Level 1 perspective‐taking at 24 months of age

The current study sought to determine the age at which children first engage in Level 1 visual perspective‐taking, in which they understand that the content of what another person sees in a situation may sometimes differ from what they see. An adult entered the room searching for an object. One candidate object was out in the open, whereas another was visible for the child but behind an occluder from the adult's perspective. When asked to help the adult find the sought‐for object, 24‐month‐old children, but not 18‐month‐old children, handed him the occluded object (whereas in a control condition they showed no preference for the occluded toy). We argue that the performance of the 24‐month‐olds requires Level 1 visual perspective‐taking skills and that this is the youngest age at which these skills have been demonstrated.     

How infants relate looker and object: evidence for a perceptual learning account of gaze following in infancy

In two experiments, it was investigated how preverbal infants perceive the relationship between a person and an object she is looking at. More specifically, it was examined whether infants interpret an adult's object-directed gaze as a marker of an intention to act or whether they relate the person and the object via a mechanism of associative learning. Fourteen-month-old infants observed an adult gazing repeatedly at one of two objects. When the adult reached out to grasp this object in the test trials, infants showed no systematic visual anticipations to it (i.e. first visual anticipatory gaze shifts) but only displayed longer looking times for this object than for another before her hand reached the object. However, they showed visual anticipatory gaze shifts to the correct action target when only the grasping action was presented. The second experiment shows that infants also look longer at the object a person has been gazing at when the person is still present, but is not performing any action during the test trials. Looking preferences for the objects were reversed, however, when the person was absent during the test trials. This study provides evidence for the claim that infants around 1 year of age do not employ other people's object-directed gaze to anticipate future actions, but to establish person-object associations. The implications of this finding for theoretical conceptions of infants' social-cognitive development are discussed.     

Young infants' perception of unity and form in occlusion displays

Young infants have been reported to perceive the unity of a center-occluded object when the visible ends of the object are aligned and undergo common motion but not when the edges of the object are misaligned (Johnson & Aslin, 1996). Using a recognition-based paradigm, the authors investigated the possibility that past research failed to provide sufficiently sensitive assessments of infants' perception of the unity of misaligned edges in partial occlusion displays. Positive evidence was obtained in 4-month-olds for veridical perception of the motion and location of a hidden region but not its orientation, whereas 7-month-olds, in contrast to the younger infants, appeared to respond to the orientation of the hidden region. Overall, the results suggest that habituation designs tapping recognition processes may be particularly efficacious in revealing infants' perceptual organization. In addition, the findings provide corroborative evidence for the importance of both motion and orientation in young infants' object segregation and for the difficulty in achieving percepts of the global form of a partly occluded object.     

Infants' understanding of object-directed action

When and in what ways do infants recognize humans as intentional actors? An important aspect of this larger question concerns when infants recognize specific human actions (e.g. a reach) as object-directed (i.e. as acting toward goal-objects). In two studies using a visual habituation technique, 12-month-old infants were tested to assess their recognition that an adult's reach is directed toward its target object. Infants in the experimental condition were habituated to a display in which an actor reached over a wall-like barrier with an arcing arm movement, to pick up a ball. After habituation infants saw two test displays, for which the barrier was removed. In the direct test event the actor reached directly for the ball, the arm tracing a visually new path, but the action consistent with attempting to reach for the object as directly as possible. In the indirect test event the actor traced the old path, reaching over in an arc, even though the wall was no longer present. This arm movement was identical to that in habituation but no longer displayed a reach going directly to its object. In a control condition infants saw the same movements but in a situation with no goal-object. In the experimental conditions, with a goal object present, infants looked longer at the indirect test event in comparison to the direct test event. In the control conditions infants looked equally at both indirect and direct test events. We conclude that sensitivity to human object-directed action is established by 12-month-olds and compare these results to recent findings by [Gergely, G., Nadasdy, Z., Csibra, G., & Biro S. (1995). Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age. Cognition, 56, 165-193] and [Woodward, A. (1998). Infants selectively encode the goal object of an actor's reach. Cognition, 69, 1-34].     

Seeing an image of the hand affects performance on a crossmodal congruency task for sequences of events

The crossmodal congruency effect (CCE) is augmented when viewing an image of a hand compared to an object. It is unclear if this contextual effect extends to a non-spatial CCE. Here, participants discriminated the number of tactile vibrations delivered to the hand whilst ignoring visual distractors on images of their own or another’s hand or an object. The CCE was not modulated by stimulus context. Viewing one’s hand from a third person perspective increased errors relative to viewing an object (Experiment 1). Errors were reduced when viewing hands, from first or third person perspectives, with additional identity markers (Experiments 2 and 3). Our results suggest no effect of context on the non-spatial CCE and that differences in task performance between hand and object images depend on their visual properties. These findings are discussed in light of the relationship between body representation and perception of body-centred stimuli in the temporal domain.     

