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Barry Stroud 《Erkenntnis》2011,75(3):495-503
A brief discussion of the ways in which awareness of and sensitivity to the history of philosophy can contribute to epistemology
even if epistemology is understood as a distinctively philosophical and not primarily historical enterprise. 相似文献
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Ram Neta 《Synthese》2006,150(2):247-280
Many epistemologists are interested in offering a positive account of how it is that many of our common sense beliefs enjoy
one or another positive epistemological status (e.g., how they are warranted, justified, reasonable, or what have you). A
number of philosophers, under the influence of Wittgenstein and/or J. L. Austin, have argued that this enterprise is misconceived.
The most effective version of this argument is to be found in Mark Kaplan’s paper “Epistemology on Holiday”. After explaining
what this criticism amounts to and why it is important, I then respond to it. My response is based upon, and is intended to
display the explanatory power of, a contractarian account of our practice of epistemic appraisal. 相似文献
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The anti-metaphysical intentions of naturalism can be respected without abandoning the project of a normative epistemology.
The central assumptions of naturalism imply that (1.) the distinction between action and behaviour is spurious, and (2.) epistemology
cannot continue to be a normative project. Difficulties with the second implication have been adressed by Normative Naturalism,
but without violating the naturalistic consensus, it can only appreciate means-end-rationality. However, this does not suffice
to justify its own implicit normative pretensions. According to our diagnosis, naturalism succumbs to the lure of an absolute
observer's stance and thereby neglects the need for participation in communal practice. By contrast, methodical culturalism
ties down the concepts of epistemology to the success of such practice. Only from this perspective, the normative force of
epistemology can be appreciated. Also, the mind-body problem loosens its hold and the distinction between action and behaviour
is reestablished. In the last section, the mutual relation between philosophy andscience is reconsidered.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
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Synthese - This article argues that there can be epistemic dilemmas: situations in which one faces conflicting epistemic requirements with the result that whatever one does, one is doomed to do... 相似文献
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Hartry Field 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(2):249-290
The paper outlines a view of normativity that combines elements of relativism and expressivism, and applies it to normative
concepts in epistemology. The result is a kind of epistemological anti-realism, which denies that epistemic norms can be (in
any straightforward sense) correct or incorrect; it does allow some to be better than others, but takes this to be goal-relative
and is skeptical of the existence of best norms. It discusses the circularity that arises from the fact that we need to use
epistemic norms to gather the facts with which to evaluate epistemic norms; relatedly, it discusses how epistemic norms can
rationally evolve. It concludes with some discussion of the impact of this view on “ground level” epistemology.
相似文献
Hartry FieldEmail: |
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Epistemology and probability 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Probability is sometimes regarded as a universal panacea for epistemology. It has been supposed that the rationality of belief is almost entirely a matter of probabilities. Unfortunately, those philosophers who have thought about this most extensively have tended to be probability theorists first, and epistemologists only secondarily. In my estimation, this has tended to make them insensitive to the complexities exhibited by epistemic justification. In this paper I propose to turn the tables. I begin by laying out some rather simple and uncontroversial features of the structure of epistemic justification, and then go on to ask what we can conclude about the connection between epistemology and probability in the light of those features. My conclusion is that probability plays no central role in epistemology. This is not to say that probability plays no role at all. In the course of the investigation, I defend a pair of probabilistic acceptance rules which enable us, under some circumstances, to arrive at justified belief on the basis of high probability. But these rules are of quite limited scope. The effect of there being such rules is merely that probability provides one source for justified belief, on a par with perception, memory, etc. There is no way probability can provide a universal cure for all our epistemological ills. 相似文献
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