The semantic view of theories and higher-order languages

Synthese - Several philosophers of science construe models of scientific theories as set-theoretic structures. Some of them moreover claim that models should not be construed as structures in the...     

Inhibition and language pragmatic view in redundant data problem solving

The present study concerns redundant data problems, defined as problems in which irrelevant data is provided. This type of problem provides a misleading context [Pascual-Leone, J. (1987). Organismic process for neo-Piagetian theories: A dialectical causal account of cognitive development. International Journal of Psychology, 22, 531–570] similar to the Piagetian class inclusion task. The two experiments performed showed that adding the a-pragmatic cue ‘in total’ to the final question of redundant data problems increased both 7- and 9-year-old children's failure rate, without modifying the structure of the problem. This indicates that a non-structural linguistic cue can bias children towards failure by enhancing the lack of inhibition of the ordinary adding schema.     

Strategies in sentential reasoning

Four experiments examined the strategies that individuals develop in sentential reasoning. They led to the discovery of five different strategies. According to the theory proposed in the paper, each of the strategies depends on component tactics, which all normal adults possess, and which are based on mental models. Reasoners vary their use of tactics in ways that have no deterministic account. This variation leads different individuals to assemble different strategies, which include the construction of incremental diagrams corresponding to mental models, and the pursuit of the consequences of a single model step by step. Moreover, the difficulty of a problem (i.e., the number of mental models required by the premises) predisposes reasoners towards certain strategies. Likewise, the sentential connectives in the premises also bias reasoners towards certain strategies, e.g., conditional premises tend to elicit reasoning step by step whereas disjunctive premises tend to elicit incremental diagrams.     

Counterexamples in sentential reasoning

How do logically naive individuals determine that an inference is invalid? In logic, there are two ways to proceed: (1) make an exhaustive search but fail to find a proof of the conclusion and (2) use the interpretation of the relevant sentences to construct a counterexample—that is, a possibility consistent with the premises but inconsistent with the conclusion. We report three experiments in which the strategies that individuals use to refute invalid inferences based on sentential connectives were examined. In Experiment 1, the participants’ task was to justify their evaluations, and it showed that they used counterexamples more often than any other strategy. Experiment 2 showed that they were more likely to use counterexamples to refute invalid conclusions consistent with the premises than to refute invalid conclusions inconsistent with the premises. In Experiment 3, no reliable difference was detected in the results between participants who wrote justifications and participants who did not.     

Temporal and spatial relations in sentential reasoning

The mental model theory postulates that the meanings of assertions, and knowledge about their context can modulate the logical meaning of sentential connectives, such as "if" and "or". One known effect of modulation is to block the representation of possibilities to which a proposition refers. But, modulation should also add relational information, such as temporal order, to models of possibilities. Three experiments tested this prediction. Experiment 1 showed that individuals spontaneously matched the tense of their conclusions (in Portuguese) to embody implied, but unexpressed, temporal relations in conditional premises. Experiment 2 demonstrated the same phenomenon in inferences from disjunctions. Experiment 3 showed that the number of such implicit relations in inferences from conditionals affects both accuracy and the speed of reasoning. These results support the modulation hypothesis.     

On sentential anagrams: Making sentences out of words

Perception and production of language often have a problem-solving component to them, and this has not been much studied. The present article describes an exploratory approach to some aspects of production which required college students to reorder sentential anagrams. The main finding was that the number of words to be ordered was the greatest influence on performance, whereas little if any influence was exerted by the grammatical variables studied. Although the problem-solving process does not model all language use, it may model the more creative aspect, in which people try to make nonstandard statements. In contrast to a common current view that sentences are holistic, well-formed linguistic objects in mind, the present work emphasizes the developmental and interactive aspect of language production.This work was supported by Grant A7655 from the National, Research Council of Canada and by Leave Fellowship W 760 174 from Canada Council.     

Temporalizing ontology: a case for pragmatic emergence

Synthese - Despite an attempt to break with the hierarchical picture in traditional emergentist thought, non-standard accounts of emergence are often still committed to a premise that ontology is...     

Pronoun comprehension in aphasia: a comparison of three languages

The research reported here investigated the effect of phonological and syntactic factors on the processing of pronouns by aphasics. The comprehension of these "closed-class" elements was studied in three different languages: French, Dutch, and German. The cross-linguistic design made it possible to vary phonological status (clitic/nonclitic) and phrasal category (noun phrase/prepositional phrase) as well as grammatical relation (direct/indirect object) while keeping class membership (closed class) and meaning constant. A sentence-picture matching task was given to 20 German-speaking, 16 Dutch-speaking, and 14 French-speaking aphasics, half of each language group being classified as agrammatic Broca's and half as paragrammatic Wernicke's aphasics. The results suggest that Broca's aphasics' limitations in retrieving pronouns, and therefore other closed-class elements, are not a function of either phonological status, phrasal category, or grammatical relation. These subjects' observed high level of performance on pronouns in language comprehension appears due to the kind of semantic and syntactic information they encode. Our findings indicate that a more refined distinction than closed class vs. open class is necessary.     

Children's avoidance of lexical overlap: a pragmatic account

Children tend to choose an unfamiliar object rather than a familiar one when asked to find the referent of a novel name. This response has been taken as evidence for the operation of certain lexical constraints in children's inferences of word meanings. The present studies test an alternative--pragmatic--explanation of this phenomenon among 3-year-olds. In Study 1 children responded to a request for the referent of a novel label in the same way that they responded to a request for the referent of a novel fact. Study 2 intimated that children assume that labels are common knowledge among members of the same language community. Study 3 demonstrated that shared knowledge between a speaker and listener plays a decisive role in how children interpret a speaker's request. The findings suggest that 3-year-olds' avoidance of lexical overlap is not unique to naming and may derive from children's sensitivity to speakers' communicative intentions.     

