The doubled movement of infinity in Kierkegaard and in Sūfism

S?ren Kierkegaard was a very rigorous critic of traditional philosophical thinking and speculative systems. According to his theory it is possible that there is a logic system, but not a system of life. If such a system exists, it can be known only to God. Man can attain the meaning of life only by his own relationship to God. However, this relationship cannot be explained by philosophy because it has to do with a transcendent ‘double movement of infinity’ which takes place between God and the individual. Like philosophy, mysticism cannot explain one's relationship to God. The difference is that philosophy neglects God as the absolute starting point, while mysticism forgets that an individual—after he has experienced divinity—may return to the real world. The self need not disappear in divinity. The dialectic of the relationship between God and man implies that both poles (God and man) are present, thus ‘the infinite difference between God and man’ does not disappear. Since Sūfism is a type of Islamic mysticism, it may be said that a Sūfi cannot witness God's truth if he remains in his union with God. It is therefore relevant to draw some parallels between Kierkegaard's view and a comparable Sūfi view about the human relationship to God.     

Parent – infant psychotherapy,the transition to parenthood and parental narcissism: Implications for treatment

In this article the author discusses some of the indications for short- or long-term parent?–?infant psychotherapeutic interventions in terms of what he defines as ‘problems of parenthood’ and ‘problems of parental narcissism’. Brief parent?–?infant psychotherapeutic interventions are most frequently indicated in the case of the former: more neurotic problems of parenthood where the parents present a manic or counter-depressive type of narcissism. Masochistic problems of parenthood are also susceptible to treatment through brief parent?–?infant interventions, although in such cases treatment may have to be continued in another modality of long-term psychotherapy. More dissociated problems of parental narcissism constitute a contraindication for brief psychotherapeutic parent?–?infant interventions. The persecutory narcissism of these parents contributes to a ‘negative pre-transference’ which creates a major resistance to the therapeutic process.     

“Of Course All Relationships Are Unique”: How Co-creative Processes Generate Unique Mother–Infant and Patient–Therapist Relationships and Change Other Relationships

The question of the uniqueness of relationships is examined: How do relationships come to be unique? What are some of the features of their uniqueness? And how can relationships, be it the mother—infant relationship or the patient—therapist relationship, have unique rather than archetypical effects on other relationships? A model of relationship uniqueness is presented that argues that mother and infant, and patient and therapist, co-create dyadic states of consciousness—states of making implicit and explicit sense of the world—out of their normally messy exchanges of age-possible meanings. These co-creative processes lead to change in the infant's and child's state of knowing the world, and also change the way the patient makes sense of the world and ways of being with others. Additionally presented are (I) a critique of attachment theory's assumption that the mother—infant relationship is the prototype of later relationships; (2) a critique of models of therapeutic change that see adult analysis as working primarily in the same domain as the workings of the mother-infant relationship; (3) a brain model of co-creative relational processes, Relational Activation Patterns (RAPs); and (4) possible psychodynamic processes in infants.     

The alchemy of training

Abstract: Training in Zurich has its own special character but also is marked by the very fact that it is in Zurich. Zurich radiates its own distinct energy and carries a specific historical significance in the world of analytical psychology. This, like all things with psychic energy, has a spectrum of meaning. This spectrum, as well as the ‘spirit’ of the place, will be critically examined, taking into account the ‘blessings’ and ‘curses’ of such genius loci. Training in Zurich is experientially based and is first and foremost an initiation: an initiation into symbolic life, or rather life where symbol plays an important role. Training is understood to involve a transformation of one's self, much like the 8^th century alchemist Morienus Romanus understood the opus as a ‘human transformation system’. It is not merely an education. The requirement of ‘immersion’ is core to the experience of becoming an analyst in Zurich and this sets up a valuable discomfort between rational intellectual learning and intuitive experience, between knowing and not‐knowing. How does this dis‐serve the making of an analyst? What is implicit in this immersion and its discomfort? Does it have a role in today's emphasis on clinical and empirical training? Does Zurich still offer something unique and valuable in the world of training, or is it passé? From these questions, the dichotomy of what is ‘urgent’ and ‘essential’ in training will be examined.     

The self in the couple relationship: part 2

Part 1 of this paper examined some of the ways in which individual therapy, by assisting in the development of a more cohesive sense of self in the individual, inevitably has an impact on the individual's relationships, especially their relationship with a partner. This paper approaches the topic of the significance of ‘the self’ in the couple relationship from an alternative direction. It focuses on the significance of ‘the self’ for couples therapy, and argues that couples therapy may sometimes need to include therapeutic work with one partner to facilitate change in the relationship. In both parts of the paper, a conceptualization of the couple relationship as ‘a transitional space’ is central.     

