AQUINAS ON ATTACHMENT, ENVY, AND HATRED IN THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA

This essay examines Aquinas's discussions of hatred in Summa Theologica I‐II, Q. 29 and II‐II, Q. 34, in order to retrieve an account of what contemporary theorists of the emotions call its cognitive contents. In Aquinas's view, hatred is constituted as a passion by a narrative pattern that includes its intentional object, beliefs, perceptions of changes in bodily states, and motivated desires. This essay endorses Aquinas's broadly “cognitivist” account of passional hatred, in line with his way of treating passions in general. I suggest that Aquinas's account of hatred's arising out of attachment is compelling. However, I also argue that if Aquinas's treatment of hatred is to help us understand the phenomenon of hate, where classes of people are abominated for an identity they bear, and to avoid equating an oppressor's hatred with that of the oppressed for the oppressor, the cognitive pathway to hatred must be broader than through envy.     

AQUINAS'S ARGUMENT AGAINST SELF-HATRED

Aquinas's argument against the possibility of genuine self‐hatred runs counter to modern intuitions about self‐hatred as an explanatorily central notion in psychology, and as an effect of alienation. Aquinas's argument does not deny that persons experience hatred for themselves. It can be read either as the claim that the self‐hater mistakes what she feels toward herself as hatred, or that, though she hates what she believes is her “self,” she actually hates only traits of herself. I argue that the argument fails on both readings. The first reading entails that all passions are really self‐love, and so is incompatible with Aquinas's own “cognitivist” view of what it is that distinguishes specific passions in experience. The second reading entails that persons have no phenomenal access to “self,” rendering self‐reference—how it is that the self can be an intentional object of conscious mental states—a mystery. Augustine's claim, which Aquinas accepts on authority, that all sin originates in inordinate self‐love seems to entail the impossibility of genuine self‐hatred because both thinkers fail to distinguish between two distinct forms of self‐love: amor concupiscentiae and amor benevolentiae.     

Shame in Relation to the Body,Sex, and Death: A Clinical Exploration of the Psychotic Levels of Shame

This paper explores the topic of shame in relation to the body, viewing it as the expression of a basic conflict that threatens to obstruct the growth of personality by breaking up the body-mind relationship. The paper presents the psychoanalysis of a psychotic patient whose paranoid shame was associated with the delusion of being noticed. During this analysis, the patient's bodily manifestations and hatred were acknowledged as related to his getting closer to an authentic existence of his own. Particular emphasis is given to the analyst's involvement in the analytic process, in the form of both bodily countertransference and dream activation. The containment and working-through of concrete aspects of hatred and death anxiety, together with the analysand's recognizing the value of sensory perception of his own body, fostered an abatement of symptoms, including his tendency to flee and to attempt to burst the confines of his body. The activation of a connection with the body seems a prerequisite to the development of abstract thinking. The paper describes similar dynamics in two vignettes of less dramatic clinical cases.     

Under the volcano: varieties of anger and their transformation

This paper seeks to illustrate the ambiguity of the affect of 'anger' which masks a number of subtly different emotions observable in clinical work. The author differentiates between anger, rage and hatred in terms of the dialectical relationship between ego and self and pays particular attention to why it is that for some patients, experiences of anger may be harnessed creatively into development, whereas for others, they remain self destructive. Using illustrations from work with two patients in analysis, the author describes how a persistent grievance originating in the earliest stages of life is linked with hatred and can lead to a defensive self structure. It is suggested that the clues to the presence of a grievance and to its potential transformation are likely to be observable first in the analyst's countertransference in the form of an all-embracing emotional strait jacket. Analysts' capacity to tolerate their own hatred is crucial to the transformation of a patient's grievance.     

