共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Jim Stone 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(2):153-160
Here is a simple counterexample to David Lewis’s causal influence account of causation, one that is especially illuminating
due to its connection to what Lewis himself writes: it is a variant of his trumping example
相似文献
Jim StoneEmail: |
2.
Peter A. Graham 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(1):65-82
David Lewis has offered a reply to the standard argument for the claim that the truth of determinism is incompatible with
anyone’s being able to do otherwise than she in fact does. Helen Beebee has argued that Lewis’s compatibilist strategy is
untenable. In this paper I show that one recent attempt to defend Lewis’s view against this argument fails and then go on
to offer my own defense of Lewis’s view.
相似文献
Peter A. GrahamEmail: |
3.
Mark Moyer 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(3):299-322
The fission of a person involves what common sense describes as a single person surviving as two distinct people. Thus, say
most metaphysicians, this paradox shows us that common sense is inconsistent with the transitivity of identity. Lewis’s theory
of overlapping persons, buttressed with tensed identity, gives us one way to reconcile the common sense claims. Lewis’s account,
however, implausibly says that reference to a person about to undergo fission is ambiguous. A better way to reconcile the
claims of common sense, one that avoids this ambiguity, is to recognize branching persons, persons who have multiple pasts
or futures.
相似文献
Mark MoyerEmail: |
4.
Ásta Sveinsdóttir 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(1):135-148
In this article I introduce a certain kind of anti-realist account of what makes a property essential to an object and defend
it against likely objections. This account, which I call a ‘conferralist’ account, shares some of the attractive features
of other anti-realist accounts, such as conventionalism and expressivism, but I believe, not their respective drawbacks.
相似文献
ásta SveinsdóttirEmail: |
5.
Albert Atkin 《Philosophia》2008,36(3):313-326
This paper traces a lost genealogical connection between Charles S. Peirce’s later theory of signs and contemporary work in
the philosophy of language by John Perry. As is shown, despite some differences, both accounts offer what might be termed
a multi-level account of meaning. Moreover, it is claimed that by adopting a ‘Peircian turn’ in his theory, Perry might overcome
alleged shortcomings in his account of cognitive significance.
相似文献
Albert AtkinEmail: |
6.
Daniel E. Flage 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):379-380
This note is a reply to some of Giovanni Grandi’s comments on my paper “Berkeley’s Contingent Necessities.”
相似文献
Daniel E. FlageEmail: |
7.
Yujin Nagasawa 《Sophia》2007,46(1):65-67
I provide a further response to Jason A. Beyer’s objections to the alleged inconsistency between God’s omniscience and His
other attributes.
相似文献
Yujin NagasawaEmail: |
8.
Delia Graff Fara 《Erkenntnis》2009,70(3):285-297
If a counterpart theorist’s understanding of the counterpart relation precludes haecceitist differences between possible worlds,
as David Lewis’s does, how can he admit haecceitist possibilities, as Lewis wants to? Lewis (Philosophical Review 3–32, 1983;
On the Plurality of Worlds, 1986) devised what he called a ‘cheap substitute for haecceitism,’ which would allow for haecceitist
possibilities while preserving the counterpart relation as a purely qualitative one. The solution involved lifting an earlier
(Journal of Philosophy 65(5):113–126, 1968; 68(7):203–211, 1971) ban on there being multiple intra-world counterparts. I argue here that serious problems for ‘cheap haecceitism’ lurk very close to its surface, and they emerge
when we consider the effect of using an actuality operator in our language. Among the most serious of the problems is the result that being the case in some possible world
does not always suffice for possibly being the case. The result applies to any counterpart theory that employs a purely qualitative
counterpart relation. The upshot is that if we are to admit haecceitist possibilities, as we should, then we must reject any
purely qualitative relation as the one involved in the analysis of what might have been for an individual.
相似文献
Delia Graff FaraEmail: |
9.
Lefteris Farmakis 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(1):41-53
Wesley Salmon and John Earman have presented influential Bayesian reconstructions of Thomas Kuhn’s account of theory-change.
In this paper I argue that all attempts to give a Bayesian reading of Kuhn’s philosophy of science are fundamentally misguided
due to the fact that Bayesian confirmation theory is in fact inconsistent with Kuhn’s account. The reasons for this inconsistency
are traced to the role the concept of incommensurability plays with reference to the ‘observational vocabulary’ within Kuhn’s
picture of scientific theories. The upshot of the discussion is that it is impossible to integrate both Kuhn’s claims and
Bayesianism within a coherent account of theory-change.
相似文献
Lefteris FarmakisEmail: |
10.
Shannon Vallor 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2009,8(1):1-15
Dennett’s recent defense in this journal of the heterophenomenological method and its supposed advantages over Husserlian
phenomenology is premised on his problematic account of the epistemological and ontological status of phenomenological states.
