The 'black hole' in the inner universe

Summary The metaphor of the 'black hole' has been borrowed from astronomy in order to describe certain phenomena occurring in work with autistic and psychotic children. This metaphor is different from Tustin's concept of the 'black hole'. I shall attempt to describe another phenomenon: not that of the hole in the self, resulting from premature separation, but the hole in the object that the autistic or psychotic child is relating to - or, rather, turning away from. I describe an autistic boy's need to protect himself against the catastrophic experience of relating to an object with such a hole in its mind. That is a particular kind of a depressed object which emits deadness, instead of the lively, responsive affect that the child should get in communication. It is not an intrusive object, but it sucks in and drowns energy. If the experience of relating to the 'black hole' in the object happens early and in such a powerful way that the child's energy feels insufficient to defend against it in any way, then the fear of annihilation becomes so strong that it may lead to the wiping out of the whole internal universe in order to escape its deadly gravitational pull. Only when a different kind of relationship gets internalized, through therapy, with an object that contains and returns life and energy, can the mind grow enough to be able to communicate the other, darker side of the relationship from which it has closed itself away.     

Out of nothingness: rhythm and the making of words

Abstract: This contribution describes some aspects of the work with a four‐year‐old autistic child who was treated for many years with four times weekly sessions of psychotherapy. The fluctuations between the symbolic and non‐symbolic use of external objects are described, as well as the ever changing quality of the child's object relations. The rhythmical element in the analysand‐analyst interplay is of great importance: the construction of the temporal shapes (Alvarez) and the modulation of presence and absence are relevant as regards the progressive capacity to name aspects of external reality and subjective experience. From a theoretical point of view, the contributions of both the post‐Jungian, including Michael Fordham, and the post‐Kleinian traditions are outlined. The notions of pre‐conception (Bion) and of archetype (Jung) are immensely helpful in working with autistic children as they actually help the analyst in assuming that some proto‐trace of representational potential is always present in the individual.     

In search of unity: Twardowski,Husserl, and Ingarden on the unity of the object

This paper is devoted to Kazimierz Twardowski's thesis that the unity of a compound object (a whole) can be ensured only by the relations between its parts and the object itself. Twardowski's idea of unity raises many difficulties, especially the threat of petitio principii: the whole is presupposed as furnishing the ground for the unification of its parts, and yet it also seems to be the result of this unification. To avoid these problems, Edmund Husserl sought to refute Twardowski's thesis, and ascribed the role of a principle of unity to the foundational relationships which directly hold between the parts of a whole. Roman Ingarden then seemed to return to Twardowski's concept of unity, but employed it within a different theory of objects, according to which to be an object is to be a subject of properties. I seek to demonstrate that: (1) Twardowski's thesis is sound if a compound object is something over and above its parts; (2) with respect to Husserl's solution, it is not clear as to whether the whole is really something over and above its parts; (3) Ingarden's conception of the subject-properties structure saves Twardowski's thesis; (4) Ingarden's theory of higher-order objects is invalid.     

INCREASING SPONTANEOUS VERBAL RESPONDING IN AUTUSTIC CHILDREN USING A TIME DELAY PROCEDURE

One oft-cited problem with teaching speech skills to autistic children isthe failure of the speech to be spontaneous. That is, the children's speech often remains underthe control of the verbal behavior of others rather than underthe control of other nonverbal referents inthe environment. We investigatedthe effectiveness of a time delay procedure to increasethe spontaneous speech of seven autistic children. Initially, the experimenter presented a desired object (e.g., cookie) and immediately modeledthe appropriate response “I want (cookie).” Gradually, asthe child imitatedthe vocalization, the experimenter increasedthe time between presentation of the object andthe modeled vocalization in an attempt to transfer stimulus control of the child's vocalization fromthe experimenter's model tothe object. Results indicated that allthe children learned to request items spontaneously and generalized this behavior across settings, people, situations, and to objects which had not been taught. These results are discussed in relation tothe literature on spontaneous speech, prompting, and generalization.     

What's Wrong with Rex? Hegel on Animal Defect and Individuality

In his Logic, Hegel argues that evaluative judgments are comparisons between the reality of an individual object and the standard for that reality found in the object's own concept. Understood in this way, an object is bad (ugly, etc.) insofar as it fails to be what it is according to its concept. In his recent Life and Action, Michael Thompson has suggested that we can understand various kinds of natural defect (i.e., defects in living things) in a similar way, and that if we do, we can helpfully see intellectual and moral badness—irrationality and vice—as themselves varieties of natural defect. In this paper, I argue that Hegel's position on animal individuality denies the claim that irrationality and vice are forms of natural defect. Hegel's account of the individuality proper to the animal organism in the Philosophy of Nature clearly disallows evaluative judgments about animals and thereby establishes a well‐defined conceptual distinction between natural defect and intellectual or ethical—i.e., broadly spiritual or geistliche—defect. Hegel thus provides a way of maintaining the difference between nature and spirit within his broader commitment to a post‐Kantian conception of substantial form.     

