The Logic of the Diamond Sutra: A is not A,therefore it is A

This paper attempts to make intelligible the logic contained in the Diamond Sutra. This 'logic' is called the 'logic of not'. It is stated in a propositional form: 'A is not A, therefore it is A'. Since this formulation is contradictory or paradoxical when it is read in light of Aristotelean logic, one might dismiss it as nonsensical. In order to show that it is neither nonsensical nor meaningless, the paper will articulate the philosophical reasons why the Sutra makes its position in this contradictory form. The thesis to be presented is that as long as one understands the 'logic of not' from a dualistic, either-or egological standpoint, it remains contradictory, but in order to properly understand it, one must effect a perspectival shift from the dualistic, egological stance to a non-dualistic, non-egological stance. This thesis is advanced with a broader concern in mind: to reexamine how the self understands itself, how it understands others, and how it understands its intra-ecological relationship with nature.     

The Catholic Diocese: A Transversalized Institution

The Catholic Church is built, on the one hand, upon a hierarchical structure and vertical relationships, with stratified duties, centered around an organizational culture which is based on strict obedience to institutional directives and which has a monopoly on the administration of the goods and resources concerning salvation. On the other hand, since the Second Vatican Council, the Church has proposed to incorporate lay people into God's Kingdom, a development which represents an opening to the active participation of diverse groups and a redistribution of access to the goods of salvation. Analysts may take a position one way or the other regarding their definition of the Church, and some even state the existence of a dominant church and a people's church. In contrast to both these perspectives, this paper looks at a methodological and theoretical model for studying diversity within Catholic unity. The model is based on the concept of the 'transversalized institution' as it is applied to the way in which Guadalajara's diocese functions.     

‘Make sure you keep our house safe!’ Thematic analysis of a children's psychotherapy group

This paper describes a systematic thematic analysis of one particular latency-aged children's group and includes a discussion about potentially helpful outcomes measures. The impetus for our small, practice-based qualitative research project came from the two papers by Reid (1999) and Canham (2002) about children's psychotherapy groups, particularly Canham's (2002) paper, ‘Group and gang states of mind’. Canham and Reid used Bion's theories of group functioning as the basis of their technique with children's groups. We felt that it would be an interesting follow-on from Reid and Canham's findings to explore in some detail the specific therapeutic factors involved in a shift from paranoid–schizoid to depressive functioning in group therapy. We hoped that this might give us some helpful clinical indications as to the circumstances in which group rather than individual psychotherapy and parallel parent work should be considered as the treatment of choice. The paper concentrates exclusively on group work with latency-aged children, therefore referring mainly to the limited number of papers published about psychoanalytic group therapy with this age group.     

The Emergence and Development of Bekhterev's Psychoreflexology in Relation to Wundt's Experimental Psychology

After its foundation, the Laboratory for Experimental Psychology at Leipzig University became an international center for psychological research, attracting students from all over the world. The Russian physiologist and psychiatrist Vladimir Bekhterev (1857–1927) was one of Wilhelm Wundt's students in 1885, and after returning to Russia he continued enthusiastically his experimental research on mental phenomena. However, he gradually distanced himself from Wundt's psychological project and developed a new concept of psychology: the so‐called Objective Psychology or Psychoreflexology. The goal of this paper is to analyze Bekhterev's position in relation to Wundt's experimental psychology, by showing how the former came to reject the latter's conception of psychology. The results indicate that Bekhterev's development of a philosophical program, including his growing interest in establishing a new Weltanschauung is the main reason behind his divergence with Wundt, which is reflected in his conception of scientific psychology. Despite this, Wundt remained alive in Bekhterev's mind as an ideal counterpoint.     

Theory of Mind and Children's Trait Attributions about Average and Typically Stigmatized Peers

Previous research indicates that children hold negative beliefs about peers with foreign accents, physical disabilities, and people who are obese. The current study examined skills associated with individual differences in children's social judgements about these typically stereotyped groups. Theory of mind, memory, and cognitive inhibition were assessed in 3‐ to 6‐year‐olds. Then, children were asked to make trait attributions and behavioural predictions about story characters' willingness to help a peer. Results indicated that better theory of mind skills were related to greater positive trait attributions and behavioural predictions about typically stereotyped characters. Younger children made fewer positive behavioural predictions as compared to older children, but both age groups made positive trait attributions. Overall, memory and inhibition had little to no influence on children's responses, although the results varied by story type. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reflections on the early stages of the Oedipus complex: The parental couple in relation to psychoanalytic work

The author refers to the parental couple as it appears in relation to the Oedipus complex at the various levels of development and psychical maturation. A 'pathological' Oedipus situation is differentiated from a 'normal' one. Accordingly the author distinguishes the primitive Oedipal fantasies about the parental couple represented in the myth by the parents of Thebes and the parents of Corinth (and the influence that these can have on the psychoanalytic work), from a couple who have reached truly creative functioning. Furthermore, it is pointed out how elements are activated in the therapist's mind: emotional qualities of a feminine maternal and masculine paternal kind that either collaborate in containing and promoting the psychoanalytic process and psychic development of the patient or else fail in this task.     

