The Multidimensional Nature of Psychopathy: Five Recommendations for Research

The seven articles in this Special Section of the Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment underscore the point that, at least in the psychopathy domain, parsimony is frequently an inaccurate scientific heuristic. These articles highlight the multidimensionality of youth psychopathy, suggesting that (a) the full constellation of psychopathy tends to outperform callous-unemotional traits alone in statistically predicting external criteria, (b) psychopathy subdimensions often interact statistically in predicting such criteria, and (c) psychopathy subdimensions often bear markedly different external correlates, including criminal offending, trait anxiety, and emotion processing. I offer five recommendations for future research on psychopathy and argue that that a full comprehension of this condition will require a better understanding of its subdimensions, and their interrelations, placement within the general personality domain, physiological correlates, and genetic and environmental underpinnings.     

Should Psychology Ignore the Language of the Brain?

ABSTRACT— Claims that neuroscientific data do not contribute to our understanding of psychological functions have been made recently. Here I argue that these criticisms are solely based on an analysis of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies. However, fMRI is only one of the methods in the toolkit of cognitive neuroscience. I provide examples from research on event-related brain potentials (ERPs) that have contributed to our understanding of the cognitive architecture of human language functions. In addition, I provide evidence of (possible) contributions from fMRI measurements to our understanding of the functional architecture of language processing. Finally, I argue that a neurobiology of human language that integrates information about the necessary genetic and neural infrastructures will allow us to answer certain questions that are not answerable if all we have is evidence from behavior.     

Psychopathy: A psychobiological perspective

After critically examining the concept of psychopathy and reviewing the major existing theories of psychopathy in the light of a psychobiological conception of abnormal behaviour (Öhman, 1981), this paper attempts to present an integrated, psychobiological model of psychopathy. Essentially this analyses psychopathy in terms of the predisposing influences, the triggering environmental events which initiate psychopathic behaviour, and the neurophsychological mechanisms which mediate it. It is suggested that individuals who show chronic antisocial behaviour, conforming to the North American term ‘sociopath’, may demonstrate a maturational deficit but do not necessarily show a psychopathic personality disorder. The latter is said to be characterised, at a personality trait level, by high Impulsiveness and Psychopathy (Blackburn, 1982 a, b), reflecting interactive deficits in goal direction and affect. At a dynamic (state) level, a psychopathic personality disorder is said to be characterised by a lack of coping, reflecting either, in the case of the secondary psychopath, a deficit in primary appraisal, (over-perception of threat), or in the case of the primary psychopath, a deficit in secondary appraisal (low perceived control over aversive environmental events). It is further suggested that a genetic predisposition to social withdrawal and exposure to an uncontrollably aversive early environment may interact to predispose an individual to develop a psychopathic personality disorder in adulthood.     

To treat a psychopath

Some people are now quite optimistic about the possibility of treating psychopathy with drugs that directly modulate brain function. I argue that this optimism is misplaced. Psychopathy is a global disorder in an individual’s worldview, including his social and moral outlook. Because of the unity of this Weltanschauung, it is unlikely to be treatable in a piecemeal fashion. Recent neuroscientific methods do not give us much hope that we can replace, in a wholesale manner, problematic views of the world with more socially desirable ones. There are, therefore, principled reasons that psychopathy is so singularly treatment resistant.     

An evolutionary theory of schizophrenia: cortical connectivity, metarepresentation, and the social brain

Schizophrenia is a worldwide, prevalent disorder with a multifactorial but highly genetic aetiology. A constant prevalence rate in the face of reduced fecundity has caused some to argue that an evolutionary advantage exists in unaffected relatives. Here, I critique this adaptationist approach, and review--and find wanting--Crow's "speciation" hypothesis. In keeping with available biological and psychological evidence, I propose an alternative theory of the origins of this disorder. Schizophrenia is a disorder of the social brain, and it exists as a costly trade-off in the evolution of complex social cognition. Paleoanthropological and comparative primate research suggests that hominids evolved complex cortical interconnectivity (in particular, frontotemporal and frontoparietal circuits) to regulate social cognition and the intellectual demands of group living. I suggest that the ontogenetic mechanism underlying this cerebral adaptation was sequential hypermorphosis and that it rendered the hominid brain vulnerable to genetic and environmental insults. I argue that changes in genes regulating the timing of neurodevelopment occurred prior to the migration of Homo sapiens out of Africa 100,000-150,000 years ago, giving rise to the schizotypal spectrum. While some individuals within this spectrum may have exhibited unusual creativity and iconoclasm, this phenotype was not necessarily adaptive in reproductive terms. However, because the disorder shared a common genetic basis with the evolving circuitry of the social brain, it persisted. Thus schizophrenia emerged as a costly trade-off in the evolution of complex social cognition.     