Tafsir and Istifsar in the Qur'an

The more emphatic the authority of a sacred Scripture the more crucial the exegesis it receives. Yet no text is able to rise from the page and say: ‘I have been misread’. Hence the basic power of the interpreter. Tafsir or ‘interpretation’, has always been a vital task vis‐à‐vis the Qur'an. Urgent questions attend on it—who is qualified? By what skills? What range of questions will they admit? Are these circumscribed to, for example, grammar? Earlier margins? Are there excluded concerns? How far will contemporary ones be admissible? All these might be said to constitute istifsar or ‘Asking tafsir’ to be comprehensively pursued. After examining traditional techniques the article reviews ‘contextuality’, ‘abrogation’, metaphor, tadabbur (or ‘reflection') and finally, some profound implications of the Qur'an's own self‐division into Meccan and Medinan elements and how this might bear on a de‐politicization of Islamic religion in response to contemporary necessities, as faced by Islam in minority situations in many countries.     

Cartesian Method and the Aristotelian-Scholastic Method

In book one of the Consolation of Philosophy, Boethius is portrayed as a man who suffers because he forgot philosophy. Scholars have underestimated the significance of this portrayal and considered it a literary device the goal of which is simply to introduce the discussion that follows. In this paper, I show that this view is mistaken since it overlooks that this portrayal of Boethius is the key for the understanding of the whole text. The philosophical therapy that constitutes the core of the ‘Consolation’ can in fact be properly evaluated only if we recognize the condition it is designed to cure. Through the portrayal of Boethius's forgetfulness, the ‘Consolation’ illustrates that it is the very nature of philosophical knowledge that makes it susceptible to being forgotten. Philosophical knowledge can (i) turn into misology, when it appears unable to solve certain problems, and (ii) be overrun by strong emotions. The therapy offered in the ‘Consolation’ is designed to make Boethius aware of the ‘fragility’ of philosophical knowledge and show him how to ‘strengthen’ it. He is taught how to more fully embody philosophy's precepts and that philosophy's inability to solve certain problems reveals not its failures but its limits.     

Hailing Zenobia: Anti‐Judaism,trinitarianism, and John Henry Newman

John Henry Newman's early nineteenth‐century monograph The Arians of the Fourth Century iterates and intensifies the anti‐Jewish rhetoric already conveyed by the Nicene trinitarian theology inaugurated by Athanasius of Alexandria in the fourth century. Invoking philosopher Judith Butler's analysis of the performative power of ‘hate speech’ not only to injure, but also to interpellate subjects who may be heard to ‘talk back’, the present article seeks to surface the subversive potentialities contained not only within Newman's text (read in its immediate historical context), but also within trinitarian discourse more generally. Zenobia, third‐century ruler of Palmyra, reviled by Newman as both a ‘Judaizer’ and an ancestor of ‘Arianism’ (i.e. anti‐trinitarian theology), serves in this article (as in Newman's text) as the privileged figure for an interpellated subject, at once ‘Jewish’ and ‘feminine’ (thus seductively ‘oriental'), that may be heard to give voice to the ‘insurrectionary’ counter‐speech harbored within the very discourse of Christian orthodoxy that seeks to suppress it.     

Death by non-feeding: Not in the baby's best interests

It has recently been suggested that doctors have a duty to act in their patient's best interest and that this duty demands that life-sustaining treatment—including food and fluids—should sometimes be withheld or withdrawn and the patient allowed to die. In this article, the author explores the scope of the ‘best interests principle’ in the context of treatment decisions for seriously handicapped newborn infants. She argues that those who hold that it is permissible to starve or dehydrate an infant to death are mistaken to think that this course of action is in the infant's best interests. While it may be true that there are times whendeath is, everything considered, in an infant's best interests, a slow and distressingmethod of bringing death about is not. Since death by dehydration and starvation is not benign, the withholding of food and fluids is generally not in an infant's best interests. The author concludes by suggesting thatwhenever the withdrawal or non-employment of life-sustaining means imposes a heavy burden on the infant, the ‘best interests principle’ would demand that the infant be killed rather than allowed to die.     

Post,Oblique, Human

Abstract

Taking its cue from the oblique of Elaine L. Graham's ‘post/human’, this essay examines the difficult relationship between humanism and its ‘post’. If, as Graham points out, the present moment is one in which anthropocentrism is both in crisis and deferred to as ‘common sense’, what is to be done? Perhaps the answer lies in strategies for ‘obliquing’ humanist discourse, working through its contradictions in order to establish the ‘post/human’ as a figure that forever disrupts humanism.     

