Towards a general theory of representation

Summary The models of science are representations of a part of reality. Every science has its own specific rules of constructing models, but there are many common rules that must be followed. These rules are to be part of what may be called a general theory of representation. This paper discusses some general aspects of representation that must be considered before such a general theory can be created. There are five sections: (1) an introduction to the topic of representation in general; (2) an overview of some general types of representation, such as goal-directed and self-organizational representations; (3) a short discussion of representation in some specific disciplines; (4) some formal aspects of representations; and (5) a discussion of epistemological aspects of representation, especially scientific reduction and mental causation.This paper was written during participation in the Research Project Mind and Brain, at the Centre for Interdisciplinary Research, University of Bielefeld, BRD.     

Perception as abduction: turning sensor data into meaningful representation

This article presents a formal theory of robot perception as a form of abduction. The theory pins down the process whereby low-level sensor data is transformed into a symbolic representation of the external world, drawing together aspects such as incompleteness, top-down information flow, active perception, attention, and sensor fusion in a unifying framework. In addition, a number of themes are identified that are common to both the engineer concerned with developing a rigorous theory of perception, such as the one on offer here, and the philosopher of mind who is exercised by questions relating to mental representation and intentionality.     

Belief in discourse representation theory

Conclusion I hope I have convinced the reader that DR theory offers at least some exciting potential when applied to the semantics of belief reports. It differs considerably from other approaches, and it makes intuitively acceptable predictions that other theories do not. The theory also provides a novel approach to the semantics of other propsitional attitude reports. Further, DR theory enables one to approach the topic of anaphora within belief and other propositional attitude contexts in a novel way, thus combining the semantics developed here with one of the theory's original motivations (Kamp, 1981a). However, these are unfortunately topics that I must reserve for another time.I am grateful to Dan Bonevac, Irene Heim, Richard Larson, Stan Peters, Rich Thomason and especially Hans Kamp and an anonymous reviewer for the Journal of Philosophical Logic for comments on previous drafts of this paper, as well as to The Center for Cognitive Science for research support.     

Indirect representation and the self-representational theory of consciousness

According to Uriah Kriegel’s self-representational theory of consciousness, mental state M is conscious just in case it is a complex with suitably integrated proper parts, M ₁ and M ₂, such that M ₁ is a higher-order representation of lower-order representation M ₂. Kriegel claims that M thereby “indirectly” represents itself, and he attempts to motivate this claim by appealing to what he regards as intuitive cases of indirect perceptual and pictorial representation. For example, Kriegel claims that it’s natural to say that in directly perceiving the front surface of an apple one thereby perceives the apple itself. Cases such as this are supposed to provide intuitive support for the principle that if X represents Y, and Y is highly integrated into complex object Z, then X indirectly represents Z. In this paper I provide counterexamples to Kriegel’s principle of indirect representation, before going on to argue that we can explain what is going on in those cases in which the subject seems to represent a complex whole by representing one its parts without positing indirect representations anyway. I then argue that my alternative approach is superior to Kriegel’s in a number of ways, thereby rendering his theory of consciousness implausible.     

On the representation of error

Though he maintained a significant interest in theoretical aspects of measurement, Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. was critical of the representational theory that in many ways has come to dominate discussions concerning the foundations of measurement. In particular, Kyburg (in Savage and Ehrlich (eds) Philosophical and foundational issues in measurement theory, 1992) asserts that the representational theory of measurement, as introduced in (Scott and Suppes, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 23:113?C128, 1958) and developed in (Krantz et?al., Foundations of measurment: additive and polynomial representations. Academic Press, 1971), cannot account for the measurement of error. The present work examines and responds to this charge.     

Distributed memory and the representation of general and specific information

We describe a distributed model of information processing and memory and apply it to the representation of general and specific information. The model consists of a large number of simple processing elements which send excitatory and inhibitory signals to each other via modifiable connections. Information processing is thought of as the process whereby patterns of activation are formed over the units in the model through their excitatory and inhibitory interactions. The memory trace of a processing event is the change or increment to the strengths of the interconnections that results from the processing event. The traces of separate events are superimposed on each other in the values of the connection strengths that result from the entire set of traces stored in the memory. The model is applied to a number of findings related to the question of whether we store abstract representations or an enumeration of specific experiences in memory. The model simulates the results of a number of important experiments which have been taken as evidence for the enumeration of specific experiences. At the same time, it shows how the functional equivalent of abstract representations--prototypes, logogens, and even rules--can emerge from the superposition of traces of specific experiences, when the conditions are right for this to happen. In essence, the model captures the structure present in a set of input patterns; thus, it behaves as though it had learned prototypes or rules, to the extent that the structure of the environment it has learned about can be captured by describing it in terms of these abstractions.     