ACQUISITION AND FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF MANDING WITH AUTISTIC STUDENTS

Three autistic students were trained to request a specific object from an adult “supplier” with the sentence, “Give me —” and to deliver that object to another adult, the “director.” Subsequently, the degree to which the object offered by the supplier controlled the “Give me —” verbal response was assessed by delivering to the student an object other than the one requested. Despite knowing the names of all objects used in the experiment, students accepted and delivered to the director any object offered by the supplier regardless of its match with the requested object. After training to say “That's not it. Give me —” when nonrequested objects were offered, students responded differentially to requested and nonrequested objects, suggesting control of the “Give me —” response by the requested object, a characteristic of a mand. These results generalized across settings and objects. Results are discussed in terms of the training technique to establish manding and the functional analysis of the resulting verbal behavior.     

Sortal continuity of material things

Spatiotemporal and qualitative continuity are not sufficient to trace the career or path of one and the same object through its history. One needs sortal continuity, guaranteed by the form-token of the object. In this paper I concentrate on the question of sortal continuity linked to the problem of the cohabitation of objects. I intend to test whether it is possible to stick to the belief in continuants or endurers as well as the sortal dependence of identity and at the same time avoid an undesirable multiplication of spatially coinciding objects, i.e., avoid the thesis of cohabitation. I abandon the philosophical view – this is the price to be paid – that the set of the material constituents making up an object is an object proper. The basic units of reality are the objects falling under sortals and not the ultimate components thereof. That a determinate piece of copper is not identical with the statue made from it, therefore, does not imply that we have a cohabitation of two numerically different objects. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The empathizing–systemizing (E–S) model of autism and psychoanalytic theories of truth,play and symbolization

Little psychoanalytic material or theory features today in psychological work on autism and autistic traits and vice versa. Baron-Cohen's (2003) empathizing–systemizing (E–S) model of the autism spectrum posits two main clusters of autistic features: those surrounding impaired empathy, and those surrounding heightened systemizing behaviours. (Baron-Cohen, 2009) speculates that the common root of these two clusters is the individual's concept of truth. Psychoanalysis has addressed the related issue of internal and external reality since (Freud, 1897) differentiated ‘psychic’ from ‘historical’ truths. This could be of interest to those espousing the E–S model from a cognitive paradigm, as a ‘truth’-oriented cognitive style in autism may develop interdependently with the individual's experience of internal and external realities. Psychoanalysis has developed further ideas of relevance to the E–S model surrounding play and symbolization, the latter being an often-overlooked aspect of Wing and Gould's (1979) triad of autistic features. Seen from a psychodynamic perspective, the E–S model might provide a means to increase therapists' awareness of milder autistic traits amongst service users and analysands. Equally, it could offer a tool to structure empirical research into psychodynamic therapy with autism spectrum conditions.     

Feuerbach's theory of object‐relations and its legacy in 20th century post‐Hegelian philosophy

This paper focuses on the way in which Feuerbach's attempt to develop a naturalistic, realist remodeling of Hegel's relational ontology, which culminated in his own version of “sensualism”, led him to emphasize the vulnerability of the subject and the role of affectivity, thus making object‐dependence a constitutive feature of subjectivity. We find in Feuerbach the first lineaments of a philosophical theory of object‐relations, one that anticipates the well‐known psychological theory of the same name, but one that also offers a broader metaphysical basis in which all types of “essential objects” are shown to matter to subjectivity. This Feuerbachian theory of object‐relations, the paper then argues, foreshadows a number of important developments in 20th century post‐Hegelian philosophy. In it can be found an anticipation of Adorno's later theory of mimesis. Equally, this theory already emphasizes the “libidinal” nature of intentionality, in a way that announces Merleau‐Ponty's ontology of the flesh. Finally, the last section of the article proposes a model with which we might reconstruct the way in which object‐relations and self‐relations can be brought together consistently. In this instance, Feuerbach uses concepts that announce Freud's notion of “primary narcissism”. One contemporary philosopher who has proposed a sophisticated model of subjectivity, in which primary narcissism is shown to complement object‐dependence, is Axel Honneth. The last section argues that Feuerbach's full image of subjective identity as reciprocal scaffolding of self‐ and object‐relations reminds strongly of Honneth's core concept of “positive self‐relation”.     

