“道德焦虑”的现代性反思

从伦理的角度看,道德焦虑体现了人类对“善”的渴望和追求,是人类对自身所处的道德困境进行反思时做出的心理反应,在维持伦理秩序和人性提升方面具有重要作用.然而,焦虑毕竟是一种精神困扰,它在当今时代的凸显,意味着我们陷入了现代性道德困境中.从道德焦虑的伦理本性及其产生的现代性根源来看,要有效化解道德焦虑引发的精神困扰,把道德焦虑转化为走出现代性道德困境的精神动力,我们必须做出一系列伦理上的努力和尝试.     

从道德情感走向道德自由

道德情感是人所具有的高级社会性情感,是与人的道德认识相伴而生的,是人产生善的道德行为的力量和源泉。本文在对道德情感进行伦理分析的基础上,对道德情感与道德理性的相通性进行了阐释,并针对今天人类道德生活中的情感缺失问题指出,道德自由的境界是道德情感与道德理性和谐统一的境界,人类要走向道德自由的理想王国就必须将道德情感还原于人的生活世界中去,给予道德情感应有的地位。     

道德敏感性：概念理解与辨析

道德敏感性是新科尔伯格取向的重要概念,是道德行为发生之前逻辑上的心理初始成分,是对情境的道德领悟与解释,典型地反映了道德认知和道德情感的相互作用。对这个概念的性质和内涵理解存在能力观和经验观等不同观点;该概念也常操作化地为道德觉察、道德意识、后果意识、确认道德问题等;它与伦理敏感性、道德直觉等相近概念有着不同程度的区别和联系。     

论当前中国社会转型时期的伦理形态与道德范式

家庭、家族、自然村落等传统伦理实体或分化或瓦解,不同社会阶层和社会群体各自的伦理境况存在较大差异且处于进一步分化之中,这就是当前中国社会转型时期总体的伦理状况或伦理形态。在这样的伦理形态中,传统道德、革命道德、社会主义道德以及现代规则主义道德等不同的道德范式各占一席之地,彼此冲突而又相互融合。从总体上把握当前中国社会的伦理形态,从这一伦理形态中的不同道德范式之间的冲突与融合中,寻绎出伦理道德未来演进的主导性方向,是当前道德治理和道德建设的前提性工作。     

试析道德绑架现象中的情感与逻辑

近年来,诸多被视为道德绑架的焦点事件及其引发的舆论热潮引发了全社会的关注与焦虑。相关事件与舆论中的基本道德概念需要清晰的定义与理解,引发舆论热潮与道德焦虑的情感因素、心理机制与道义逻辑也需要全面深入的描述与分析。道德绑架事件与舆论中对立双方的道德情感与价值直觉分别是同情心与公平感,此类行为源自对义务与美德范畴的混淆,忽视了基本权利对于区分美德与义务这两种道德行为的关键意义。因此,需要厘清道德绑架与义务、美德、权利等相关概念的关系,正确定义道德绑架概念,清晰区分道德绑架与合理的道德要求,进而分析与澄清道德绑架相关事件与舆论中的道德情感与逻辑推理,努力化解诸多立场冲突与舆论对立引发的道德焦虑甚至道德恐慌。     

从人的生命本性看道德与伦理的区分

道德、伦理作为人类特有的现象,必然与人的生命本性有着内在关联.人的超自然性蕴含着做人问题,道德、伦理是做人问题在人的个体性与社会性两个方向上的解决.道德是个体做人方向与方式的选择,伦理是包含底线伦理和社会道德的规范系统.道德、伦理的区分具有重要的伦理学意义.     

伦理与道德之辨正

伦理与道德两个概念的内涵及其相互关系在许多研究者那里是比较模糊的。本文试图从词源学的角度并结合黑格尔在《法哲学原理》中的相应观点对二者的内涵加以区别界定并对二者的关系加以厘定:道德是个体对自身完满性的价值追求,具有主体性与私人性;而伦理则是基于社会成员之间的互动交往而形成的规范体系,具有“互主体性”与公共性。道德是伦理的基础,伦理是道德的提升。笔者认为,对伦理与道德加以区分和厘定将有助于伦理冲突的化解、伦理关系的协调以及伦理秩序的维护。     

论个体道德情感

道德理性、道德情感和道德意志相互渗透,构成一个支配个人道德活动的完整的心理机制.本文着重论述了道德情感的内容、特点与功能,认为它对充实道德理性、增强道德意志、坚定道德信念、推动道德实践、培养崇高的道德人格等方面有重要的作用.     