Communicative impairment in traumatic brain injury: a complete pragmatic assessment

The aim of the present study was to examine the communicative abilities of traumatic brain injury patients (TBI). We wish to provide a complete assessment of their communicative ability/disability using a new experimental protocol, the Assessment Battery of Communication, (ABaCo) comprising five scales—linguistic, extralinguistic, paralinguistic, context and conversational—which investigate all the main pragmatic elements involved in a communicative exchange. The ABaCo was administered to 21 TBI subjects and to a control group. The results showed that performance by TBI patients was worse than that of controls on all scales; moreover they showed a trend of increasing difficulty in understanding and producing different pragmatic phenomena, i.e., standard communication acts, deceits and ironies, whether such phenomena are expressed through the linguistic or extralinguistic modality.     

Incidental formation of episodic associations: The importance of sentential context

The influence of relevant semantic context on the incidental formation of episodic associations between words was probed in two experiments. In Experiment 1, we examined the influence of associations formed incidentally between unrelated words presented either in isolation or embedded in a sentential context on subsequent explicit paired-associate leaning tested by cued recall. The results of Experiment 1 showed that the cued-recall rate of words studied in sentential context was higher than that of words co-occurring in isolated pairs. A subsequent single-items recognition test showed equal item memory for words studied in sentences than for words studied in isolated pairs, suggesting that the sentential context effect in cued recall indeed reflected stronger associations between paired words rather than better memory for single words. In Experiment 2, we ruled out memory for the entire sentence as an alternative explanation for the results of Experiment 1. We suggest two possible mechanisms to account for this advantage: First, pairs embedded in a sentence undergo semantic elaboration that might lead to the incidental formation of an association between them. Second, words embedded in a sentence enjoy the conjoint activation of compatible semantic features, a fact that may also facilitate the formation of an episodic association between them. The implications of these results for computational models using word representations based on co-occurrence data are discussed.     

Some syntactic determinants of sentential complexity,II : Verb structure

The effect of the lexical complexity of verbs on the processing of sentences was evaluated in two experiments. Verb complexity was indexed by the number of types of grammatical structure a verb permits (e.g., a verb may be transitive or intransitive and may permit various types of complement structures). Ss’ performances in paraphrasing sentences and in solving anagrams containing complex verbs were significantly poorer than their performances with the same sentences and anagrams containing less complex verbs.     

Both sides get the point: Hemispheric sensitivities to sentential constraint

Behavioral studies have consistently reported striking differences in the impact of sentence-level information on the processing of words presented in the right (RVF) versus the left (LVF) visual field, with context effects apparent only for RVF items. The consistent lack of such effects in the LVF has been taken to mean that right hemisphere language comprehension is largely insensitive to message-level meaning. We used the functional specificity afforded by event-related potential measures to assess this claim. Target words completing strongly and weakly constraining sentence contexts, in which constraint arose at the sentence level rather than from lexical associations, were presented laterally in the LVF or RVF. Increased constraint significantly reduced N400 amplitudes with presentation in both VFs, with no differences in the timing or amplitude of these effects. These results are inconsistent with the view that the VF asymmetries found in behavioral measures reflect differential hemispheric capacities at the level of semantic analysis and integration, although VF-based differences on earlier components (P2) suggest asymmetries in the impact of sentential context on perceptual aspects of word processing in the two hemispheres.     

Idealistic advice and pragmatic choice: a psychological distance account

In 6 studies, we found that advice is more idealistic than choice in decisions that trade off idealistic and pragmatic considerations. We propose that because advisers are more psychologically distant from the choosers' decision problem, they construe the dilemma at a higher construal level than do choosers (Trope & Liberman, 2003, 2010). Consequently, advisers are more influenced by idealistic considerations that are salient at a high-level construal, whereas choosers are more influenced by pragmatic considerations that are salient at a low-level construal. Consistent with this view, Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that compared with choosers, advisers weigh idealistic considerations more heavily and pragmatic considerations less heavily, place greater emphasis on ends (why) than on means to achieve the end (how), and generate more reasons (pros) in favor of acting idealistically. Studies 3 and 4 provide converging support for our account by demonstrating that making advisers focus on a lower construal level results in more pragmatic recommendations. In Study 3, we manufactured more pragmatic recommendations by priming a low-level implementation mind-set in a purportedly unrelated task, whereas in Study 4 we did so by reducing advisers' psychological distance from the dilemma by asking them to consider what they would choose in the situation. The results of Study 4 suggest advisers do not spontaneously consider self-choice. Finally, in Studies 5 and 6, we demonstrate the choice-advice difference in consequential real-life decisions.     

Why we simulate negated information: a dynamic pragmatic account

A well-established finding in the simulation literature is that participants simulate the positive argument of negation soon after reading a negative sentence, prior to simulating a scene consistent with the negated sentence (Kaup, Ludtke, & Zwaan, 2006; Kaup, Yaxley, Madden, Zwaan, & Ludtke, 2007). One interpretation of this finding is that negation requires two steps to process: first represent what is being negated then "reject" that in favour of a representation of a negation-consistent state of affairs (Kaup et al., 2007). In this paper we argue that this finding with negative sentences could be a by-product of the dynamic way that language is interpreted relative to a common ground and not the way that negation is represented. We present a study based on Kaup et al. (2007) that tests the competing accounts. Our results suggest that some negative sentences are not processed in two steps, but provide support for the alternative, dynamic account.