Effects of comorbid psychopathy on criminal offending and emotion processing in male offenders with antisocial personality disorder

Antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) and psychopathy are two syndromes with substantial construct validity. To clarify relations between these syndromes, the authors evaluated 3 possibilities: (a) that ASPD with psychopathy and ASPD without psychopathy reflect a common underlying pathophysiology; (b) that ASPD with psychopathy and ASPD without psychopathy identify 2 distinct syndromes, similar in some respects; and (c) that most correlates of ASPD reflect its comorbidity with psychopathy. Participants were 472 incarcerated European American men who met Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (4th ed., American Psychiatric Association, 1994) criteria for ASPD and Psychopathy Checklist criteria for psychopathy, who met the criteria for ASPD but not for psychopathy, or who did not meet diagnostic criteria for either ASPD or psychopathy (controls). Both individuals with ASPD only and those with ASPD and psychopathy were characterized by more criminal activity than were controls. In addition, ASPD with psychopathy was associated with more severe criminal behavior and weaker emotion facilitation than ASPD alone. Group differences in the association between emotion dysfunction and criminal behavior suggest tentatively that ASPD with and ASPD without prominent psychopathic features may be distinct syndromes.     

Moral cognition,affect, and psychopathy

Few theorists would challenge the idea that affect and emotion directly influence decision-making and moral judgment. There is good reason to think that they also significantly assist in decision-making and judgment, and in fact are necessary for fully effective moral cognition. However, they are not sufficient. Deliberation and more reflective thought processes likewise play a crucial role, and in fact are inseparable from affective processes. I will argue that while the dual-process account of moral judgment set forth by Craigie (2011) has great merit, it fails to appreciate fully the extent to which affective and reflective processes are not only integrated, but also mutually interdependent. Evidence from psychopathy indicates that when reflective processes are not assisted adequately by what I will call ‘affective framing’, and moral cognition is of the “cooler,” less emotionally-informed variety, what results is not effective cognitive functioning, but rather psychopathology. My proposed account of affective framing aims to make sense of the way in which affect plays a strictly necessary and integral role not just in intuitive moral responses, but also in reflective moral judgments, so that moral cognition is accomplished by the joint operation of affective processes and reflective reasoning processes.     

Neuroticism and psychopathy predict brain activation during moral and nonmoral emotion regulation

Functional neuroimaging has identified brain regions associated with voluntary regulation of emotion, including the prefrontal cortex and amygdala. The neural mechanisms underlying individual differences in emotion regulation have not been extensively studied. We investigated the neural correlates of neuroticism and psychopathic personality traits in the context of an emotion regulation task. Results showed that amygdala activity elicited by unpleasant pictures was positively correlated with neuroticism and negatively correlated with a specific psychopathic trait related to emotional underreactivity. During active attempts to decrease emotional responses to unpleasant pictures, superior and ventrolateral prefrontal activity was positively correlated with psychopathy, but not with neuroticism. In contrast, dorsolateral prefrontal activity was positively correlated with neuroticism, but not with psychopathy. Psychopathy was also negatively correlated with medial prefrontal activity in response to pictures depicting moral violations, suggesting reduced emotional responses to moral stimuli in individuals with high levels of psychopathic traits. These results demonstrate dissociable influences of different personality traits on neural activity associated with responses to emotional stimuli and on the recruitment of regulation-related brain activity during the active down-regulation of responses to negative emotional stimuli. These results have implications for the etiology of trait-based psychopathology involving emotional dysregulation.     