The Theory of Transformations and Autistic States Autistic Transformations: A Proposal1

This work integrates two areas of thinking: one in which the author develops considerationsregardingobservationmethodsofmentalphenomenainpsychoanalysis according to Bion's theory of transformations; the other in which she is concerned with the investigation of primitive mental states‐protomental states‐more specifi cally, the autistic states of neurotic patients, described by Tustin. Some ideas on the ‘philosophical’ position underlying transformations theory are elaborated, particularly emphasizing the idea that the same phenomenon in psychoanalysis may be considered from different perspectives, as long as it is situated within the theoretical reference frame to which it belongs. The author considers the idea that this method of phenomenon observation is part of a wider context of general human knowledge, in which uncertainty and relativity of concepts are the main components. By adopting transformations theory as a perspective of phenomena observation that pervades the analytical meeting, the author questions whether it is possible to include other groups of transformation of emotional experiences in this theory, which shows particular phenomena with specifi c qualities, distinct from those emphasized by Bion. She hypothesizes that autistic phenomena present in neurotic patients, characterizing autistic states, may be considered and detached, making up a particular group of transformation of emotional experience, which analysts often face in their daily practice. She names this group ‘autistic transformations’.     

论虚概念

把外延理解为“具有概念所反映的特有属性的客观事物(或类)”,导致“虚概念没有外延”或“有外延但是空类”此类有问题的结论,应该理解为由概念(思维)中的对象组成;而把虚概念理解为“所指称的对象不存在于客观世界的概念”,又导致把理想模型等科学概念当成虚概念,实际上,对象有虚实,属性也有虚实。实对象、实属性,是无异议的实概念;虚对象、实属性,也是实概念,如思维科学中的概念;实对象、虚属性,是虚概念,如“地心说”中的概念;虚对象、虚属性,是公认的虚概念,如鬼魂。可见,无论对象虚实,只要所指称的对象的主要特征所反映的属性是非客观的概念就是虚概念。     

Dream and loss—on triangulation and its implication on the capacity for self-reflection in psychoanalytic work

This paper takes as its starting point Freud's idea that the loss of the object and its inner restoration is an on-going process, which has a crucial influence on the facing of reality. The author's aim is to illustrate that it is by working through the loss of the object that an inner triangulation may be experienced. The idea of triangulation is based on Ronald Brittens definition of it as the image of a mental space in which subjective experiencing can be combined with observing. Via a clinical material, where the distinction between self and object may be endured only with difficulties, the author discusses how phantasizing may serve as an evasion of a notion of an inner catastrophe and how a collapsed triangular space can be restored. In this discussion, the differentiating aspect by negation is touched upon. In connection to another clinical case, the author discusses how the analysand creates what the author calls an illusion about the mutual inter-changeability of the objects. This is used to protect the analysand from experiencing feelings of Oedipal competition, and through that, mourn the illusion of an exclusive place in the Oedipal triad. The conclusion is that the capacity to create meaning comprises the idea of the possibility of together with the subjective experience, internalizing the perspective of ?the other”. Further, that the working through of the Oedipal situation stabilizes the capacity for an observing thinking, since it places the person in a triangular position where he/she is able both to identify with the parties in the Oedipal arena and to observe hislher own contribution to the Oedipal interplay.     

Meaning and object in Freud's theory of language

This article sets out to challenge the interpretation of Freud's views on the origins of the meaning of language according to which meaning always originates from an act of naming. In Freud's terms, word‐presentations would originally denote object‐ or thing‐presentations and gain meaning through this reference. This interpretation claims that this view was already expressed in Freud's On Aphasia (1891) and influenced all his later theory of language. To oppose this claim, three conceptions proposed by Freud are discussed that strongly suggest the participation of language in the construction of the field of objects: a metapsychological hypothesis (the concepts of word‐, thing‐, and object‐presentation), the explanation of a psychopathological phenomenon (the genesis of a fetishistic object‐choice), and a concept concerning the foundations of the psychoanalytic method of dream interpretation (secondary elaboration). As a conclusion, it is argued that Freud's early views in On Aphasia (1891) can be alternatively understood such as to allow for a different view of language and its relationship with objects.     

