DO CONDITIONAL REINFORCERS COUNT?

Six pigeons were trained on a procedure in which seven components arranged different food-delivery ratios on concurrent variable-interval schedules each session. The components were unsignaled, lasted for 10 food deliveries, and occurred in random order with a 60-s blackout between components. The schedules were arranged using a switching-key procedure in which two responses on a center key changed the schedules and associated stimuli on two side keys. In Experiment 1, over five conditions, an increasing proportion of food deliveries accompanied by a magazine light was replaced with the presentation of the magazine light only. Local analyses of preference showed preference pulses toward the alternative that had just produced either a food-plus-magazine-light or magazine-light-only presentation, but pulses after food deliveries were always greater than those after magazine lights. Increasing proportions of magazine lights did not change the size of preference pulses after food or magazine-light presentations. Experiment 2 investigated the effects of correlations between food ratios and magazine-light ratios: In Condition 6, magazine-light ratios in components were inversely correlated (-1.0) with food ratios, and in Condition 7, magazine-light ratios were uncorrelated with food ratios. In Conditions 8 and 9, pecks also produced occasional 2.5-s flashes of a green keylight. In Condition 8, food and magazine-light ratios were correlated 1.0 whereas food and green-key ratios were correlated -1.0. In Condition 9, food and green-key ratios were correlated 1.0 whereas food and magazine-light ratios were correlated -1.0. Preference pulses toward alternatives after magazine lights and green keys depended on the correlation between these event ratios and the food ratios: If the ratios were correlated +1.0, positive preference pulses resulted; if the correlation was -1.0, preference pulses were negative. These results suggest that the Law of Effect has more to do with events signaling consequences than with strengthening responses.     

DO ELEPHANTS EVER FORGET?1

Three adult female elephants (Elephas maximus) were tested on a light-dark discrimination problem with an 8-yr intertrial interval. The first subject took only 6 min to reach criterion and made only two errors, suggesting remarkable retention. The other two subjects were found to have visual anomalies that would have gone undetected without this research.     

HOW WELL DO JURORS REASON?

Significant individual variation IS observed m how people reason as jurors At the saUsficing end of a continuum we identify, the juror draws on evi-dence selectively to construct a single story of what happened, with no acknowledgment of discrepant evidence or alternative possibilities A contrasting theory-evidence coordination mode of processing entails construction of multiple theories (story-verdict constellations)that are evaluated against the evidence and against alternatives Individual differences Influence task outcome, the satisficing mode being associated with more extreme verdict choices and very high certainty     

WHY DO PEOPLE USE FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE?

Abstract— In this article, we examine the discourse goals that are accomplished by the use of eight forms of figurative language: hyperbole, idiom, indirect request, irony, understatement, metaphor, rhetorical question, and simile. Subjects were asked to provide reasons why they would use a particular figure of speech. Based on their responses, a discourse goal taxonomy that includes each of the eight figures was developed. The goal taxonomy indicates that each figure of speech is used to accomplish a unique constellation of communicative goals. The degree of goal overlap between the eight forms was also calculated, and the results provide support for theoretical claims about the relatedness of certain figures. Taken together, the goal taxonomy and overlap scores broaden our understanding of functional and theoretical differences between the various kinds of figurative language.     

DO PEOPLE REALLY ADAPT TO MARRIAGE?

Although cross-sectional studies have shown a reliable association between marital status and subjective well-being, a recent longitudinal study [Lucas et al. 2003, Journal of Personality & Social Psychology 84(3), pp.␣527–539] found no support for the idea that happiness increases after marriage. Instead, participants who got married reported short-term increases followed by complete adaptation back to baseline levels of well-being. However, researchers have criticized this study on two grounds. First, these results contradict cohort-based analyses from a nationally representative sample. Second, these analyses do not control for pre-marriage cohabitation, which could potentially inflate baseline levels of well-being. The original data (plus four additional waves) are reanalyzed to address these concerns. Results confirm that individuals do not get a lasting boost in life satisfaction following marriage.The data used in this paper were made available by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW). This research was supported by a grant from the Anthony Marchionne Foundation.     

WHY “DO NO HARM”?