Working with chronic and relentless self‐hatred,self‐harm and existential shame: a clinical study and reflections

This paper is the first of a two‐part series which explores some of the theoretical and experiential reference points that have emerged in my work with people whose relationship to their body and/or sense of self is dominated by self‐hatred and (what Hultberg describes as) existential shame. The first paper focuses on self‐hatred and the second paper focuses on shame. This first paper is structured around vignettes taken from a 14‐year analysis with a woman who was bulimic, self‐harmed and repeatedly described herself as ‘feeling like a piece of shit’. It draws together elements of Jung's concepts of the complex and symbol, and Laplanche's enigmatic signifier to focus on experiences of ‘inner otherness’ around which we are unconsciously organized. It also brings Jung's understanding that emotion is the chief source of consciousness into conversation with Laplanche's approach to the transference which is that by being aware that they do not ‘know’, the analyst provides a ‘hollow’ in which the patient's analytic process can evolve. These combinations of ideas are linked speculatively to emerging understandings of the neuroscience of perception and throughout the paper clinical material is used to illustrate these discussions.     

Knowing hatred2,3

Hatred is known to be a common phenomenon and a lot has been written about this affect. However, the author believes that the more we read and write about hate the further away we find ourselves from a real sense of understanding of this so familiar and yet so elusive experience. She feels that using a single concept to describe ‘hatred’ seems to be a simplification of the matter, since it consists of a chain of affects that does not lend itself to easy theoretical or experiential distinction. In this paper the author aims at ‘knowing’ the experience of hatred as the individual's reaction to an unbearable existential excess, that is, as the psychic attempt to handle an emotional profusion in the context of human relation and in relation to it. The emotional abundance that the psyche cannot contain and process by itself is dealt with by the defensive use of simplification, detachment and distancing. An attempt is made to understand the relation between psychic existing and hatred, between craving, desiring and hate, between passionate aliveness‐or a passion to live‐ and the difficulty in containing the excessive dimension of it. The author illustrates her thesis through a reading of Tolstoy's ‘Kreutzer sonata’ as a monologue of hatred.     

Male and female images in a case of frigidity (discussion)

Abstract

The case of Anna presented by Professor Giliberti is discussed from an interpersonal perspective. Attention is given to Anna's real experiences of hypocrisy, social inadequacy, hatred and blame projection. Paranoid aspects are emphasized and seen as connected with a disparity between appearance and reality in the communicative pattern of the family.     

Growing Up With Hatred: A Psychoanalytic Developmental Perspective

This article looks at how hatred affects development: how children may come to hate, the impact of hatred on a child’s development, the evolving awareness of hatred, and how we may try to insulate a child from being the object of hatred and prejudice. What is suggested is that we aid children in developing a “not REALLY me” me; one akin to the “me” that a psychoanalyst develops in response to being the object of transference.     

Catharine Macaulay on the Paradox of Paternal Authority in Hobbesian Politics

Catharine Macaulay's first political pamphlet, “Loose remarks on certain positions to be found in Mr. Hobbes's philosophical rudiments of government and society with a short sketch for a democratical form of government in a letter to Signor Paoli,” published in London in 1769, has received no significant scholarly attention in over two hundred years. It is of primary interest because of the light it sheds on Macaulay's critique of patriarchal politics, which helps to establish a new line of thinking about the historian as an early feminist writer. It appears she was working from an unauthorized edition of the Thomas Hobbes's De Cive (1647) entitled Philosophicall Rudiments of Government and Society, printed by a royalist bookseller in London 1651. Some errors in this translation may explain Macaulay's skewed understanding of Hobbess argument in support of the premises of monarchy. Her intriguing analysis of paternal authority in “Loose Remarks” anticipates recent feminist explorations of Hobbesian political thought.     

Heidegger?s Thought and Nazism

This article rejects the idea that Heidegger's Nazism derives from his philosophical thought. No connection has convincingly been shown to hold between the ontological apparatus of Being and Timeand any political orientation. The elaboration of the concept of being in the later work needs to be understood as Heidegger's own reaction to the activism of his earlier thought which in the absence of any principle of respect for other human beings could provide no moral basis for resistance to Nazi ideology. The tensions between the circumstances of Heidegger's early life - rural, conservative, and Catholic - and the Nietzschean modernism of his philosophical thought are explored. It is suggested that there were analogous tensions between tradition and the modern world in Nazism and that it was Heidegger's hatred of that world that led him to respond favorably to some (but not all) of the themes of Nazi thought.     

