“前科学概念”的定义

错误概念是历史上研究之初、学者们首选的术语。错误概念的意思是“对事物含糊的（vague）、不完善的（imperfect）或者是错误的（mistaken）理解（understanding）”（James H．Wandersee,Joel J．Mintzes,Joseph D．Novak,1994）。Arthur Louis Odom（1995）在研究中也主张用“错误概念”,他说“错误概念是学生拥有的与通常从科学家那里获得的概念不同的观念（ideas）”。     

不着

诗歌达到高妙的境界,可以“不着一字,尽得风流”。诗歌里的“不着”,我的理解,是“意在言外,撇开皮相”的意思。我这里说的“不着”,指的是一种生活态度,意指“不沾不滞,与物推移”。     

断定、否定、承诺、资格与不相容性（以及一些推论）

在这篇短文里,我将比较Huw Price（【7】）和我本人（【9】）关于否定的对称性处理的两种不同方式,并与Robert Brandom关于承诺、资格和不相容性的分析进行对比。这两种方式都可以归为Brandom所谓的规范语用学,是一种关于意义的语义学反实在论：语汇的含义是由人们的受规则支配（即规范的）的语用实践（语用学）予以明确的。这样的处理不同于直觉主义者的语义学反实在论,因为它提供了一种方式,使得我们可以区分“A”和“A得以保证”的推理意义。尽管“证明”具有某种中心地位,但“实证”并不是意义的首要承载者。而这种区分植根于对人们语用实践的细致分析。一方面,根据Price以及我本人的看法,人们既做断定也做否定;另一方面,Brandom则区分了自上而下的承诺与自下而上的资格,以及据此而定义的不相容性概念。本文考察这些不同进路之间的各种关联,并讨论从这些考察中浮现出的一种关于证明的看法。     

心身问题与心灵哲学

第9届维特根斯坦国际专题讨论会的主题是心灵哲学(philosophy of mind,或译心智哲学)和心理学哲学。详细地讨论过的问题包括:心身问题、心灵哲学的传统问题和心理学哲学。 1.心身问题什么是心身问题?“心灵”(mind)一词有多种非常不同的用法,这一事实导致了现代讨论中的某种混乱。对这个词,我们至少可以区分出五种不同的用法,因此心身问题至少有五种意义。 (1)我们可以象笛卡儿使用“mens”一词那样使用“心灵”一词,让它指称具有心理属性的东西,亦即指称那种能思想,能感知,能相信和能欲求的东西。在这种情况下,我们通常是用“心灵”这个词意指“人”这个词所意指的东西,因而该词表示的就是你和我这样一些实     

试读《中庸》

本文试图寻《中庸》文本的内容，逐节读懂它的哲学意义。作者按“自己”与“他者” 的关系，对“天命之谓性”提出了一种看法，把“性”理解为万物（包括人）在宇宙、世界中的“位置”， 是在“他者”的关系中开显出来的“自己”，因而“自己”不受抑象的，“中”和“庸”也都有各自的具体 含义。从这个基本的角度，文章探讨了《中庸》中的“率性”、“忠孝”、“诚”等概念的意思，力求在哲 学理论上有一个贯通的理解。     

文化挪用现象的哲学反思——基于文化挪用施为性话语形式的分析

文化挪用是一种文化背景的人使用另一种文化中的文化元素的行为。文化挪用概念在文化交流和保护文化间存在张力,用于意指时易引起争议。由于文化挪用具有“施为性话语”的形式,意指他人文化挪用不但不会保护弱势群体,反而会造成二次伤害,并把子虚乌有的罪名安置到被意指者身上。文化挪用的实质是把受害者设定为“绝对他者”,在摆出意指“东方主义”的姿态时其实挑起了“东方主义”的话语。受害者为了反抗这一话语,又不得不作出自我东方化的陈述。由于蕴含危险,应避免意指文化挪用,以开放平和态度开展文化交流。     

论心灵、意义和实在——J.哈伦访 H.普特南

哈:心灵哲学的最终目标是什么?心灵哲学和诸如神经科学、认知科学以及心理学等学科有什么区别? 普:象哲学的所有其他分支一样,心灵哲学是对一大堆松散的问题的讨论,这些问题随着时间的推移不断增加(有时也会减少)。“心灵”概念本身,几千年来,变化极大,使事情更为复杂。例如,亚里士多德并没有与我们的“心灵”概念确切对应的概念。赛克(Psyche),或灵魂,在亚里士多德哲学中,和我们的“心灵”并不等同,因为它包括诸如消化生殖等一些‘非精神”的功能。(其所以如此,是由于在亚里士多德哲学中,“灵魂”就是生命有机体的形式。这一概念明显地不如我们目前的“心灵”概念吗?)而且,在亚里士多德哲学中,奴斯(nous),或理性,排除了许多我们认为是精神的功能(这些功能中的一部分被萨姆斯[thumos]取代,它是亚里士多德认为存在于心中的整合中心)。     

神话、教义与哲学：灵知主义和思想史研究新趋势

20世纪下半叶，随着“后现代思潮”的衰退，一种重访过去、回归宗教、瞩望形而上境界的趋势日益显著。一种“新灵知主义（new gnosticism）”思潮构成了“后现代心灵（postmodern mind）”的一个显著维度。①复兴的灵知主义同其历史先驱构成了一种传承而又对话、延续而又颠覆的关系。     