What It's Like To Have a Cognitive Home

Many people believe that the mind is an epistemic refuge of sorts. The idea is that when it comes to certain core mental states, one's being in such a state automatically puts one in a position to know that one is in that state. This idea has come under attack in recent years. One particularly influential attack comes from Timothy Williamson (2000), who argues that there is no central core of states or conditions—mental or otherwise—to which we are guaranteed epistemic access. In Williamson's words, we are cognitively homeless. In this paper I will argue that Williamson's argument for the conclusion that we are cognitively homeless fails. Then I will show that there is a class of phenomenal states that constitutes a substantial cognitive refuge. When all is said and done, I will have both defended and shed light on our cognitive home.     

Associations between mothers' sensitivity to their infants' internal states and children's later understanding of mind and emotion

This study investigated associations between mother–infant interactions and children's subsequent understanding of mind and emotion. Mothers' tendency to comment on their infants' internal world and their general sensitivity to their infants' internal states were measured through coded play interactions at 10 months. The latter measurement included ratings on four aspects of maternal behaviour: mindful facilitation, joint attention commenting, pacing, and affect catching. In contrast to mothers' internal state language, these behaviours did not tap mothers' explicit linguistic representation of their infants' mental states. At 54 months, children's understanding of mind and emotion was measured through a range of false‐belief tasks and an emotion‐understanding task. Multivariate analysis revealed direct positive links between mothers' sensitivity to their infants' internal states and children's later understanding of mind. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The (Neglected) role of the father in Children's mental health

BackgroundAlthough the bulk of the literature on child development, historically, has focused on the significant role of the mother, less attention has been given to that of the father. Therefore, more attention has been given to fathers’ roles in the last 20–30 years.AimThe aim of the current review was to explore the role of the father on a child's development.MethodsAn extensive literature search using 'Psycharticles', ‘PsychInfo’, and ‘Google Scholar’ databases using terms like 'father's role', 'child/children's', 'child development', and 'mental health' was conducted to achieve the objective of the study.ResultsFathers were found to play a significant role in nurturing their children. Fathers are considered to be important for the development of the child's autonomy, the shaping of gender identity, and the development of the moral system of the child. Usually, he is the one who establishes the feeling of security in the child's mind. He is considered to be the protector and defender of the family Freud's position is that the father is the symbol of security, power, and authority for the child.ConclusionAlthough the original aim of the research was to draw a line between parents' roles in the family and shed light on the father's role, the findings suggest that the fundamental concept in nurturing children depends on the complementary roles of parents as children need their parents equally.     

The Epistemological Problem of Other Minds and the Knowledge Asymmetry

The traditional epistemological problem of other minds seeks to answer the following question: how can we know someone else's mental states? The problem is often taken to be generated by a fundamental asymmetry in the means of knowledge. In my own case, I can know directly what I think and feel. This sort of self‐knowledge is epistemically direct in the sense of being non‐inferential and non‐observational. My knowledge of other minds, however, is thought to lack these epistemic features. So what is the basic source of my knowledge of other minds if I know my mind in such a way that I cannot know the minds of others? The aim of this paper is to clarify and assess the pivotal role that the asymmetry in respect of knowledge plays within a broadly inferentialist approach to the epistemological problem of other minds. The received dogma has always been to endorse the asymmetry for conceptual reasons and to insist that the idea of knowing someone else's mental life in the same way as one knows one's own mind is a complete non‐starter. Against this, I aim to show that it is at best a contingent matter that creatures such as us cannot know other minds just as we know a good deal of our own minds and also that the idea of having someone else's mind in one's own introspective reach is not obviously self‐contradictory. So the dogma needs to be revisited. As a result, the dialectical position of those inferentialists who believe that we know about someone else's mentality in virtue of an analogical inference will be reinforced.     

