Egocentrism and focalism in unrealistic optimism (and pessimism)

People tend to overestimate their comparative likelihood of experiencing a rosy future. The present research suggests that one reason for this error is that when people compare their likelihood of experiencing an event with that of the average person, they focus on their own chances of experiencing the event and insufficiently consider the likelihood of the average person experiencing the event. As a consequence, people tend to think that they are more likely than the average person to experience common events and less likely than the average person to experience rare events. This causes unrealistic optimism in the case of common desirable events and rare undesirable events, but unrealistic pessimism in the case of rare desirable events and common undesirable events (Studies 1 and 2). Study 2 further suggests that both egocentrism and focalism underlie these biases. These results suggest that unrealistic optimism is not as ubiquitous as once thought.     

Egocentrism, event frequency, and comparative optimism: when what happens frequently is "more likely to happen to me"

Three studies investigated the role of nonmotivated egocentric processes in comparative optimism (and pessimism). According to an egocentric-processes account, when people judge their comparative likelihood of experiencing an event (e.g., "Compared to the average person, how likely are you to become wealthy?"), they consider their own chances of experiencing the event more so than the referent's chances. This should produce higher comparative estimates when an event's absolute frequency is high rather than low-a prediction supported in Study 1, which manipulated event frequency through a novel, time frame manipulation. Study 2 empirically distinguished egocentrism from a related focalism account. In Study 3, comparative estimates were related to the perceived frequency of events, independent of the events' perceived desirability and controllability. Path analyses provided additional support for egocentrism, and systematic cases of comparative pessimism were observed as predicted by the egocentric-processes account.     

Changing perception of average person's risk does not suffice to change perception of comparative risk

The direct method of assessing "unrealistic optimism" employs a question of the form, "Compared with the average person, what is the chance that event X will occur to you?" It has been proposed that when individuals construct their responses to this question (direct-estimates) they focus much more strongly on estimates of their own risk (self-estimates) than on estimates of the average person's risk (other-estimates). A challenge to this proposal comes from findings that interventions that alter other-estimates also change direct-estimates. Employing a novel intervention technique, we tested the possibility that such interventions may indirectly also change self-estimates and that this is what accounts for their effect on direct-estimates. Study 1 (n = 58) showed that an intervention which was designed to (and did) affect other-estimates also affected self-estimates, while Study 2 (n = 101) showed that it affected direct-estimates. Study 3 (n = 79) confirmed that we could modify the intervention so as to maintain the effect on other-estimates, but eliminate that on self-estimates. Study 4 (n = 112) demonstrated that when this was done, there was no longer any effect on direct-estimates. The findings are consistent with the proposal that direct-estimates are constructed largely just out of self-estimates. Implications for heath education programs are discussed.     

Why It Can't Happen to Me: The Base Rate Matters,But Overestimating Skill Leads to Underestimating Risk1

Undergraduates (N = 330) estimated their risk for aversive events (e.g., motor vehicle accident), in which we varied personal control (e.g., driver = self or other) and bogus base rates (high vs. low). Base rate data influenced risk estimates, but people underestimated their risk if they were the agent (e.g., the driver) rather than if another person was the agent. Justifications for estimates suggested that the base rate was perceived to be the risk for the average person. Most people then adjusted their estimates for a negative outcome downward because they believed that they were better than average on a skill (e.g., driving skill) that was perceived to be causally related to the event.     

Indian college students' attitudes toward abortion in different contexts

Two experimental studies used the hypothetical situation of a pregnant woman (the stimulus person) considering the possibility of an abortion and obtained from Bombay college students estimates of the likelihood of an abortion and their own recommendations in favor of abortion. The first study had a 2 (subject's sex) × 2 (reason for abortion: unplanned child vs. female child) × 2 (person more in favor of abortion: stimulus person vs. her husband) × 3 (stimulus person's socioeconomic status: upper, middle, or lower class) factorial design with 15 subjects per cell. Male subjects indicated greater likelihood of abortion than female subjects. Recommendations were stronger for the unplanned rather than female child and for the lower class rather than upper and middle class stimulus persons. The second study had a 2 (subject's sex) × 3 (reason for abortion: unplanned marital pregnancy, premarital pregnancy, or rape pregnancy) × 3 (stimulus person's socioeconomic status: upper, middle, or lower class) factorial design with 15 subjects per cell. Perceived likelihood and strength of recommendation were highest for rape pregnancy followed by premarital pregnancy and marital pregnancy in that order. The interactions in this study suggested a greater vulnerability of the middle class as compared to the other two classes with respect to sexual morality.     

