What do philosophers believe?

What are the philosophical views of contemporary professional philosophers? We surveyed many professional philosophers in order to help determine their views on 30 central philosophical issues. This article documents the results. It also reveals correlations among philosophical views and between these views and factors such as age, gender, and nationality. A factor analysis suggests that an individual’s views on these issues factor into a few underlying components that predict much of the variation in those views. The results of a metasurvey also suggest that many of the results of the survey are surprising: philosophers as a whole have quite inaccurate beliefs about the distribution of philosophical views in the profession.     

What makes us believe a conditional? The roles of covariation and causality

Two experiments were conducted to investigate the roles of covariation and of causality in people's readiness to believe a conditional. The experiments used a probabilistic truth-table task (Oberauer & Wilhelm, 2003 Oberauer, K. and Wilhelm, O. 2003. The meaning(s) of conditionals: Conditional probabilities, mental models, and personal utilities. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory & Cognition, 29: 680–693. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) in which people estimated the probability of a conditional given information about the frequency distribution of truth-table cases. For one group of people, belief in the conditional was determined by the conditional probability of the consequent, given the antecedent, whereas for another group it depended on the probability of the conjunction of antecedent and consequent. There was little evidence that covariation, expressed as the probabilistic contrast or as the pCI rule (White, 2003 White, P. A. 2003. Making causal judgements from the proportion of confirming instances: The pCI rule. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 29: 710–727.  [Google Scholar]), influences belief in the conditional. The explicit presence of a causal link between antecedent and consequent in a context story had a weak positive effect on belief in a conditional when the frequency distribution of relevant cases was held constant.     

?The person is a monad with windows?: sketch of a conceptual history of ‘person’ in Russia

The basic concepts ??person?? (Person), I/self (Ich) and ??subject?? (Subjekt) structuring the Russian discourse of personhood (Personalit?t) developed during the philosophical discussions of the 1820s?C1840s. The development occurred in the course of an intense reception of German Idealism and Romanticism. Characteristic of this process is that the modern meaning of personhood going back to the theological and natural-law interpretations of the person in Western Europe does not exist in the Russian cultural consciousness. Therefore the Russian concepts of personhood demonstrate the influence of the semantic innovations of Romanticism. Correspondingly, the semantic core of the Russian discourses on personhood is not the idea of an ??autonomous person?? but that of an ??unique individuality??. Here, personhood is not the indefeasible attribute of every man, but the mark of inimitable individuality. Accordingly, the basic distinction underlying the discourse on personhood in Russia is not the differentiation between ??person?? and ??thing?? as in the European tradition, but the distinction between ??individual?? and (anonymous) ??community??. Also, in the meaning of the concept of I/self the dominant differentiation is not that between I/self (Ich) and not-I/not-self (Nicht-Ich), but that between I and We. This discourse on personhood centring on the idea of individuality took form in Russia starting in the middle of the nineteenth century, in particular in aesthetics, psychology, and educational theory, as well as in the philosophy of history. The comparative intercultural analysis of the history of concepts pertaining to personhood in the German-Russian cultural transfer brings to light the dialectic of European modernity in which a degree of tension is visible between the idea of personal autonomy and individuality.     

What does the lord require of us?

Contextual therapy is a heuristic approach to intergenerational family dynamics. This article sets forth the main tenets of that approach and explores the contribution that it makes to the pastoral care and counseling of families. The concept of relational justice, which is a focal point in contextual therapy, is brought into dialogue with the biblical concept of righteousness and the theological concept of justification by faith.     

What does a person in a “TOT” state know that a person in a “don’t know” state doesn’t know

The purpose of this study was to examine the significance of Brown and McNeill’s (1966) findings regarding the “tip of the tongue” (TOT) phenomenon, A modified version of their procedure was used with 56 Ss. Although their findings that Ss in a TOT state can detect parts and properties of the missing word were generally replicated, a division of the TOT state into a variety of substates showed correct detection rate to vary greatly, depending on the substate involved. In addition, correct detection of partial information was demonstrated even when S declared he had no knowledge of the selected word (don’t know). It was suggested that a distinction be made between information detection based on knowledge of the characteristics common to the class of items of which the target is a member (“class detection”) and detection based on knowledge of characteristics specific to the target in question (“differential detection”). Both class and differential detection were found to obtain in TOT states as well as in the don’t know state. Some theoretical and methodological implications were suggested     

Internalism about a person’s good: don’t believe it

Internalism about a person’s good is roughly the view that in order for something to intrinsically enhance a person’s well-being, that person must be capable of caring about that thing. I argue in this paper that internalism about a person’s good should not be believed. Though many philosophers accept the view, Connie Rosati provides the most comprehensive case in favor of it. Her defense of the view consists mainly in offering five independent arguments to think that at least some form of internalism about one’s good is true. But I argue that, on closer inspection, not one of these arguments succeeds. The problems don’t end there, however. While Rosati offers good reasons to think that what she calls ‘two-tier internalism’ would be the best way to formulate the intuition behind internalism about one’s good, I argue that two-tier internalism is actually false. In particular, the problem is that no substantive theory of well-being is consistent with two-tier internalism. Accordingly, there is reason to think that even the best version of internalism about one’s good is in fact false. Thus, I conclude, the prospects for internalism about a person’s good do not look promising.     

