Bias in interpretation of ambiguous sentences related to threat in anxiety

In the 1st of 2 experiments, currently clinically anxious, recovered clinically anxious, and normal control subjects were presented with a mixture of unambiguous and ambiguous sentences; both threatening and nonthreatening interpretations were possible for the latter. A subsequent recognition-memory test indicated that the currently anxious subjects were more likely than normal control and recovered anxious subjects to interpret the ambiguous sentences in a threatening fashion rather than in a nonthreatening fashion. This suggests that the biased interpretation of ambiguity found in currently anxious subjects reflected their anxious mood state. A 2nd experiment established that the difference in interpretative processes between currently anxious and control subjects was not due to response bias and that the interpretative bias was a reasonably general one.     

When a face type is perceived as threatening: Using general recognition theory to understand biased categorization of Afrocentric faces

Prior research indicates that stereotypical Black faces (e.g., wide nose, full lips: Afrocentric) are often associated with crime and violence. The current study investigated whether stereotypical faces may bias the interpretation of facial expression to seem threatening. Stimuli were prerated by face type (stereotypical, nonstereotypical) and expression (neutral, threatening). Later in a forced-choice task, different participants categorized face stimuli as stereotypical or not and threatening or not. Regardless of prerated expression, stereotypical faces were judged as more threatening than were nonstereotypical faces. These findings were supported using computational models based on general recognition theory (GRT), indicating that decision boundaries were more biased toward the threatening response for stereotypical faces than for nonstereotypical faces. GRT analysis also indicated that perception of face stereotypicality and emotional expression are dependent, both across categories and within individual categories. Higher perceived stereotypicality predicts higher perception of threat, and, conversely, higher ratings of threat predict higher perception of stereotypicality. Implications for racial face-type bias influencing perception and decision-making in a variety of social and professional contexts are discussed.     

Differentiating between memory and interpretation biases in socially anxious and nonanxious individuals

Although individual cognitive biases toward threat in social anxiety are well established, few studies have examined the manner in which cognitive biases work in conjunction. In the present study, socially anxious ( n = 54 ) and nonanxious ( n = 58 ) individuals read 10 passages consisting of positive social or evaluative, negative social or evaluative, and neutral content and completed two cognitive tasks assessing memory of factual details and interpretation immediately and after 48 h. Socially anxious and nonanxious individuals did not differ in their memory for details presented in the passages. However, they made less positive and more negative interpretations of details included in the passages, particularly in positive passages that were self-relevant and particularly in positive passages after the delay. After including depression, state anxiety, and trait anxiety as covariates, biased interpretation of positive passages after the time delay remained significant, but biased interpretation of the self-relevant, positive passages did not. It is concluded that socially anxious individuals are characterized by accurate memory of threatening, factual material, but that they impose a biased interpretation upon that material, especially after some time has passed.     

Selective processing of threat cues in panic disorder

A computerized Stroop color-naming paradigm was used to investigate attentional biases for selectively processing threat information in panic-disordered patients. Subjects named the colors of neutral words (e.g. TYPICAL), fear words (e.g. PANIC), bodily sensation words (e.g. HEARTBEAT), and catastrophe words (e.g. HEART ATTACK). To control for familiarity with threat concepts, we used clinicians who treat panic disorder as normal control subjects. In contrast to normal controls, panic patients exhibited greater Stroop interference for all threat words, especially those associated with catastrophe. Stroop interference waned during the course of the experiment, thereby indicating habituation to the semantic content of the cues. These findings suggest that panic disorder, like other anxiety disorders, is associated with an attentional bias for processing threatening information.     

Altered processing of health threat words as a function of hypochondriacal tendencies and experimentally manipulated control beliefs

Attentional biases associated with various forms of psychopathology have been well documented. Few studies, however, have assessed the factors that moderate these biases. The present paper assesses the biased processing of health words as a function of hypochondriacal tendencies during a threat of bioterrorism (anthrax), and whether perceived control can moderate those biases. Based on a sample of 328 participants, hypochondriacal tendencies were associated with slower reaction times on a modified emotional Stroop task when the stimulus words were anthrax-related, and this effect was moderated by a manipulation of perceived control. Specifically, individuals with low perceived control over the health threat had greater attentional bias of anthrax infection, independent of related variables such as anxiety.     

