Personality and Health in the 1980s: Psychosomatic Medicine Revisited?

This special issue is a sign of a resurgence of interest in the role of personality in health not seen since the 1940s and early 1950s when the promises of the psychosomatic approach to health and illness appeared to be the greatest. This new look at personality and health represented by contributions to this special issue attempts to address the limitations of earlier work in psychosomatic medicine by making more explicit efforts to define personality variables precisely, to distinguish these variables from conceptually related psychological constructs, and to embed them in a body of theory and empirical research. This new work also attempts to remedy methodological limitations of earlier work by placing greater emphasis on prospective research and highlighting distinctions between symptom reports, illness behavior, and actual illness. However, the new work and earlier work in psychosomatic medicine share certain working assumptions, for example, a primary emphasis on the relatively direct impact of personality on disease onset, an assumption that personality variables operate in interaction with stressful events, and a frequent emphasis on general susceptibility to disease. Moreover, this new work frequently risks the same methodological pitfalls that limited scientific progress in psychosomatic medicine. We argue that the rapid rise and decline of psychosomatic medicine is most likely to be repeated in research on personality and health in the 1980s if reasonable criteria for considering personality variables a risk factor for disease are not precisely defined, disease endpoints (the dependent variable) are not assessed precisely, personality variables of interest (the independent variable) are not empirically distinguished from other related psychological variables, and complex relationships among risk factors are not taken into account. It is emphasized that models drawn from personality research cannot be transferred unchanged to the health arena without risking false inferences about the role of personality in health.     

Performance Appraisal Process Research in the 1980s: What Has It Contributed to Appraisals in Use?

In the early 1980s, Landy and Farr (1980) and Feldman (1981) redirected performance appraisal research from issues related to the development of psychometrically sound rating scales to those involving the cognitive processes of raters. Since that time, several reviews have attempted to translate principles from social cognition and cognitive psychology to the specific conditions of formal appraisal systems in work-oriented organizations. In addition, a number of empirical studies have been conducted on this topic. This article reviews empirical research during the 1980s that focused on performance appraisal processes, particularly the research that has focused upon rating accuracy. The review is structured around a three-stage process model of gathering, storing, and retrieving information about social stimuli for the purposes of rating performance. Factors affecting this process are clustered into four categories: appraisal settings, ratees, raters, and the nature of the scales used for the appraisal. Once reviewed, the research is evaluated in terms of its contributions to improving the quality of appraisal systems as they are used in organizations.     

What in the world are the ways things might have been?

Robert Stalnaker is an actualist who holds that merely possible worlds are uninstantiated properties that might have been instantiated. Stalnaker also holds that there are no metaphysically impossible worlds: uninstantiated properties that couldn't have been instantiated. These views motivate Stalnaker's "two dimensional" account of the necessary a posteriori on which there is no single proposition that is both necessary and a posteriori. For a (metaphysically) necessary proposition is true in all (metaphysically) possible worlds. If there were necessary a posteriori propositions, that would mean that there were propositions true in all possible worlds but which could only be known to be true by acquiring empirical evidence. Consider such a purported proposition P. The role of empirical evidence for establishing P's truth would have to be to rule out worlds in which P is false. If there were no such worlds to be ruled out, we would not require evidence for P. But by hypothesis, P is necessary and so true in all metaphysically possible worlds. And on Stalnaker's view, the metaphysically possible worlds are all the worlds there are. So there can be no proposition that is true in all possible worlds, but that we require evidence to know. In this way, the motivation for Stalnaker's two dimensional account of the necessary a posteriori rests on his denying that there are metaphysically impossible Worlds. I argue that given his view of what possible worlds are, Stalnaker has no principled reason for denying that there are metaphysically impossible worlds. If I am right, this undercuts Stalnaker's motivation for his two dimensional account of the necessary a posteriori.

Comparative Philosophy and the Tertium: Comparing What with What,and in What Respect?

Comparison is fundamental to the practice and subject-matter of philosophy, but has received scant attention by philosophers. This is even so in “comparative philosophy,” which literally distinguishes itself from other philosophy by being “comparative.” In this article, the need for a philosophy of comparison is suggested. What we compare with what, and in what respect it is done, poses a series of intriguing and intricate questions. In Part One, I offer a problematization of the tertium comparationis (the third of comparison) by examining conceptualizations of similarity, family resemblance, and analogy, which it is sometimes argued can do without a tertium comparationis. In Part Two, I argue that a third of comparison is already required to determine what is to be compared, and insofar as that determination precedes the comparison that tertium may be called “pre-comparative.” This leads me to argue against incomparability and to show how anything can indeed be compared to anything. In Part Three, I relate my arguments to what is today commonly labelled “comparative philosophy.” Finally, I raise some questions of ontology and politics in order to demonstrate the relevance of a philosophy of comparison.     