论布兰顿之规范性实践概念

布兰顿（R．Brandom）的规范性实践概念有三项主要内涵：（1）默会地遵行实践传统孕育的“隐性规则”是遵从具有明确阐释的“显性规则”的前提;（2）规范性意涵独立于因果性,是基于意向性之主客体不同方面的模态关系的差异,不可相互取代;（3）那些作为默会信念的“隐性规则”本质上并不是迥异于“显性规则”的东西,它们仍以话语推论关系为范型,仍需具备概念阐释的可能性。特纳（S．Turner）和劳斯（J．ROUSe）分别从“还原论的”与“非还原论的”自然主义立场批评布兰顿的观点。对这些批评的回应将会表明,为什么上述三项意涵对规范性实践概念而言是同时必要的。     

工作记忆,意思相对频率与汉语歧义句的加工

本研究选取高、低工作记忆能量两组被试,通过两个实验,考察了歧义句多种解释的相对使用频率和被试工作记忆能量在歧义句加工中的作用。结果表明：（１）意思相对频率在歧义句加工中有显著效应,主要意思比次要意思更易于提取;（２）工作记忆能量对歧义句的加工仅表现出一定程度的影响,材料难度增加时,该效应达到边缘性显著的水平。     

Need for Meaning,Meaning Confusion,Meaning Anxiety,and Meaning Avoidance: Additional Dimensions of Meaning in Life

Two aspects of meaning in life have drawn much attention in previous research: presence of meaning and search for meaning. We proposed four additional aspects concerning individuals’ thoughts and feelings about meaning in life: need for meaning, meaning confusion, meaning avoidance, and meaning anxiety. We developed items to measure these dimensions. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis indicated that the data fit the factors well. Convergent and discriminant validities of the four dimensions were demonstrated though their distinct patterns of correlations with other variables, such as personality traits, need satisfaction, personal aspirations, life satisfaction, anxiety and depression. Moreover, cluster analysis revealed that individuals could be divided into meaningful groups according to these dimensions, with each group demonstrating unique psychological features. Implications for future studies on meaning in life are discussed.     

Meaning Naturalism, Meaning Irrealism, and the Work of Language

I defend the hypothesis that organisms that produce and recognize meaningful utterances tend to use simpler procedures, and should use the simplest procedures, to produce and recognize those utterances. This should be a basic principle of any naturalist theory of meaning, which must begin with the recognition that the production and understanding of meanings is work. One measure of such work is the minimal amount of space resources that must go into storing a procedure to produce or recognize a meaningful utterance. This cost has an objective measure, called Kolmogorov Complexity. I illustrate the use of this measure for a naturalist theory of meaning by showing how it offers a straight solution to one of the most influential arguments for meaning irrealism: the skeptical challenge posed by Kripke’s Wittgenstein.     

Propositions,Meaning, and Names

The object of this paper is to sketch an approach to propositions, meaning, and names. The key ingredients are a Twin‐Earth‐inspired distinction between internal and external meaning, and a middle‐Wittgenstein‐inspired conception of internal meaning as role in language system. The focus here is not on working out all the details, but on outlining the approach and showing how it offers a promising solution to the problem of the meaning of proper names. This is a plea for a neglected way of thinking about these topics.     

Truth,Meaning, and Circularity

It is often argued that the combination of deflationism about truth and the truth-conditional theory of meaning is impossible for reasons of circularity. I distinguish, and reject, two strains of circularity argument. Arguments of the first strain hold that the combination has a circular account of the order in which one comes to know the meaning of a sentence and comes to know its truth condition. I show that these arguments fail to identify any circularity. Arguments of the second strain hold that the combination has a circular explanation of the ideas or concepts of meaning and truth. I show that these arguments identify a genuine, but acceptable, circularity.     

Meaning, Truth, and Phenomenology

This essay approaches Derrida through a consideration of his writings on Saussure and Husserl. Derrida is right to insist, following Saussure, on a relational theory of meaning: words do not have a one-to-one correspondence with their referents. But he is wrong to insist on a purely differential theory of meaning: words can refer to reality within the context of a body of knowledge. Similarly, Derrida is right to reject Husserl's idea of presence: no truths are simply given to consciousness. But he is wrong to reject the very idea of objective knowledge: we can defend a notion of objective knowledge couched in terms of a comparison of rival bodies of theories. The essay concludes by considering the implications of the preceding arguments for the enterprise of phenomenology.     

Wonder,Mystery, and Meaning

Abstract

This paper explores the connection between wonder and meaning, in particular ‘the meaning of life’, a connection that, despite strong intrinsic connections between wonder and the (philosophical) search for meaning has not yet received any sustained attention. Does wonder ‘merely’ inspire our search for meaning, or does it also point the way towards meaning? In exploring this question I first engage with Hannah Arendt, then examine the suggestion (by Josef Pieper and Rachel Carson, among others) that the meaning wonder points us to lies in connecting us with the mystery of existence. Can there be meaning in mystery, or is wonder––as a state of being lost for words in the face of mystery––rather antithetical to meaning? This discussion leads to the idea, emphasized in recent writing on wonder, that wonder (also) depends on the meaning we ascribe to things. In the final section I discuss wonder as a potential source of meaning in life, then return to the question whether it can also point towards a deeper meaning of life. I conclude that no purely rational justification can be given for this view, but that this need not detract from the importance of wonder in our lives.     

Reasoning,Meaning, and Mind

Book Information Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind. By Gilbert Harman. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1999. Pp. viii + 291. Hardback, $120.00.