Threat-based cognitive biases in anxious children: comparison with non-anxious children before and after cognitive behavioural treatment

Attention and interpretation biases for threat stimuli were assessed in 19 anxious (ANX) children before and after cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT), and compared with responses from 19 non-anxious (NA) control children collected over the same period. Attentional bias was assessed using a picture version of the visual probe task with threat, neutral and pleasant pictures. Threat interpretation bias was assessed using both a homographs task in which children used homograph words in a sentence and their neutral or threatening meaning was assessed, and a stories task in which children rated their negative emotion, danger judgments, and influencing ability in ambiguous situations. ANX children showed attention biases towards threat on the visual probe task and threat interpretation biases on the stories task but not the homographs task at pre-treatment in comparison with NA children. Following treatment, ANX children's threat interpretation biases as assessed on the stories task reduced significantly to within levels comparable to NA children. However, ANX children continued to show larger attentional biases towards threat than pleasant pictures on the visual probe task at post-treatment, whereas NA children did not show attentional biases. Moreover, a residual threat interpretation style on the stories task at post-treatment was associated with higher anxiety symptoms in both ANX and NA children.     

A multi-session interpretation modification program: changes in interpretation and social anxiety symptoms

Previous research suggests that socially anxious individuals interpret ambiguous social information in a more threatening manner compared to non-anxious individuals. Recently, studies have experimentally modified interpretation and shown that this subsequently affected anxiety in non-anxious individuals. If similar procedures can modify interpretation biases in socially anxious individuals, they may lead to a reduction in social anxiety symptoms. In the current study, we examined the effect of a computerized Interpretation Modification Program (IMP) on interpretation bias and social anxiety symptoms. Twenty-seven socially anxious individuals were randomly assigned to the IMP or a control condition. Participants completed eight computer sessions over four weeks. The IMP modified interpretation by providing positive feedback when participants made benign interpretations and negative feedback in response to threat interpretations. The IMP successfully decreased threat interpretations, increased benign interpretations, and decreased social anxiety symptoms compared to the control condition. Moreover, changes in benign interpretation mediated IMP's effect on social anxiety. This initial trial suggests that interpretation modification may have clinical utility when applied as a multi-session intervention.     

Spiders appear to move faster than non-threatening objects regardless of one's ability to block them

We examined whether perception of a threatening object – a spider – was more accurate than of a non-threatening object. An accurate perception could promote better survival than a biased perception. However, if biases encourage faster responses and more appropriate behaviors, then under the right circumstances, perceptual biases could promote better survival. We found that spiders appeared to be moving faster than balls and ladybugs. Furthermore, the perceiver's ability to act on the object also influenced perceived speed: the object looked faster when it was more difficult to block. Both effects – the threat of the object and the perceiver's blocking abilities – acted independently from each other. The results suggest effects of multiple types of affordances on perception of speed.     

Lack of a benign interpretation bias in social anxiety disorder

Cognitive models of social anxiety posit that recurrent interpretation of ambiguous information as threatening maintains symptoms (e.g. Clark & Wells, 1995, pp. 69-93, Social phobia: Diagnosis, assessment, and treatment. New York: Guilford Press; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997, pp. 741-756, Behavior Research and Therapy, 35). However, biased interpretation may also be represented as a failure to make a benign interpretation of the ambiguous event. Furthermore, interpretation bias can be characterized by both an online (automatic) component and an offline (effortful) component (Hirsch & Clark, 2004, pp. 799-825, Clinical Psychology Review, 24). To measure both benign and threat biases, as well as examine the effect of social anxiety on offline versus online interpretations, Beard and Amir (2009, pp. 1135-1141, Behaviour Research and Therapy, 46) developed the Word Sentence Association Paradigm (WSAP). In the current study, we administered the WSAP to a group of participants diagnosed with social anxiety disorder (SAD) as well as to a group of non-anxious control (NAC) participants. We found that participants with SAD demonstrated a lack of benign online bias, but not an online threat bias when compared to NACs. However, when examining offline biases, SAD patients endorsed social threat interpretations and rejected benign social interpretations to a greater degree than non-anxious individuals. Our results, when taken together, clearly implicate the role of reduced bias toward benign information in SAD.     

Visual working memory and threat monitoring: Spider fearfuls show disorder-specific change detection

Previous studies of biased information processing in anxiety addressed biases of attention and memory, but little is known about the processes taking place between them: visual working memory (VWM) and monitoring of threat. We investigated these processes with a change detection paradigm. In Experiment 1, spider fearfuls (SF) and non-anxious controls (NAC) judged two subsequently presented displays as same or different. The displays consisted of several pictures, one of which could depict a spider. In Experiment 2, SF and NAC, both without snake fear, were tested with displays including either a spider or a snake image to determine the material-specificity of biased VWM. Both groups showed increased change detection for threat images. This effect was significantly stronger in SF, for spider images only, indicating a threat-specific VWM bias. Thus, contrary to the assumptions made by most cognitive models of anxiety, an explicit memory bias was found.     