Teaching science at the university level: What about the ethics?

Ethics in science is integrated into an interdisciplinary science course called “Science, Technology and Society” (STS). This paper focuses on the section of the course called “Societal Impact on Science and Technology”, which includes the topics Misconduct in Science, Scientific Freedom and Responsibility, and the Use of Human Subjects in Research. Students in the course become aware not only of the science itself, but also of the process of science, some aspects of the history of science, the social responsibilities of scientists, and the ethical issues in science. Teaching techniques include the instructor sharing experiences as a scientist with the students, sharing books and resources with students, utilizing current sources of information like the weekly “Science Times”, inviting guest speakers, and utilizing portfolios to assess student learning. This paper was delivered orally at the National Academy of Sciences’ “Convocation on Scientific Conduct”, 6–7 June 1994.     

What’s the point? Golden and Labrador retrievers living in kennels do not understand human pointing gestures

In many studies that have investigated whether dogs’ capacities to understand human pointing gestures are aspects of evolutionary or developmental social competences, family-owned dogs have been compared to shelter dogs. However, for most of these studies, the origins of shelter dogs were unknown. Some shelter dogs may have lived with families before entering shelters, and from these past experiences, they may have learned to understand human gestures. Furthermore, there is substantial variation in the methodology and analytic approaches used in such studies (e.g. different pointing protocols, different treatment of trials with no-choice response and indoor vs. outdoor experimental arenas). Such differences in methodologies and analysis techniques used make it difficult to compare results obtained from different studies and may account for the divergent results obtained. We thus attempted to control for several parameters by carrying out a test on dynamic proximal and distal pointing. We studied eleven kennel dogs of known origin that were born and raised in a kennels with limited human interaction. This group was compared to a group of eleven dogs comparable in terms of breed, sex and age that had lived with human families since they were puppies. Our results demonstrate that pet dogs outperform kennel dogs in their comprehension of proximal and distal pointing, regardless of whether trials where no-choice was made were considered as errors or were excluded from statistical analysis, meaning that dogs living in kennels do not understand pointing gestures. Even if genetic effects of the domestication process on human–dog relationships cannot be considered as negligible, our data suggest that dogs need to learn human pointing gestures and thus underscore the importance of ontogenetic processes.     

What’s in a Dao?: Ontology and Semiotics in Laozi and Zhuangzi

The present essay examines the conflicting ontological assumptions that one can find behind the word dao in the texts of the Laozi and Zhuangzi and argues that the relative indifference to these texts toward whether or not dao has an ontic reality should not be considered a flaw of early Daoism. Rather, the historical process by which the term dao collects various possible ontological implications can be thought of as a philosophical stance in its own right. That is, if the terms which one is obliged to use in discussing the immaterial necessarily hide, at least as much as they explain, the nature of Being, then it is a reasonable response to decline to ground one??s ethics in an ontology, and that while the resulting philosophy may not qualify as a fully-adumbrated system, this does not diminish its potential usefulness.     

Applying Science and Applied Science: What’s the Difference?

Prandtl’s work on the boundary layer theory is an interesting example for illustrating several important issues in philosophy of science such as the relation between theories and models and whether it is possible to distinguish, in a principled way, between pure and applied science. In what follows I discuss several proposals by the symposium participants regarding the interpretation of Prandtl’s work and whether it should be characterized as an instance of applied science. My own interpretation of this example (1999) emphasised the degree of autonomy embedded in Prandtl’s boundary layer model and the way it became integrated in the larger theoretical context of hydrodynamics. In addition to extending that discussion here I also claim that the characterization of applied science which formed the basis for the symposium does not enable us to successfully distinguish applied science from the general practice of ‘applying’ basic scientific knowledge in a variety of contexts.     

Television sex roles in the 1980s: Do viewers' sex and sex role orientation change the picture?

This study investigated viewer perceptions of female and male television characters as a result of viewer sex and sex role orientation. Young adult viewers (N=677) rated television characters and themselves using the Personal Attributes Questionnaire (PAQ). Viewers were classified as feminine, masculine, androgynous, or undifferentiated in their PAQ orientations. The television characters were four men and four women who shared the lead and a working relationship on crime action shows. Results indicated that viewers rated all the male characters as stereotypical masculine, but only one female character as stereotypical feminine. Viewer sex and sex role orientations did affect ratings. Viewer sex had a greater impact on the ratings of female characters than on the ratings of male characters. Female viewers tended to rate female characters as higher in instrumental and masculine traits than male viewers did. Results based on sex role orientation of the viewer were inconsistent across characters, but in general, undifferentiated viewers rated both male and female characters as low in expressive and instrumental traits compared to how androgynous viewers rated them. Further, a masculine sex role orientation appeared to block perception of expressive traits in both male and female characters.This research was supported in part by a University of Akron faculty research grant.     