Maximus the Confessor and the Problem of Participation

In defining the theological problem of participation as the question of how created beings, namely human beings, can participate (μ?θεξι?) in the transcendent Uncreated God towards deification (θ?ωσι?) without a pantheistic blurring of essences, this article examines the Christologically intuitive way in which Maximus the Confessor (580–662) would have responded. Specifically, Maximus’ Cyrilline Chalcednonianism, featuring an unconfused perichoretic union between Christ's two natures in his hypostatic union, serves directly as an apologetic and hermeneutic for humanity's and creation's participation in God. In addition, taking into account the scholarly debate over Maximus’ understanding of the relationship between the Logos and the logoi, it is argued that this indirectly provides a second Christological way forward to resolve the problem at hand, particularly when the two types of logoi (that ‘of being’ and that ‘of virtue’) are correctly distinguished. Insofar as the Logos and the logoi, not to mention the notions of participation and deification, were viewed by Maximus through his Cyrilline Chalcedonian lens, his Cyrilline Chalcednonian Christology was ultimately his answer to the theological problem of participation.     

Becoming a philosopher: What Heidegger learned from Dilthey, 1919–25

Wilhelm Dilthey is, famously, an epistemological pioneer for a second, ‘human’ kind of science that ‘understands’ life as we live it, instead of ‘explaining’ things as we observe them. Even today, he is usually cited for his role in the Erklären–Verstehen debate. My article, however, follows Heidegger's suggestion that we make the existence of the debate itself the problem. Whether there are different sorts of entity, different reasons for studying them and different means for doing so – such issues raise questions about science itself, not just about how to do it better. Moreover, what sort of philosopher is competent to address such questions? Heidegger argues that Dilthey's later writings intimate that it must be one who thinks from the ‘standpoint of (historical) life itself.’ This issue, says Heidegger, is ‘alive’ in Dilthey but is continually short-circuited by his very traditional plan for a ‘Critique of Historical Reason.’ Dilthey's unsuccessful struggles to produce this Critique are his gift to us, however. They encourage us to explicitly reconsider, as Heidegger does not only in Being and Time but throughout his life, what Dilthey cannot: If philosophy, like all human practices, is historical to the core, what is it to ‘be’ philosophical, about science or anything else?     

Mindful Parenting: a group approach to enhancing reflective capacity in parents and infants

In this paper, the process of ending therapy is likened to the ordinary developmental task of ‘letting go’ that parents have to undertake, to help their child to grow up. ‘Letting go’ is contrasted with the process of ‘holding’ the child in mind that is so central to the therapeutic and parental task Following thoughts about some of the external issues that play a part in the decision to end a child's treatment, this developmental perspective of psychoanalytic psychotherapy is discussed through a clinical illustration of the ending of a 5-year-old boy's treatment. Different strands of the therapeutic relationship as highlighted during the ending phase of therapy are distinguished and attention is drawn to the role of the ‘new relationship’ between therapist and child and how this differs from the transference relationship. Countertransference issues in their broadest form are also considered.     

不只是“谈话疗法”：精神分析治疗中的非言语维度

精神分析治疗在很长一段时间里被视为“谈话疗法”,其治愈机制是将潜意识的内容意识化,语言解释在其中发挥关键作用。自20世纪末开始,越来越多分析师强调非言语交流在治疗中的作用。非言语交流不仅能够为咨访双方提供更丰富的交流形式,还能通过互动中的“相遇时刻”,实现对患者过去经验的重组,改变其有缺陷的内隐关系知晓。非言语交流和语言交流能够在治疗中发挥互补作用,未来的精神分析心理学要继续加强对非言语领域的研究。     

Constructing the collective unconscious

Abstract: Innovative attempts at collating Jungian analytical psychology with a range of ‘post‐modern’ theories have yielded significant results. This paper adopts an alternative strategy: a Lacanian vantage point on Jungian theory that eschews an attempt at reconciling Jung with post‐structuralism. A focused Lacanian gaze on Jung will establish an irreducible tension between Jung's view of archetypes as factors immanent to the psyche and a Lacanian critique that lays bare the contingent structures and mechanisms of their constitution, unveiling the supposed archetypes’a posteriori production through the efficacy of a discursive field. Theories of ideology developed in the wake of Lacan provide a powerful methodological tool allowing to bring this distinction into focus. An assembly of Lacan's fragmentary accounts of Jung will be supplemented with an approach to Jungian theory via ?i?ek's Lacan‐oriented theory of the signifying mechanism underpinning ‘ideology’. Accordingly, the Jungian archetype of the self, which is considered in some depth, can begin to be seen in a new light, namely as a ‘master signifier’, not only of Jung's academic edifice, but also —and initially—of the discursive strategies that establish his own subjectivity. A discussion of Jung's approach to mythology reveals how the ‘quilting point’ of his discourse comes to be coupled with a correlate in the Real, a non‐discursive ‘sublime object’ conferring upon archetypes their fascinating aura.     