Edmund Pellegrino has argued that the dramatic changes in American health care call for critical reflection on the traditional norms governing the therapeutic relationship. This paper offers such reflection on the obligation to “do no harm.” Drawing on work by Beauchamp and Childress and Pellegrino and Thomasma, I argue that the libertarian model of medical ethics offered by Engelhardt cannot adequately sustain an obligation to “do no harm.” Because the obligation to “do no harm” is not based simply on a negative duty of nonmaleficence but also on a positive duty of beneficence, I argue that it is best understood to derive from the fiduciary nature of the healing relationship.     

DO I HAVE TO BE HERE NOW?

Kaplan claims that (1) ‘I am here now’, though analytic, is not a necessary truth. But this sentence is not a proposition, in a sense of proposition in which some, but not all, sentences are propositions. Since it is not a proposition, it is not true, and consequently not analytic. It is in fact a fragment of a proposition, the same fragment as ‘he was there then’ in (2) ‘CJFW said in Oxford on 23 September 1991 that he was there then’. Sentences containing indexicals in general owe their sense to the corresponding fragments of sentences containing ‘quasi-indexicals’(‘then’, for example, is the quasi-indexical to ‘now’ as indexical). Someone uttering (1) assertively will thereby make a proposition like (2) true. (2) entails (3) ‘CJFW said in Oxford on 23 September 1993 that CJFW was in Oxford on 23 September 1991′. So by uttering (1) in the appropriate circumstances I made it true that I had asserted the proposition (4) ‘CJFW was in Oxford on 23 September 1991′. What is analytic and necessarily true is the proposition ‘If (3) then (4)’.     

DO INFANTS SHOW GENERALIZED IMITATION OF GESTURES?

Two experiments were conducted to investigate generalized imitation of manual gestures in 1- to 2-year-old infants. In Experiment 1, 6 infants were first trained four baseline matching relations (e.g., when instructed "Do this", to raise their arms after they saw the experimenter do so). Next, four novel gestures that the infants did not match in probe trials were selected as target behaviors during generalized imitation Test 1; models of these gestures were presented on unreinforced matching trials interspersed with intermittently reinforced baseline matching trials. None of the infants matched the target behaviors. To ensure that these behaviors were in the infants' motor skills repertoires, the infants were next trained to produce them, at least once, under stimulus control that did not include an antecedent model of the target behavior. In repeat generalized imitation trials (Test 2), the infants again failed to match the target behaviors. Five infants (3 from Experiment 1) participated in Experiment 2, which was identical to Experiment 1 except that, following generalized imitation Test 1, the motor-skills training was implemented to a higher criterion (21 responses per target behavior), and in a multiple-baseline, across-target-behaviors procedure. In the final generalized imitation test, 1 infant matched one, and another infant matched two target behaviors; the remaining 17 target behaviors still were not matched. The results did not provide convincing evidence of generalized imitation, even though baseline matching was well maintained and the target behaviors were in the infants' motor skills repertoires, raising the question of what are the conditions that reliably give rise to generalized imitation.     

DO EXPLANATORY DESIRE ATTRIBUTIONS GENERATE OPAQUE CONTEXTS?

Many philosophers assert that psychological verbs generate opaque contexts and that the object of a psychological verb cannot be replaced with a co-referring expression salva veritate as the objects of non-psychological verbs can be. I argue that the logical and linguistic concerns which govern this assertion do not transfer to observational and experimental situations because the criteria that we use in order to verify that an observed subject has one hypothesized desire rather than another provide inconclusive evidence when we don't allow for all regular substitutions in psychological contexts. This becomes more obvious when we contextualize intentional behavior within the appropriate framework by recognizing that, in order to make sense of any desire attribution, we must understand the subject experiencing the desire to be pursuing each desired situation as a means to a further overarching goal. I conclude that the object of desire should always be read de re.     

GENESIS REVISITED: CAN WE DO BETTER THAN GOD?

Abstract. We are faced with growing powers of manipulation of our human genetic makeup. While not denying that these powers can be used for great good, it behooves us to think now of possible upper limits to the change that we might want to effect. I argue that thoughts of changing the human species into a race of supermen and superwomen are based on weak premises. Genetic fine-tuning may indeed be in order; wholesale genetic change is not.     

WHAT DOES HOLISM HAVE TO DO WITH MORAL PARTICULARISM?

