial expressions. To this end, we develop a system that automatically recognizes the action units defined in the facial action coding system (FACS). The system uses a sophisticated deformable template, which is known as the active appearance model, to model the appearance of faces. The model is used to identify the location of facial feature points, as well as to extract features from the face that are indicative of the action unit states. The detection of the presence of action units is performed by a time series classification model, the linear-chain conditional random field. We evaluate the performance of our system in experiments on a large data set of videos with posed and natural facial expressions. In the experiments, we compare the action units detected by our approach with annotations made by human FACS annotators. Our results show that the agreement between the system and human FACS annotators is higher than 90% and underlines the potential of modern computer vision and machine learning techniques to social psychology research. We conclude with some suggestions on how systems like ours can play an important role in research on social signals.     

Using human inquiry groups in counselling research

The nature of human inquiry groups and their use in counselling research are explored. A key feature of such a group is that the details of what is researched and how it is researched are decided by the group rather than by the researcher alone. Human inquiry groups proceed through a process of cycling. The first stage involves group members gathering together to agree on the nature and the methodology of the research and on the action to be taken. The next two stages involve taking the agreed action and fully experiencing it. Finally, group members reflect together on the research so far, including drawing conclusions and initiating further research cycles. The value of human inquiry as a qualitative methodology for counselling research is considered, including a comparison between the role of the human inquiry researcher and that of the counsellor. The initiator of a human inquiry group may well make use of counselling and group-work skills. Possible problems include role conflict, collusion, how to avoid the human inquiry group turning into a therapy group, and other validity issues. The key question of how to analyse the data produced by such a group is examined. The grounded-theory approach of Glaser and Strauss is considered as one way to analyse human inquiry data. Potential difficulties with such an analysis are explored and the use of a bricolage is presented as one possible solution. Human inquiry is seen to be an important and innovative approach to counselling research which is particularly appropriate for exploratory studies.     

Response-specifying cue for action interferes with perception of feature-sharing stimuli

Perceiving a visual stimulus is more difficult when a to-be-executed action is compatible with that stimulus, which is known as blindness to response-compatible stimuli. The present study explored how the factors constituting the action event (i.e., response-specifying cue, response intention, and response feature) affect the occurrence of this blindness effect. The response-specifying cue varied along the horizontal and vertical dimensions, while the response buttons were arranged diagonally. Participants responded based on one dimension randomly determined in a trial-by-trial manner. The response intention varied along a single dimension, whereas the response location and the response-specifying cue varied within both vertical and horizontal dimensions simultaneously. Moreover, the compatibility between the visual stimulus and the response location and the compatibility between that stimulus and the response-specifying cue was separately determined. The blindness effect emerged exclusively based on the feature correspondence between the response-specifying cue of the action task and the visual target of the perceptual task. The size of this stimulus–stimulus (S–S) blindness effect did not differ significantly across conditions, showing no effect of response intention and response location. This finding emphasizes the effect of stimulus factors, rather than response factors, of the action event as a source of the blindness to response-compatible stimuli.     

生物自组织临界性与肿瘤

分析了局部组织由再生、化生和癌变呈现的各种宏观行为和性质,从生物自组织临界性的角度讨论了这类行为和性质的演化模式及机制,指出肿瘤实质是局部组织经历一系列临界状态下相变造成的。     

Interference due to shared features between action plans is influenced by working memory span

In this study, we examined the interactions between the action plans that we hold in memory and the actions that we carry out, asking whether the interference due to shared features between action plans is due to selection demands imposed on working memory. Individuals with low and high working memory spans learned arbitrary motor actions in response to two different visual events (A and B), presented in a serial order. They planned a response to the first event (A) and while maintaining this action plan in memory they then executed a speeded response to the second event (B). Afterward, they executed the action plan for the first event (A) maintained in memory. Speeded responses to the second event (B) were delayed when it shared an action feature (feature overlap) with the first event (A), relative to when it did not (no feature overlap). The size of the feature-overlap delay was greater for low-span than for high-span participants. This indicates that interference due to overlapping action plans is greater when fewer working memory resources are available, suggesting that this interference is due to selection demands imposed on working memory. Thus, working memory plays an important role in managing current and upcoming action plans, at least for newly learned tasks. Also, managing multiple action plans is compromised in individuals who have low versus high working memory spans.     