Personality disorder and antisocial deviance: comments on the debate on the structure of the psychopathy checklist-revised

The recent debate on the structure of the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R: Hare, 1991; 2003) has been presented primarily as a statistical issue, but underlying it are longstanding conceptual issues about the relationship of personality concepts to deviant behavior and of psychopathy to criminality and personality disorder. I discuss these issues in this paper. The antisocial items of the PCL-R seem to reflect a propensity to commit crimes that has long been of interest to criminology. This disposition overlaps with, but differs conceptually from personality dispositions, but these surface dispositions do not provide a causal account of criminality. I present data that indicate that the core personality characteristics of psychopathy are more closely related to narcissistic and histrionic personality disorders than to antisocial personality disorder. Overemphasis on involvement in crime has obscured the nature of psychopathy as a disorder of personality characterised by interpersonally harmful behavior that need not necessarily take criminal form.     

Is perception informationally encapsulated? The issue of the theory‐ladenness of perception

Fodor has argued that observation is theory neutral, since the perceptual systems are modular, that is, they are domain-specific, encapsulated, mandatory, fast, hard-wired in the organism, and have a fixed neural architecture. Churchland attacks the theoretical neutrality of observation on the grounds that (a) the abundant top-down pathways in the brain suggest the cognitive penetration of perception and (b) perceptual learning can change in the wiring of the perceptual systems. In this paper I introduce a distinction between sensation, perception, and observation and I argue that although Churchland is right that observation involves top-down processes, there is also a substantial amount of information in perception which is theory-neutral. I argue that perceptual learning does not threaten the cognitive impenetrability of perception, and that the neuropsychological research does not provide evidence in favor of the top-down character of perception. Finally, I discuss the possibility of an off-line cognitive penetrability of perception.     

A New Approach to Reducing Disorder and Improving Well-Being

ABSTRACT— Psychological science has usually approached the treatment of disorder through research on individual combinations of risk and protective factors (including life experiences, thinking styles, behaviors, social relationships and genes) and the application of interventions that focus on improvements in the individual. However, we can do better than this. Not only should we be aiming to enhance well-being rather than merely reducing disorder, but we should also be doing so for the majority of people rather than the few who have a disorder. In this article, I focus on the mental health spectrum and make the case for a broad population-based approach. I argue that a very small shift in the population mean of the underlying symptoms or risk factors can do more to enhance well-being and reduce disorder than would any amount of intervention with individuals who need help. Examples from research on alcohol abuse and psychological distress are presented to illustrate the value of a population-based approach.     

Altered emotional decision-making in prisoners with borderline personality disorder

Previous studies have identified neuropsychological deficits in individuals with antisocial personality disorder and/or psychopathy. Few studies have examined neuropsychological functioning in individuals with borderline personality disorder (BPD), and no studies have yet investigated cognitive and emotional function in male prisoners with BPD. In this study, we compared the risky decision-making of 17 participants with a history of serious violent or sexual offenses and a diagnosis of DSM-IV BPD with that of 17 participants with similar offending histories but personality disorders other than BPD. Those with BPD exhibited altered processing of information about potential losses (punishment) when the probability of gains (reward) was high; they also increased their choice of risky options even in circumstances where this was clearly avoidable. These data suggest that individuals with a diagnosis of BPD and a history of serious offenses have problems integrating different reinforcement signals when choosing between risky actions, perhaps reflecting corticolimbic dysfunction as an underlying mechanism in BPD.     

The neurobiology of antisocial personality disorder: The quest for rehabilitation and treatment

Psychopathy is perhaps one of the most misused terms in the American public, which is in no small part due to our obsession with those who have no conscience, and our boldness to try and profile others with this disorder. Here, I present how psychopathy is seen today, before discussing the classification of psychopathy. I also explore the neurological differences in the brains of those with psychopathy, before finally taking a look at genetic risk factors. I conclude by raising some questions about potential treatment.     