Towards a theory of the integration of the Other in representation

In this article, the author tries to uncover the elements of a theoretical model which would take into account the psychic transformations necessary to facilitate the emergence of representation. Toward this end, he firstly relies on Jung's notion of the archetype and Freud's idea of hallucinatory wish fulfilment, which he reconsiders in the light of the writings of Fordham (de-integration and re-integration of the primary self), and of Jean Laplanche (primary seduction), and linking it to the model based on chaos theory as developed in physics. He thus concludes that under the influence of primary seduction, the archetype is able to become a veritable, strange psychic attractor, enabling the determining factor of the instinctual axis of the archetype to open up to the possibility of symbolization, a necessary underlying feature for the occurrence of subjectivity. He ends his argument with a brief clinical vignette which illustrates the effect of openness to the psychic unknown constituted by primary seduction in the transference.     

A causal-model theory of conceptual representation and categorization

This article presents a theory of categorization that accounts for the effects of causal knowledge that relates the features of categories. According to causal-model theory, people explicitly represent the probabilistic causal mechanisms that link category features and classify objects by evaluating whether they were likely to have been generated by those mechanisms. In 3 experiments, participants were taught causal knowledge that related the features of a novel category. Causal-model theory provided a good quantitative account of the effect of this knowledge on the importance of both individual features and interfeature correlations to classification. By enabling precise model fits and interpretable parameter estimates, causal-model theory helps place the theory-based approach to conceptual representation on equal footing with the well-known similarity-based approaches.     

语义表征具身理论:情绪在概念表征中的作用

概念如何被表征是认知科学的热点问题,其中抽象概念如何表征是当前具身认知最具争议性的话题之一。与前期概念隐喻理论(强调意象图式)和知觉符号理论(强调情境内省信息)的观点不同,语义表征具身理论强调情绪经验信息在抽象概念表征和加工中的作用。具体而言,具体概念的表征主要来自感觉运动信息,而抽象概念的表征主要来自情绪经验信息和语言信息。研究证明,抽象概念的高情绪经验信息能够促进词汇的加工,且这一促进作用受词汇情绪效价的调节。未来研究应进一步考虑影响情绪经验信息发挥作用的因素,比如语言信息的丰富性、情绪唤醒或个体的情绪状态等。     

On the effectiveness of including meaningful pictures in the formation of equivalence classes

In three experiments, 165 adult participants were trained on 12 baseline conditional discriminations and tested for the formation of three 5-member equivalence classes (A➔B➔C➔D➔E). All experiments included two reference groups; the abstract (ABS) group was trained with all abstract stimuli and the picture (PIC) group with C-stimuli as meaningful pictorial stimuli but A, B, D, and E stimuli as abstract shapes. In Experiment 1, the color of the meaningful stimuli was manipulated. In the ABS, PIC, and black-and-white groups, 33.3%, 80%, and 93.3% formed equivalence classes, respectively. In Experiment 2, participants were exposed to a test block with and without trials that included C stimuli. For the groups with and without C trials in the test, 93.3% and 86.7% formed equivalence classes, respectively, compared to 20% in the ABS group. In Experiment 3, the number of meaningful pictures and their location in stimulus classes were manipulated. One group was trained with 3 pictures (C1/B2/D3, the 3-PIC) while the other groups had 2 pictures (C1/B2 and C1/D3, the 2-PIC). In the second test block for the ABS and PIC groups, 6.7% and 86% of the participants formed equivalence classes, respectively. For the 3-PIC and the 2-PIC groups, 66.7% and 50% of the participants formed equivalence classes, respectively. Results suggest that the effects of meaningful stimuli in equivalence classes (a) cannot be attributed to the use of colorful stimuli in previous studies, (b) occur during training and are not dependent on the presence of meaningful stimuli at test, and (c) are sensitive to stimulus location.