Infants track action goals within and across agents

The ability to understand that goals and other intentional relations are attributes of individual people is of fundamental importance to social life. It enables us to predict and interpret actions on-line by relating a person's prior and current behaviors, and distinguishing them from the behaviors of other persons. In this paper, we consider the origins of the ability to mark goals as attributes of individual people. Using a visual habituation paradigm to assess infants' tracking of goals, we tested whether infants represented goals are specific to particular agents. Thirteen-month-old infants restricted reaching goals to particular agents, but generalized a conventional linguistic action, labeling, across agents. Nine-month-old showed the former pattern but not the latter. We discuss these findings in the context of developing understandings of person specific and person general action knowledge.     

The sound of darkness: why do auditory cues aid infants' search for objects hidden by darkness but not by visible occluders?

In manual search tasks designed to assess infants' knowledge of the object concept, why does search for objects hidden by darkness precede search for objects hidden by visible occluders by several months? A graded representations account explains this décalage by proposing that the conflicting visual input from occluders directly competes with object representations, whereas darkness merely weakens representations. This study tests the prediction that representations of objects hidden by darkness are strong enough for infants to bind auditory cues to them and support search, whereas representations of objects hidden by occluders are not. Six-and-half-month-olds were presented with audible or silent objects that remained visible, became hidden by darkness, or became hidden by a visible occluder. Search required engaging in the same means-end action in all conditions. As predicted, auditory cues increased search when objects were hidden by darkness but not when they were hidden by a visible occluder. Results are discussed in the context of different facets of object concept development highlighted by graded representations perspectives and core knowledge perspectives and in relation to other work on multimodal object representations.     

Piagetian stage IV search errors with an object that is directly accessible both visually and manually

Previous work has shown that infants make the Piagetian stage IV error when the object is covered by a transparent occluder. However, it is not clear whether this happens because nine-month-old infants' failure to understand the identity of hidden objects extends to visible objects, or whether they are puzzled by object relationships involving transparency. Nine-month-old infants were presented with one of three different stage IV tasks in which the object was visible and uncovered at the second location. Stage IV errors were obtained with the object visible, but only when a covered place was provided at the first location. It is concluded that this result is stronger evidence that the stage IV error is not simply a hidden-object phenomenon, and that it may be best explained by taking account of infants' functional place knowledge, as well as their knowledge of object identity.     

Infants' tracking of objects and collections

Recent research suggests that infants' understanding of the physical world is more complex and adult-like than previously believed. One of the most impressive discoveries has been infants' ability to reason about medium-sized, material objects. They are able to individuate objects in a scene, and to enumerate and reason about them. This article reports a series of experiments investigating 8-month-old infants' ability to reason about collections of objects. Experiment 1 shows a sharp contrast between infants' understanding of single objects versus collections. While infants detected the discontinuous ('Magical') disappearance of a single object, they did not detect the Magical Disappearance of a non-cohesive pile of objects. Experiments 2-4 found that infants' difficulty remained even when the distinct identity of each object in the collection was emphasized, but could be overcome if infants (a) first saw the individual objects clearly separated from each other prior to their being placed together in a pile, or (b) had prior experience with the objects making up the collection. Our findings suggest that infants' expectations about object behavior are highly specific regarding the entities they are applied to. They do not automatically apply to any and all portions of matter within the visual field. Both the behavior of an entity, and infants' prior experience play roles in determining whether infants will treat that entity as an object.     

Reasoning about a hidden object after a delay: evidence for robust representations in 5-month-old infants

The present research examined two alternative interpretations of violation-of-expectation findings that young infants can represent hidden objects. One interpretation is that, when watching an event in which an object becomes hidden behind another object, infants form a prediction about the event's outcome while both objects are still visible, and then check whether this prediction was accurate. The other interpretation is that infants' initial representations of hidden objects are weak and short-lived and as such sufficient for success in most violation-of-expectation tasks (as objects are typically hidden for only a few seconds at a time), but not more challenging tasks. Five-month-old infants succeeded in reasoning about the interaction of a visible and a hidden object even though (1) the two objects were never simultaneously visible, and (2) a 3- or 4-min delay preceded the test trials. These results provide evidence for robust representations of hidden objects in young infants.     