Attentional bias to threat in clinical anxiety states

Abstract

Attentional responses to threat stimuli were assessed in anxious patients, normal controls, and subjects who had recovered from a clinical anxiety state. The main aims of the study were: (1) to replicate MacLeod, Mathews, and Tata's (1986) finding of an attentional bias to threat in currently anxious patients compared with normal control subjects; (2) to assess whether the bias is related to the predominant worries of anxious patients; and (3) to investigate whether the bias is present in recovered anxious patients. The original finding of an anxiety-related attentional bias was replicated. The results indicated that the extent to which anxious patients selectively attended to social threat words was associated with the seventy of their social worries. The attentional responses of the recovered anxious group were not significantly differentiated from those of the currently anxious or normal control groups.     

Effect of a positive emotional state on interpretation bias for threat in children with anxiety disorders

The authors examined the effect of a positive emotional state on interpretation bias for threat in children with anxiety disorders. Participants were 34 children with anxiety disorders and 34 children without any psychological disorders who were randomly assigned to either a positive or neutral emotion induction condition. Consistent with the broaden-and-build theory, children with anxiety disorders exhibited an interpretation bias for threat, but not when they were in a positive emotional state. Furthermore, results indicated that positive emotional state made a unique prediction of interpretation bias score, whereas state anxiety did not. Findings are discussed with reference to theory, clinical implications, and suggestions for future research.     

Processing impairments in OCD: it is more than inhibition!

The study aimed to address a significant gap in the literature on inhibition impairments in OCD, by concurrently studying facilitation and inhibition processes and the effect of threat on these twin mechanisms. Participants were 20 persons with symptomatic OCD, 11 with remitted OCD, 20 with panic disorder and 20 normal control participants. Participants were required to respond to words that were either neutral or personally threatening, which during an immediately preceding trail, were responded to as targets (facilitation) or inhibited as non-targets (inhibition). OCD participants displayed greater facilitation and reduced inhibition, differences that were related to their diagnostic status but unrelated to symptomatic status. Threat had no effect on facilitation, but exacerbated inhibition problems in the symptomatic OCD and panic groups. This research suggests that underlying differences in both facilitation and inhibition, combined with influences of activated threat-schema on inhibition may play a role in the development and maintenance of OCD.     

An anxiety-related bias in semantic activation when processing threat/neutral homographs

Three experiments are reported comparing high and low-trait anxious subjects in terms of their patterns of semantic activation in response to ambiguous primes, with one threat-related and one neutral meaning. Such primes were followed by targets related to either their threat or neutral meaning, or by unrelated targets, in a lexical decision task. Experiments 1 to 3 employed stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) of 750 msec, 500 msec, and 1250 msec, respectively. At 500-msec SOA all subjects showed facilitation for both meanings. At 750-msec SOA the only significant priming effect was that for the threat-related meaning in the high-anxiety group, and a similar trend was found at 1250-msec SOA. Consideration of the patterns of priming for targets following ambiguous threat/neutral primes suggest that at the longer SOAs, high-anxiety subjects consciously “lock on” to a threatening interpretation if one has been made available by earlier automatic spreading activation.     

The effects of self-focus on attentional biases in social anxiety:An ERP study

Cognitive theories of social anxiety disorder suggest that biased attention plays a key role in maintaining symptoms. These biases include self-focus and attention to socially threatening stimuli in the environment. The goal of this study was to utilize ERPs that are elicited by a change detection task to examine biases in selective attention (i.e., N2pc) and working memory maintenance (i.e., contralateral delay activity; CDA). Additionally, the effect of self-focus was examined using false heart rate feedback. In support of the manipulation, self-focus cues resulted in greater self-reported self-consciousness and task interference, enhanced anterior P2 amplitude and reduced SPN amplitude. Moreover, P2 amplitude for self-focus cues was correlated with reduced task performance for socially anxious subjects only. The difference in P2 amplitude between self-focus and standard cues was correlated with social anxiety independent of depression. As hypothesized, socially anxious participants (n = 20) showed early selection and maintenance of disgust faces relative to neutral faces as indicated by the N2pc and CDA components. Nonanxious controls (n = 22) did not show these biases. During self-focus cues, controls showed marginal evidence of biased selection for disgust faces, whereas socially anxious subjects showed no bias in this condition. Controls showed an ipsilateral delay activity after being cued to attend to one hemifield. Overall, this study supports early and persistent attentional bias for social threat in socially anxious individuals. Furthermore, self-focus may disrupt these biases. These findings and supplementary data are discussed in light of cognitive models of social anxiety disorder, recent empirical findings, and treatment.     

Anticipated outgroup evaluations and intergroup bias

A study is reported that tests the hypothesis that group members exhibit intergroup bias in response to the belief that outsiders will discriminate against them. To this end, two experimental conditions are included in which subjects anticipate either biased evaluations or fair evaluations respectively. In a control condition, subjects do not expect to be evaluated from an external source. Results indicated, as expected, that those who anticipated biased evaluations from an outgroup exhibited bias themselves, while those who anticipated fair evaluations exhibited outgroup favouritism. The fact that control subjects exhibited the same degree of bias as those who anticipated biased evaluations from the outgroup poses some difficulties for the hypothesized connection between anticipated discrimination and intergoup bias. Thus, it appears that intergroup bias is the rule and not the exception in an intergroup context. Nevertheless, it is clear that anticipated evaluations of outgroup members can effect intergroup bias.     