Unrealistic optimism and perceived control: role of personal competence

This work analyzed the effects of unrealistic optimism in the interaction between the emotional valence of future events, the perception of control over these events, and the person with whom one compares oneself. It was hypothesized that, if the person of comparison is judged as very competent, a pessimistic bias should be produced. Likelihood of four different types of events (positive and controllable, positive and uncontrollable, negative and controllable, and negative and uncontrollable) were rated by 133 university students (22 men and 111 women) for themselves, for an average student, for their best friend, and for a bright friend. A pessimistic bias was observed on the relative likelihood of the events when the comparison was made between oneself and a competent and bright friend, when events were perceived as controllable, especially positive ones. Not enough is known, however, to provide meaningful interpretation at present; that must await further data and theoretical development.     

Appraisal of life change, depression, and illness in hardy and nonhardy women

A survey study of adult women was conducted to examine whether psychological hardiness buffers people against stressful life change through the appraisal and interpretation of life experiences. Hardy and nonhardy participants reported life events for the previous year, physical illness for the previous 6 months, and current levels of depression and rated each reported event in terms of its desirability. Results indicate that, although hardiness is not associated with the likelihood of reporting any specific life event, nonhardy subjects appraise a significantly higher proportion of their life experiences as undesirable than do hardy subjects and report that each negative event requires greater adjustment. Discussion focuses on nonhardiness as a correlate of the trait of negative affectivity rather than hardiness as a reflection of special resiliency to stress.     

Mood, motivation, and misinformation: aging and affective state influences on memory

Normative age differences in memory have typically been attributed to declines in basic cognitive and cortical mechanisms. The present study examined the degree to which dominant everyday affect might also be associated with age-related memory errors using the misinformation paradigm. Younger and older adults viewed a positive and a negative event, and then were exposed to misinformation about each event. Older adults exhibited a higher likelihood than young adults of falsely identifying misinformation as having occurred in the events. Consistent with expectations, strength of the misinformation effect was positively associated with dominant mood, and controlling for mood eliminated any age effects. Also, motivation to engage in complex cognitive activity was negatively associated with susceptibility to misinformation, and susceptibility was stronger for negative than for positive events. We argue that motivational processes underlie all of the observed effects, and that such processes are useful in understanding age differences in memory performance.     

Emotional reactivity to daily events in major and minor depression

Although emotional dysfunction is an important aspect of major depressive disorder (MDD), it has rarely been studied in daily life. Peeters, Nicolson, Berkhof, Delespaul, and deVries (2003) observed a surprising mood-brightening effect when individuals with MDD reported greater reactivity to positive events. To better understand this phenomenon, we conducted a multimethod assessment of emotional reactivity to daily life events, obtaining detailed reports of appraisals and event characteristics using the experience-sampling method and the Day Reconstruction Method (Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2004) in 35 individuals currently experiencing a major depressive episode, 26 in a minor depressive (mD) episode, and 38 never-depressed healthy controls. Relative to healthy controls, both mood-disordered groups reported greater daily negative affect and lower positive affect and reported events as less pleasant, more unpleasant, and more stressful. Importantly, MDD and mD individuals reported greater reductions in negative affect following positive events, an effect that converged across assessment methods and was not explained by differences in prevailing affect, event appraisals, or medications. Implications of this curious mood-brightening effect are discussed.     

Now I see it but you don't: 14-month-olds can represent another person's visual perspective

Twelve- and 14-month-old infants' ability to represent another person's visual perspective (Level-1 visual perspective taking) was studied in a looking-time paradigm. Fourteen-month-olds looked longer at a person reaching for and grasping a new object when the old goal-object was visible than when it was invisible to the person (but visible to the infant). These findings are consistent with the interpretation that infants 'rationalized' the person's reach for a new object when the old goal-object was out of sight. Twelve-month-olds did not distinguish between test conditions. The present findings are consistent with recent research on infants' developing understanding of seeing.     

Future-event schemas and certainty about the future: automaticity in depressives' future-event predictions.

The proposition was tested that depressives make predictions about the future based on a pessimistic future-event schema. Participants varying in depression predicted whether positive and negative events would happen to them (or to an average person) in the future by pressing yes or no at a computer terminal as quickly as possible, either under a concurrent attentional load or under no such load. As hypothesized, depressives predicted more negative events and fewer positive events than did mild depressives or nondepressives and showed greater automaticity in their predictions. That is, the attentional load did not increase depressives' response latencies for either negative or positive events, even though it did so reliably for both mildly depressed and nondepressed individuals. Depressives may thus possess a highly developed future-event schema that operates efficiently in enabling future-event predictions.     

