What Must Pro-Lifers Believe About the Moral Status of Embryos?

Embryo rescue cases and minimal miscarriage prevention research have been interpreted as showing that even pro-lifers are not really committed to the unborn having the same moral status as the born. I will suggest instead that judgments about embryo rescues are often distorted by triage considerations that reveal nothing about differences in moral status between those saved and those not. I will present metaphysical and ethical considerations – none assuming a difference in moral status – why preventing millions of miscarriages does not warrant the massive redistribution of research funds that would occur to prevent the deaths of equal numbers of humans already born.     

What is Wrong With Moral Testimony?

Is it legitimate to acquire one’s moral beliefs on the testimony of others? The pessimist about moral testimony says not. But what is the source of the difficulty? Here pessimists have a choice. On the Unavailability view, moral testimony never makes knowledge available to the recipient. On Unusability accounts, although moral testimony can make knowledge available, some further norm renders it illegitimate to make use of the knowledge thus offered. I suggest that Unusability accounts provide the strongest form of pessimist view. I consider and reject five Unavailability accounts. I then argue that any such view will fail. But what is the norm rendering moral testimonial knowledge unusable? I suggest it lies in the requirement that we grasp for ourselves the moral reasons behind a moral view. This demand is one testimony cannot meet, and that claim holds whatever account we offer of the epistemology of testimony. However, while appeal to this requirement forms the most plausible pessimist view, it is another question whether pessimism is correct.     

What is Wrong with the Concept of Religious Experience?

After briefly mentioning the reason why the concept of religious experience has become a key to understanding Western and non-Western religious phenomena in current religious studies, this paper argues that the concept itself is insufficient to represent the religious phenomena of Islam, because to speak about 'an experience of God' in the context of Islam is misleading. This paper also argues that to consider mystical experience as well as the prophetic revelation that is wah?y within the boundaries of religious experience is confusing. Since the transmission process and contents of wah?y are extraordinary and miraculous, it should not be treated as an ordinary religious occurrence and therefore should not be considered as a personal religious experience.     

What Accounts for Prosocial Behavior? Roles of Moral Identity,Moral Judgment,and Self-Efficacy Beliefs

Prior research suggests that moral identity influences individuals’ willingness to engage in prosocial behavior. Little attention, however, has been given to the roles of and relations between moral identity and other factors, such as moral judgment, in accounting for types of prosocial behavior in adolescence. The current study examined the extent to which moral identity, moral judgment, and social self-efficacy contribute to prosocial behaviors in adolescence. Approximately 338 adolescents (M_age?=?13.4 years) completed measures of moral identity, moral judgment, social self-efficacy, and prosocial behavior. Teachers rated adolescents’ prosocial behaviors, which largely corroborated the adolescents’ self-reports. Moral identity was found to predict most types of prosocial behavior. Moral judgment and moral identity were related and jointly predicted altruistic prosocial behaviors, but did not predict helping in front of others. Further, moral identity mediated the relationships between moral judgment and some forms of prosocial behavior (e.g., emotional, volunteering). Self-efficacy beliefs were found to predict some types of prosocial behavior (e.g., public), perhaps providing adolescents with confidence to engage in prosocial action. Overall, moral identity was especially effective in directly accounting for prosocial behavior, and may act as a mediator to bridge the moral judgment–moral action gap among adolescents.     

What is so Good about Moral Freedom?

Many Christian philosophers believe that it is a great good that human beings are free to choose between good and evil, so good indeed that God is justified in putting up with a great many evil choices for the sake of it. But many of the same Christian philosophers also believe that God is essentially good – good in every possible world. Unlike his sinful human creatures, God cannot choose between good and evil. In that sense, he is not 'morallyFree'. It is not easy to see how to fit these two theses into a single coherent package. If moral freedom is such a great good in human beings, why is it not a grave defect in God that he lacks it? And if the lack of moral freedom does not detract in any way from God's greatness, would it not have been better for us not to have it? I develop, but ultimately reject, what I take to be the most initially promising strategy for resolving this dilemma.     