Developments in young infants' reasoning about occluded objects

Eight experiments were conducted to examine 3- and 3.5-month-old infants' responses to occlusion events. The results revealed two developments, one in infants' knowledge of when objects should and should not be occluded and the other in infants' ability to posit additional objects to make sense of events that would otherwise violate their occlusion knowledge. The first development is that, beginning at about 3 months of age, infants expect an object to become temporarily visible when passing behind an occluder with an opening extending from its lower edge. The second development is that, beginning at about 3.5 months of age, infants generate a two-object explanation when shown a violation in which an object fails to become visible when passing behind an occluder with an opening in its lower edge. Unless given information contradicting such an explanation, infants infer that two identical objects are involved in the event, one traveling to the left and one to the right of the opening. These and related findings provide the basis for a model of young infants' responses to occlusion events; alternative models are also discussed.     

Object representation and predictive action in infancy

Previous research has shown that 6‐month‐old infants extrapolate object motion on linear paths when they act predictively on fully visible moving objects but not when they observe partly occluded moving objects. The present research probed whether differences in the tasks presented to infants or in the visibility of the objects account for these findings, by investigating infants’ predictive head tracking of a visible object that moves behind a small occluder. Six‐month‐old infants were presented with an object that moved repeatedly on linear or nonlinear paths, with an occluder covering the place where all the paths intersected. The first time infants viewed an object’s motion, their head movements did not anticipate either linear or nonlinear motion, but they quickly learned to anticipate linear motion on successive trials. Infants also learned to anticipate nonlinear motion, but this learning was slower and less consistent. Learning in all cases concerned the trajectory of the object, not the specific locations at which the object appeared. These findings suggest that infants form object representations that are weakly biased toward inertial motion and that are influenced by learning. The findings accord with the thesis that a single system of representation underlies both predictive action and perception of object motion, and that occlusion reduces the precision of object representations.     

How monkeys see the eyes: cotton-top tamarins’ reaction to changes in visual attention and action

Among social species, the capacity to detect where another individual is looking is adaptive because gaze direction often predicts what an individual is attending to, and thus what its future actions are likely to be. We used an expectancy violation procedure to determine whether cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus oedipus) use the direction of another individual’s gaze to predict future actions. Subjects were familiarized with a sequence in which a human actor turned her attention toward one of two objects sitting on a table and then reached for that object. Following familiarization, subjects saw two test events. In one test event, the actor gazed at the new object and then reached for that object. From a human perspective, this event is considered consistent with the causal relationship between visual attention and subsequent action, that is, grabbing the object attended to. In the second test event, the actor gazed at the old object, but reached for the new object. This event is considered a violation of expectation. When the actor oriented with both her head-and-eyes, subjects looked significantly longer at the second test event in which the actor reached for the object to which she had not previously oriented. However, there was no difference in looking time between test events when the actor used only her eyes to orient. These findings suggest that tamarins are able to use some combination of head orientation and gaze direction, but not gaze direction alone, to predict the actions of a human agent. Received: 17 February 1999 / Accepted after revision: 9 May 1999     

Visual control of reaching and grasping in infants.

The role of visual input during reaching and grasping was evaluated. Groups of infants (5, 7, and 9 months old) and adults reached for an illuminated object that sometimes darkened during the reach. Behavioral and kinematic measures were assessed during transport and grasp. Both infants and adults could complete a reach and grasp to a darkened object. However, vision was used during the reach when the object remained visible. Infants contacted the object more often when it remained visible, though they had longer durations and more movement units. In contrast, adults reached faster and more precisely during transport and grasp when the object remained visible. Thus, continuous sight of the object was not necessary, but when it was available, infants used it for contacting the object whereas adults used it to reach and grasp more efficiently.     

2.5-month-old infants' reasoning about when objects should and should not be occluded.

The present research examined 2.5-month-old infants' reasoning about occlusion events. Three experiments investigated infants' ability to predict whether an object should remain continuously hidden or become temporarily visible when passing behind an occluder with an opening in its midsection. In Experiment 1, the infants were habituated to a short toy mouse that moved back and forth behind a screen. Next, the infants saw two test events that were identical to the habituation event except that a portion of the screen's midsection was removed to create a large window. In one event (high-window event), the window extended from the screen's upper edge; the mouse was shorter than the bottom of the window and thus did not become visible when passing behind the screen. In the other event (low-window event), the window extended from the screen's lower edge; although the mouse was shorter than the top of the window and hence should have become fully visible when passing behind the screen, it never appeared in the window. The infants tended to look equally at the high- and low-window events, suggesting that they were not surprised when the mouse failed to appear in the low window. However, positive results were obtained in Experiment 2 when the low-window event was modified: a portion of the screen above the window was removed so that the left and right sections of the screen were no longer connected (two-screens event). The infants looked reliably longer at the two-screens than at the high-window event. Together, the results of Experiments 1 and 2 suggested that, at 2.5 months of age, infants possess only very limited expectations about when objects should and should not be occluded. Specifically, infants expect objects (1) to become visible when passing between occluders and (2) to remain hidden when passing behind occluders, irrespective of whether these have openings extending from their upper or lower edges. Experiment 3 provided support for this interpretation. The implications of these findings for models of the origins and development of infants' knowledge about occlusion events are discussed.     

