Eight good questions for developmental epistemology and psychology

My reply to eight good questions arising from commentary is an elaboration of my main argument that there are parallels in the epistemologies of Frege and Piaget and that these parallels have distinctive implications for developmental psychology. The eight questions are: (i) was Piaget really an epistemologist? (ii) is Piaget's epistemic subject psychological or epistemological? (iii) is Frege's non-modal logic consistent with Piaget's account of necessity? (iv) does Piaget's constructivism entail realism? (v) what is the relation between thinking and thought? (vi) is Frege's concept of mind too narrow? (vii) how are cause and reason related in the interpretation of thought? (viii) what is the status of an act of judgment in the interpretation of thought? These questions are productive, and can be developed.     

Harré on Piaget's Sociological Studies

Piaget's Sociological Studies is largely taken up with questions of sociology, epistemology, moral, political and legal theory. Roughly, these are by-passed in Harré's (2000, this journal) interpretation of Piaget's social account. Our critique is in two parts. In the first part, we explain the basis of our disagreement with Harré's interpretation of six specific issues. These are Piaget's model of social exchange, sociology, concept of egocentrism, response to Wallon, psycho-social parallelism, distinction between the concrete and the abstract. In the second part, we challenge two central theses invoked in Harré's review, namely (A) all psychological activity is a joint activity, and (B) any society is based on irreducible differences in psychological activity. We have tried to set the record straight as far as Piaget's social account is concerned. Harré's review shows a general lack of acquaintance with Piaget's account and our aim has been to compensate for this.     

Experimental Studies of Children's Learning

This article compares John Dewey's theory of inquiry with Jean Piaget's analysis of the mechanisms implied in the increase of knowledge. The sources for this paper are Dewey's studies on logic and the theory of inquiry and Piaget's historical-critical and psychogenetic investigations. Three major conclusions result from the comparison: first, there are significant convergences between the two theories; second, Piaget's developmental analysis makes explicit what is programmatic in Dewey's investigations; and, finally, Piaget is incorrect in characterizing Dewey's pragmatism as a method that does not meet the criteria of intelligent activity.     

Epistemological principles for developmental psychology in Frege and Piaget

My main aim is to identify and discuss parallels between the epistemologies of Gottlob Frege and Jean Piaget. Although their work has attracted massive attention individually, parallels in their work have gone unnoticed. My discussion is in four parts and covers psychologism and epistemology; five epistemological criteria in Frege's rational epistemology under an AEIOU mnemonic, namely autonomy, entailment, intersubjectivity, objectivity and universality; the elaboration of these same criteria in Piaget's developmental epistemology; their implications for developmental psychology and epistemology. One main conclusion is that the same criteria fit both Frege's and Piaget's epistemology. A second conclusion is that Piaget's developmental epistemology can be regarded as an elaboration of Frege's rational epistemology in each of these five respects on both methodological and substantive grounds. Both conclusions are compatible with non-psychologism, which was accepted by both Frege and Piaget.     

From Classroom to Controversy: Conflict in the Teaching of Religion

What happens when a class assignment becomes a source of controversy? How do we respond? What do we learn? By describing the controversy surrounding an assignment on religion and representation, this article examines conflict's productive role in teaching about New Religious Movements (NRMs) and religion. It suggests that we consider how our personal and institutional dispositions toward conflict influence our pedagogies. Moreover, it urges us to consider how teaching conflicts within and/or between disciplines can enhance our learning objectives and stimulate students' ability to think critically.     

The nature(s) of developmental change: Piaget,Vygotsky, and the transition process

This essay proposes (1) that more than one kind of large-scale developmental change exists; and (2) that more than one kind of developmental change mechanism is needed to explain them. These proposals are supported by work in nonuniversal theory which states that intellectual development should be characterized neither as domain-general nor as domainspecific, but as a spectrum of developmental domains that range from the universal to the unique. The current article extends nonuniversal theory by positing and then describing (1) a sixth region of development—a pancultural region: and (2) five basic change mechanisms (maturation, domain-specific structures, technologies, instruction, and equilibration) that differentially influence developmental change at particular points along the universal-to-unique continuum. The contributions of each of the five change mechanisms is illustrated by an analysis of children's ability to draw maps. The value of the universal to unique framework is demonstrated by showing how it helps resolve Piaget's and Vygotsky's seemingly contradictory views on the relationship between learning and development.     