Tragedy or tragicomedy: Mixed feelings induced by positive and negative emotional events

Based on the theory of appraisal, we predicted that positive and negative events happening to the same people or things in a specific chronological order (i.e., a negative event following a positive event) would induce different mixed feelings than the same events happening to different people or things. Pairs of emotional pictures with different captions were used to create two event groups. In the “tragic event” group, the positive and negative events happened to the same person or things, and in the “tragicomic event” group, the positive and negative events happened to different people or things. We designed two experiments to explore and compare the generation of mixed feelings in those two groups. In Experiment 1, the negative event was shown first, and in Experiment 2, the negative event was shown second (although the chronological order of the depicted events was the same). The participants were 381 undergraduates: 195 in Experiment 1 and 186 in Experiment 2. In both experiments, we found that tragic events introduced less intense mixed feelings than did tragicomic events due to fewer pleasurable feelings induced by the tragic events. There was no significant difference in the report of negative emotions between the groups. Appraisal theory and negative bias effects may explain these results.     

Sex differences in domain-specific depressogenic cognitive responses to negative and positive life events

Maladaptive cognitive responses to stressful life events represent well-replicated risk factors for depression. Research indicates that stressful life events that are dependent on the individual to occur or are interpersonal may generate more maladaptive cognitive responses than those that are independent and/or non-interpersonal. The current study examined the roles of sex and life event domains in eliciting depressogenic cognitive responses. Participants were 212 (71% female) undergraduate students who completed seven weekly questionnaires on participant-identified most negative and most positive life events over the previous 7 days. Additionally, participants reported levels of brooding and cognitive style in response to the most negative event and levels of positive rumination and dampening in response to the most positive event. Data were analyzed using mixed ANOVAs. Results indicated that females engaged in greater brooding regardless of event dependency. In addition, dependent and interpersonal life events generated greater brooding while dependent and non-interpersonal negative events generated greater negative cognitive style. An interaction between sex and domain was observed for dampening positive life events, such that males did not differ between interpersonal and non-interpersonal life events while females were more likely to dampen following interpersonal life events than non-interpersonal events.     

共患难,更同盟:共同经历相同负性情绪事件促进合作行为

4项实验探讨了共同经历相同负性情绪事件,相比单独经历负性情绪事件,是否以及如何促进了个体间的合作。实验1~3分别采用抽奖任务和瑞文推理测验任务操纵负性情绪事件,采用公共物品博弈任务测量合作行为,结果表明,共同经历相同负性情绪事件,相比单独经历负性情绪事件,促进了个体间的合作行为。实验2通过测量归属需要、社会联结和内群体认同,实验3通过操纵归属需要,来考察共同经历相同负性情绪事件促进合作行为的潜在机制,结果表明,共同经历者之间的合作行为受归属需要的驱动,而社会联结和内群体认同不足以对该现象进行解释。实验4通过操纵个体共同经历“相同”和“不同”的负性情绪事件,进一步厘清了,促进个体间的合作是由于“共同经历相同的负性情绪事件”而非“共同经历负性情绪”造成的。研究结果有利于解释小群体的形成,对群体和社会管理亦具有借鉴意义。     

Understanding the Relationship of Trauma,Substance Use,and Resilience Among Religiously Affiliated University Students

This study examined patterns of association between experiencing 12 traumatic life events, resilience, and substance use at a conservative church-affiliated university. The authors used data (N?=?278) from a Health Risk and Protective Factors Study that was conducted during the 2012 spring semester. Initial bivariate analysis indicated several significant positive and negative associations between three of the traumatic life event variables and alcohol, marijuana, and tobacco use within the past year and between two of the traumatic life event variables and alcohol use within the past 30 days. Preliminarily, resilience was only inversely associated with amphetamine use within the past year for men. When examined further using partial correlations to clarify these relationships while controlling for resilience, strong significant positive associations were found specifically between experiencing a disaster-type event and alcohol use within the past year and within the past 30 days for men only. Overall significant moderate positive associations were found between experiencing parental divorce and alcohol use within the past year, and between experiencing a disaster-type event and alcohol use within the past year and within the past 30 days. Use of two-way between-groups ANOVA found no significant interaction among these variables. Results may suggest that experiencing certain traumatic life events and male gender are more likely connected to alcohol use behaviors, whereas resilience may have multiple pathways for adaptive coping.     