Psychopathic Personality Traits and Somatization: Sex Differences and the Mediating Role of Negative Emotionality

Although a number of investigations have provided evidence for an association between antisocial personality disorder and somatization disorder, the variables underlying this association remain unknown. We examined the relations among measures of primary and secondary psychopathy, somatization, and negative emotionality (NE) in 150 undergraduates. Somatization was positively and significantly correlated with measures of secondary, but not primary, psychopathy, and the relations between secondary psychopathy indices and somatization tended to be significantly stronger in females than in males. Some support was found for the hypothesis that the association between secondary psychopathy and somatization is mediated by NE, but not for the hypothesis that low levels of behavioral inhibition lead to somatization. Although the present findings are consistent with the possibility that somatization is a sex-differentiated manifestation of secondary psychopathic traits, replication of these findings in clinical samples will be necessary.     

Descartes on Hatred

This paper examines Descartes’ account of hatred. Descartes holds that individuals should not hate, because hatred separates us from goods, causes sadness, and produces vicious character traits. Although some scholars argue that hatred is necessary to protect the body, I argue that Descartes holds that hatred is not necessary to protect the body, because there are other means of protecting the body that do not involve hatred. I conclude this paper by showing the place of hatred in Descartes’ broader moral theory, especially his emphasis on the wellbeing of the soul and the virtue of generosity.     

Non-domination and Egalitarian Welfare Politics

In this article I will do three things: I will argue that solidarity is not necessary for political legitimacy, that non-domination is a strong candidate for legitimacy criterion, and, finally, that non-domination can legitimate the egalitarian welfare state.     

Psychopaths and blame: The argument from content

The recent debate over the moral responsibility of psychopaths has centered on whether, or in what sense, they understand moral requirements. In this paper, I argue that even if they do understand what morality requires, the content of their actions is not of the right kind to justify full-blown blame. I advance two independent justifications of this claim. First, I argue that if the psychopath comes to know what morality requires via a route that does not involve a proper appreciation of what it means to cause another harm or distress, the content of violations of rules against harm will be of a lower grade than the content of similar actions by normal individuals. Second, I argue that in order to intend a harm to a person—that is, to intend the distinctive kind of harm that can only befall a person—it is necessary to understand what personhood is and what makes it valuable. The psychopath's deficits with regard to mental time travel ensure that s/he cannot intend this kind of harm.     

The Soteriology of Role-Play in the Bhagavad Gītā

I will here apply the classical Indian model of the dramatic actor as a methodology for interpreting the soteriological psychology of the Bhagavad Gītā, paying special attention to the usefulness of this approach for clarifying K???a's rationale in showing his divine form in Chapter 11. I argue that the Gītā advocates creative role-play as both the means and the end of liberation. Further, while K???a's teachings can be understood in terms of orthodox Hindu soteriologies that have in view an overcoming of the emotions, I argue that K???a looks to transform Arjuna into an ‘athlete of emotion’, much like traditional Indian-based training methods do for theatrical actors.     

Emotion Regulation and Stress

This paper examines the similarities and differences between emotion regulation and stress coping and reviews research that suggests that the association between emotion regulation and stress may be explained by the common neural structures. Developmental changes related to emotion regulation and stress are also discussed. Overall, the research suggests that individuals vary in their ability to regulate emotions and cope with stress, and these abilities may differ across age. Little is known, however, about the factors that influence individual differences in emotion regulation and stress coping. We suggest that behavioral genetic designs may be an important avenue for future research. Such research would indicate the extent to which variation in emotion regulation and stress are due to genetic and/or environmental influences and further the extent to which common genetic and/or environmental factors explain the links between emotion regulation and stress.     

Conversation,responsibility, and autism spectrum disorder

In this paper, I present a challenge for Michael McKenna’s conversational theory of moral responsibility. On his view, to be a responsible agent is to be able to engage in a type of moral conversation. I argue that individuals with autism spectrum disorder present a considerable problem for the conversational theory because empirical evidence on the disorder seems to suggest that there are individuals in the world who meet all of the conditions for responsible agency that the theory lays out but who are nevertheless not responsible agents. Attending to the moral psychology of such individuals will, I think, help shed light on an important gap in the conversational theory.