Moral particularists are united in their opposition to the codification of morality, and their work poses an important challenge to traditional ways of thinking about moral philosophy. Defenders of moral particularism have, with near unanimity, sought support from a doctrine they call ‘holism in the theory of reasons.’ We argue that this is all a mistake. There are two ways in which holism in the theory of reasons can be understood, but neither provides any support for moral particularism.     

WHAT DOES HERMENEUTICS HAVE TO DO WITH BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION?

In common usage, ‘hermeneutics’ is a word often used interchangeably with ‘interpretation’. This has especially become so in biblical studies, but a review of how the word ‘hermeneutics’ came to prominence in biblical scholarship suggests that there is value in continuing to keep it as a concept distinguishable from interpretation. The omnipresence of the word in contemporary biblical studies obscures some of the specific roles that hermeneutics is well suited to perform. The potential benefits of hermeneutics in this more limited sense for biblical interpretation are discussed with respect to the two main hermeneutical theorists of the late twentieth century: Hans‐Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur.     

REACTING TO CONSECRATING SCIENCE: WHAT MIGHT AMATEURS DO?

In Consecrating Science: Wonder, Knowledge, and the Natural World, Lisa H. Sideris makes a compelling case that a new cosmology movement advocates for a new, universal, creation story grounded in the sciences. She fears the new story reinforces elite power structures and anthropocentrism and thus environmental degradation. Alternatively, she promotes genuine wonder which occurs in experiences of the natural world. As Sideris focuses on the likely logical outcome of the assumptions and arguments of the new cosmologies, she does not investigate whether and how people react to these new myths. I suggest that methods of documentary studies, applied to popular book reviews on Amazon and Goodreads, shed light on the ramifications of the new cosmologies among the general public. While many reviewers exhibit attitudes and behaviors that would concern Sideris, responses are far from univocal. Using this case as a guide, I suggest that attention to the experience of laypeople could contribute productively to religion and science research in general.     

DO WE SENSE MODALITIES WITH OUR SENSE MODALITIES?1

It has been widely assumed that we do not perceive dispositional properties. I argue that there are two ways of interpreting this assumption. On the first, extensional, interpretation whether we perceive dispositions depends on a complex set of metaphysical commitments. But if we interpret the claim in the second, intensional, way, then we have no reason to suppose that we do not perceive dispositional properties. The two most important and influential arguments to the contrary fail.     

DO BLACK AND WHITE SUPERVISORY PROBLEM SOLVING STYLES DIFFER?*

Do black supervisors manage differently than white supervisors? Do black supervisors solve problems in the same way as white supervisors? To investigate these issues a group of 21 blacks and 56 whites in a supervisory training program conducted by the College of Business, University of Georgia, were studied using a take-home paper and pencil exercise. Certain independent variables were first identified which included biographical data, employment experience and personality factors. The exercises attempted to measure the way they resolved role conflict situations and handled disciplinary problems–two important duties of supervisors. The most outstanding finding from the study was the paucity of differences in all measures except in attitudes toward received discipline. Blacks were less willing to accept harsh punishment for violation of organizational rules than whites, especially where there was a history of high performance. We conclude, however, that organizational acculturation may substantially offset any minority subcultural influences in organizational situations.     

ESCAPE,AVOIDANCE, PUNISHMENT: WHERE DO WE STAND?

This paper reviews progress since the author's previous writings in three areas. In escape training, the preparatory-response explanation of bar holding still appears to be valid. In avoidance, the newer safety-signal version of two-factor theory has much to recommend it and readily incorporates Anger's conditioned aversive temporal stimuli formulation. Shock-density reduction is rejected as a substitute for two-factor theory. Finally, criticisms of the avoidance interpretation of punishment are answered and recent empirical data are cited in its support.     

WHY DO ASSESSMENT CENTERS WORK? THE PUZZLE OF ASSESSMENT CENTER VALIDITY

The finding that assessment centers are successful in making valid predictions of managerial success is well established in the literature. Unfortunately, it is not clearly understood why assessment centers work. For example, construct validity of assessment center dimensions is rarely obtained. In this paper we affirm the evidence for predictive validity of assessment centers and conclude that assessment centers can work for a variety of purposes and in numerous contexts. But we also assert that we do not know why they work. The bulk of the paper goes on to raise possible explanations for the predictive validity observed in assessment centers and raises implications for practice and guidance of future research.