Conditional Probabilities, Potential Surprise, and the Conjunction Fallacy

Tversky and Kahneman (1983) found that a relationship of positive conditional dependence between the components of a conjunction of two events increases the prevalence of the conjunction fallacy. Consistent with this finding, the results of two experiments reveal that dependence leads to higher estimates for the conjunctive probability and a higher incidence of the fallacy. However, contrary to the theoretical account proposed by Tversky and Kahneman, the actual magnitude of the conditional relationship does not directly affect the extent of the fallacy; all that is necessary is for a positive conditional relationship to exist. The pattern of results obtained can be accounted for in terms of Shackle's (1969) 'potential surprise' theory of subjective probability. Surprise theory predicts that the impact of the conditional event will be at its maximum where the relationship is a negative one. Tversky and Kahneman's model, on the other hand, predicts the maximum effect when the relationship is positive. In all 12 scenarios tested, multiple regression analysis revealed that the standardized beta weight associated with the conditional event was greater when the relationship was a negative one. Thus the outcome was supportive of the surprise model rather than Tversky and Kahneman's account.     

Age-related positivity effects and autobiographical memory detail: evidence from a past/future source memory task

This study investigated whether the age-related positivity effect strengthens specific event details in autobiographical memory. Participants retrieved past events or imagined future events in response to neutral or emotional cue words. Older adults rated each kind of event more positively than younger adults, demonstrating an age-related positivity effect. We next administered a source memory test. Participants were given the same cue words and tried to retrieve the previously generated event and its source (past or future). Accuracy on this source test should depend on the recollection of specific details about the earlier generated events, providing a more objective measure of those details than subjective ratings. We found that source accuracy was greater for positive than negative future events in both age groups, suggesting that positive future events were more detailed. In contrast, valence did not affect source accuracy for past events in either age group, suggesting that positive and negative past events were equally detailed. Although ageing can bias people to focus on positive aspects of experience, this bias does not appear to strengthen the availability of details for positive relative to negative past events.     

Age-related positivity effects and autobiographical memory detail: Evidence from a past/future source memory task

This study investigated whether the age-related positivity effect strengthens specific event details in autobiographical memory. Participants retrieved past events or imagined future events in response to neutral or emotional cue words. Older adults rated each kind of event more positively than younger adults, demonstrating an age-related positivity effect. We next administered a source memory test. Participants were given the same cue words and tried to retrieve the previously generated event and its source (past or future). Accuracy on this source test should depend on the recollection of specific details about the earlier generated events, providing a more objective measure of those details than subjective ratings. We found that source accuracy was greater for positive than negative future events in both age groups, suggesting that positive future events were more detailed. In contrast, valence did not affect source accuracy for past events in either age group, suggesting that positive and negative past events were equally detailed. Although ageing can bias people to focus on positive aspects of experience, this bias does not appear to strengthen the availability of details for positive relative to negative past events.     

On the emotions that accompany autobiographical memories: Dysphoria disrupts the fading affect bias

Participants in two studies recalled autobiographical events and reported both the affect experienced at event occurrence and the affect associated with event recollection. The intensity of affect associated with a recalled event generally decreased, but the affective fading was greater for negative events than for positive events. The magnitude of this fading affect bias also varied with participants' dysphoria levels: Dysphorics showed a smaller fading affect bias than non-dysphorics. Additional analyses suggested that the fading affect bias is not a product of: (1) distorted retrospective memory for the affect originally accompanying events; (2) differences in the initial affect intensity of positive and negative events; or (3) differences in the ages of positive and negative events. Other variables that might be related to the fading affect bias are discussed.     

Tell me who you are and I tell you how you feel: expected emotional reactions to success and failure are influenced by knowledge about a person's personality

The present research investigated the influence of knowledge about a person's modesty or arrogance on people's expectations regarding that person's emotional reactions to success and failure. Arrogance and modesty reflect the extent to which someone is likely to publicize their ability. Accordingly, we predicted that observers' expectations regarding a person's tendency to publicize their ability should inform expectations about the person's emotional reactions to success and failure. In two vignette studies, observers predicted the emotional state of a protagonist, as well as the probability that s/he will actually express that emotion and share the experience with others. For success, participants predicted a protagonist's pride, happiness, schadenfreude, and embarrassment if praised for a positive outcome. For failure, participants predicted anger, shame, guilt, sadness, and fear reactions. Across studies, personality information explained more variance than did gender or status. Results showed that the expectations for an arrogant person matched modal expectations for success, whereas for failure the expectations for the modest individual were closest to the modal expectations. Specifically, both modest and arrogant individuals were expected to suppress emotions that do not fit their self-presentational styles rather than to exaggerate expressions that do. This paper adds to our understanding of the information that people use to predict others' emotional reactions.