Challenge and threat states: Cardiovascular,affective, and cognitive responses to a sports-related speech task

This study examined the relationship among cardiovascular responses indicative of challenge and threat states, self-efficacy, perceived control, and emotions before an upcoming competition. Using a repeated-measures design, 48 collegiate athletes talked about an upcoming competition (sport-specific speech task) and the topic of friendship (control speech task), whilst cardiovascular responses (heart rate, preejection period, cardiac output, and total peripheral resistance) were collected and self-report measures of self-efficacy, perceived control, and emotions completed. Findings showed that participants with a physiological threat response reported higher levels of self-efficacy and excitement. Further, none of the other emotions or the cognitive appraisals of challenge and threat predicted cardiovascular patterns indicative of either a challenge or threat state. Thus, cardiovascular responses and self-report measures of self-efficacy, perceived control, and emotions did not correlate in the manner predicted by the theory of challenge and threat states in athletes. This finding may reflect methodological aspects, or that perhaps highly efficacious individuals believe they can perform well and so the task itself is more threatening because failure would indicate under-performance.     

Incremental Validity of Perceived Control Dimensions in the Differential Prediction of Interpretive Biases for Threat

This study evaluated whether a diminished perception of control over environmental and interoceptive events differentially predicted interpretive biases for threat for ambiguous scenarios. The sample had 95 participants without a history of psychopathology. Results indicated that the internal dimension of the Anxiety Control Questionnaire (ACQ; R. M. Rapee, M. G. Craske, T. A. Brown, & D. H. Barlow, 1996) was predictive of interpretive biases for internal scenarios above and beyond demographic variables, subclinical panic attack history, and state anxiety; the external control subscale of the ACQ also was predictive of internal rank-ordered responses. The ACQ external dimension was predictive of interpretive responses for external scenarios beyond the effects accounted for by the other predictor variables, including perceived control for internal events. These findings provide initial correlational evidence consistent with cognitive–behavioral accounts of panic disorder that posit a perceived lack of control over aversive events may exacerbate an interpretive bias for threat.     

Attentional biases and memory for emotional stimuli in men and male rhesus monkeys

We examined attentional biases for social and non-social emotional stimuli in young adult men and compared the results to those of male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) previously tested in a similar dot-probe task (King et al. in Psychoneuroendocrinology 37(3):396–409, 2012). Recognition memory for these stimuli was also analyzed in each species, using a recognition memory task in humans and a delayed non-matching-to-sample task in monkeys. We found that both humans and monkeys displayed a similar pattern of attentional biases toward threatening facial expressions of conspecifics. The bias was significant in monkeys and of marginal significance in humans. In addition, humans, but not monkeys, exhibited an attentional bias away from negative non-social images. Attentional biases for social and non-social threat differed significantly, with both species showing a pattern of vigilance toward negative social images and avoidance of negative non-social images. Positive stimuli did not elicit significant attentional biases for either species. In humans, emotional content facilitated the recognition of non-social images, but no effect of emotion was found for the recognition of social images. Recognition accuracy was not affected by emotion in monkeys, but response times were faster for negative relative to positive images. Altogether, these results suggest shared mechanisms of social attention in humans and monkeys, with both species showing a pattern of selective attention toward threatening faces of conspecifics. These data are consistent with the view that selective vigilance to social threat is the result of evolutionary constraints. Yet, selective attention to threat was weaker in humans than in monkeys, suggesting that regulatory mechanisms enable non-anxious humans to reduce sensitivity to social threat in this paradigm, likely through enhanced prefrontal control and reduced amygdala activation. In addition, the findings emphasize important differences in attentional biases to social versus non-social threat in both species. Differences in the impact of emotional stimuli on recognition memory between monkeys and humans will require further study, as methodological differences in the recognition tasks may have affected the results.     

A cognitive model of pathological worry

We present an evidence-based model of pathological worry in which worry arises from an interaction between involuntary (bottom-up) processes, such as habitual biases in attention and interpretation favouring threat content, and voluntary (top-down) processes, such as attentional control. At a pre-conscious level, these processes influence the competition between mental representations when some correspond to the intended focus of attention and others to threat distracters. Processing biases influence the probability of threat representations initially intruding into awareness as negative thoughts. Worry in predominantly verbal form then develops, influenced by conscious processes such as attempts to resolve the perceived threat and the redirection of attentional control resources to worry content, as well as the continuing influence of habitual processing biases. After describing this model, we present evidence for each component process and for their causal role in pathological worry, together with implications for new directions in the treatment of pathological worry.