Remarks on aggression

This paper attempts to draw attention to the difference between the states of mind and inner worlds of neurotic, borderline and psychopathic patients, with reference to different types of destructiveness: anger in the neurotic patient; desperate vengeful hatred in the borderline paranoid; and a cold addiction to violence in the psychopath. Discussion focuses on technical issues and the need to meet the psychopathic patient where he really is, in the inner bleak emotional cemetery he may be inhabiting. Although most patients refuse to stay put in the neat schematic categories outlined, they do seem to appreciate and to need the therapist's recognition of the specific quality of these vastly different states of mind.     

"i hope someone murders your mother!": an exploration of extreme support for the death penalty

Although general support for the death penalty is decreasing, a segment of the pro-death penalty population continues to support capital punishment with great vehemence. Extreme support for the death penalty is expressed through angry, confrontational, and sometimes threatening verbal attacks against condemned prisoners and opponents of capital punishment. Expressions of this support are especially strong around the time of highly publicized executions. This paper explores extreme support for capital punishment in the months before and after Tennessee's first execution in 40 years, using data gathered from newspaper reports, letters to the editor, interviews with death penalty opponents, and the authors' own experiences. Linking Bowers and Pierce's brutalization theory with community psychology theory, we explore ways in which highly publicized executions seem to unleash of hatred and violent intention among a number of death penalty supporters and how this behavior may illuminate research of increases in homicide after highly executions.     

SELF‐FORGIVENESS AND FORGIVENESS

If the notion of a victim's forgiveness encounters scepticism in today's world, more so the notion of self‐forgiveness by the offender. However, a failure to forgive oneself, when self‐forgiveness is appropriate, may be detrimental to one's moral and psychological well‐being. Self‐forgiveness is called for when guilt, self‐hatred and shame reach high levels. Further, a third party's assurance that the offence is forgivable may contribute considerably to the completion of the self‐forgiveness process. This article explores the notion of forgiveness of self and compares it with the notion of forgiveness of others. In addition, guilt and shame, right and wrong, repentance and dealing with the consequences of harmful actions are examined in the context of self‐forgiveness.     

Maternal anxiety and toddler depressive/anxiety behaviors: The direct and moderating role of children's focused attention

Attention mechanisms have a pertinent role in shaping developmental pathways to anxiety and depressive disorders. The current study examined the direct and interactive associations between maternal anxiety symptoms, children's focused attention, and children’s anxiety and depression behaviors in early toddlerhood. Participants were 150 mother-child dyads (50 % female) that were assessed at two time points. At 12 months of child age, mothers reported about their anxiety symptoms and children's focused attention. Children's focused attention was also observed and rated from an individual play task. At 18 months of age, mothers reported about children's anxiety and depression behaviors. Focused attention predicted child anxiety and depressive behaviors, with different patterns of associations between observed and reported measures of attention. There was also a significant interaction between maternal anxiety symptoms and observed children's focused attention. A positive association between maternal anxiety symptoms and child anxiety and depression symptoms was evident only for children with above-average levels of observed focused attention during play. Results suggest that different aspects of focused attention play a role in maternal reported anxiety and depression behaviors in early development and may modulate the intergenerational transmission of anxiety.     

Ressentiment and power: On Reginster's The Will to Nothingness

A critical discussion of Bernard Reginster's book The Will to Nothingness. The contribution engages with Reginster's interpretation of Nietzschean ressentiment, arguing that it is an essentially interpersonal attitude in two different senses. It is a response to a social situation of structural deprivation, and it involves an element of antagonism toward those who are better off within this social structure. The contribution then discusses Reginster's claim that modern morality restores the sense of power of the masses by adjusting the goals that they aim to pursue. I argue that this interesting interpretation does not do full justice to the themes of hostility or hatred that permeate the Genealogy of Morals, extending from Nietzsche's discussion of the slave revolt to his treatments of the bad conscience and of ascetic ideals.     