Epistemicism and Nihilism about Vagueness: What’s the Difference?

In this paper I argue, first, that the only difference between Epistemicism and Nihilism about vagueness is semantic rather than ontological, and second, that once it is clear what the difference between these views is, Nihilism is a much more plausible view of vagueness than Epistemicism. Given the current popularity of certain epistemicist views (most notably, Williamson’s), this result is, I think, of interest.     

Creative Cognition and Psychosis Vulnerability: What’s the Difference?

Evidence from experimental psychology provides unequivocal support for enhanced creativity among individuals who are prone to psychotic and mood disorders. At the same time, there is strong epidemiological evidence for greater incidence of creative achievement among those diagnosed with bipolar disorder (but not schizophrenia). This review examines the evidence for common factors predisposing an individual to creativity and psychosis, as well as factors that distinguish the capacity for creative achievement from the creative potential that may be inherent in psychosis vulnerability. Factors implicated as common to creative potential and psychosis vulnerability include enhanced divergent thinking, reduced latent inhibition and preattentive filtering mechanisms; on the other hand, greater cognitive flexibility, motivation, and openness to experience tend to be associated with creative achievement, but not psychosis. This evidence is considered with respect to the utility of tailored vocational interventions to effectively harness creative potential, which may be useful for young individuals in the early stages of illness or their unaffected family members.     

Perceptions of wisdom: What is it and who has it?

One hundred fifty-five men and 233 women, aged 20 to 79 years, were asked to name both the most wise and the most interpersonally wise persons they knew personally and to give the age and sex of each. Participants were also asked for the areas in which their nominees were particularly wise. Overall, men and women responded similarly. The subjects tended to nominate individuals who were older than they were; the difference between their own age and their nominees' age decreased with increasing age. Subjects nominated males more often than females as wise and this tendency increased with the subjects' age. With the exception of older women, participants nominated females more often than males as interpersonally wise. When asked to report the areas in which their wise nominees were particularly wise, subjects tended to mention specific skill areas (e.g., business or science) for male nominees and interpersonal skill areas for female nominees.Please note that Nancy W. Denney is deceased.     

Using principles of cognitive science to improve science learning in middle school: What works when and for whom?

Four principles of cognitive science were used to make systematic revisions in middle school science instructional modules from two kinds of curriculum: one popular textbook series and one popular hands‐on series (two modules each). Schools were randomly assigned to 1 of the 3 arms (cognitive science modifications with professional development, active control with professional development, or business‐as‐usual). Two cohorts of students were followed in each arm for each setting. There were significant benefits of the cognitive science intervention, but the nature of effects varied for the two settings and curricula. For the text‐based curriculum, positive effects of cognitive science modifications were concentrated in classrooms with lower proportions of underrepresented minority students. For the hands‐on curriculum, there were positive effects that were not linked to school composition. Participation in the active control did not significantly improve student learning. Implications for policy and research are discussed.     

What goes well with physics? Measuring and altering the image of science

Background. In view of the shortage of students majoring in science, we examined the image of physics in terms of students' implicit, automatic associations with physics. Aims. To describe the specific image of physics that might alienate students (difficulty, masculinity, heteronomy) and test an intervention for altering the image. Samples. In Study 1 the sample consisted of 63 school students (11th grade) and in Study 2 the sample consisted of 71 undergraduates. Methods. Study 1 measured participants' implicit associations between physics (relative to English) and the image dimensions of difficulty, masculinity and heteronomy, implicit attitudes towards and identification with physics using latency data (Implicit Association Test; IAT) and explicit attitudes using a questionnaire. Study 2 was an experimental treatment that required reading a text (treatment group) that emphasized the importance of discourse and creativity for science versus a school textbook for physics (control group). Dependent variables: implicit attitudes (IAT). Results. Students in Study 1 associated physics (relative to English) more easily with words referring to difficulty (than to ease), to males (than to females), to heteronomy (than to self‐realization), to unpleasantness (relative to pleasant words) and to others (relative to words referring to self). The three image aspects of difficulty, masculinity and heteronomy predicted explicit attitudes. Participants in the treatment group in Study 2 showed a significant reduction of the IAT effects compared to the control group. Conclusions. The findings indicate that students' negative explicit attitudes towards physics coincide with negative implicit associations about physics. An intervention addressing the alteration of implicit associations proved to be fruitful. Implications for science education are discussed.