Psychotherapists' dreams about their patients

Abstract This study examines therapists’ dreams about their patients from the Jungian and the relational perspectives. Few clinical and empirical references to this subject are to be found in the literature. In the present study 31 dreams were collected from 22 therapists. Dreams were collected using anonymous self‐report inventory. The research focused on three theoretical research questions: 1. What themes appear in the manifest content of therapists’ dreams about their patients? 2. What contributions are made by Jungian interpretation of therapists’ dreams about their patients? 3. To what extent are masochistic contents present in the manifest content of therapists’ dreams about their patients? The first question was addressed using categorical content analysis of a) themes common to different dreams and b) pre‐determined themes for all dreams. The third research question was addressed using Beck's (1967) ‘Masochistic Dream’ measure. Results: Among the themes common to different dreams were: therapist‐patient role reversal; therapist and/or patient attends and remains in meeting, departs/doesn’t depart; cancellation of therapy session; sexuality between therapist and patient; aggression; presence vs. absence; non‐verbal relationship and communication; time; driving vs. stopping. With regard to pre‐determined themes it was found that in 20 of the 31 dreams, the therapist had a negative experience and was characterized as vulnerable. Likewise it was found that 26 out of 31 dreams took place in either a) a street, a road, a route, a corridor; b) en route to somewhere; c) a therapy room and/or building; d) a house. With regard to the contribution of Jungian interpretations of the dreams it was found that 17 of the dreams had diagnostic and prognostic elements, 4 of which were initial dreams, 9 of them were compensatory dreams and in 14 it was found that the patient represents the shadow of the therapist. With regard to the third question it was found that 18 of the 31 dreams met Beck's (1967) criteria for masochistic dreams. The theoretical discussion examines the findings from a Jungian perspective, with an emphasis on also understanding the dream in terms of its expression of relational aspects of the therapist‐patient relationship. The findings affirm the presence of the ‘wounded healer’ archetypes in therapists’ dreams about their patients. The results of the study indicate that therapists’ dreams about their patients can be a valuable tool for deepening understanding of the therapeutic relationship and process.     

Power and the origins of unhappiness: Working with individuals

Evidence that the ‘ultimate repressed’ in our understanding of emotional distress is power can be gleaned even from Freud's writing. This is a form of repression which community psychology is well placed to lift. Impossible though it is to stand outside the ‘apparatus of power’ (and, therefore to give a complete analysis of it), we cannot achieve an accurate account of the causes of human unhappiness without taking its operations into account as fully as possible. The psychological therapies do have an implicit notion of will power, but this serves only to distract our attention from the external, material nature of power. We have to be careful, moreover, not to ‘psychologize’ power by trying to turn it into an internal attribute to be ‘switched on’ by an essentially mysterious process of ‘empowerment’. We need to specify empirically the types of power that contribute to ‘clinical’ distress and give an account of ‘therapy’ in terms of the powers to which it has access (recognizing also that these are limited).     

Narrative and the Stability of Intention

This paper addresses a problem concerning the rational stability of intention. When you form an intention to φ at some future time t, you thereby make it subjectively rational for you to follow through and φ at t, even if—hypothetically—you would abandon the intention were you to redeliberate at t. It is hard to understand how this is possible. Shouldn't the perspective of your acting self be what determines what is then subjectively rational for you? I aim to solve this problem by highlighting a role for narrative in intention. I'll argue that committing yourself to a course of action by intending to pursue it crucially involves the expectation that your acting self will be ‘swept along’ by its participation in a distinctively narrative form of self‐understanding. I'll motivate my approach by criticizing Richard Holton's and Michael Bratman's recent treatments of the stability of intention, though my account also borrows from Bratman's work. I'll likewise criticize and borrow from David Velleman's work on narrative and self‐intelligibility. When the pieces fall into place, we'll see how intending is akin to telling your future self a kind of story. My thesis is not that you address your acting self but that your acting self figures as a ‘character’ in the ‘story’ that you address to a still later self. Unlike other appeals to narrative in agency, mine will explain how as narrator you address a specifically intrapersonal audience.     

不只是“谈话疗法”：精神分析治疗中的非言语维度

精神分析治疗在很长一段时间里被视为“谈话疗法”,其治愈机制是将潜意识的内容意识化,语言解释在其中发挥关键作用。自20世纪末开始,越来越多分析师强调非言语交流在治疗中的作用。非言语交流不仅能够为咨访双方提供更丰富的交流形式,还能通过互动中的“相遇时刻”,实现对患者过去经验的重组,改变其有缺陷的内隐关系知晓。非言语交流和语言交流能够在治疗中发挥互补作用,未来的精神分析心理学要继续加强对非言语领域的研究。