Intersubjectivity in Wittgenstein and Freud: Other Minds and the Foundations of Psychiatry

Intersubjectivity, the cooperation of two or more minds, is basic to human behavior, yet eludes the grasp of psychiatry. This paper traces the dilemma to the “problem of other minds” assumed with the epistemologies of modern science. It presents the solution of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, known for his treatment of other minds in terms of “human agreement in language.” Unlike recent studies of “Wittgenstein's psychology,” this one reviews the Philosophical Investigations' “private language argument,” the crux of his mature views on mind. It reads that argument as recording his shift from the modern egocentric paradigm of mind to an intersubjective one. The paper contrasts the merits of Wittgenstein's reduction of subject and object to grammar with the problems of Freud's metapsychological reduction. It shows how Wittgenstein's intersubjective method avoids the excesses of behaviorism and phenomenology, offering a specifically human way to adapt mechanistic and interpretive means to the communicative ends of psychiatry.     

THE PATIENT'S OBJECTS IN THE ANALYST'S MIND

In every analysis, the analyst develops an internal relationship with the patient's objects—that is, the people in the patient's life and mind. Sometimes these figures can inhabit the analyst's mind as a source of data, but at other times, the analyst may feel preoccupied with or even invaded by them. The author presents two clinical cases: one in which the seeming absence of a good object in the patient's mind made the analyst hesitate to proceed with an analysis, and another in which the patient's preoccupation with a “bad” object was shared and mirrored by the analyst's own inner preoccupation with the object. The use and experience of these two objects by the analyst are discussed with particular attention to the countertransference.     

‘The Mind as an Object of God's Knowledge’: Another Cartesian Temptation?

In this paper my aim is to consider the picture of God's immediate knowledge of the mind as this appears in Wittgenstein's work, where its soundness seems to be brought into question. My argument is that the response to this denial should take the form, not of an investigation of a theological position concerning God's knowledge (“can God look into the human mind?”), but of a negotiation of the difficulties affecting our use of this picture. A great part of the latter can be seen as difficulties in mastering the communicative relation between God and man which lies at the heart of the religious form of life, and which arises from the dislocation which familiar language‐games undergo within it.     

The knower and the known

This paper is a presentation and discussion of Spinoza's view on the knower, or the mind, as an agent. The knower is on his view to be regarded as an active or generative complex cognitive experience. Imagination, reason and intuition are the cognitive principles. On account of their intrinsic relation to “the first law of nature”, that of selfpreservation, together with the thesis of the mind as constituted by ideas or knowledge, these principles function at the same time as moral principles. Consequently, it makes sense to speak of an individual's moral attitude toward everything be knows. A discussion of imagination, reason and intuition mainly as cognitive principles is followed by some concluding remarks on the cognitive and moral relation between human beings: To know another human being is to know his knowledge. The moral attitude of individuals to each other is a function of their mutual knowledge of knowledge.     

Courting the Enemy: McMahan on the Unity of Mind

Abstract

Jeff McMahan has recently developed the embodied mind theory of identity in place of the other standing theories, which he examines and consequently rejects. This paper examines the performance of his theory on cases of commissurotomy or the split-brain syndrome. Available experimental data concerning these cases seem to suggest that a single mind can divide into two independent streams in ways that are incompatible with our intuitive notion of mind. This phenomenon poses unique problems for McMahan's theory that we are essentially minds. I attempt to use his considered response to these cases as a weapon against his own embodied mind theory by highlighting some of the tensions in McMahan's response. In particular, I argue that in reaching his conclusion McMahan admits to something quite contrary to the very spirit of his own theory and that it is a powerful point in its support that one of the theories McMahan rejects can deal very well with these cases.     

HOW SHOULD WE BEHAVE? A REVIEW OF REASONS AND PERSONS BY DEREK PARFIT

In this book Parfit attempts to develop a rational, non-religious ethics. Instead of asking, “What does God tell us to do?” he asks, “What does reason tell us to do?” Given a set of simple assumptions, he considers whether it is possible to be consistently selfish or consistently good. Analyses of personal dilemmas (problems of self-control) and moral dilemmas (problems of social cooperation) show that neither consistent selfishness nor consistent goodness is logically possible. Instead, a fine balance must be maintained between, on the one hand, our immediate versus long-term good and, on the other, our own good versus that of other people. Ultimately Parfit fails to develop a formula by which such a balance may be struck. Parfit''s analysis is consistent with behavioral analysis in its reductionistic view of the self and the parallel it draws between relations with other people and relations with oneself at other times. Parfit''s analysis is inconsistent with behaviorism in its view of the mind as internal, available to introspection, and able to cause behavior. His nonfunctional mentalism leads Parfit to inconsistencies and blocks the path to a consistent ethics. Teleological behaviorism''s view of the mind in terms of patterns of overt behavior is not hampered by these inconsistencies and may lead to a functional rather than purely rational ethics.     