ORGANISMIC PROCESSES FOR NEO-PIAGETIAN THEORIES: A DIALECTICAL CAUSAL ACCOUNT OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT

The paper criticizes some epistemological presuppositions of Piaget's and of neo-Piagetian's work, in particular, the psycho-Logical principle. This principle is contrasted with a more valid psycho-dialectical one. It is suggested that a dialectical-constructivist (i.e., causal-dynamic) perspective offers a causal theoretical framework for cognitive development that is superior to that of Piaget and many neo-Piagetians. I outline criteria for evaluating causal developmental theories, and point out deficiencies in Piaget's and neo-Piagetian's stage theories vis-à-vis the criteria. An organismic theory of constructive operators - a dialectical/causal theory - is introduced as a remedy for these deficiencies. I focus on a modular model of mental attention that is constituted by four dynamically interacting functional systems. These systems together explain the ‘beam’ of mental attention and its phenomenological/behavioural effects. I claim that the stages of cognitive development are caused by growth of mental attention. The validity of this model is supported by data on a motor performance task (Rho task). The Rho data show: (a) the existence of stage-wise plateaus in children's performance at ages congruent with the redefined Piagetian stages; (b) the psychological structures which, driven by mental attention (M-capacity), are responsible for performance on the task, appear to be located in the left hemisphere of the brain. These findings, predicted by the dialectical theory of mental attention, highlight its causal-predictive power.     

面纱·身体·伊斯兰教——由法国“罩袍禁令”引发的思考

法国"罩袍禁令"一经颁布,世界舆论哗然。一块小小的面纱为何能引发世界如此广泛的争论?它在冲突或争论之中为何被赋予重要意义?面纱所遮掩的女性身体在其中又扮演何种角色?面纱、身体、伊斯兰教三者之间又存在怎样的内在关系?本文试图对这些问题进行分析,并提出女性身体除了表达一个族群对自己文化、宗教特性的坚守之外,也成为其反抗外来力量的工具和媒介。     

The Inner Game of Sport: is Everything in the Brain?

The article deals with the following: (1) Three brain imaging studies on athletes are evaluated. What do these neuroscientific studies tell us about the brain and mind of the athlete? (2) Empirical investigations will need a neuro-theory of mind if they are to make the leap from neural activity to the mental. The article looks at such a theory, Gerald Edelman's ‘Neural Darwinism’. What are the implications of such a theory for sport science and philosophy of sport? (3) The article appreciates some of the neurosciences applications, but questions the hope of giving a complete theory of mind.     

Distinguishing Structural and Functional Models of Human Development: A Response to "What Transits in an Identity Status Transition?"

In response to Jane Kroger's "What Transits in an Identity Status Transition?" (this issue), this article questions the usefulness of the concept of soft structural stages as a tool for understanding James Marcia's ego identity status model. The authors begin by distinguishing a variety of developmental models along a continuum, ranging from cognitively based structural stages to culturally based social age periods, with functional stage models holding the overlapping middle ground. Applying this conceptual continuum to Kroger's theoretical essay, three inconsistencies are noted, each of which suggests that Marcia has constructed primarily a functional model. The authors affirm Kroger's conclusion that Marcia's model is developmental, although of a different type than Kroger proposed.     

Primitive religious thought and the evolution of religion

In an article in this journal about the ideas of Levy-Brühl, Don Wiebe reviewed ideas from anthropology to argue that there is indeed a primitive mentality, and that mythopoeic religious thought is an instance of this mentality. Wiebe ends by declaring religious thought generally to be mythopoeic. The anthropological literature does support well Wiebe's thesis that primitive thought is primitive, in particular those studies which use Piaget's theory of cognitive development as a guide for interpreting primitive and other thought styles. But Piaget's theory can be extended to interpret other stages of culture and thought. This aids in recognizing that religious thought develops in stages also, from primitive folktales to archaic complex myths, and then to classical rationalized theologies and most recently to symbolic theologies.     