By employing Husserl’s philosophy of science to clarify the relationship between phenomenology and evidence and the implications
of this relationship for the empirical identification of ‘real’ conscious states, I argue that the naturalistic account of
consciousness Dennett hopes for could be authoritative as a science only by virtue of the very phenomenological evidences
Dennett’s method consigns to the realm of fiction. Thus heterophenomenology, qua scientific method, is incoherent.
相似文献
Shannon VallorEmail: |
11.
K. Brad Wray 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(1):81-89
I argue that van Fraassen’s selectionist explanation for the success of science is superior to the realists’ explanation.
Whereas realists argue that our current theories are successful because they accurately reflect the structure of the world,
the selectionist claims that our current theories are successful because unsuccessful theories have been eliminated. I argue
that, unlike the explanation proposed by the realist, the selectionist explanation can also account for the failures of once successful theories and the fact that sometimes two competing theories are both equally successful.
相似文献
K. Brad WrayEmail: |
12.
J. Angelo Corlett 《Journal of Academic Ethics》2008,6(3):205-209
This paper amounts to a reply to Professor Donald G. Brown’s thoughtful comment on my “Ethical Issues in Journal Peer-Review”,
which appeared in this journal.
相似文献
J. Angelo CorlettEmail: |
13.
14.
Stewart Cohen 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):121-125
I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient
for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.
相似文献
Stewart CohenEmail: |
15.
Matthew J. Hertenstein Carrie A. Hansel Alissa M. Butts Sarah N. Hile 《Motivation and emotion》2009,33(2):99-105
Based on social–functional accounts of emotion, we conducted two studies examining whether the degree to which people smiled
in photographs predicts the likelihood of divorce. Along with other theorists, we posited that smiling behavior in photographs
is potentially indicative of underlying emotional dispositions that have direct and indirect life consequences. In the first
study, we examined participants’ positive expressive behavior in college yearbook photos and in Study 2 we examined a variety
of participants’ photos from childhood through early adulthood. In both studies, divorce was predicted by the degree to which
subjects smiled in their photos.
相似文献
Matthew J. HertensteinEmail: |
16.
J. R. G. Williams 《Erkenntnis》2009,70(2):151-171
This paper explores the interaction of well-motivated (if controversial) principles governing the probability conditionals,
with accounts of what it is for a sentence to be indefinite. The conclusion can be played in a variety of ways. It could be
regarded as a new reason to be suspicious of the intuitive data about the probability of conditionals; or, holding fixed the
data, it could be used to give traction on the philosophical analysis of a contentious notion—indefiniteness. The paper outlines
the various options, and shows that ‘rejectionist’ theories of indefiniteness are incompatible with the results. Rejectionist
theories include popular accounts such as supervaluationism, non-classical truth-value gap theories, and accounts of indeterminacy
that centre on rejecting the law of excluded middle. An appendix compares the results obtained here with the ‘impossibility’
results descending from Lewis (1976).
相似文献
J. R. G. WilliamsEmail: |
17.
Joke Bruinsma-de Beer 《Pastoral Psychology》2006,55(2):167-174
In this article the author discusses the differences between pastoral care and psycho-social therapy. She clarifies the specific identity of pastoral care on the basis of Henning Luther’s theology. He distinguishes different anthropological presuppositions in pastoral care and psycho-social therapy. Consequently, she demonstrates the relevancy of Luther’s theology for today’s Practical Theology.
相似文献
Joke Bruinsma-de BeerEmail: |
18.
David Braun 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(2):243-262
I criticized Jeffrey King’s theory of complex demonstratives in “Problems for a Quantificational Theory of Complex Demonstratives.”
King replied in “Complex Demonstratives as Quantifiers: Objections and Replies.” I here comment on some of King’s replies.
相似文献
David BraunEmail: |
19.
Marc V. P. Slors 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(2):321-336
In the first section of this paper I argue that the main reason why Daniel Dennett’s Intentional Systems Theory (IST) has
been perceived as behaviourist or antirealist is its inability to account for the causal efficacy of the mental. The rest
of the paper is devoted to the claim that by emending the theory with a phenomenon called ‘empathic resonance’ (ER), it can
account for the various explananda in the mental causation debate. Thus, IST + ER is a much more viable option than IST, even
though IST + ER assigns a crucial role to the phenomenology of agency, a role that is incompatible with Dennett’s writings
on consciousness.
相似文献
Marc V. P. SlorsEmail: |
20.
Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock 《Husserl Studies》2008,24(2):131-140
Quine’s criticism of the notion of analyticity applies, at best, to Carnap’s notion, not to those of Frege or Husserl. The
failure of logicism is also the failure of Frege’s definition of analyticity, but it does not even touch Husserl’s views,
which are based on logical form. However, some relatively concrete number-theoretic statements do not admit such a formalization
salva veritate. A new definition of analyticity based not on syntactical but on semantical logical form is proposed and argued for.
相似文献
Guillermo E. Rosado HaddockEmail: |