BEING DRIVEN MAD: TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING BORDERLINE AND OTHER DISTURBED STATES OF MIND THROUGH THE USE OF THE COUNTER‐TRANSFERENCE

In this paper material is presented from supervision groups run for nurses and other mental health professionals. The patients presented to the group came from different mental health settings with a diagnosis that included borderline features and/or other disturbed states of mind. All of the patients described caused strong counter‐transference feelings of sympathy, confusion, anger, hopelessness and guilt. Although these views were not expressed in formal ward rounds or recorded in clinical notes, evidence of their influence could be seen in the staff's attitude toward these patients. In supervision groups staff would either say that the patients were victims of mistreatment or they adopted a rather moralistic tone saying, ‘the patient is attention‐seeking’, ‘manipulative’ or ‘not mentally ill’. Psychoanalytic supervision which puts the transference and counter‐transference relationship at the centre of practice can help staff to think about their feelings and digest them in a way that makes use of them as evidence rather than discarding them as purely subjective. It also helps to reduce the toxic effects of the patient's projections upon the clinician's mind and this in turn helps to reduce retaliatory or manic clinical decisions. In this paper I argue that staff teams need time to reflect on their practice in handovers and clinical meetings and that psychoanalytic supervision can offer a particularly valuable clinical perspective on patients with Borderline features. This sort of support should be seen as an essential part of the work of nurses and other mental health professionals rather than an unaffordable luxury.     

HIERARCHIES: THE CORE ARGUMENT FOR A NATURALISTIC CHRISTIAN FAITH

This article takes on a perhaps impossible task: not only to reconstruct the core argument of Arthur Peacocke's program in science and religion but also to evaluate it in two major areas where it would seem to be vulnerable, namely, more recent developments in systems biology and the philosophy of mind. If his theory of hierarchies is to be successful, it must stand up to developments in these two areas and then be able to apply the results in a productive way to Christian theological reflection. Peacocke recognized that one's model of the mind‐body relation is crucial for one's position on the God‐world relation and divine action. Of the three models that he constructed, it turns out that only the third can serve as a viable model for theology if it is to be more than purely deistic or metaphorical.     

On the mathematical representation of phenomena of emergence

This paper is a philosophical enquiry into the role that mathematics play in the articulation of science. It is conducted, in its essentials, in the spirit of Wittgenstein's views on the nature and function of philosophy, which are to lay bare, as it were, the manner in which we do whatever it is that we do, and then to examine the claims that we make for the deed. My conclusions should be easily accessible to those familiar with his thinking on the subject of science.

The case that has inspired the writing of this paper is not that of biology, nor is it the biological theory of evolution; rather, the case I have kept in mind while writing this paper is that of cognitive science, sometimes presented as a “science of mind” by its practitioners. It is primarily a computational theory characterized by two distinct approaches, one internal, the gist of which is that the brain/mind distinction is definitely passé; the other external, based on the view that the mark of human mentation is to be found in the ordinary use of old expressions to convey new meanings, i.e. in the Cartesian test for the existence of other minds, and its simpler computational version, the Turing test. Two intuitions underlie the paper: one, that language is obviously an adaptive characteristic of human organisms: one learns one's own mother's tongue, and feral children cannot conceptualize if first exposed to language after reaching puberty; two, empirical evidence supports the view that the “knowing brain” is different architecturally from the “untutored” one. These intuitions warrant regarding man's cognitive apparatus as an evolutionary system, and the “mind” as an emergent property.     

Hume's Unified Theory of Mental Representation

On its face, Hume's account of mental representation involves at least two elements. On the one hand, Hume often seems to write as though the representational properties of an idea are fixed solely by what it is a copy or image of. But, on the other, Hume's treatment of abstract ideas (and other similar cases) makes it clear that the representational properties of a Humean idea sometimes depend, not just on what it is copied from, but also on the manner in which the mind associates it with other ideas. Past interpretations of Hume have tended to focus on one of these elements of his account to the neglect of the other. But no interpretation of this sort is likely to capture the role that both copying and association play within Hume's discussion. In what follows, I argue that the most plausible way of understanding Hume's discussion involves attributing to him a unified account of mental representation in which both of these elements play a central role. I close by discussing the manner in which reading Hume in this way would alter our understanding of the relationship between Hume's thought and contemporary philosophy of mind.