The latent variable approach as applied to transitive reasoning

We discuss the limitations of hypothesis testing using (quasi-) experiments in the study of cognitive development and suggest latent variable modeling as a viable alternative to experimentation. Latent variable models allow testing a theory as a whole, incorporating individual differences with respect to developmental processes or abilities in the model. Experiments, in contrast, aim at testing hypotheses that refer to a specific part of a theory; also they ignore individual differences or model the individual differences using age group as a proxy for developmental stage. Drawing on a sample of 409 5–13-year olds, we demonstrate the advantages of latent variable models in the area of transitive reasoning. A comparison of three models showed that the latent variable model that represented fuzzy trace theory had a better fit than the models representing Piaget's theory or linear ordering theory.     

Antecedent Variables for Sociomoral Reasoning Development: Evidence from Two Cultural Settings

This study examined the developmental pattern of sociomoral reasoning in two different cultural settings, focusing on factors assumed to influence the course of growth in this particular domain. The specific hypotheses tested concerned the relationships between operational thinking within Piaget's theory and Kohlberg's conceptualization of sociomoral judgement development. Secondary school and university students from Greece and Nigeria aged 15 to 22 years (N = 281) participated in the study. Results indicated that (1) the developmental sequence was similar in the two differing cultural environments, (2) stage endorsement differed significantly in the two samples, and (3) the necessary-but-not-sufficient hypothesis was confirmed in both groups. The possible explanations of the findings are discussed in connection with the basic assumptions of the structural-developmental approach to socio-cognitive growth.     

Prozac and the Post-human Politics of Cyborgs

Working through the lens of Donna Haraway's cyborg theory and directed at the example of Prozac, I address the dramatic rise of new technoscience in medicine and psychiatry. Haraway's cyborg theory insists on a conceptualization and a politics of technoscience that does not rely on universal “Truths” or universal “Goods” and does not attempt to return to the “pure” or the “natural.” Instead, Haraway helps us mix politics, ethics, and aesthetics with science and scientific recommendations, and she helps us understand that (without recourse to universal truth or universal good) questions of legitimacy in science come down to local questions of effect and inclusion. What, in the case of my example, are the effects of Prozac? And for whom? Who is included and empowered to create legitimate psychiatric knowledge? Who is excluded and why? And, what political strategies will increase the democratic health of psychiatric science and practice?     

When is a picture?

Philosophical discussions of depiction sometimes suffer from a lack of differentiation between several questions concerning the ‘nature’ of pictorial representation. To provide a suitable framework I distinguish six such questions and several levels on which one might want to proceed in order to answer some of them. With this background, I reconstruct Goodman's and Elgin's answer to the specific question: ‘What distinguishes the pictorial from the verbal or linguistic?’ I try to reveal some major motivations behind their system-oriented approach and to indicate some reasons why a strategy of this kind is to a certain extent mandatory to grasp the ‘nature of the pictorial’. The system-relative and functional character of depiction has to be captured by every adequate theory.     

Humanism and Theoretical Pluralism

Christian Smith's What Is a Person? calls for a normative turn in sociology—the grounding of sociology in a theory of human nature. While offering a systematic account of a thick view of personhood—what it should look like, how it can be applied, and why it is needed—the book proposes a critical realist personalism as the best metatheoretical direction for sociology. The author of this essay agrees with the main questions and direction of Smith's project. However, by historicizing the origins and sociological implications of personalist moral theory, the author problematizes the personalism that is one of the foundations of Smith's project. She contrasts personalism with humanism, suggesting that the latter might possess both the normative robustness and comparative potential needed for contemporary sociological theory and practice. She ends her response to Smith's book by raising questions about the relationship between critical realist personalism and theoretical pluralism.     