What Will the Neighbors Think? The Effect of Moral Communities on Cohabitation

In this study, we analyze the relationship between county-level religious adherence rates and county-level cohabitation rates in the year 2000. Based on the concept of moral communities, we test hypotheses that higher rates of affiliation with certain religious traditions and lower levels of religious heterogeneity will correlate with lower rates of cohabitation. The analysis consists of data from two sources: the 2000 U.S. Census and the 2000 Religious Congregations and Membership Study. In well-controlled models, spatial regression analysis indicates significant negative relationships between evangelical adherence rates and percent cohabiting. Our results also show that, although rates of adherence and heterogeneity also matter outside the South, the effects are consistently stronger in the South and among Christian denominations. This study advances research on cohabitation by conducting a county-level examination of the impact of religion and moral communities on the increasingly high levels of cohabitation that we are seeing in the United States.     

What Values in Design? The Challenge of Incorporating Moral Values into Design

Recently, there is increased attention to the integration of moral values into the conception, design, and development of emerging IT. The most reviewed approach for this purpose in ethics and technology so far is Value-Sensitive Design (VSD). This article considers VSD as the prime candidate for implementing normative considerations into design. Its methodology is considered from a conceptual, analytical, normative perspective. The focus here is on the suitability of VSD for integrating moral values into the design of technologies in a way that joins in with an analytical perspective on ethics of technology. Despite its promising character, it turns out that VSD falls short in several respects: (1) VSD does not have a clear methodology for identifying stakeholders, (2) the integration of empirical methods with conceptual research within the methodology of VSD is obscure, (3) VSD runs the risk of committing the naturalistic fallacy when using empirical knowledge for implementing values in design, (4) the concept of values, as well as their realization, is left undetermined and (5) VSD lacks a complimentary or explicit ethical theory for dealing with value trade-offs. For the normative evaluation of a technology, I claim that an explicit and justified ethical starting point or principle is required. Moreover, explicit attention should be given to the value aims and assumptions of a particular design. The criteria of adequacy for such an approach or methodology follow from the evaluation of VSD as the prime candidate for implementing moral values in design.     

What Is Conventionalism about Moral Rights and Duties?

A powerful objection against moral conventionalism says that it gives the wrong reasons for individual rights and duties. The reason why I must not break my promise to you, for example, should lie in the damage to you—rather than to the practice of promising or to all other participants in that practice. Common targets of this objection include the theories of Hobbes, Gauthier, Hooker, Binmore, and Rawls. I argue that (1) the conventionalism of these theories is superficial; (2) genuinely conventionalist theories are not vulnerable to the objection; and (3) genuine moral conventionalism is independently plausible.     

What is the Problem with Fundamental Moral Error?

Quasi-realists argue that meta-ethical expressivism is fully compatible with the central assumptions underlying ordinary moral practice. In a recent paper, Andy Egan has developed a vexing challenge for this project, arguing that expressivism is incompatible with central assumptions about error in moral judgments. In response, Simon Blackburn has argued that Egan's challenge fails, because Egan reads the expressivist as giving an account of moral error, rather than an account of judgments about moral error. In this paper I argue that the challenge can be reinstated, even if we focus only on the expressivist's account of judgments about moral error.     

What do I Think of Others in Relation to Myself? Moral Identity and Moral Inclusion in Explaining Prejudice

The aim of this article is to analyze the effect of moral identity on prejudice in conjunction with moral inclusion/exclusion attitudes. In particular, the hypothesis is that even if high moral identity people tend to be less prejudicial than low moral identity people, this result can be explained with reference to moral inclusion/exclusion attitudes. A questionnaire was distributed to 192 Italian subjects. According to the hypothesis, results show that moral identity is negatively correlated with blatant prejudice, but that this effect is completely mediated by the perception of moral inclusion/exclusion with the other groups. These results suggest that it is not how morally you behave (symbolization), or the relevance you give to moral traits for your identity (internalization), that have an effect on prejudice, but rather it is who you include within the moral community within which moral values apply. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do You Reap What You Sow? The Effect of Cyberostracism on Moral Impurity

Two experiments tested whether cyberostracism increases people’s perceived moral impurity and their tendency to purchase cleansing products. In both experiments, participants were first either ostracized or included in a web-based social interaction. Next, they completed self-report measures to assess their perceived moral impurity and tendency to purchase cleansing products. The results showed that participants who were ostracized reported a higher level of moral impurity and a higher tendency to purchase cleansing products. These findings advance our current understanding on the effect of online social interaction on people’s moral self-perception.     