The Influence of Motor Imagery on Postural Sway: Differential Effects of Type of Body Movement and Person Perspective

The present study examined the differential effects of kinesthetic imagery (first person perspective) and visual imagery (third person perspective) on postural sway during quiet standing. Based on an embodied cognition perspective, the authors predicted that kinesthetic imagery would lead to activations in movement-relevant motor systems to a greater degree than visual imagery. This prediction was tested among 30 participants who imagined various motor activities from different visual perspectives while standing on a strain gauge plate. The results showed that kinesthetic imagery of lower body movements, but not of upper body movements, had clear effects on postural parameters (sway path length and frequency contents of sway). Visual imagery, in contrast, had no reliable effects on postural activity. We also found that postural effects were not affected by the vividness of imagery. The results suggest that during kinesthetic motor imagery participants partially simulated (re-activated) the imagined movements, leading to unintentional postural adjustments. These findings are consistent with an embodied cognition perspective on motor imagery.     

Inferences about character and motive influence intentionality attributions about side effects

In two studies, we predicted and found that inferences about motive and character influence intentionality attributions about foreseeable consequences of action (i.e., side effects). First, we show that inferences about intentionality are greater for good side effects than bad side effects when a target person's character is described positively. In Study 2, we manipulated information about a target person and found that inferences about intentionality were greater when side effects were consistent with a target person's character and motives. Overall, our data cast doubt on the generality of the side-effect effect. We discuss our findings and their implications for future research on intentionality and social perception.     

Out of Sight Is Not Out of Mind: Developmental Changes in Infants' Understanding of Visual Perception During the Second Year

Three experiments investigated 14-, 18-, and 24- month-old infants' understanding of visual perception. Infants viewed films in which a protagonist was either able to view the location of a hidden object (Visual Access condition) or was blindfolded when the object location was revealed (No Visual Access condition). When requested to find the object, the protagonist pointed either at the correct location or at the incorrect location. Across experiments, 18-month-olds looked longer at the unexpected action (e.g., person pointing at the incorrect location in the Visual Access condition). By 24 month of age, infants could infer the correct search behavior from gaze alone. These findings suggest that by the middle of the second year of life, infants understand the psychological relation between an observer and an object, even if the object is no longer visible.     

The Animate-Inanimate Distinction in Infancy: Developing Sensitivity to Constraints on Human Actions

Infants aged 4 and 6 months were presented with events in which a person acted so as to set another person, or an inanimate object, in motion. In one condition, the actor spoke to the person (natural) or inanimate object (unnatural); in the other condition, the actor grasped and manipulated the person (unnatural) or object (natural). Six-month-old infants looked reliably longer at the natural actions than at the unnatural actions. A follow-up experiment revealed that their preference depended on the naturalness of the human actions themselves, not on the features or motions of the person or object that was acted upon. Looking preferences at 4 months were equivocal, consistent with the thesis that sensitivity to the natural actions develops over the first 6 months of age. We discuss these findings in relation to the development of social understanding, social gaze, and visual exploration.     

Infants' representations of three-dimensional occluded objects

Infants' ability to represent objects has received significant attention from the developmental research community. With the advent of eye-tracking technology, detailed analysis of infants' looking patterns during object occlusion have revealed much about the nature of infants' representations. The current study continues this research by analyzing infants' looking patterns in a novel manner and by comparing infants' looking at a simple display in which a single three-dimensional (3D) object moves along a continuous trajectory to a more complex display in which two 3D objects undergo trajectories that are interrupted behind an occluder. Six-month-old infants saw an occlusion sequence in which a ball moved along a linear path, disappeared behind a rectangular screen, and then a ball (ball-ball event) or a box (ball-box event) emerged at the other edge. An eye-tracking system recorded infants' eye-movements during the event sequence. Results from examination of infants' attention to the occluder indicate that during the occlusion interval infants looked longer to the side of the occluder behind which the moving occluded object was located, shifting gaze from one side of the occluder to the other as the object(s) moved behind the screen. Furthermore, when events included two objects, infants attended to the spatiotemporal coordinates of the objects longer than when a single object was involved. These results provide clear evidence that infants' visual tracking is different in response to a one-object display than to a two-object display. Furthermore, this finding suggests that infants may require more focused attention to the hidden position of objects in more complex multiple-object displays and provides additional evidence that infants represent the spatial location of moving occluded objects.