Children's Unusual Responses to Observed Movement

Olum discovered that seven-year-old children give unusual responses to observed movement, presented on a Michotte apparatus, in contrast to that of adults. We made the following changes in Olum's procedures: (a) stimuli were presented without repetition, (b) neutral instructions were used, (c) different and more complicated stimuli were used, (d) 20 seven-year-old and 20 ten-year-old children were used. The unusual responses remained. They cannot be explained as an effect of repetition, particular stimuli, or procedure. The younger children's responses were less accurate and more variable. This accords with Piaget's perceptual theory, as it relates to stages of cognitive development.     

Visual Perceptual Thresholds of Albino Rats Obtained on the SMVDA with Striae,Single Lines,and Paired Bars

Piaget's concept of socialized speech was re-evaluated with the use of everyday preschool speech collected during free play on 174 boys and girls age 2–0 to 5–11. With one important exception, the results supported Piaget's concept of an age increment in socialized speech relative to egocentric speech. Egocentric speech (Repetition, Monologue, Collective Monologue) showed no increase with age; socialized speech (Adapted Information, Criticism and Derision, Questions and Answers) showed significant age increments. The one exception was the socialized category Commands, Requests, Threats, which like the egocentric categories, appeared early at high levels and did not increase with age. This latter finding pointed up an internal inconsistency in Piaget's formulation and suggested a possible resolution of the socialized speech controversy.     

From Piaget's Epistemic Subject to Pascual-Leone's Metasubject: Epistemic Transition in the Constructivist—Rationalist Theory of Cognitive Development

The explanation of the transition from one epistemic theory to another is an important part of Piaget's genetic epistemology. It is argued that this epistemic transition leads to a retrodictable orthogenetic tendency toward optimizing equilibration. The objective of this paper is to establish a relationship between Piaget's epistemic subject and Pascual-Leone's metasubject and to demonstrate that the postulation of the latter can be considered as an epistemic transition between two constructivist—rationalist theories, which leads to the development of a theory with greater explanatory power. Epistemic transition in this paper refers to a progressive problemshift (cf. Lakatos, 1970), between the theories of Piaget and Pascual-Leone. Piaget builds a “general model” by neglecting individual differences, that is, studies the epistemic subject, whereas Pascual-Leone by incorporating a framework for individual difference variables, studies the metasubject—the psychological organization of the epistemic subject. Empirical evidence is presented to demonstrate that Pascual-Leone's theory of constructive operators is a model of the psychological organism (the metasubject), which is at work inside Piaget's epistemic subject. Finally, it is concluded that the greater explanatory power of Pascual-Leone's theory can be interpreted as an epistemic transition between Piaget's epistemic subject and Pascual-Leone's metasubject.     

The sociocultural movement in psychology,the role of theories in sociocultural inquiries,and the theory of sociocultural models

This special issue presents the theory of sociocultural models (TSCM) and its applications in diverse areas of psychology, including education, health care, clinical practice, gender relations, and general research. As many theories already exist in the social sciences, some readers may ask: “Why do cross‐cultural, cultural, and indigenous psychologists need another theory?” This question is comprised of two aspects: culture/cultural and theory/theoretical. Therefore, to answer it, it is important to clarify both issues. The first relates to cultural and its relation to psychological. The second, theory, considers its relation to cultural and psychological. These issues have long‐range implications for all culture and psychology disciplines as they pose many questions: What role does culture play in the mental functioning of people? How is culture constituted? Is cultural related to social? Does people’s mental functioning exert reciprocal influences on their cultural and social functioning? While working toward answering these questions, researchers quickly determine that more questions arise: What role should theories play in answering these questions? What constitutes theory in culture and psychology disciplines? How should such a theory (or such theories) address the triad of cultural, social, and mental? Consequently, in an effort to provide an overview of the TSCM and to begin to answer these questions, this introduction consists of two parts. The first part addresses the sociocultural turn in modern psychology; this part discusses its implications for research in culture and psychology disciplines. The second segment examines the topic of the theoretical backgrounds of cultural and cross‐cultural research and connects the philosophical paradigms of interpretivism and realism with the theory of sociocultural models. This introduction concludes with a brief overview of the articles included in this issue.