Moral Machines?

Wendell Wallach and Colin Allen??s Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right From Wrong (Oxford University Press, 2009) explores efforts to develop machines that, not only can be employed for good or bad ends, but which themselves can be held morally accountable for what they do??artificial moral agents (AMAs). This essay is a critical response to Wallach and Allen??s conjectures. Although Wallach and Allen do not suggest that we are close to being able to create full-fledged AMAs, they do talk seriously about making incremental progress in the direction of creating them (even if we never fully succeed). However, there are important questions about the moral development of AMAs that Moral Machines does not address. Given the responsibilities entrusted to human moral agents, we take questions about their moral development very seriously. In the case of children, the hope is that eventually they will develop into full-fledged moral agents. How might we expect this to go with less than fully formed AMAs? Will there be a comparable story of moral development and moral education that we can tell?     

Psychosocial Stress and Cardiovascular Risk: What is the Role of Daily Experience?

We describe an ecological momentary assessment (EMA) protocol designed to measure daily life experiences along several psychosocial dimensions (Social Conflict, Task Demand, Decisional Control, Negative Affect, and Arousal) hypothesized to be relevant for cardiovascular disease risk. In a large community sample, these assessments have been administered in conjunction with ambulatory blood pressure (ABP) monitoring and measures of subclinical cardiovascular disease. Several results have emerged that support the promise of this approach. First of all, each of these dimensions of experience appears to be a trigger for cardiovascular activation, with movement on each scale being associated with significant within-person changes in heart rate and blood pressure in the natural environment. Second, there appear to be individual differences in physiological responsiveness to these dimensions of daily experience, with such differences being associated in some cases with laboratory-based assessments of cardiovascular reactivity, as might be expected. Third, EMA ratings are associated in several instances with (between-person) stable individual differences in ABP readings. And finally, we have found that some of the characteristics defined by our EMA ratings are related to measures of subclinical atherosclerosis. Such effects appear to be mediated, in part, by ABP. The advantages of using EMA measures for capturing the effects of psychosocial stressors are highlighted by comparing the predictive validity of these daily life assessments to traditional global self-reports. We conclude by describing future plans for use of this type of assessment protocol for helping us to characterize psychosocial characteristics relevant to cardiovascular disease risk. Personality and social processes during daily living may have an important impact not only on psychological functioning but also on physical health and disease. In this article we review our recent work involving the assessment of daily experience as a means of better understanding the role of psychosocial stress in cardiovascular disease risk. First, we outline the rationale for our interest in daily experience sampling for examining these processes, and we describe the methods we have adopted for this purpose. Next, we review findings from a recent study in which we have used these approaches to examine the role of psychosocial stress on ABP and atherosclerosis in a community-dwelling sample. We compare our approach to more traditional (global self-report and laboratory-observation) methods for examining these relationships in humans, and we discuss potential future directions for use of daily experience sampling in studies of health and behavior.     

What Does the Frame Problem Tell us About Moral Normativity?

Within cognitive science, mental processing is often construed as computation over mental representations—i.e., as the manipulation and transformation of mental representations in accordance with rules of the kind expressible in the form of a computer program. This foundational approach has encountered a long-standing, persistently recalcitrant, problem often called the frame problem; it is sometimes called the relevance problem. In this paper we describe the frame problem and certain of its apparent morals concerning human cognition, and we argue that these morals have significant import regarding both the nature of moral normativity and the human capacity for mastering moral normativity. The morals of the frame problem bode well, we argue, for the claim that moral normativity is not fully systematizable by exceptionless general principles, and for the correlative claim that such systematizability is not required in order for humans to master moral normativity.