Attention allocation towards own face is pronounced during middle adolescence: an eye‐tracking study

Increased interest in the self has long been deemed to be one of the most peculiar characteristics of adolescence. On the basis of this, we conjectured that attentiveness towards self‐relevant information, especially one's own face, becomes more pronounced during the middle adolescence. The present study tested this hypothesis by comparing the pattern of visuospatial attention allocation to their own face among early, middle and late adolescent males using an eye‐tracking methodology. The results have shown a clear pattern of increased attention allocation towards their own face over a close friend's and a stranger's face in middle adolescents, but fixation durations on their own and a friend's face did not differ from each other in early and late adolescents. In addition, middle adolescents showed higher public self‐consciousness and a lower level of self‐esteem than early and late adolescents, respectively. These results indicate that attention allocation towards one's own face is more pronounced during middle adolescence, and is associated with increased interest in their own attributes.     

Interfaith etiquette in an age of Islamophobia

Islamophobia represents one of the greatest moral dilemmas of our time. Anti‐Muslim hostility and hatred, driven by racism, has manifested itself in exclusionary, discriminatory, and violent actions toward Muslims and those perceived as Muslims. By most metrics, Islamophobia in the United States is only getting worse. This article draws on Krister Stendahl's rules of interfaith engagement as a means of offering Christians a blueprint for how to reach out and engage with their Muslim neighbors in an age of Islamophobia.     

Working with chronic and relentless self‐hatred,self‐harm,and existential shame: a clinical study and reflections (Paper 2 of 2)

This second of two papers focuses on the shame which emerged in the first 14 years of analysis of a woman who was bulimic, self‐harmed, and repeatedly described herself as ‘feeling like a piece of shit’. To explore this intense and pervasive shame I draw on Jung's and Laplanche's emphasis on experiences of unresolvable, non‐pathological ‘foreignness’ or ‘otherness’ at the heart of the psyche. Images, metaphors, elements of clinical experience, and working hypotheses from a number of analytic traditions are used to flesh out this exploration. These include Kilborne's use of Pirandello's image of shame as like a ‘hole in the paper sky’ which, I suggest, points to a crack in subjectivity, and reveals our belief in the efficacy of the self to be illusory. Hultberg's observations on shame as having an existential mode (function) are also explored, as is the nature of analytic truth. Using these ideas I describe my patient's process of finding some small but freeing space in relation to her shame and self‐hatred. Through enduring and learning from her shame in analysis she realized that it was part of a desperate unconscious attempt to draw close to her troubled father and so to ‘love him better’.     

Impervious and intrusive: The impenetrable object in transference and countertransference

The author describes an internal object that he calls the ‘impenetrable object’ which has two characteristics: being impervious to the projections from the patient and being intrusive, i.e. projecting into the patient. It arises out of an early relationship with a mother who may be generally disturbed or traumatized so that she is unable to take in or tolerate the child's projections and may use the child as a receptacle for her own projections. He links the concept of an impenetrable object with other concepts such as Williams's ‘reversal of the container–contained relationship’ and Green's ‘dead mother’. If such an object dominates the patient's internal world, it can lead to severe difficulties in the analytic process. Interpretations may be experienced as violent projections from the analyst which the patient has to ward off and the analyst may enact an impervious or intrusive object in various ways. The author describes a case in which such dynamics played a significant role. He argues that intensive work in the countertransference is required to detect subtle enactments and allow a shift in the analyst, which in turn can enable change in the patient. He gives clinical material that demonstrates such work by the analyst and illustrates the shift from an impenetrable object to a more permeable one in the patient's internal world.     

Reforming England's Blasphemy Law to Protect the Individual

Using a framework of legal analysis proposed by Robert Post, this article examines the novel possibility of a reform in England's current criminal law of blasphemy. As previous attempts to include faiths other than Christianity faltered politically and theoretically, the article proposes a reform of the law to protect individual citizens and not religious groups. Different from incitement to racial or religious hatred legislation, this new offense would rest on what Joel Feinberg calls 'vicarious harm', the harm done directly to a person by deliberately wounding her sense of the sacred. The essay takes as given the propositions that equality before the law is desirable, a clear and ordered criminal offense is better than a vague criminal offense, and, as given specifically by the circumstances in England, a reverence for the transcendent sacred is privileged above other forms of reverence.