What does doodling do?

Doodling is a way of passing the time when bored by a lecture or telephone call. Does it improve or hinder attention to the primary task? To answer this question, 40 participants monitored a monotonous mock telephone message for the names of people coming to a party. Half of the group was randomly assigned to a ‘doodling’ condition where they shaded printed shapes while listening to the telephone call. The doodling group performed better on the monitoring task and recalled 29% more information on a surprise memory test. Unlike many dual task situations, doodling while working can be beneficial. Future research could test whether doodling aids cognitive performance by reducing daydreaming. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What does a compound letter tell the psychologist's mind?

The paradigm based on using compound stimuli for studying global and local processing is revisited. Noting that not all researchers employ compound stimuli for the same purpose, the issue of its purpose is discussed. It is argued that the paradigm is pertinent for examining at least three notions--formation preference, global addressability, and within-object global precedence. It is suggested that findings in the paradigm are accommodated well by a disjunction of those three perceptual dispositions. A number of further issues associated with the interpretation of findings obtained with it are examined as well. An experimental study is reported that is meant to examine one such issue--a possible artifact putatively introduced by the special attribute of element homogeneity characteristic of compound stimuli. Seven experiments were used to examine to what extent, if at all, global advantage observed in compound stimulus paradigms depends on element heterogeneity. Across those experiments, heterogeneity did not have any effect that could be interpreted as suggesting that the paradigm is biased in favor of the global structure due to element homogeneity.     

What does a general factor of personality look like in unshared environmental variance?

A general factor of personality (GFP) was obtained solely from unshared environment, by deriving it from the intercorrelations of monozygotic twin differences. This GFP was compared with a GFP derived from correlations reflecting all three components of variance—genes, shared environment, and unshared environment. In two large samples of adult Australian twins, for the items of two questionnaires, the two approaches gave virtually identical GFPs. However, in a sample of adolescent Australian twins, the two GFPs were correlated but distinct.     

What does being initiated severely into a group do? The role of rewards

Undergoing an admission process (an initiation) can induce exaggerated feelings about a group, but there is little research about the role of rewards. This study replicated Aronson and Mills’ (1959) experiment. Seventy participants underwent either a severe initiation or a mild initiation. After the initiation, about half the sample received an extrinsic reward for merely completing the task. The remaining half did not receive an extrinsic reward. This was to vary the amount of dissonance. Initiation severity and reward condition had significant, noncrossing interactions. A reward led to higher group identity than no reward, supporting Levine and Moreland's (1994) group socialization model. A severe initiation did not lead to more group identity than a mild initiation; therefore, Aronson and Mills’ findings were not replicated. Interestingly, a mild initiation followed by a reward led to more group identity than a severe initiation followed by a reward. Another unexpected finding was that the extrinsic reward made no difference to group identity if the initiation was severe. Effects on ratings of the discussion were nonsignificant. Future research needs to establish how new group members ponder the severity of the admission process during the cost–benefit calculation preceding their identification with a group.     

What Is a Context of Utterance?

Philosophical Studies -     

What does a man do after he makes an error? an analysis of response programming

When people make errors during continuous tasks they temporarily pause and then slow down. One line of explanation has been that they monitor feedback to detect errors, that they may make incidental responses when errors occur (e.g. they may swear) and that they may pause to analyse their errors. In all these cases they may be assumed to act as single channel information processing systems of limited capacity, and to be unable to recognise any new signal until these processes have been completed.

Analysis of response after errors shows that this cannot be the case. Responses after errors are inaccurate, but are not slow when they require the subject to make the response which he should have made on the previous trial (i.e. to make an error correction response). Subjects thus must recognise new signals as soon as they occur. The present results require a new model of error detection and correction, and a model for response programming and priming.     

What does the character of medicine as a social practice imply for professional conscientious objection?

The dispute over professional conscientious objection presumes a picture of medicine as a practice governed by rules. This rule-based conception of medical practice is identifiable with John Rawls’s conception of social practices. This conception does not capture the character of medical practice as experienced by practitioners, for whom it is a sensibility or “form of life” rather than rules. Moreover, the sensibility of medical practice as experienced by physicians is at best neutral, and at worst hostile, to the demands of those who would override physician conscientious objection to the provision of currently contested services. That being so, calls for overriding physician conscientious objection are much more demanding of the medical profession than they appear in light of Rawls’s view. As such overriding may entail the forcible transformation of medicine’s form of life, the author contends that it would be more prudent to provide contested services by circumventing the medical profession than by compelling it.     

What must a proof of incompatibilism prove?

Peter van Inwagen has developed two highly influential strategies for establishing incompatibilism about causal determinism and moral responsibility. These have come to be known as ‘the Direct Argument’ and ‘the Indirect Argument,’ respectively. In recent years, the two arguments have attracted closely related criticisms. In each case, it is claimed, the argument does not provide a fully general defense of the incompatibilist’s conclusion. While the critics are right to notice these arguments’ limitations, they have not made it clear what the problem with the arguments is supposed to be. I suggest three possibilities, arguing that none proves to be well founded. I conclude that the scope of these arguments is fully adequate for their defenders’ purposes.