黑格尔对道德的批判

黑格尔的伦理思想以他关于“道德法”和“伦理法”的区分以及对康德道德理论的批判而著名.本文的作者Mlen W.伍德从黑格尔早期关于道德问题的思考切入,以《自然法论文》、《精神现象学》以及《法哲学原理》为主要文本,较为系统地阐发了黑格尔对道德的批判.作者认为,黑格尔虽然批判了道德观点的空洞性、抽象性,但是赞同道德是伦理生活的一个方面和现代文化的组成部分.对于黑格尔而言,道德不是形而上学的假设,它要在伦理生活中获得实现.黑格尔与康德的伦理思想并不完全对立,他们共享着同样的伦理价值、理性自治,只是黑格尔试图在康德伦理思想的基础上使道德走出主观性的应该、把伦理价值与社会和历史现实联系起来.     

制度伦理与道德建设

本文通过对制度、制度化道德、道德三者关系的分析 ,认为制度伦理是一个客观存在 ,有其相对独立的价值。制度伦理建设包括对制度的道德合理性问题的解决 ,以及道德的制度化、法律化两个方面 ,都对道德建设起着重要作用 ,也是道德建设的重要内容。因此 ,应加强对制度伦理的研究 ,并在实践中切实加强制度伦理方面的建设。     

Moral Realism,Moral Disagreement,and Moral Psychology

Abstract

This paper considers John Doris, Stephen Stich, Alexandra Plakias, and colleagues’ recent attempts to utilize empirical studies of cross-cultural variation in moral judgment to support a version of the argument from disagreement against moral realism. Crucially, Doris et al. claim that the moral disagreements highlighted by these studies are not susceptible to the standard ‘diffusing’ explanations realists have developed in response to earlier versions of the argument. I argue that plausible hypotheses about the cognitive processes underlying ordinary moral judgment and the acquisition of moral norms, when combined with a popular philosophical account of moral inquiry—the method of reflective equilibrium—undercut the anti-realist force of the moral disagreements that Doris et al. describe. I also show that Stich's recent attempt to provide further theoretical support for Doris et al.'s case is unsuccessful.     

Moral Disagreement and Moral Semantics

When speakers utter conflicting moral sentences (“X is wrong”/“X is not wrong”), it seems clear that they disagree. It has often been suggested that the fact that the speakers disagree gives us evidence for a claim about the semantics of the sentences they are uttering. Specifically, it has been suggested that the existence of the disagreement gives us reason to infer that there must be an incompatibility between the contents of these sentences (i.e., that it has to be the case that at least one of them is incorrect). This inference then plays a key role in a now‐standard argument against certain theories in moral semantics. In this paper, we introduce new evidence that bears on this debate. We show that there are moral conflict cases in which people are inclined to say both (a) that the two speakers disagree and (b) that it is not the case at least one of them must be saying something incorrect. We then explore how we might understand such disagreements. As a proof of concept, we sketch an account of the concept of disagreement and an independently motivated theory of moral semantics which, together, explain the possibility of such cases.     

Moral Worth and Moral Knowledge

To have moral worth an action not only needs to conform to the correct normative theory (whatever it is); it also needs to be motivated in the right way. I argue that morally worthy actions are motivated by the rightness of the action; they are motivated by an agent's concern for doing what's right and her knowledge that her action is morally right. Call this the Rightness Condition. On the Rightness Condition moral motivation involves both a conative and a cognitive element—in particular, it involves moral knowledge. I argue that the Rightness Condition is both necessary and sufficient for moral worth. I also argue that the Rightness Condition gives us an attractive account of actions performed under imperfect epistemic circumstances: by agents who rely on moral testimony or by those who, like Huckleberry Finn, have false moral convictions.     

Moral Overridingness and Moral Theory

I begin by proposing and explicating a plausible articulation of the view that morality is overriding. I then argue that it would be desirable for this thesis to be sustained. However, the prospects for its vindication will depend crucially on which moral theory we adopt. I examine some schematic moral theories in order to bring out which are friendly and which unfriendly to moral overridingness. In light of the reasons to hope that the overridingness thesis can be sustained, theories apparently incompatible with it – I argue that consequentialism is one – have a count against them.     

Moral Relativism and Moral Expressivism

Though moral relativism has had its supporters over the years, it is not a dominant position in philosophy. I will argue here, though, that the view is an attractive position. It evades some hardcore challenges that face absolutism, and it is reconcilable with an appealing emotivist approach to moral attitudes. In previous work, I have offered considerations in favor of a version of moral relativism that I call “perspectivalism.” These considerations are primarily grounded in linguistic data. Here I offer a self‐standing argument for perspectivalism. I begin with an argument against moral absolutism. I then argue that moral terms, such as ‘wrong’ and ‘right’, require for their application that the moral judge instantiate particular affective states, and I use this claim to provide further defense of moral relativism.