Feature Centrality and Conceptual Coherence

Conceptual features differ in how mentally tranformable they are. A robin that does not eat is harder to imagine than a robin that does not chirp. We argue that features are immutable to the extent that they are central in a network of dependency relations. The immutability of a feature reflects how much the internal structure of a concept depends on that feature; i.e., how much the feature contributes to the concept's coherence. Complementarily, mutability reflects the aspects in which a concept is flexible. We show that features can be reliably ordered according to their mutability using tasks that require people to conceive of objects missing a feature, and that mutability (conceptual centrality) can be distinguished from category centrality and from diagnosticity and salience. We test a model of mutability based on asymmetric, unlabeled, pairwise dependency relations. With no free parameters, the model provides reasonable fits to data. Qualitative tests of the model show that mutability judgments are unaffected by the type of dependency relation and that dependency structure influences judgments of variability.     

独立预测作用,还是基础性影响？——价值观对集体行动的影响机制

为阐明价值观在集体行动参与中的地位和影响机制,研究者以利比亚事件为背景,针对现实和网络场域中不同程度的4类集体行动倾向,在天津市957名大学生中进行问卷调查研究,结果发现：价值观显著增加了低成本集体行动倾向解释率,并调节着情绪、工具性动机和社会认同对集体行动倾向的影响;中国人进行集体行动决策时具有集体主义理性计算特征;不同场域和程度的集体行动有其各自规律.结论：价值观在集体行动参与决策中是一种与社会认同类似的基础性变量.     

Visual memory for feature bindings: The disruptive effect of responding to new perceptual input

In the current study, we examined how short-term memory for location–identity feature bindings is influenced by subsequent cognitive and perceptual processing demands. Previous work has shown that memory performance for feature bindings can be disrupted by the presentation of subsequent visual information, particularly when this information is similar to that held in memory. The present study demonstrates that memory performance for feature bindings can be profoundly disrupted by also requiring a response to visual information presented subsequent to the visual memory array. Across five experiments, memory for a location–identity binding was substantially impaired following a localization response to a following item that matched the location but mismatched the identity of the memory target. The results point to an important role for action in the episodic integration processes that control short-term visual memory performance.     

The role of response mechanisms in determining reaction time performance: Piéron’s law revisited

A response mechanism takes evaluations of the importance of potential actions and selects the most suitable. Response mechanism function is a nontrivial problem that has not received the attention it deserves within cognitive psychology. In this article, we make a case for the importance of considering response mechanism function as a constraint on cognitive processes and emphasized links with the wider problem of behavioral action selection. First, we show that, contrary to previous suggestions, a well-known model of the Stroop task (Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990) relies on the response mechanism for a key feature of its results—the interference—facilitation asymmetry. Second, we examine a variety of response mechanisms (including that in the model of Cohen et al., 1990) and show that they all follow a law analogous to Piéron’s law in relating their input to reaction time. In particular, this is true of a decision mechanism not designed to explain RT data but based on a proposed solution to the general problem of action selection and grounded in the neurobiology of the vertebrate basal ganglia. Finally, we show that the dynamics of simple artificial neurons also support a Piéron-like law.     

The Theory of Event Coding (TEC): a framework for perception and action planning

Traditional approaches to human information processing tend to deal with perception and action planning in isolation, so that an adequate account of the perception-action interface is still missing. On the perceptual side, the dominant cognitive view largely underestimates, and thus fails to account for, the impact of action-related processes on both the processing of perceptual information and on perceptual learning. On the action side, most approaches conceive of action planning as a mere continuation of stimulus processing, thus failing to account for the goal-directedness of even the simplest reaction in an experimental task. We propose a new framework for a more adequate theoretical treatment of perception and action planning, in which perceptual contents and action plans are coded in a common representational medium by feature codes with distal reference. Perceived events (perceptions) and to-be-produced events (actions) are equally represented by integrated, task-tuned networks of feature codes--cognitive structures we call event codes. We give an overview of evidence from a wide variety of empirical domains, such as spatial stimulus-response compatibility, sensorimotor synchronization, and ideomotor action, showing that our main assumptions are well supported by the data.     

Density effects in conjunction search: evidence for a coarse location mechanism of feature integration.

Four experiments used the visual search paradigm to examine feature integration mechanisms. Reaction time to determine the presence or absence of a conjunctive target is relatively fast and exhaustive for low-density displays. Search rate is slow and self-terminating for high-density displays. Density effects do not arise when the target is defined by a unique feature. Two mechanisms are proposed for feature integration. A fast mechanism integrates features on the basis of coarse location information coded with the initial registration of the features. This coarse location mechanism requires that display items be spaced apart. A second, slower mechanism is used when objects are clumped together. The 2-mechanism hypothesis provides a resolution to conflicting findings in the visual search and illusory-conjunction literature. A possible interpretation of the findings with a single guided search mechanism for feature integration is also discussed.