The emergence of an American middle school of psychoanalysis commentary on Karen Rosica's paper

In this paper we explore a few points emphasized by both Fairbairn and American Relational Theory related to conceptualizations of the new and old object and the implications for working in the analytic situation. Underlying much of our discussion is the belief that there are useful tensions between, on the one hand, Fairbairn's emphasis on our attachment to bad and old objects and refractory clinging to these bad objects in the face of receiving something new, and, on the other, a construal of a push or willingness toward integrating externality and newness of objects (e.g., Winnicott, 1969; Benjamin, 1988). American Relational models which explore complexities of interaction augment an understanding of Fairbairn's formulations of why we hold on to old objects. Fairbairn's theory also offers ways of understanding aspects of repetition, even, and sometimes especially, in trying to provide new experience.     

The influence of popular media characters on children's object choices

Children often prefer objects and food packaging bearing images of popular media characters. However, it is unclear what factors may influence this. This study investigated whether depictions of popular media characters on high-quality (brand new) and low-quality (dirty, broken) objects influenced 3- to 4-year-old children's (N = 84) object preferences, as well as which objects children selected to help them complete a functional task (e.g., using a bucket to transport several small items). We also investigated whether children's preferences were related to inhibitory control. We found children's preferences were influenced by images of popular characters, but not their choice of objects for functional use. Instead, children relied on object quality when selecting an object to complete a task. Inhibitory control was not related to children's object choices. These results suggest children may weigh object features differently when making decisions for different purposes.     

Editorial Notice

Abstract

John McDowell has claimed that the rational link between perceptions and empirical judgements allows us to perceive objects as belonging to a wider reality, one which extends beyond the objects perceived. In this way, we can be said to have a perceptual awareness of the world. I argue that McDowell's account of this perceptual awareness does not succeed. His account as it stands does not have the resources to explain how our perceptions can present objects as belonging to a wider reality, regardless of the judgements we make about that reality. I suggest that we can give a better account of this perceptual awareness of the world by appealing to transcendental phenomenology. A phenomenological study of perceptual experiences describes how they are structured by a sense of the perceived objects as belonging to a world containing other objects of possible perception. I shall outline this sense we have of the world, and argue that it allows us to perceive objects as belonging to a wider reality. Transcendental phenomenology can thus help to explain our perceptual awareness of the world.     

A MODIFIED INCIDENTAL-TEACHING PROCEDURE FOR AUTISTIC YOUTH: ACQUISITION AND GENERALIZATION OF RECEPTIVE OBJECT LABELS

A modified incidental-teaching procedure was used to increase the receptive language skills of autistic youth who had previously experienced lengthy institutionalization. At the time of the study, the two severely language-delayed children had recently been transitioned to a community-based group home. Receptive-labeling skills were taught for four sets of objects typically used in school lunch preparation. The percentage of correct, unprompted object identifications displayed by Youth 1 increased when the incidental-teaching package (gestural prompts, behavior-specific praise, and contingent access to lunch-making supplies) was sequentially introduced in a multiple-baseline design across sets of objects. These results were replicated with Youth 2. The youths' newly acquired language skills also generalized to a different setting (the dining room of the group home) and to a different activity occurring later in the day (a traditional sit-down, discrete-trial session). This research indicates that the linguistic skills of severely developmentally delayed autistic children can be accelerated by incidental instruction that is provided in the course of shaping other home-living skills.     

Mapping the contours of faith in the land of separation: spiritual geographies for children

According to Jean Piaget, children begin to develop a concept of an object, such as that it has sides that are not visible from the child's perspective or that it is likely to be where one saw it last, in early infancy. By the close of the prelinguistic phase at about 2 years old, the child has developed a mature object concept, one that comprehends the object as a continuing entity even when it is not visible. Many children's picture books demonstrate Piaget's concept of object permanence through narrative and image. This paper offers a close reading of three classics, Goodnight moon, Harold and the purple crayon and Where the wild things are, in an explanation of how children are able to develop faith in an invisible, omnipresent deity.     

‘The newspaper reader’: On the meaning of concrete objects in a psychoanalytic treatment1

The author investigates the meaning of concrete objects in the psychoanalytic treatment of a severely disturbed patient for the development of his inner world and the analytic process. She includes a survey of relevant theoretical concepts with an emphasis on Winnicott and Bion. It is shown that the objects served basic defensive functions both within the analytic relationship and for the precarious intrapsychic state of the patient. The author describes the technical dealing that led to a structural change. From the comparison of the initial dream and a later dream, Mr N's inner development from total inclusion in the object to triadic reality of separated, repaired objects becomes discernible. The author shows how this progress was facilitated by his use of concrete objects as links between his psychotic and non‐psychotic parts, as well as by the specifi c way the analyst handled the paradoxical transference‐ countertransference. She also illustrates the thesis that the developmental steps described are crucial for the capability to digest psychic pain by symbolization instead of discharging it in a destructive‐violent way.